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Foreword
Ever since assuming the position of Additional Secretary and Director 
General, Central Government Health Scheme, in the Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare in September 2010, I have observed firsthand the 
opportunities and challenges facing health financing in India. Despite 
recent gains, the country still struggles with low levels of population cov-
erage and financial protection, poor outcomes, but rapidly rising costs. 
Since Independence, the health financing scenario in the public sphere 
has not changed much. It consists of mostly central government public 
health programs, state-financed service delivery systems, and insurance 
schemes for formal sector workers and civil servants. Reflecting low levels 
of public spending, out-of-pocket spending at the point of service sur-
passes all other sources of financing, suggesting that much more needs to 
be done to ensure more equal access to health care and suitable financial 
protection. 
This book fills a critical knowledge gap by providing an in-depth 
analysis of a relatively new, but promising health financing modality: 
government health insurance schemes. La Forgia and Nagpal dissect the 
nine largest schemes with considerable detail and accuracy, focusing on a 
new crop of schemes that emerged in the last few years and are directed 
toward protecting the poorest segments of Indian society. The authors 
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finely probe these schemes, uncovering their progress, potential, and 
shortcomings. Arguably, these recent arrivals represent a pioneering—at 
least in the Indian context—but still emerging platform that can be one 
of the key tools for achieving India’s stated goal of universal health cover-
age. However, finishing the job started will be more difficult. In this 
respect, the authors make a significant contribution by specifying the 
operational changes that will be required to transform them into more 
robust platforms for contributing to universal coverage. Policy makers and 
planners should pay close attention to these recommendations.
The road ahead will not be easy. In preparation for the 12th Five Year 
Plan (2012–17), the central government is planning to significantly 
increase public spending on health to spearhead the march toward uni-
versal coverage. This is certainly a welcome initiative, considering the 
historically low levels of government financing for health. But it is not 
only a question of giving the health system more money. How best to 
spend these new resources to secure more effective services is also an 
issue that needs to be addressed. These health insurance schemes can 
spearhead changes in the broader system of finance and delivery at the 
tertiary and secondary levels in the march toward universal coverage. 
How to direct the new funding is already the subject of intense debate. 
For example, some call for expanding public delivery systems operated by 
the states while others call for extending coverage through government-
sponsored health insurance. This may be a false dichotomy, and the 
authors intelligently avoid this trap. What is clear is that the country can 
ill afford to move ahead on parallel tracks—expanding financing of both 
the demand and supply sides without a clear notion of coordination and 
future convergence. To their credit, La Forgia and Nagpal recommend a 
blended approach, one that strengthens the links of government health 
insurance to public delivery but ties funding to performance. Yet the 
authors maintain the essential and innovative features pioneered by this 
new generation of health insurance schemes in terms of patient choice 
of provider, private participation, defined (and delivered) benefits, and 
the separation of purchasing from provision. This approach is well 
grounded in current Indian reality but also draws on international experi-
ence. Clearly, there is a huge role for the public delivery system in India, 
but it needs a shot in the arm, in terms of both financing and incentives 
for improved performance. This book provides the analytic basis and 
policy recommendations for reorienting how India pays for and delivers 
health care, connecting the dots between the supply- and demand-side 
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approaches. By doing so, this book strengthens the hand of those seeking 
to reform the health system. 
I have enjoyed reading this publication, and stand amply informed 
about the intricacies of the current crops of schemes, the context in 
which they operate, and the opportunities and challenges they face. I am 
sure that other readers of this book will also echo my thoughts. I do look 
forward to continued efforts from all stakeholders on the recommenda-
tions made in this book, and also to reading more such analytical pieces 
that create and share new knowledge on the Indian health insurance 
schemes. 
L.C. Goyal
Additional Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, and 
Director General, Central Government Health Scheme
Government of India
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Preface
In response to a formal request from India’s Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare (MOHFW), the World Bank undertook research on the 
country’s major central and state government-sponsored health insurance 
schemes (GSHISs). Their organizational design features, spending, 
impacts, challenges, and potential for contributing to the achievement of 
universal coverage were assessed. This book presents the first comprehen-
sive and systematic review of all major GSHISs operating in India. The 
analytical focus, however, is on the GSHISs launched since 2007. These 
schemes targeted poor populations.
This book reports the findings from three central-level schemes and six 
state schemes. The central schemes include the Employees’ State Insurance 
Scheme (ESIS), Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) scheme, and 
Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS). At the state level, the 
schemes include the Rajiv Aarogyasri (Andhra Pradesh, AP), Yeshasvini, 
(Karnataka, KA), Vajpayee Arogyashri (Karnataka, KA), Kalaignar1 
(Tamil Nadu, TN), RSBY Plus (Himachal Pradesh, HP), and the proposed 
Apka Swasthya Bima Yojana (Delhi). 
1 In 2011–12, the scheme was modified to include additional procedures and relaunched as 
the Chief Minister’s Comprehensive Health Insurance Scheme, and the executing agency 
serving the scheme also changed.
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In the Indian context, this veritable wave of new GSHISs represents 
an alternative form of mobilizing and allocating government resources for 
health care. Prior to the appearance of these schemes, nearly all public 
financing was directed to the government-owned and -operated service 
delivery system to support an implicit (and often undelivered) benefits 
package. The poor were often faced with steep out-of-pocket spending to 
resolve their health needs in both public and private facilities.
In an environment challenged by low public financing for health, 
entrenched accountability issues in the public delivery system, and the 
persistent predominance of out-of-pocket spending, particularly by the 
poor, GSHISs have introduced a new set of arrangements to govern, allo-
cate, and manage the use of public resources for health, including an 
explicit (and delivered) package of services, greater accountability for 
results, and a “built-in” bottom-up design to reach universal coverage by 
first covering the poor. These arrangements are promising foundations for 
reaching a positive consensus on reforming India’s health finance and 
delivery system. 
The remainder of the preface summarizes the main findings reported 
in this book in the form of responses to frequently asked questions on 
GSHISs. 
Design and Organizational Features of GSHISs
How many families or individuals are covered under the GSHISs? Which 
key population groups are covered and how does that vary from scheme to 
scheme? In 2010, about 240 million Indians were covered by GSHISs, 
about 19 percent of the population, including smaller schemes not 
reviewed in this report. Accounting for private insurance and other 
schemes, more than 300 million people, more than 25 percent of the 
population, have access to some form of health insurance. The newer 
schemes target populations living below the poverty line (BPL)2 and the 
informal sector, but the way BPL lists are defined varies across schemes. 
RSBY, as well as state schemes in HP and Delhi, uses the BPL lists based 
on central government Planning Commission criteria; the states of AP and 
2 The poverty line was established by the GOI and has been defined on the basis of the money 
required to buy food worth 2,100 calories in urban areas and 2,400 calories in rural areas. 
However, states use a variety of parameters to determine their own poverty lines, including 
land holding, type of house, clothing, food security, sanitation, consumer durables, literacy 
status, labor force, means of livelihood, status of children, type of indebtedness, reasons for 
migrations, and so forth. 
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TN use the more extensive state BPL lists for their respective schemes. In 
effect, these latter states have extended coverage to the “vulnerable” poor, 
covering (in theory) nearly 80 percent and 50 percent of their respective 
populations. ESIS covers formal private sector employees earning up to 
Rs. 15,0003 per month and their dependents; CGHS covers central-level 
civil servants residing in 25 notified4 cities.
What is the depth of benefit coverage under the publicly funded GSHISs 
for the poor, and how does that compare with costs per beneficiary per year 
under these schemes? The new generation of GSHISs aims to provide 
financial protection to the poor against catastrophic health shocks. For 
these schemes, “catastrophic” is invariably defined in terms of inpatient 
care. RSBY focuses mostly on secondary care; most state schemes empha-
size tertiary care. Most of the newer schemes demonstrate a strong 
emphasis on surgical procedures. Ambulatory care is largely uncovered 
except for limited coverage as part of an inpatient episode. Nevertheless, 
significant variations in the depth of benefit coverage exist as evidenced 
by the wide range of “inpatient treatment packages” covered by the 
schemes. Most schemes limit their exposure through annual family caps, 
ranging from Rs. 30,000 for RSBY to Rs. 150,000 for the AP scheme. The 
older programs, ESIS and CGHS, are the only ones to provide coverage 
for a comprehensive benefits package that includes preventive and pri-
mary care services, and also do not have annual caps. 
The depth of coverage is reflected in per beneficiary costs, ranging 
from Rs. 5,333 in CGHS to Rs. 180 for RSBY. CGHS offers open-ended, 
comprehensive coverage with no overall cap and relatively few restric-
tions on services. RSBY’s low costs also reflect its secondary inpatient 
focus, a low annual spending cap, and conservatively priced packaged 
rates. The beneficiary costs of the state schemes that emphasize tertiary 
care (TN, KA, and AP) have roughly similar per beneficiary costs, varying 
between Rs. 148 and Rs. 183, reflecting a combination of low utilization 
frequency and the higher package rates common to these state schemes.
How much is being spent on publicly funded health insurance schemes and 
how does it fit within India’s existing health financing system? How does it 
relate to the expenditure for public delivery? For NRHM? In 2009–10, these 
nine GSHISs spent an estimated 5,800 crores,5 about 8 percent of total 
3 For all Rupee data presented in this book, US$1 = Rs. 45.
4 Notified areas are geographical areas where ESIS has sufficient capacity to provide the 
services contained in the benefits package. Nearly all cities with a population of 1 million 
or more are notified areas.
5 One crore is equivalent to Rs. 10,000,000, roughly US$204,000 in October 2011.   
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government health expenditure. Including private, community, and other 
insurance spending that same year, total spending on health insurance 
accounted for Rs. 160 billion (Rs. 16,000 crores), 6.4 percent of the esti-
mated total health expenditure of Rs. 2.5 trillion in 2009–10. To illus-
trate, GSHISs accounted, respectively, for 24 and 5.6 percent of GOI and 
KA own health expenditure in 2008–09. 
These contributions represent additional spending to supply-side subsi-
dies. The government direct delivery system, including GOI’s flagship pro-
gram, NRHM, and state health directorates, continues to account for about 
nine-tenths of the public health spending in the country. Nevertheless, 
GSHISs have an increasing share of the incremental public spending on 
health, reflecting strong political support for these schemes and a corre-
sponding budgetary commitment. 
What do the utilization data of these schemes show with respect to the 
frequency of claims, disease patterns, and trends over time? Utilization rates 
vary significantly with the depth of benefit coverage, scheme maturity, 
and other factors such as the provider payment mechanism used (dis-
cussed below). Schemes in AP, TN, and KA (Vajpayee Arogyashri) pro-
vide coverage for low-frequency, high-cost tertiary care only, and their 
hospitalization frequency is thus the lowest among the schemes under 
study. They are not comparable with community averages, which are 
based on all types of inpatient stays. Consequently, their utilization rates 
are significantly lower (about 5 hospitalizations for 1,000 beneficiaries 
per year) than the inpatient utilization rates generated for these states 
from the National Sample Survey (NSS) data (between 22 and 37 hospi-
talizations per 1,000 inhabitants per year). However, Yeshasvini (in KA) 
covers mostly secondary care but also some tertiary care. RSBY covers 
mostly high-frequency secondary hospital care. Frequency of hospitaliza-
tion for these two schemes is significantly higher, 22 and 25 admissions, 
respectively, per 1,000 beneficiaries per year and is more or less compa-
rable to national community averages. 
Responding to likely adverse selection (which is expected in a volun-
tary context) and possible moral hazard, as well as the lack of adequate 
cost-containment mechanisms, utilization rates for private voluntary 
insurance dwarf those of GSHISs. Similar to RSBY and Yeshasvini, private 
insurers generally cover both secondary and tertiary inpatient care, but 
their members display a much higher frequency of hospitalization at 
about 64 admissions per 1,000 per year. 
How do the GSHISs pay the health care providers and how is it different 
from past practices? All schemes studied here use a system of “package rates” 
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for paying their networked providers for inpatient services. ESIS and CGHS 
also use line-item budgets and salaries for their own facilities and staff, 
respectively. A package rate is a simplified case rate consisting of a single fee 
or close-ended payment for a set of inputs and services for a specific and 
predefined treatment or procedure. Package rates offer several advantages. 
They are easy to administer, are less complicated or subjective than an open-
ended fee-for-service arrangement, and, in principle, can contain costs if the 
rates are set at or near costs. They can limit the liability of the schemes (as 
payers) and may motivate efficiency improvements among providers—if 
priced correctly. Importantly, providers do not receive a payment unless 
they provide the treatment, which has an advantage over budgetary-based 
payment systems in which payments are not linked to outputs. But package 
rates also represent a huge advantage over itemized fee-for-service payment 
mechanisms applied by most private insurers. The latter method of payment 
is a known driver of cost escalation.
What is the role of health insurance companies in these schemes? 
Inasmuch as most GSHISs are in their early years, nearly all have yet to 
develop the institutional architecture to ensure robust governance and 
management. All the newer schemes use intermediary agencies, such as 
commercial insurers and third-party administrators (TPAs), to perform 
most managerial functions on their behalf. To be sure, the rapid strides in 
the commercial health insurance industry in recent years have made 
insurers’ capacity (e.g., technological acumen, management experience, 
professional manpower) available to GSHISs for performing functions 
such as provider network management, administration of preauthoriza-
tion processes, claim processing, information management, and so forth. 
These managerial contributions would have been inconceivable a decade 
earlier. Government systems still lack both the incentives and capacities 
to perform these functions. Of the two shortcomings, lack of incentives 
may be more difficult to surmount. The new generation of GSHISs has 
been able to effectively leverage available private capacity, creating a 
model of engaging with private insurers and private providers that is 
unique to India. A case can be made that the use of insurers as interme-
diaries may be useful in the short to medium term because they have 
incentives to check provider and beneficiary behaviors that negatively 
impact their bottom line. 
What design and control features for reducing fraud and moral hazard 
have been built into these schemes? Not surprisingly, evidence is emerg-
ing of cases of induced demand, illegitimate charges, and fraud (e.g., 
false claims, ghost patients, claim bundling). To detect and contain 
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these abuses, schemes require control systems in three domains: con-
stant vigilance over claims data, reviews of preauthorization requests, 
and physical verification of beneficiaries undergoing  treatment. They 
also need grievance and feedback systems for patients and providers. 
Some schemes have implemented sound vigilance measures along 
these lines with varying degrees of sophistication. Others appear to be 
in reaction mode, responding to press reports or random beneficiary 
complaints. Few schemes systematically or proactively implement 
fraud-detection measures. Nevertheless, when detected, there is a 
noticeable tendency to deal with unethical practices or unwarranted 
treatment. Many schemes have disempaneled hospitals as a disciplinary 
action after investigation confirmed such complaints. For example, as 
of September 2010, RSBY, AP, and Yeshasvini had disempaneled 54, 
67, and 58 hospitals, respectively. Whether these actions have decreased 
the incidence of such practices is unknown, but enforcement of rules 
and policies is a good sign.
What are the GSHIS linkages to the public delivery system? Most 
GSHISs are marginally linked to the public delivery system, and most 
networked hospitals are private. Particularly for the tertiary-focused 
state GSHISs, one of the main reasons to initiate these schemes was the 
limited capacity in the public sector to provide tertiary care. The actual 
share of private hospitals in service utilization may be larger than 
implied by the quantum of networked hospitals since most beneficiaries 
choose private facilities when seeking care. For example, in the AP, TN, 
and KA schemes, most network facilities are private hospitals, which, 
ranked by number of admissions, are also predominant among the top 20 
facilities. However, a few public medical colleges and public autonomous 
hospitals were also included among the top 20 hospitals for Vajpayee 
Arogyashri, Yeshasvini, and Rajiv Aarogyasri. Nevertheless, barring these 
few large, tertiary public institutions, many other public hospitals 
empaneled by the schemes, especially district and subdistrict hospitals, 
saw little or none of the insurance traffic. This is particularly the case for 
the tertiary-focused schemes. The exceptions to this observation include 
public hospital utilization in Kerala (under RSBY) and the linkages for 
referral from public facilities in AP. Under current governance and insti-
tutional arrangements, most public hospitals are in no position to com-
pete with private facilities. Few have the autonomy or flexibility to 
manage their own affairs. They are entirely dependent on the hierarchi-
cal control of state health authorities for nearly all budgetary and input 
decisions. 
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Opportunities
What are the major strengths of the schemes? GSHISs are  well-positioned 
to become key stakeholders in policy decisions regarding health financing 
and delivery arrangements. GSHISs hold the potential to spearhead 
reforms in the public delivery system through strengthening accountabil-
ity for results by linking financing to outputs. In addition to the gains in 
coverage and financing, taken together, the schemes introduced a demand-
side purchasing approach to public financing while embracing several 
innovative features—at least for the Indian context. These include:
• Defined (and delivered) entitlements 
• Separation of purchasing from financing 
• Targeting of low-income groups 
• Impressive use of information and communication technology, includ-
ing electronic beneficiary registration and utilization tracking 
• Patient choice of providers 
• Package rates for provider payment
• Extensive engagement with the private sector in the areas of insurance, 
administration, and delivery. 
Strong political interest in health insurance is evident, especially at 
the state level, and is a driver of expansion of population coverage, 
extension of benefits, and increased public expenditures for health. 
This is clearly observed in KA, TN, and AP where political leaders have 
extended coverage to non-BPL populations and have managed to reach 
50 to 80 percent of the population in the latter two states. Other states 
such as HP and Kerala are seeking to deepen the benefits package for 
the BPL population already enrolled in RSBY beyond the standard 
RSBY offering. Kerala has also extended RSBY coverage to the non-
BPL population at the state’s cost. Political ownership at the state level 
has been an important lever for sustainability, and to date, there is no 
evidence of this support ebbing. Political support from the central gov-
ernment as well as from participating states for RSBY coverage and its 
expansion is also strong. This is evidenced by the inclusion of new 
groups of beneficiaries (such as NREGA beneficiaries, construction 
workers, railway baggage handlers, and vendors working in railway sta-
tions). Significantly, GSHISs have been a driver for increasing public 
financing for health from state governments. For example, some state 
governments appear more likely to increase health financing if funds 
are directed through insurance schemes.
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Future Directions and Potential Impacts of GSHISs
How will India’s health insurance sector change over the next few years and 
how might it look in 2015 in terms of its size, composition, and spending? 
In light of current trends, and assuming continued political and financial 
support from government, insurance coverage can be expected (perhaps 
conservatively) to exceed 630 million persons (50 percent of the popula-
tion) by 2015. Most of the growth is likely to occur along three lines: 
RSBY, commercial insurance, and state-sponsored schemes. GSHIS cover-
age will likely more than double, from 243 million in 2009–10 to nearly 
530 million in 2015. By then, RSBY aims to reach 60 million families 
(roughly 300 million members) and will account for most of the growth 
in GSHISs. State schemes such as Vajpayee Arogyashri (KA) will con-
tinue to expand, while population growth will also add new members to 
other GSHISs. 
Turning to expenditures, spending through health insurance mecha-
nisms will continue to increase at an estimated overall compounded 
annual growth rate of 19 percent per annum, reaching Rs. 38,000 crores 
(Rs. 380 billion) by 2015. GSHISs will account for about 40 percent of 
the total; commercial insurers will represent most of the remainder 
(excluding their GSHIS business). In 2015, spending through health 
insurance will reach 8.4 percent of total health spending, up from 
6.4 percent in 2009–10. 
Several states are expected to introduce schemes over the next five 
years that will further add to coverage and spending. Other factors will 
also drive coverage expansion and expenditure growth. For example, there 
will be pressure to expand coverage to non-BPL but vulnerable poor and 
to deepen the benefit coverage, as already observed in several state 
schemes. RSBY is piloting a program for ambulatory care coverage, and 
continued experimentation with extending benefit coverage to a subset 
of ambulatory services is expected.
What is the impact of these insurance schemes on budgetary support for 
public health facilities and primary care? Is the money being spent on GSHISs 
duplicating what is being spent on the public health system? State health 
department officials openly worry that their budgets may be negatively 
affected by the expansion of government-sponsored insurance. However, 
there is no evidence that public subsidies are being “converted” from the 
supply to the demand side. Government contributions to GSHISs appear 
to represent additional funds for health. Without the presence of these 
schemes, it is difficult to say whether these additional funds would have 
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been directed to public delivery or would have stayed outside the health 
sector itself. Also, most state schemes were created to address public sup-
ply constraints at the secondary and tertiary levels. Nevertheless, some 
schemes have shown an intent to improve the capacity of public provi-
sion beyond what was available in the public health system. For example, 
schemes in Kerala and AP have provided the public hospitals with an 
additional source of financing that has been used to upgrade infrastruc-
ture and introduce new services.
Is there any information on the impact of the GSHISs on access to and uti-
lization of health services? What about issues of moral hazard? Available 
utilization data suggest that insurance coverage has resulted in higher uti-
lization of covered services among beneficiaries. However, impact on 
utilization is best measured through beneficiary and household surveys 
applying rigorous methodologies.
Recent evaluation data from the Yeshasvini scheme show that affilia-
tion (and the resulting financial access) resulted in increased utilization—
a utilization rate of between 6 percent and 7 percent higher among 
insured members than among their uninsured peers. Since both groups 
were matched for health status, it was unlikely that adverse selection had 
caused this higher utilization. Lower-income members increased utiliza-
tion by a still significant 2 percent. 
Research using administrative data identified some factors that affect 
utilization. In an analysis of 16,000 claims in 2007 and 2008 from 
R. Aarogyasri (AP), distance from cities where most empaneled facilities 
demanded by the beneficiaries were located was found to be negatively 
associated with utilization. Similarly, in an analysis of RSBY claims data 
from 75 districts, the authors reported that utilization was related to the 
distance between blocks and the towns where empaneled hospitals are 
located. Nevertheless, other factors that increased the probability of uti-
lization were detected through regression analysis of the claims data from 
18 districts (3,600 villages): being elderly, being literate, residing in a dis-
trict with a large number of empaneled hospitals, having access to trans-
portation, and living in a village where other insured villagers have 
already been treated through the scheme. 
Is there any evidence of impact on reducing financial burden or reducing 
out-of-pocket payments? A major objective common to all schemes is to 
reduce the financial burden of health spending on the poor. From the fact 
that all schemes are cashless (or nearly so) and provide coverage for 
 hospitalization, a case can be made that they have reduced the financial 
burden on the poor, at least for the covered inpatient services. However, 
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as in the case of access and utilization, impacts on financial burden are 
best measured through rigorous evaluations.
Analyses of household data from two schemes provide insights into 
their effects on household spending. The authors of an impact evaluation 
of the Yeshasvini scheme in Karnataka involving a large survey of mem-
bers matched beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries to compare their bor-
rowing behavior to pay for inpatient surgical care. They reported a 
30 percent reduction in such borrowing among low-income beneficiaries 
compared with nonenrollees and a 36 percent drop for higher-income 
members. Payments that drew from sources other than borrowings (e.g., 
income, savings) increased by 74 percent for all sampled beneficiaries. 
The authors concluded that the scheme had a significant price reduction 
effect, but only for surgical care. An evaluation of the impact of 
Aarogyasri on out-of-pocket health spending during a 12-month period 
subsequent to the rollout of Phase 1 of the program found that house-
holds significantly reduced inpatient spending (in absolute terms and as 
a share of household consumption and catastrophic spending). 
Households participating in Phase 1 also significantly reduced the prob-
ability of having any out-of-pocket health spending. The results demon-
strate that Aarogyasri provided financial protection for inpatient care, 
which is the main focus of the scheme. Whether these financial benefits 
are evident in other schemes remains an open question and requires 
further rigorous evaluation.
Operational Challenges
What are the GSHISs doing to address issues related to the quality of health 
care delivered by their providers? The schemes are not yet using their finan-
cial leverage to improve the quality of their network providers. Hospital 
empanelment, the main form of quality control of providers, normally 
focuses on assessing the structural aspects of quality. It is not a rigorous 
process. Also, there is little evidence of follow-up inspections or recertifi-
cation. Empanelment information is usually stored in manual form and is 
neither analyzed nor reevaluated. Some schemes (e.g., AP Aarogyasri) 
have created special posts to oversee empanelment and monitor quality, 
but the functions are concentrated on collecting  information and reacting 
to complaints and grievances about hospitals and beneficiaries. Quality 
and patient safety information is not demanded or collected from provid-
ers. Providers have few incentives to improve  standards of care or insti-
tute quality-improvement measures. 
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What are the GSHISs doing in terms of data collection, monitoring, and 
analysis and what information is provided to beneficiaries? A few schemes 
have recently made strides in strengthening monitoring systems, but the 
general weakness of these systems and dearth of data and analysis under-
lie all issues. Most schemes have yet to develop robust systems to monitor 
insurer, TPA, and provider performance regularly. This situation impedes 
their effectiveness in buying services, selectively contracting providers, 
supervising and assessing performance (e.g., insurers, TPAs, and provid-
ers), gauging beneficiary trust and satisfaction, and systematically correct-
ing emerging problems. Two schemes have only recently planned for 
impact evaluations. 
Beneficiaries appear to have insufficient information on enrolment, 
benefits, and providers. Inadequate information on covered and uncov-
ered procedures can result in denials of preauthorization as well as out-
of-pocket expenses for beneficiaries. Most consumers lack the information 
on provider performance (e.g., quality, patient satisfaction, volume) that 
would allow them to make well-informed choices. 
To what extent do GSHISs implement sound purchasing and contracting 
practices? At their current state of development, schemes tend to focus 
on ascertaining admissibility of a claim under coverage rules and the 
preagreed package rates, and on simple reimbursement of validated 
claims to the treating hospitals. Scant attention has been given to pur-
chasing and contracting functions to maximize insurers’ and network 
providers’ performance. Invariably a scheme contracts a single insurer for 
a demarcated geographical area (state or district), and in the absence of 
performance-based contracting instruments, insurers are driven by their 
own incentives, which may not dovetail with scheme objectives. 
Similarly, schemes have yet to take advantage of their financial leverage 
to motivate providers to improve their quality, efficiency, patient safety, 
and satisfaction. 
Are GSHISs doing enough to control costs? Insurers under contract with 
the schemes have incentives to check provider and beneficiary behaviors 
that negatively impact their bottom line. However, they face weak incen-
tives to control costs over the long term. Because schemes’ contracts with 
insurers are short term, insurers can reprice the premium or exit the 
market when costs rise rather than invest in long-term cost containment. 
Similarly, although package rates are a significant advancement over item-
ized fee-for-service payments in their ability to contain costs, package 
rates have not been systematically based on underlying costs or market 
prices and need improvement. Significant strengthening is needed in such 
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managerial cost-containment measures as claims analysis, preauthoriza-
tion, provider profiling, utilization review, use of generic drugs, and chan-
neling a high patient volume to low-cost, high-volume providers. 
What are the schemes doing to control provider behaviors? How are 
GSHISs affecting the provider market? Package rates and preauthorization 
processes have helped rein in the delivery of unnecessary care, but pro-
viders still have incentives to induce demand for unneeded care and 
substitute inpatient for outpatient treatment. Although scheme managers 
and policy makers are cognizant of these problems, efforts to detect, con-
trol, and penalize such behaviors need to be intensified.
Further, a case can be made that current schemes stimulate a hospital-
centric delivery system—already obsolete in most industrialized countries 
and, in the long term, unaffordable, ineffective, and unsustainable in dealing 
with a large burden of chronic disease that is emerging in India. In addition, 
to enable greater access, the schemes have prescribed a low minimum num-
ber of beds required for empanelment. This may be  promoting the expan-
sion of small hospitals that barely meet the empanelment criteria, and 
where clinical management may be too meager and volume too small to 
offer high-quality care.
How sound are governance arrangements and managerial systems? 
Because most GSHISs are in their early years, few have yet developed the 
institutional architecture to ensure robust governance and management. 
Although nearly all the GSHISs studied here have established governing 
agencies that are legally autonomous from the government department 
that creates and oversees this agency, formal arrangements for periodic 
consultations with key stakeholders are generally absent. Schemes rely 
heavily on insurers and TPAs for most managerial functions, but insuffi-
ciently monitor fulfillment of these tasks. Most GSHISs lack the staff and 
management tools to act as effective agents for their beneficiaries.
What is the interface between the GOI and state schemes? Even though 
health is constitutionally a state subject, how this mandate should be 
applied to health insurance is unclear. Although the GOI flagship RSBY 
scheme has successfully rolled out in a large number of states, it has not 
progressed on the issue of integration with state government-sponsored 
schemes. In at least one state, RSBY is implemented in one set of districts 
while a state-sponsored scheme is implemented in another set. The 
schemes are already beginning to overlap in some districts. In other states, 
RSBY has not begun its operations because central and state authorities 
have not agreed on common ground for integration with state-sponsored 
health insurance schemes. Differences related to the definition of BPL 
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status, benefits packages, price structures, coverage caps, empanelment 
criteria, and lack of portability of state schemes have hampered scheme 
mergers into an integrated state-based insurance system. Nevertheless, 
some states (HP, Kerala, and Delhi) have elected to try a “top-off” model 
that uses RSBY as the base coverage while the state finances a deeper 
tertiary coverage exceeding RSBY-covered services.
Policy Recommendations
What are the major short- and medium-term policy recommendations 
emerging from the study, who will need to address them, and when? GSHISs 
can serve as change agents for overcoming financing and delivery obsta-
cles to achieving universal coverage. By pioneering new ways of doing 
business in terms of financing, payment, and managing and delivering 
care, the current crop of GSHISs can also facilitate reform of the dom-
inant fee-for-service system used by private providers, as well as the 
budget-based, public direct delivery system. However, GSHISs will first 
need to address the above-mentioned operational challenges and design 
constraints. 
GSHISs, in close coordination with the related government agencies, 
should implement the following series of measures over a two-year 
period. 
• Promote governance and coordination.
• Strengthen purchasing and contracting practices.
• Reinforce cost containment by consolidating the GSHISs’ purchasing 
power, reforming provider payment mechanisms, and strengthening 
utilization management and control systems.
• Establish robust monitoring and data use.
• Fix targeting mechanisms.
• Introduce quality-based purchasing.
• Expand public hospital autonomy.
• Strengthen the collection and dissemination of consumer information.
A number of recommendations to be implemented over the medium 
term are also proposed to improve current financing and delivery arrange-
ments and make them work together to contribute to universal coverage. 
Overall, a reorientation is sought in the current configuration of health 
financing and service delivery, using the building blocks laid by the new 
generation of GSHISs as well as the NRHM. The recommendations 
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 outline pragmatic and affordable pathways to achieving universal cover-
age based on realistic assumptions of fiscal capacity, the current configura-
tion of health financing and delivery arrangements, lessons and innovations 
from GSHISs, and international experience. Most can be implemented 
over a five-year period and could be included in India’s forthcoming 12th 
Five Year Plan for economic development.
The proposal consists of developing and implementing:
(1)  The GOI-financed standard benefits package of secondary and maternity 
care for the BPL population. The proposal builds upon RSBY design 
and implementation experience. The package would contain services 
currently covered under RSBY—mostly secondary and maternity 
care. It would therefore provide coverage against many (but not all) 
frequent and financially catastrophic hospitalization events. Similar to 
RSBY, the benefits would be fully subsidized, portable across India, 
and directed to the BPL population.
(2)  The GOI-financed standard ambulatory package for the BPL population, 
delivered through the existing primary care system. This would also 
strengthen ties between the GSHISs and the public delivery system for 
referral for inpatient services and follow-up care after discharge. Three 
approaches are outlined: (a) package payments for defined periods of 
postdischarge, follow-up care (e.g., consultation, diagnostics, and drugs) 
for insured patients, which can be provided in government primary 
health centers (PHCs), community health centers (CHCs), and other 
contracted primary care providers; (b) capitation and package payments 
for defined bundles of primary care services that are tied to performance 
in government PHCs/CHCs (such as antenatal care package, infant care 
package, diabetes management package); nongovernmental organiza-
tions can also be contracted under this arrangement to deliver primary 
services in localities with no, or inadequate, governmental services; and 
(c) standard outpatient insurance “product” bought from insurers for 
care provided by public and private outpatient clinics and hospitals. 
(3)  State-financed “top-off” benefits for the BPL population. States can be 
incentivized to offer an expanded set of tertiary care benefits beyond 
the coverage under the GOI-financed common package, aimed at the 
BPL group but drawing on states’ own resources according to their 
fiscal capacity. Similar to the GOI-financed common package, the 
benefits would be fully subsidized (e.g., cashless) for BPL populations 
without any premium contributions or cost sharing when using ser-
vices. The GOI and states may draw on the utilization experience of 
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the existing state-sponsored top-off and tertiary-care schemes to 
guide the design of the benefits package.
(4)  State-financed “contributory” point of service package for the vulnerable 
non-BPL population. This recommendation involves offering a “con-
tributory” point of service scheme for the vulnerable non-BPL group. 
This group may not be the poorest in the population, but it is finan-
cially vulnerable to health shocks and generally seeks care from pri-
vate providers, paying out-of-pocket for nearly all services. Several 
states already classify this “vulnerable” population as poor, but pov-
erty data suggest that they do have some capacity to pay for care. 
Ideally, this scheme’s benefits can consist of an integrated offering of 
the aforementioned standard (secondary and maternity), ambulatory 
care, and “top-off” (tertiary care) packages. 
    The administrative costs of collecting from the informal sector are 
expected to be high, and the collection procedure, complex. The collec-
tion procedure is also likely to result in incomplete uptake and adverse 
selection. Therefore, no upfront collection of contributions from this 
group is recommended. Potential beneficiaries would be enrolled free of 
cost (or automatically) as in the case of the BPL population. They would 
“contribute” only when seeking care, by making copayments for the 
claim costs at the point of service, namely, the hospital. Depending on 
their fiscal capacity, states could consider a 30 to 70 percent subsidy of 
the package costs for this vulnerable group. Because this state subsidy is 
applied to the already negotiated (and discounted) package rates, it 
would effectively lower out-of-pocket spending to a small fraction of 
the fee-for-service market prices which the intended beneficiaries would 
incur without it. This would be a strong incentive to enroll. The feasibil-
ity of this scheme, however, will depend on improvements in targeting 
and separation of BPL from the vulnerable non-BPL group.
What would be the institutional arrangements for the proposed schemes? 
GOI would establish a governance agency to support all GSHISs. This 
autonomous national umbrella agency would coordinate, monitor, evalu-
ate, and provide technical support to all government-sponsored schemes, 
including the preparation of guidelines, policies, statutes, information 
technology systems, and operating instructions and manuals. Each state 
would administer the multiple components of the proposed coverage as 
part of an integrated, state-executed insurance system, including the 
pooling of risks, purchasing of services, and direct monitoring of providers 
and beneficiaries. Thus, services for all schemes would be bought from a 
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common, state-based platform through this independent state agency 
wherein the states make all “operational” rules and set requirements. 
Having a single, integrated purchasing platform would build purchasing 
power and enforcement power for common pricing and quality criteria. 
How much would the implementation of the proposed measures cost? 
Assuming all of the recommended packages, including the optional point-
of-service scheme, are introduced in all states by 2015, and the primary 
care incentive is kept at Rs. 500 per family per year, the total incremental 
cost is estimated to reach Rs. 38,400 crores, accounting for an additional 
22 percent of projected total government health expenditure in that 
same year. This amount would represent a little less than 0.4 percent of 
the country’s projected GDP in 2015. It is not unduly large relative to the 
recent growth trends in public health expenditure, and it is well within 
the stated commitment of the GOI to raise the share of public health 
spending to between 2 percent and 3 percent of GDP. The share of the 
additional cost for the GOI is about Rs. 9,000 crores, while the state por-
tion is Rs. 29,400 crores, which would represent, respectively, increases of 
10 percent and 33 percent above the base GOI and state health spending 
projected for 2015. Given that nominal GOI spending increased by 
23 percent annually between 2005–06 and 2008–09, a high elasticity of 
central health spending relative to GDP, and credible commitments to 
public outlays for health during the 12th Plan, the government of India 
should be able to afford these schemes. However, they might not be 
affordable for some states. Although state health expenditure grew by 
17 percent between 2005–06 and 2008–09, this rate of increase might 
not cover all the optional components for some states.
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SHI social health insurance 
SMC state medical commissioners
TAC tariff advisory committee
TEC technical executive committee
TN Tamil Nadu
TNHSS Tamil Nadu Health Systems Society 
TNMSC Tamil Nadu Medical Supplies Corporation
TPA third-party administrator 
UHIS Universal Health Insurance Scheme 
US$  U.S. dollar; for all Rupee data presented in this book, 
US$1 = Rs. 45
VA Vajpayee Arogyashri
WHO World Health Organization
Note: All dollars in this book are U.S. dollars unless otherwise described.
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C H A P T E R  1
Introduction
Since Independence, India has struggled to provide its people with uni-
versal health coverage. Whether defined in terms of financial protection 
or access to and effective use of health care, the majority of Indians 
remain irregularly and incompletely covered. Addressing the coverage 
gap is a huge challenge in light of the traditionally low public spending 
on health (currently about 1 percent of GDP), the high levels of infor-
mal or unorganized labor (93 percent of the labor force) (NCEUS 
2007), a large but dispersed rural population (72 percent rural) (MOHA 
2001), high levels of poverty (27.5 percent) (Planning Commission 
2007),1 unregulated service delivery, and low quality of service providers 
serving the poor (Das et al. 2011; Shiva Kumar et al. 2011; Reddy 2011; 
Berman et al. 2010; Human Rights Watch 2009; Rani, Bonu, and Harvey 
2007; Planning Commission 2005; MOHFW 2005; Das and Hammer 
2004, 2006). 
Despite this ominous picture, opportunities to reverse the trend have 
recently come to the fore. As specified in the National Health Policy 
(MOHFW 2002) and the current coalition government’s framework for 
governance (“common minimum program”) (Government of India 
2004), the government is committed to raising public health spending 
to between 2 and 3 percent of GDP. Increasing public spending on 
2       Government-Sponsored Health Insurance in India
health has been confirmed in recent government pronouncements 
related to the preparation of the 12th five-year development plan 
(2012–17) (Planning Commission 2011). In addition to improving the 
reach and supply of public provision in rural areas, since its launch in 
2005 the central government’s flagship National Rural Health Mission 
(NRHM) has strengthened demand-side funding programs such as 
Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), which provide conditional cash transfers 
to pregnant poor mothers for institutional births and transportation 
assistance. Vigorous economic growth and a reformed regulatory envi-
ronment have propelled the voluntary private health insurance industry 
into a period of accelerated expansion, with annual growth rates of more 
than 30 percent since 2001–02. At the same time, the insurance industry 
has crafted innovative products to improve the breadth of benefit cover-
age and is increasingly contributing to the expansion of the private sup-
ply of health services. Finally, and most recently, a new generation of 
government-sponsored health insurance schemes (GSHISs) has emerged 
to provide the poor with financial coverage. These schemes, their design 
and coverage features, their potential to contribute to universal coverage, 
and their role within India’s health finance and delivery system are the 
subjects of this book. 
Briefly, the main objective of these new GSHISs was to offer financial 
protection against catastrophic health shocks, defined in terms of an inpa-
tient stay. Between 2007 and 2010, six major schemes have emerged, 
including one sponsored by the government of India (GOI) and five 
state-sponsored schemes. In 2011, several others are understood to be on 
the planning table at the state level. The designs and rate structures of 
these new schemes were drawn from the experience of existing social 
insurance schemes and private insurance products in India. This new 
wave of schemes provides fully subsidized coverage for a limited package 
of secondary or tertiary inpatient care, targeting below poverty popula-
tions. Similar to the private voluntary insurance products in the country, 
ambulatory services including drugs are not covered except as part of an 
episode of illness requiring an inpatient stay. The schemes have organized 
hospital networks consisting of public and private facilities, and most care 
funded by these schemes is provided in private hospitals.
The recently launched GSHISs are a new form of mobilizing govern-
ment resources in an underfinanced system while pioneering a new set 
of design features and institutional arrangements to govern, allocate, and 
manage the use of these resources. Though still small in terms of the 
quantum of public financing, these GSHISs introduced a number of 
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significant changes in traditional government health financing and deliv-
ery arrangements in India. They have established a demand-side mecha-
nism that mobilizes and channels additional public financing to health, 
introduced an explicit benefits package, pioneered cashless care (e.g., 
there are no point of service payments or other forms of cost sharing 
required from beneficiaries and the hospital charges are directly settled 
by the schemes with their network hospitals), fostered public private 
partnerships (with insurers and providers), and in principle stimulated 
competition among insurers (for government contracts) and providers 
(for beneficiaries, when ill). Prior to the appearance of these schemes, 
nearly all public financing was directed to government-owned and 
-operated service providers to support an implicit but irregularly (at 
best) delivered benefits package. Although services are nominally free 
in most cases, users faced significant costs for unavailable drugs and 
consumables, transportation, diagnostics, and other services as well as 
informal payments. Moreover, the GOI has yet to deliver on pledges for 
significant increases in public financing for health, at least through the 
public delivery system. However, recent pronouncements suggest that 
government may double public spending on health in the 12th Five 
Year Plan, 2012–17 (Planning Commission 2011). 
Based on a systematic review of nine GSHISs, including older social 
health insurance schemes (SHIs), the objective of this book is to assess 
their practices and performance to enable policy makers to gain insight 
into emerging issues requiring their attention if India is to achieve univer-
sal health coverage. The focus is on two lines of inquiry. 
The first involves institutional and “operational” opportunities and 
challenges regarding their design features, governance arrangements, 
financial flows, cost-containment mechanisms, underlying stakeholder 
incentives, information asymmetries, and potential for impact on finan-
cial protection and on access to care and use by targeted beneficiaries. 
The second entails “big picture” questions on the future configuration 
of India’s health financing and delivery systems that have surfaced, due 
in part to the appearance of a new wave of GSHISs after 2007. How 
these schemes will interact with and affect the wider health financing 
and delivery system is a major underlying issue facing Indian policy 
makers. Will they contribute to integration or will they lead to greater 
fragmentation? Will they contribute to improving health sector effi-
ciency and quality or will they lead to a steep escalation in the cost of 
health care? Will explicit entitlements be expanded, and if so, does 
government have the capacity to enforce the provision of the benefits 
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package as well as ensure efficient delivery within quality standards? 
Specific objectives follow: 
• Document key design features of the prominent government-sponsored 
health insurance schemes in India including their institutional structure, 
beneficiaries and membership, benefits package and exclusions, provider 
payment mechanisms, intermediaries, and health providers used.
• Identify emerging issues, opportunities, and challenges facing the 
schemes, including the financial sustainability thereof, in light of global 
experiences and within the Indian context.
• Estimate current and future coverage and spending, based on available 
data and allowing for certain assumptions on utilization, claims, costs, 
and inflation.
• Recommend policy measures for expanding coverage and improving 
the efficiency and effectiveness of health insurance schemes within the 
context of health financing in India. 
• Develop hypotheses and questions for subsequent research.
Ostensibly, the objective of any health insurance scheme is to 
increase access, utilization, and financial protection, and ultimately 
improve health status. Due to lack of evaluations and analyses of 
household data, the authors of this book do not examine the impact of 
health insurance in terms of these objectives.2 A recent review of the 
evidence of the effects of health insurance in low- and middle-income 
countries shows that insurance can positively influence access and uti-
lization of health services, provide financial protection against cata-
strophic health shocks while reducing out-of-pocket spending, and, if 
designed in a pro-poor manner, offer greater benefits to the poor than 
the well-off (Escobar, Griffin, and Shaw 2010; Giedion and Yadira 
Diaz 2010). However, evidence on the impact on health status is 
inconclusive.
This book is not meant to highlight problems of the GSHISs, but 
rather to raise potential challenges and emerging issues that should be 
addressed to ensure the long-term viability of these schemes and secure 
their place within the health finance and delivery system. A number of 
the schemes have been under implementation for only a few years and 
have yet to stabilize in terms of core processes and procedures. Many of 
the schemes have made great strides in recent years, and in most cases 
through “learning by doing.” They have gained popularity among major 
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stakeholders. In short, similar to health insurance everywhere, all schemes 
examined here are works-in-progress. 
GSHISs are not a panacea for all the problems facing the Indian health 
sector. However, they are a new component in health financing that has 
the potential to contribute to more efficient, affordable, and better qual-
ity care and, ultimately, to spearhead reform. How well these schemes 
become integrated into and supportive of other components of the 
finance and delivery system will determine their long-term sustainability. 
Further, international experience has shown that no matter how success-
ful these fledgling GSHISs are during their initial years, early success is no 
guarantee of future success. 
This book is the first comprehensive review of all the major publicly 
funded health insurance schemes in India. It responds to a request from 
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) received by the 
World Bank in June 2010 to assess GSHISs in terms of their organiza-
tional design features, spending, impacts, challenges, and potential to 
contribute to the achievement of universal coverage. The collaborating 
partners for the field research, the Public Health Foundation of India and 
Access Health International, also received similar requests from the 
Planning Commission, the government of India, and the state govern-
ment of Andhra Pradesh (AP), respectively.
The rest of this chapter outlines the analytical framework and meth-
ods used to assess the schemes and construct the case studies. It also 
contains a summary matrix depicting the salient features of each scheme. 
Chapter 2 briefly outlines the current configuration of health finance and 
delivery in India and examines the context in which the schemes devel-
oped. It distills the design linkages among the schemes and the ways 
certain trends and innovations have disseminated among the schemes 
over time. Chapter 3 synthesizes organizational, operational, and design 
issues emerging from the case studies. Chapter 4 presents recommenda-
tions for strengthening the design and operational features of the schemes 
that can be implemented in the short term. Chapter 5 proposes options 
for the medium-term expansion of health insurance and linking demand- 
and supply-side financing and delivery arrangements. This chapter also 
includes an agenda for future research. Appendixes A through I contain 
detailed case studies of nine GSHISs. For these schemes, sufficient infor-
mation was collected to produce case studies.3 Appendix J includes the 
instruments applied to collect information and data for the cases. 
Appendix K contains a glossary of terms used in this book.
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Analytical Framework and Methods
Based on an instrument developed by the authors (appendix J), the key 
features of and challenges faced by health insurance schemes were 
assessed through site visits to scheme administrative offices, enrolment 
stations, and network hospitals, interviews with managerial staff, review 
of published and unpublished documents, and analysis of available sec-
ondary data, including enrolment, claims, and spending. For three 
schemes, Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana, RSBY (GOI), Rajiv Aarogyasri 
(AP), and Yeshasvini (KA), reports based on assessments, evaluations, and 
small sample surveys were made available to the team. The findings are 
incorporated in the case material reported here. In some cases, the team 
visited enrolment camps and empaneled hospitals to get a sense of how 
the schemes worked in practice. No primary data through household, 
beneficiary, or provider surveys were collected for this research. 
Depending on the availability of information, each case study fol-
lows a similar framework, addressing a series of features and questions 
related to each of the schemes under study. Table 1.1 outlines the 
main areas of inquiry. However, for lack of information, not all case 
studies follow the format or contain information on each area of 
inquiry.
Within the framework, an attempt was made to assess other aspects of 
the insurance as both a financing and risk-reduction instrument. For 
example, the authors looked for possible information asymmetries associ-
ated with health insurance: moral hazard (overutilization), adverse selec-
tion (overrepresentation of high-risk individuals), cream skimming 
(insurers’ selection of low-risk individuals), and provider induced 
demand. However, for lack of household and provider data, in most cases 
such problems were hypothesized from theory and experience. The 
authors also attempted to examine incentives faced by the four key stake-
holders for the schemes that influence their decisions: government (to set 
and enforce beneficiary-eligibility criteria, set package rates to pay pro-
viders, and define benefits packages), insurers (to contain costs, expand 
coverage, and improve equity of coverage), providers (to provide only 
necessary care, improve quality, and to contain costs), and beneficiaries 
(to get care soon enough to avoid more serious illness). The lack of house-
hold and provider data did not permit definitive statements on incentives 
and information asymmetries or impact. However, in most cases suffi-
cient information was available to propose hypotheses on these themes. 
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Table 1.1 Analytical Framework Applied to Case Studies
Area of inquiry Specific topics covered 
Institutional features Objectives, mission, legal and regulatory framework, contextual 
enablers (that led to creation of scheme), ownership, 
organizational structure, interinstitutional linkages, governance 
arrangements including stakeholder participation, supervisory 
oversight and decision-making authorities, management 
capacity, use of intermediaries (insurers and TPAs)
Beneficiaries Target population, eligibility criteria, enrolment processes, 
characteristics of enrollees, equity of coverage
Benefits package Services and/or conditions covered, preexisting conditions, 
exclusions, pre- and postcare coverage
Provider network Number, location, ownership, and characteristics of empaneled 
facilities, empanelment criteria, competition among providers, 
linkages to public delivery system, provider education
Financing and financial 
status
Sources of income, registration and user fees, premium setting 
Information 
environment
Reporting requirements 
Utilization and claims Number and amount of claims received, paid, and repudiated, 
including details on geographical distribution, disease 
distribution (including analysis of top 10 diseases/procedures 
paid under the scheme and their costs), utilization by different 
income quintiles as available, concentration of utilization, 
provider induced demand, timeliness of claims and payments, 
administrative costs
Provider payment 
mechanisms
Types and effectiveness of measures, variation in rates across 
schemes, rate-setting methods, payment procedures
Cost containment Demand- and supply-side measures: copayments, deductibles, use 
of gatekeepers, second opinion, utilization review and control, 
prior authorizations, screening, concurrent review, discharge 
planning, in-depth analysis of claims experience, use of 
underwriting and actuarial analysis
Quality orientation Quality assurance activities, guidelines, or standards; use of quality 
measures for empanelment, inspections
Consumer information 
and protection
Provision of information to beneficiaries on benefits and 
responsibilities; complaint and redress systems including 
statistics of grievances received and settled, comparative 
information on provider infrastructure, statistics or quality 
(given to consumers) if any
Other Evidence of moral hazard (overutilization), adverse selection 
(provider and beneficiary), provider penalty mechanisms
Overall performance Patient satisfaction, political viability, equity of access and 
utilization, expansion challenges, fraud and corruption
Source: Authors.
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Case Study Selection and Summaries 
The nine schemes included in this study are considered “health insurance” 
schemes in the Indian context, but not necessarily under Indian insurance 
law (box 1.1). They involve pooling risk and purchasing services from 
public and private providers and, in most new generation GSHISs, there 
is also a formal contract between a government agency and an insurance 
company.4 Most schemes do not collect contributions from the beneficia-
ries; they are entirely funded from general tax revenues. Thus, risk pooling 
occurs at the societal level. 
For this study, all major central and state-level schemes receiving a 
government subsidy were selected, including the traditional social health 
insurance (SHI) schemes, the Employees’ State Insurance Scheme (ESIS), 
and the Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS).5 Other health 
insurance schemes were not included6—those for specific employee 
groups or those still in an initial planning stage such as the case of 
Maharashtra state. However, the Apka Swasthya Bima Yojana (ASBY) 
scheme in Delhi, which was scheduled for rollout in 2011, was taken up 
for the study.7 The following schemes were assessed:8 
Box 1.1 
Indian Law and Health Insurance
In terms of Indian insurance defining an “insurance contract” and specifying the 
entities eligible to offer insurance, a scheme should either have a contract with 
a licensed commercial insurer (as in RSBY; AP; Tamil Nadu, TN; and Himachal 
Pradesh, HP), or should be offered by an exempted public insurer created under 
an act of law (e.g., ESIS). Therefore, according to Indian insurance laws, a scheme 
such as Yeshasvini is not “insurance” even though it involves the collection and 
pooling of contributions (and a formal risk transfer to the government agency 
executing the scheme), and purchasing of health services from a defined network 
of providers. Under insurance laws, Yeshasvini can best be described as a self-
managed contributory health scheme (sometimes also called “self-insurance”). 
The other scheme in Karnataka, Vajpayee Arogyashri (VA), is similarly not an “insur-
ance” scheme since it too does not contract with a licensed insurer. However, 
within the broad context of how “health insurance” is understood internationally 
and in India (and with the above disclaimer), the authors consider these nine 
schemes “health insurance” schemes.
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• Central level. ESIS, Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) scheme, 
and CGHS. 
• State level. Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP), Yeshasvini (KA), Vajpayee Arog-
yashri (KA), Kalaignar (TN), RSBY Plus (HP), and ASBY (Delhi).
Table 1.2 presents and compares summary features of the nine 
schemes. All new generation schemes launched after 2007 receive a full 
subsidy from government. The three schemes are sponsored by the cen-
tral government. ESIS and CGHS offer comprehensive coverage (ambu-
latory, secondary, and tertiary) to formal sector employees and civil 
servants, respectively. Beneficiaries contribute through payroll deduc-
tions. Both are directly administered by government, although CGHS 
also makes limited use of private TPAs. RSBY, a national scheme, covers 
secondary care for the population living below the poverty line (BPL). 
Contributions by beneficiaries are nominal and are only for enrolment. 
Financing is shared between the central government (75 percent) and the 
states (25 percent). RSBY contracts private and public insurers on a com-
petitive basis to take on insurance and administrative functions. The 
remaining schemes are state sponsored. Three schemes, Rajiv Aarogyasri 
(AP), Vajpayee Arogyashri (KA), and Kalaignar (TN), provide cashless, 
inpatient, tertiary care coverage to BPL populations as well as to the 
lower-middle class.
All of the newer schemes have another common feature: the use 
of com mercial insurers or TPAs for underwriting and administrative 
 functions such as beneficiary enrolment, hospital empanelment and 
claims processing and payment. Yeshasvini covers members of rural 
cooperatives in Karnataka and offers primarily surgical inpatient care, 
including  secondary and some tertiary care procedures. It is the only 
 state-subsidized scheme in which beneficiaries make mandatory contri-
butions, which represented about 58 percent of the scheme’s revenues 
in 2009–10. The final two state schemes, RSBY Plus (HP) and ASBY 
(Delhi), can best be described as RSBY “top-up” schemes. They cover 
higher-end tertiary care for the BPL population already enrolled in RSBY 
on a cashless basis. The in-depth case studies are provided in appendixes 
A through I. They are summarized in table 1.2.
The next chapter reviews the health finance and delivery context in 
India and the conditions that gave rise to a new generation of GSHISs. 
Thereafter, we delve into a detailed analysis of the schemes (based on the 
aforementioned framework) in the succeeding chapter.
Table 1.2 Summary of Salient Characteristics of the Government-Sponsored Health Insurance Schemes, 2010
Scheme name
Employees’ 
State Insurance 
Scheme (ESIS)
Central 
Government 
Health 
Scheme (CGHS)
Yeshasvini 
Co-operative 
Farmers Health-
care Scheme 
(Karnataka)
Rajiv Aarogyasri 
Community 
Health Insurance 
Scheme (AP)
Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima 
Yojana, RSBY
(GOI/MOLE)
Chief Minister 
Kalaignar’s 
Insurance 
Schemea (TN)
Vajpayee 
Arogyashri 
Scheme 
(Karnataka) RSBY Plus (HP)
Apka Swasthya 
Bima Yojanab 
(Delhi)
Launch year 1952 1954 2003 2007 2008 2009 2009 2010 2011–12a
Geographical 
area
Pan India in 
notified areas 
Pan India, 
25 cities
Entire state of 
Karnataka
Entire state of 
Andhra 
Pradesh
Pan India: 
Currently 
implemented 
in 25 states
Entire state of 
Tamil Nadu
Gulbarga 
Division of 
Karnataka
Entire state of 
Himachal 
Pradesh
Entire territory of 
Delhi
Target/eligible 
population
Private formal 
sector 
Employees and 
pensioners of 
central 
government 
and certain 
other groups
Members of the 
rural 
cooperative 
societies (both 
above and 
below the 
poverty line) 
BPL or annual 
family income 
below Rs. 
75,000
BPL families and 
other targeted 
groups
BPL; annual 
family income 
below 
Rs. 72,000; 
members of 
26 welfare 
boards
BPL residing in 
covered areas
Enrollees in HP 
under RSBY
Enrollees in Delhi 
under RSBY
Number of 
beneficiaries
55.4 million 3 million 3 million 20.4 million 
families, 
70 million 
beneficiaries
23.4 million 
families, 
70 million 
beneficiaries
13.4 million 
families, 
36 million 
beneficiaries
1.5 million 
families, 
7.5 million 
beneficiaries
0.24 million 
families, 
0.8 million 
beneficiaries
0.65 million 
families 
(proposed)
Unit of 
enrolment
Family Family Individual Family Family Family Family Family Family
Benefits package Comprehensive Comprehensive Inpatient, 
surgical 
secondary 
focus; covers 
more than 
1,200 notified 
surgeries
Inpatient, 
tertiary focus; 
938 identified 
procedures 
and follow-up 
packages 
covered
Inpatient lower-
cost, 
secondary 
care focus; 
maternity also 
covered.
Inpatient 
tertiary focus; 
more than 400 
identified 
hospitalization 
procedures 
covered
Inpatient 
tertiary focus; 
402 packages 
and 50 follow-
up packages 
covered 
Inpatient 
tertiary focus; 
326 defined 
procedures 
above RSBY 
covered
Inpatient tertiary 
focus; defined 
procedures over 
and above RSBY 
covered
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Maximum 
insurance 
coverage
No limit No limit Rs. 200,000 per 
person per 
year
Rs. 150,000 per 
family per year 
plus buffer of 
Rs. 50,000 per 
year
Rs. 30,000 per 
family per year
Rs. 100,000 over 
four years, per 
family
Rs. 150,000 per 
family per year 
plus Rs. 50,000 
per year buffer
Rs. 175,000 
beyond the 
Rs. 30,000 
covered by 
RSBY
Rs. 150,000 per 
family per year
Hospital 
empanelment, 
minimum beds
As per CGHS 
criteria (see 
next column)
100 beds in 
metropolitan 
cities; 50 beds 
in others
50 inpatient 
beds and 
3 intensive care 
unit (ICU) beds
50 beds 10 beds 30 beds 50 beds 50 beds 50 inpatient beds
Number of 
empaneled 
hospitals 
(government 
and private)
148 own plus 
about 400 
private 
hospitals
562 private 
hospitals (and 
can use any 
public 
hospital)
543 hospitals 
(including 30 
public 
hospitals)
241 private and 
97 government 
hospitals
8,111 hospitals 
(5,604 private 
and 2,507 
public)
692 hospitals 
(including 
56 public 
hospitals)
94 hospitals 
(86 private 
and 8 public)
16 hospitals —
Sources of funds Contribution, 
percent of 
wages 
(employees 
1.75 percent, 
employers 
4.75 percent) 
Central 
government 
budget, 
employee 
contribution 
based on 
salary 
Contributions 
(beneficiaries 
58 percent), 
(state 
government 
42 percent)
State 
government 
(100 percent, 
through the 
health budget 
and through a 
levy on 
alcohol sales 
in the state)
Central 
government 
75 percent, 
state 
government 
25 percent, 
but in some 
states, it is 90 
percent from 
center plus Rs. 
30 from 
beneficiary
State 
government 
(100 percent)
State 
government 
(100 percent)
State 
government 
(100 percent)
State government 
(100 percent)
(continued next page)
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Total 
expenditure, 
2009–10 
(millions of Rs.) 
Rs. 19,900 Rs. 16,000  Rs. 550 Rs. 12,000 Rs. 3,500 Rs. 5,170 None. 
Claim 
expenditure 
commenced 
in 2010–11.
None.
March 1, 2010 
to February 15, 
2011, Rs 85.6 
Estimated budget 
for first year: 
Rs. 400 to 600 
Premium price, 
2009–10
Contribution, 
percent of 
wages 
(employees 
1.75 percent, 
employers 
4.75 percent) 
Contribution 
varies between 
Rs. 50 and Rs. 
500 per 
employee per 
month. Balance 
paid by 
government.
Rs. 120 per 
person per 
year; increased 
to Rs. 150 per 
person per year 
in 2010–11
Rs. 439 per 
family (varies 
between 
phases and 
districts)
Average: Rs. 540 
per family per 
year including 
service tax
Rs. 469 per 
family per year 
plus service 
tax
— Rs. 364 per 
family per year 
including 
service tax
—
Number of 
hospitalizations 
per year
417,498, 
2009–10
— 66,749, 
2009–10
319,446,
2009–10
400,000, 
2009–10
184,044, 
first year
3,738, 
until November 
15, 2010
241 (March 
2010 to 
February 2011)
—
Hospitalization 
frequency
0.75 percent per 
member per 
year
— 2.23 percent per 
beneficiary
0.6 percent per 
beneficiary
2.5 percent per 
beneficiary
0.5 percent 
(annualized)
— 0.10 percent (in 
11.5 months) 
per family
—
Table 1.2 (continued)
Scheme name
Employees’ 
State Insurance 
Scheme (ESIS)
Central 
Government 
Health 
Scheme (CGHS)
Yeshasvini 
Co-operative 
Farmers Health-
care Scheme 
(Karnataka)
Rajiv Aarogyasri 
Community 
Health Insurance 
Scheme (AP)
Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima 
Yojana, RSBY
(GOI/MOLE)
Chief Minister 
Kalaignar’s 
Insurance 
Schemea (TN)
Vajpayee 
Arogyashri 
Scheme 
(Karnataka) RSBY Plus (HP)
Apka Swasthya 
Bima Yojanab 
(Delhi)
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Governing 
agency/legal 
status
ESIC / 
autonomous 
corporation 
MOHFW / GOI Yeshasvini Co-
operative 
Farmers 
Health Care 
Trust/ 
autonomous 
trust
Aarogyasri 
Healthcare 
Trust/trust 
State nodal 
agency/ 
insurance 
company
TN Health 
Systems 
Society/ 
autonomous 
society
Suvarna Arogya 
Suraksha Trust/ 
autonomous 
trust
HP Swasthya 
Bima Yojana 
Society/ 
autonomous 
society
Apka Swasthya 
Bima Yojana 
trust/ 
autonomous 
trust
Executing 
agency
ESIC and state 
ESIS 
departments
Same as 
governing 
agency
TPA Trust and 
insurance 
company 
State nodal 
agency and 
insurance 
company
insurance 
company 
Licensed TPA State health 
department 
and 
contractual 
staff
Insurance 
companies and 
TPAs
Number of staff 
in governing 
agency
13,585 (includes 
hospital and 
dispensary 
staff )
— 2 117 ~10 at center 
and 
~100 at state 
nodal 
agencies
<10 <10 5 —
Note: — = not available.
a. In 2011–12, the scheme was modified to include additional procedures and relaunched as the Chief Minister’s Comprehensive Health Insurance Scheme, and the executing agency serving the 
scheme also changed. The maximum coverage was also changed from Rs. 100,000 floating over four years to Rs. 100,000 per year. Hereafter, this write-up reflects the scheme details that existed 
when this study was undertaken, in 2010–11.
b. ASBY was on the drawing board when this study began. The expected launch in 2011–12 had not yet happened when this book went to press.
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Notes
 1. However, a recent study submitted to the Planning Commission measures 
poverty at 37.2 percent. Official estimates using the new methodology are 
expected in late 2011 (GOI 2009).
 2. Yeshasvini (Karnataka, KA) is the only scheme under study to have been the 
subject of an impact evaluation. The results are cited in this book. This study 
also makes use of small household surveys of beneficiaries in two schemes, 
RSBY (GOI) and R. Aarogyasri (AP), which provide limited information on 
potential impact. 
 3. The authors attempted to assess all government-sponsored schemes that were 
under implementation or in the final planning stages. However, the team had 
difficulty securing sufficient information from a few schemes. For example, 
CGHS and ESIS possess manual reporting systems while some other schemes 
were too new to have data for an appreciable length of time. A tenth scheme 
in Rajasthan, though not a health insurance scheme per se and therefore not 
documented here as a case study, provided valuable insights into building the 
recommendations on linkages with the public health system, discussed in 
chapter 5, this volume.
 4. The two schemes in Karnataka do not have contracts with insurers.
 5. These schemes receive a subsidy beyond any government contribution as an 
employer. Also, any health financing and delivery reform would have to 
account for these relatively large SHI schemes.
 6. Other schemes include those operated by the department of textiles and the 
employee health services of the Defence and Railways Departments. The lat-
ter provide medical coverage through a network of facilities departmentally 
owned and operated for their employees and dependents. No contributions 
are collected and, for the most part, no outside services are purchased except 
for some tertiary care procedures. 
 7. At the time of going to print, Maharashtra had already launched phase 1 of 
its health insurance scheme (christened as Rajiv Gandhi Jeevandayee Arogya 
Yojana) in 8 districts of the state; the ASBY scheme in Delhi had been 
deferred; while the Kalaignar scheme in TN has been expanded to include 
more procedures and will be relaunched as the Chief Minister’s Comprehensive 
Health Insurance Scheme. However, these evolutionary changes do not 
materially alter the analysis or recommendations contained in this book. 
 8. References to the “new wave” or “new generation” of GSHI schemes include 
the following, all launched after 2007: Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(RSBY), Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP), Vajpayee Arogyashri (KA), Kalaignar (TN), 
RSBY Plus (HP), and ASBY (Delhi).
Introduction       15
References
Berman, Peter, Rajeev Ahuja, Ajay Tandon, Susan Sparks, and Pablo Gottret. 2010. 
“Government Health Financing in India: Challenges in Achieving Ambitious 
Goals.” HNP Discussion Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Das, Jishnu, and Jeffrey Hammer. 2004. “Strained Mercy: Quality of Medical Care 
in Delhi.” Economic and Political Weekly 39 (9): 951–61.
Das, Jishnu, and Jeffrey Hammer. 2007. “Location, Location, Location: Residence, 
Wealth, and the Quality of Medical Care in Delhi, India.” Health Affairs 26 (3): 
w338–w351.
Das, Jishnu, Alaka Holla, Brian Chan, Veena Das, Diana Tabak, and Manoj 
Manmohan. 2011. “The Quality of Medical Care in India: Evidence from a 
Standardized Patient Study in Two States.” World Bank Working Paper, World 
Bank, Washington, DC.
Escobar, Luisa Maria, Charles C. Griffin, and R. Paul Shaw. 2010. The Impact of 
Health Insurance in Low- and Middle-Income Countries. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press.
Giedion, Ursula, and Beatriz Yadira Diaz. 2010. “A Review of the Evidence.” In 
The Impact of Health Insurance in Low-and Middle-Income Countries, ed. 
Maria-Luisa Escobar, Charles C. Griffin, and R. Paul Shaw, 13–32. Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Government of India. 2004. National Common Minimum Programme of the 
Government of India, New Delhi, India.
Government of India. 2009. Report of the Expert Group to Advise the Ministry of 
Rural Development on the Methodology for Conducting the Below Poverty Line 
(BPL) Census for 11th Five Year Plan, New Delhi, India.
Human Rights Watch. 2009. No Tally of the Anguish: Accountability in Maternal 
Health Care in India. New York: Human Rights Watch.
MOHA (Ministry of Home Affairs, India). 2001. Census of India. Registrar 
General and Census Commissioner. MOHA New Delhi, India.
MOHFW (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, India). 2002. National Health 
Policy, MOHFW, New Delhi, India.
MOHFW (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, India). 2005. Financing and 
Delivery of Health Care Services in India. National Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, MOHFW, New Delhi, India.
NCEUS. (National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector) 
(India). 2007. Report on Conditions of Work and Promotion of Livelihoods in the 
Unorganized Sector, Government of India, New Delhi. 
16       Government-Sponsored Health Insurance in India
Planning Commission of India. 2005. Mid-term Appraisal of the Tenth Five Year 
Plan (2002–07). Planning Commission of India, New Delhi, India: 
Government of India. 
Planning Commission of India. 2007. “Poverty Estimates for 2004–05”. Press 
Information Bureau, New Delhi, India: Government of India.
Planning Commission of India. 2011. “Faster, Sustainable and More Inclusive 
Growth.” 12th Five Year Plan Approach Paper 2012–17, Planning Commission 
of India, New Delh, India: Government of India, India.
Rani, Manju, Sekhar Bonu, and Steve Harvey. 2007. “Differentials in the quality 
of antenatal care in India.” International Journal for Quality in Health Care 
Advance Access 20 (1): 62–71.
Reddy, Rahul K. 2011. “Health Needs of North Coastal Prakasam Region, Andhra 
Pradesh, India.” Hyderabad, India: Access Health International and 
Nimmagadda Foundation. 
Shiva Kumar, A.K., Lincoln C. Chen, Mita Choudhury, Shiban Ganju, Vijay 
Mahajan, Amarjeet Sinha, and Abhijit Sen. 2011. “Financing Health Care for 
All: Challenges and Opportunities.” Lancet 377 (9766): 668–79.
World Bank. 2010. World Development Indicators (WDI). Database. World Bank, 
Washington, DC.
17 
C H A P T E R  2
Understanding the Context: 
The Development of Health 
Insurance in India
The extent and efficiency of health financing arrangements, the reach and 
performance of service delivery, and the evolution of risk-protection mech-
anisms in India have profoundly shaped the development of government-
sponsored health insurance schemes (GSHISs). This is especially true of 
the recent crop of schemes, which as a group, were launched as a response 
to challenges and opportunities evident in the health system. This chapter 
attends to the contextual dimensions underlying the emergence of GSHISs. 
First the configuration of health financing in the country is reviewed and 
the salient problems and limitations of traditional, and heretofore domi-
nant, health financing and delivery arrangements are examined. The discus-
sion then turns to an examination of the historical development of health 
insurance in India. No scheme was woven from whole cloth. The spillover 
effects across schemes were extensive. The discussion focuses on the advent 
of a more or less common set of design elements that together fashioned 
the structural and organizational features of the new wave of GSHISs.
A Brief Review of Health Finance and Delivery in India
India has traditionally been a low spender on health care, allocating 
approximately 4.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), US$40 per 
capita in 2008–09.1 In terms of India’s share in global health expenditure, 
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this country, where more than 16 percent of the world’s population resides, 
scrapes by with less than 1 percent of the world’s total health expenditure. 
The share of health spending has also not kept pace with the country’s 
dynamic economic growth (in 2001–02, health spending accounted for 
4.8 percent of GDP). Public spending on health has hovered at about 
1 percent of GDP for the last decade. Government (central, state, and 
local) is the source of about one-fifth of spending; out-of-pocket payments 
represent about 70 percent—one of the highest percentages in the world.2 
External sources constitute a small share (2.3 percent) of health financing. 
Within the public health spending envelope, however, central government 
spending on health has increased as a percentage of total central govern-
ment expenditure from 1.5 percent in FY2003–04 to 1.9 percent in 
FY2008–09 (Duggal 2007). Nominal central government spending 
increased by about 23 percent annually between 2005–06 and 2008–09, 
largely due to investments by the government of India (GOI) in its flagship 
National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) (MOHFW 2009a: 35).
India is significantly below its global comparators in terms of public 
expenditure on health as a share of GDP among countries with similar 
levels of income (GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars). At India’s cur-
rent income level, most countries exhibit higher public spending on 
health as a share of their GDP (World Bank 2010a). Figure 2.1 illustrates 
this situation on a log scale in which each circle represents a country. The 
countries in South Asia have been labeled for ease of comparison.
India also falls short in terms of health impact. Although it has 
achieved laudable annual percent reductions in infant mortality over the 
last decade, some of its neighbors, such as Bangladesh and Nepal, have 
achieved steeper declines (Deolalikar et al. 2008). India has gained less 
ground in reducing malnutrition, maternal mortality, adult mortality, and 
prevalence of communicable diseases than its neighbors. In relation to its 
income level and total health spending per capita, India has not per-
formed as well as its comparators on lowering maternal mortality, and its 
performance is just about average for infant mortality (World Bank 
2010a). Huge disparities in health outcomes are still evident across states 
and social groups (e.g., scheduled castes and scheduled tribes), and 
improvements have not been shared equally.
Table 2.1 provides an overview of health financing in India by major 
sources for 2004–05 and 2008–09.3 Over this period, total health 
spending increased by 64 percent while government spending more 
than doubled. GOI spending on NRHM accounts for a large share of the 
increase in public spending over this period. In part due to the NRHM, 
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the GOI is taking on an increasingly larger financial role in health 
financing vis-à-vis the states. Government spending on health insurance 
also increased significantly in the period but still represented a small 
share of total government spending (about 5 percent in 2008–09).4
Figure 2.2 depicts financial flows among major actors in India’s health 
system according to the national health accounts classification: catego-
rized by sources, agents, and providers. The bolded arrows show the 
main financial flows. Box 2.1 describes health financing arrangements in 
terms of organizational forms for risk pooling observed in India.
Health finance and delivery in India have developed along four main 
and mostly parallel lines.5 The first and by far the largest is out-of-pocket 
spending by households (69 percent of spending). Nearly all this spend-
ing is directed to fee-for-service private providers, but some are for user 
fees collected at public facilities. This method of finance places consider-
able financial burden on poor households and is seen as one of the impor-
tant reasons for impoverishment in India (discussed below). Approximately 
80 percent of outpatient and 60 percent of inpatient care is provided by 
private practitioners (MSPI 2004). This translates into a flow of 77 per-
cent of total health spending directed toward private providers (including 
charitable and other nonprofit facilities).
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The second is tax-financed, direct public delivery (20 percent of total 
health spending) available, in principle, for India’s entire population. 
Most funds are channeled through the MOHFW and state health secre-
tariats, but central and state governments directly fund a number of 
public medical colleges and affiliated hospitals. A limited number of 
autonomous public institutions and nonprofit hospitals also receive 
direct financing from central and state governments. Operated mainly by 
the states, the public delivery system includes facilities at primary, sec-
ondary, as well as tertiary levels, and accounts for about 20 percent and 
Table 2.1 India: Estimated Distribution of Health Expenditure, by 
Source (Rs. million)
Item 2004–05 Percent 2008–09 Percent
GOI health expenditure 90,667 7 223,857 10
 Central expenditures, including 
NRHM (excluding insurance)
44,997 90,137a
 Transfers to states (e.g., NRHM, 
HIV/AIDS) 
37,670 113,720a
 Insuranceb 8,000c 20,000d
State and local government health 
expenditure, own resources
172,465 13 362,957e 17
 Non-insurance 171,465 352,957
 Insuranceb 1,000f 10,000g
Total public health expenditure 283,085 586,814
External assistance 30,495 2 37,016 2
Private health expenditure 1,044,135 78 1,573,935 72
Out-of-pocket 928,388 —
.
Insurance 21,717 68,740
Other 94,030 —
.
Total health expenditure (THE) 1,337,763 100 2,197,765 100
THE as share of GDP (percent) 4.25 — 4.13 —
Sources: Authors’ estimates based on data from National Health Accounts 2004–05 (MOHFW 2009b) and expen-
diture data from health insurance schemes.
Note — = not available.
a. Includes estimated spending for NRHM.
b. All estimates of insurance spending are approximate.
c. Includes estimated expenses on Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) and Universal Health Insurance 
Scheme (UHIS) subsidy.
d. Includes estimated expenditure on CGHS, RSBY, Handicraft/Handloom schemes, and UHIS subsidy.
e. Includes provision for estimated expenditure of Rs. 20,000 million at local government level
f. Includes estimated expenditure on Yeshasvini and state subsidies to Employees’ State Insurance Scheme (ESIS).
g. Includes estimated expenditure on Aarogyasri (AP), Yeshasvini, state share of RSBY, state ESIS subsidy,
and other state schemes.
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40 percent, respectively, of outpatient and inpatient utilization. 
Considerable interstate variation exists especially in inpatient utilization 
(Mahal et al. 2002).
General tax revenues are the major source of financing for the central 
and state governments’ contributions to health spending, most of it for 
free or highly subsidized services delivered through public providers. 
Constitutionally, health is a state subject in India. Most of the central 
government’s budget for health is allocated to the states through grant 
transfers (from the MOHFW) to support various national health pro-
grams, known as Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSSs).6 Although the 
central health budget has grown considerably, transfers to states as a pro-
portion of the total budget of the MOHFW declined sharply since the 
1990s. The share of the Central Government expenditure on health, 
including grants to states, constituted about one-third of the combined 
public
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Figure 2.2 India: Main Actors and Fund Flows in Health System, ca. 2005
Source: National Health Accounts for 2004–05 (MOHFW 2009b) and authors’ estimates.
Note: The published NHA data contain certain inaccuracies which have resulted in both over- and underesti-
mates of spending. For example, social insurance was placed as a source rather than firms and households. Also, 
some smaller sources of funds have not been depicted in this figure, and therefore the totals for sources do not 
add to 100 percent.
 *Includes spending by other central ministries.
**Includes spending by local governments (about 1 percent of total spending).
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expenditure by the states and central government in 2001–02 (NCMH 
2005). However, this percentage has increased since 2005 when the 
NRHM, the GOI flagship program to improve the public delivery sys-
tem, was launched. In 2008–09, for example, GOI funding represented 
two-fifths of the country’s total public financing (table 2.1).
State governments draw funds from several sources including general 
tax revenues, general central government transfers, and MOHFW trans-
fers for centrally sponsored health schemes.7 Since the launch of NRHM, 
the funding mechanism for central assistance from the MOHFW has 
migrated from the treasury to the state health societies.8 These societies 
now receive most central transfers for health schemes. State health 
spending from own resources as a percent of state GDP varies consider-
ably. In 2008–09, most states spent between 0.6 percent and 1.5 percent 
of their state GDP on health (Reserve Bank of India 2010). While state 
financing accounts for 58 percent of public spending on health, it varies 
greatly across states. Most states have traditionally placed low priority on 
health spending (Shiva Kumar et al. 2011).9
Although central government transfers through NRHM have increased 
state spending, ranging from 13 percent to 36 percent across the states, 
additional GOI funding has not bridged this spending gap. States are 
Box 2.1
India: Organizational Arrangements for Risk Pooling
The health financing system can also be categorized by the way financial risks are 
pooled. The largest is the national health service system operated by the states 
and is cofinanced by the GOI and states mainly through general tax revenues. This 
is a societal pooling arrangement in which the entire population in theory has 
access to publicly delivered care for free or at highly subsidized prices. The second 
is social health insurance (SHI) which is mandatory for formal sector workers, civil 
servants, military, and railway employees. Separate schemes operate for each of 
these groups. Risk pooling is performed through employee and employer contri-
butions (via a payroll tax) and government subsidies. Voluntary private health 
insurance is the third and is financed through premium payments by individuals 
and employers. The fourth, and most recent, are fully-subsidized, mass schemes 
for the poor operated by central and state governments. In this book, we refer to 
both social insurance and subsidized mass schemes as government-sponsored 
health insurance schemes (GSHISs).
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mandated to contribute 15 percent of total NRHM spending (GOI con-
tributes 85 percent), but many states have not fulfilled this mandate. For 
example, in 2007–08 only four states complied with the 15 percent con-
tribution (MOHFW 2009a). Nevertheless, nominal state government 
spending increased by an annual 17 percent between 2005–06 and 
2008–09, 10 percent per annum in real terms.10
The third segment consists of social insurance schemes for formal 
private sector workers, civil servants, and military and railway employees 
(4.1 percent of spending). These schemes are mandatory, and most are 
financed through employee and employer contributions via a payroll 
tax, but also receive partial government subsidies. Others are fully sub-
sidized by the government (e.g., military, railways) or public corpora-
tions (e.g., coal and petroleum parastatals). Beneficiaries seek care in 
facilities owned and operated by the schemes or contracted out to the 
private sector.
The fourth segment is private voluntary health insurance (PVHI), 
which emerged in the late 1980s but has grown rapidly in the 2000s. In 
2004–05, PVHI accounted for 1.6 percent of total health expenditure 
but, by 2008–09, reached an estimated 3 percent.11 Private insurance 
companies’ health products emphasize inpatient coverage provided in 
networked private hospitals. The market consists of two, roughly equal 
size components: a group market (catering to employers) and a retail 
market comprising individual and family plans. In 2010, PVHI covered 
about 60 million people or 5 percent of the population.
A large number of community-based microinsurance schemes also 
exist, but their coverage is small and was estimated at about 5-6 million 
persons in the early years of this decade (Devadasan et al. 2004).12 
However, a small portion of this coverage may overlap with the PVHI 
market: some CBHI schemes buy group insurance from private insurance 
companies.
A fifth segment, not depicted in figure 2.2 and the subject of this book, 
appeared in the second half of the 2000s. Unlike their social insurance 
counterparts described above, these new government-sponsored schemes 
are fully subsidized, mass-coverage programs that target the poor.
Private firms, external agencies, and others make up the remaining 
share of India’s health expenditure. Although firms represent a fairly sig-
nificant source of financing, in India, unlike in other countries, these 
funds are not always directed to health insurance (PVHI and SHI). 
Rather, they are often used to fund on-site health facilities or to reim-
burse employees’medical care expenses.13
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Financial Burden
Deepening health insecurity has been a main driver of calls for government 
funding of health insurance for the poor. Selvaraj and Karan (2009), based 
on National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) data (MSPI 2004), esti-
mate that nearly 39 million persons were pushed into poverty by out-of-
pocket payments for health care during 2004, compared with 26 million 
during 1993–94. Applying a different methodology to the NSSO data, 
Berman, Ahuja, and Bhandari (2010) estimate that 63 million individuals 
(11.9 million households) were pushed below the poverty line by health 
care expenditure in 2004. These figures represented 6.2 percent of all 
households (6.6 percent in rural areas and 5 percent in urban areas).
Households, on average, devote about 5.8 percent of all their expendi-
ture to health care. Health accounts for about 10.5 percent of nonfood 
expenditure (World Bank 2010a). Approximately 14 percent of households 
in rural areas and 12 percent in urban areas spend more than 10 percent of 
their total annual consumption expenditure on health care (MSPI 2004). 
Countries such as Sri Lanka do much better, while China, Bangladesh, and 
Vietnam do worse than India on this count. A comparison of household 
spending on health for selected countries in Asia is shown in figure 2.3.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
M
ala
ys
ia 
(1
99
9)
Ta
iw
an
, C
hi
na
 (2
00
0)
In
do
ne
sia
 (2
00
6)
Th
ail
an
d 
(2
00
2)
Ho
ng
 Ko
ng
 SA
R, 
Ch
in
a (
20
00
)
Sr
i L
an
ka
 (1
99
7)
Ph
ilip
pi
ne
s (
19
99
)
In
do
ne
sia
 (2
00
1)
Ko
re
a, 
Re
p. 
(2
00
0)
Ne
pa
l (1
99
6)
In
di
a (
20
00
)
Ch
in
a (
20
00
)
Ba
ng
lad
es
h 
(2
00
0)
Vi
et
na
m
 (1
99
8)
%
 o
f h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
ex
ce
ed
in
g
th
re
sh
o
ld
25% of nonfood expenditure 10% of total expenditures
Figure 2.3 India and Comparators: Household Spending on Health Exceeding 
Thresholds (25% of nonfood expenditure and 10% of total expenditures) 
Source: Van Doorslaer 2005.
Understanding the Context: The Development of Health Insurance in India        25
Table 2.2 India: Average Out-of-Pocket Expenditure for an 
Inpatient Stay, 1996 and 2004 (nominal Rs.)
Location/provider 1995–96 2004
Rural
Government 2,080 3,238
Private 4,300 7,408
All 3,202 5,695
Urban
Government 2,195 3,877
Private 5,344 11,533
All 3,921 8,851
Sources: MSPI 1996, 2004.
Table 2.2 shows the average amounts paid by rural and urban 
households for a hospital stay based on NSSO data from 1995–96 
and 2004 rounds (MSPI 1996, 2004). In 2004, unit level NSSO 
records show that drug purchases represented between 45 percent 
and 55 percent of all inpatient expenses and between 70 percent and 
80 percent of outpatient expenses incurred by households (MSPI 
2004). Although private hospitals cost significantly more than gov-
ernment facilities, the latter are far from “free.” Patients in govern-
ment hospitals have to pay out-of-pocket costs of user fees, medicines, 
and other supplies. There is also evidence of informal payments 
 (TII-CMS 2008).
Public subsidies for health disproportionately favor the richer seg-
ments of society. Peters et al. (2002) estimated that, in the late 1990s, 
for every Rs. 1 spent on the poorest income quintile, the government 
spent an estimated Rs. 3 on the richest quintile. As in other developing 
countries, the relatively well-off capture subsidies directed to hospitals. 
Mahal et al. (2002) reported that, while 46.5 percent of public spend-
ing is on hospitals, 36 percent is directed to the top quintile, and only 
8.1 percent benefits the bottom quintile. Health financing reforms 
to improve equity in public health spending remain an imperative 
for India.
Service Delivery Issues
Service delivery is far from optimal in India. Public services are plagued 
by a number of shortcomings that contribute to lack of trust on the part 
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of the population. These deficiencies were cogently summarized by the 
Planning Commission in an appraisal of the 10th Five Year Plan:
[T]he quality of [health] care across the rural public health infrastructure is 
abysmal and marked by high levels of absenteeism, poor availability of skilled 
medical and para-medical professionals, callous attitudes [among health 
workers], unavailable medicines and inadequate supervision and monitoring 
. . . The poor continue to avail of the costlier services provided by the private 
practitioner, even when they have access to subsidised or free public health 
care, due to reasons of distance (for significant segments of the population), 
but more importantly, on account of the unpredictable availability and very 
low quality of health care services provided by the rural public primary 
health sector. (Planning Commission of India 2005: 102)
Since 2005, a number of studies at state, district, and village levels 
have confirmed the Planning Commission’s portrayal of the public deliv-
ery system. These studies highlighted the underlying lack of accountabil-
ity to patients, communities, and public objectives as a main driver of 
poor quality, irregular supply, callous behaviors, and corrupt practices 
observed among public providers (Das et al. 2011; Reddy 2011; Bajpai, 
Sacs, and Dhalakia 2009; Ali et al. 2009; Hammer, Alyar, and Samji 2006; 
TII-CMS 2008; Das and Hammer 2006, 2007; Banerjee et al. 2008; 
CUTS-CART 2010; Gill 2009; Chaudhury et al. 2010).14 Although 
increased financing under NRHM has improved infrastructure and 
resulted in hiring a large number of health workers, the underlying 
accountability issues remain unaddressed.
Whether the private sector can contribute to affordable and better 
quality care for the poor remains to be seen. Private practitioners are 
omnipresent throughout India, but the range and quality of their services 
varies significantly. As suggested above, private providers emphasize 
curative care and provide a smaller share of immunizations and prenatal 
care than the public sector. Unqualified allopathic practitioners have a 
significant presence in rural areas and charge about a third less for a 
consultation than qualified allopathic providers (Peters et al. 2002). 
However, qualified allopathic providers congregate in urban settings 
(Costa and Diwan 2007). Recently, corporate hospital chains have been 
extending their reach into smaller cities (IFC forthcoming). Because 
private medical practitioners are unregulated, almost anybody can open 
a practice. In a further complication, nearly all public sector physicians 
also practice privately in solo clinics or as consultants to hospitals.15
Finally, acknowledging the limitations of the health financing and 
delivery system outlined above, the central government established the 
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National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (NCMH). The 
commission’s recommendations created an enabling policy environment 
for a new wave of government-sponsored health insurance schemes. The 
NCMH critically appraised the health system and suggested ways of 
strengthening it with the specific objective of improving access for all to 
a minimum set of essential health interventions. NCMH advocated: (1) 
moving toward universal health insurance for secondary and tertiary 
care, (2) significantly increasing public outlays for health, and (3) stimu-
lating a competitive provider environment. Health insurance schemes 
have been one vehicle applied by central and state governments to 
achieve these objectives (MOHFW 2005).
Health Insurance in India: Context and Historical Development 
The GSHISs date to the late 1940s when the central government intro-
duced the Employees’ State Insurance Scheme (ESIS) for blue-collar 
workers employed in the private sector. This was followed in the mid-
1950s by the Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) for central 
government employees and for their families. Both schemes provided 
comprehensive medical coverage and followed a traditional social insur-
ance risk-pooling model in which funds are pooled through employer 
and employee payroll contributions, supplemented, in these schemes, by 
government subsidies. Other government schemes for employees in rail-
ways and defense, and other civil servants, also emerged shortly after 
Independence.16
Perhaps due to the supply-side focus described in the previous section, 
demand-side financing approaches involving government-subsidized 
health insurance for the poor were slow to emerge. Since the launching 
of ESIS and CGHS, nearly five decades passed before a new wave of 
GSHISs emerged.
Not Cut from Whole Cloth
Context and capacities have played an important role in the development 
of the wave of GSHISs launched since 2007. Each of these schemes 
benefited from the earlier development of the health insurance industry 
over a 20-year period. Figure 2.4 traces the genealogy of GSHISs and the 
linkages among them. 
Among the early attempts by the central government to introduce 
health insurance for the informal sector was the UHIS. Introduced in 
2003, UHIS was a hospitalization indemnity product that could be 
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voluntarily purchased from any state-owned insurer at a heavily subsi-
dized price (e.g., Rs. 165, less than US$4 a year). Despite its name, the 
scheme remained far from “universal” and covered only 3.7 million 
lives by 2008–09. Another scheme launched in the same year was 
Yeshasvini, a contributory scheme introduced by the Department of 
Cooperation in Karnataka for the members of rural cooperative societ-
ies in that state. 
Both schemes provided valuable lessons and possessed a number of 
common structural features that were adopted by the new generation of 
GSHISs. Features introduced by at least one of these schemes 
include: premium partially or largely subsidized by government on the 
demand side; cashless inpatient coverage; service provision by “net-
worked” public and private hospitals; provider payment through prospec-
tive, case-based “package” rates; a bottom-up coverage design consisting 
of targeting the informal and BPL populations; and use of health insur-
ance companies or third-party administrators as intermediaries for risk 
underwriting or administrative functions or both.17 
Benefits design of UHIS and Yeshasvini was also modeled on standard-
ized insurance products sold in the private market since the mid-1980s. 
ESIS (1948) 
and CGHS (1954)
UHIS (2003)
RSBY (2008)
Yeshasvini (2003)
Aarogyasri
(2007)
RSBY plus (2010) 
ASBY (2010–11)
Kalaignar (2009)
Vajpayee Arogyashri
(2010)
private insurers—Mediclaim
(1986)
Figure 2.4 India: A Genealogy of Government-Sponsored Health Insurance 
Schemes
Source: Authors.
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The first, known as Mediclaim, and launched by four public non-life insur-
ance companies,18 covered inpatient care up to a defined annual cap. This 
feature was also adopted by most GSHISs.19 Although subsequent versions 
of this Mediclaim product continue to dominate the PVHI market, more 
than 30 insurers (mostly non-life and some life insurers) now offer more 
than 300 mostly indemnity products.20 Another variant of the Mediclaim-
type coverage, which was introduced by private insurers, is known as the 
“family floater.” It covers the entire family and was an additional design 
feature incorporated by a number of GSHISs analyzed in this book. 
During its early years of development, the private insurance indus-
try’s influence on hospitals was minimal. At the turn of the century, the 
private health insurance system was small and insignificant relative to 
total hospital revenues (about 2 percent of India’s total spending on 
hospitalization). Like uninsured patients, the insured paid their bills in 
cash but subsequently sought reimbursement from their insurers. This 
meant that patients not only had to arrange substantial funds upfront, 
but also suffer losses due to deductions and delays during claim pro-
cessing by the insurer.
By 2008–09, however, health insurance companies were paying claims 
amounting to about 10 percent of all hospitalization expenditure in the 
country.21 This proportion was much higher for hospitals located in larger 
cities where insurers and third-party administrators (TPAs) were contrib-
uting 30 percent or more to total hospital revenues. In the 2000s, the 
number of “networked hospitals” rapidly expanded, and is currently esti-
mated at about 10,000 hospitals across the country. By the late 2000s 
GSHISs were able to tap into this large hospital network for access to 
treatment for their beneficiaries (and indeed augmented it further), 
which facilitated GSHIS expansion. 
With the rapid growth of private insurance and the introduction of 
TPAs in the 2000s, the concept of “cashless” hospitalization emerged, and 
was subsequently adapted by all GSHISs. TPAs (and insurers) entered into 
agreements with networked hospitals to treat the beneficiaries. Claims 
were settled between the TPA or insurer and the hospital, and patients 
were charged only for copayments or services not covered by insurance. 
This is a far cry from the early days of the system, when hospitals were 
wary of joining the cashless networks—a new, untested concept for most 
hospitals before the mid-2000s. Based on discussions with TPAs and insur-
ers, the share of cashless hospitalization is currently estimated at more 
than 60 percent of the PVHI market. The remainder of the market still 
relies on paper-based reimbursement. 
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The operational capacities of the PVHI industry to process prior 
authorizations for cashless claims and the claim payment processes also 
grew, accounting for several million transactions annually. The informa-
tion technology capabilities of insurers, TPAs, and hospitals—an essential 
prerequisite to the success of most new GSHISs—also witnessed consis-
tent development across the industry.
The commercial health insurance market itself has become fiercely 
competitive, which has also benefited the emerging GSHISs. Insurers 
have demonstrated their willingness to quote lower and lower prices in a 
bid to acquire larger volumes of business. This was reflected in the low 
premium bids offered by insurers for the GSHIS business (chapter 3, this 
volume). The low premiums facilitated the affordability of GSHISs for 
government, at least in the short term. However, in the long run much 
greater resources may be needed to sustain the schemes.
Returning to the public sector, the system known as “Chief Minister’s 
Relief Fund” was also a precursor in the genealogy of the newer 
GSHISs, especially for the state government schemes. Several states in 
the country had been operating relief funds, often housed in the chief 
minister’s office, which made discretionary grants for high-cost ill-
nesses, based on the patient’s financial status. Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that grant allocations were often inequitable and patronage 
driven, and resulted in out-of-pocket spending. With its initial list of 
covered illnesses stemming from applications for such grants, Andhra 
Pradesh institutionalized this discretionary grants program into a 
health insurance scheme. Subsequently, other states such as Himachal 
Pradesh also chose to convert a discretionary grants system into insur-
ance-based entitlements for the state’s poorest citizens. Several other 
states are contemplating this option. 
Notes
 1. MOHFW 2009a (provisional estimations from 2005–06 to 2008–09). 
 2. Exceeded in Asia only by Pakistan, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Afghanistan in 
2008 (WHO 2010).
 3. In this chapter different sources of data on health spending are cited for dif-
ferent years. Not all data are consistent. Some data are available for certain 
years only, such as data based on national surveys (NSSO) and national health 
accounts (NHA).
 4. These themes are discussed in greater detail in the paragraphs that follow.
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 5. This segmentation of finance and delivery has been observed in other low- 
and middle-income countries (Londoño and Frank 1997; La Forgia 2000; 
Baeza and Packard 2006).
 6. These include: HIV/AIDS, disease surveillance, malaria, blindness control, 
tuberculosis, leprosy, reproductive and child health, and so forth, and are 
implemented by state health authorities.
 7. The source of state budgetary expenditures is general state taxes. Information 
on the exact tax source is unavailable.
 8. Registered as independent societies with state officials managing their affairs ex 
officio, the state health societies allow faster decision making, quicker cash trans-
fers, and easier accounting requirements than the conventional treasury route.
 9. An exception to this statement is the recent wave of state-sponsored GSHISs
 10. Absorptive capacity of states to spend GOI transfers has been a major issue, 
particularly since the onset of NRHM (Duggal 2007). For example, a GOI 
audit found nearly 40 percent of transfers being unspent balances among the 
various programs under the NRHM in 2007–08 (MOHFW 2009a). However, 
some of the unspent funds were due to late-in-the-year releases by the 
MOHFW. This is a consequence of the budgetary cycle in which MOHFW 
funds lapse on March 31each year, and mounting pressure to push funds to 
states as this date approaches, leaving little time for spending. States’ absorp-
tive capacity, nevertheless, has improved in recent years (MOHFW 2011).
 11. Authors’ estimates. Health insurance spending is taken up in chapter 3.
 12. Kuruvilla and Liu (2007) outline the constraints to microinsurance schemes: 
(1) population coverage is usually limited to small geographical areas; (2) 
breadth of coverage is restricted, usually limited to primary care; (3) weak 
managerial capacity leads to low quality, cost escalation, and inefficiencies; 
and (4) without a significant government subsidy, coverage cannot be 
expanded to larger groups.
 13. One reason for the limited group insurance market could be the additional 
service tax liability on insurance premiums which employers do not incur if 
they provide in-house services or reimburse employees’ medical expenses 
(IRDA 2009).
 14. Based on 36 focus group discussions conducted in 25 villages and wards in the 
impoverished Prakasam Region, AP, Reddy (2011: 41) provides the following 
depiction of community sentiments toward public hospitals: “They [villagers] 
opined that they cannot rely on the hospital in cases of emergencies as they 
never know if it functions properly with all the doctors and support staff. The 
same doctors working in the hospital have their private clinics and nursing 
homes. People prefer to attend their clinics as all the necessary equipment and 
staff to provide timely treatment is present there.” 
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 15. The low quality of diagnostic skills and advice provided by both qualified and 
unqualified private practitioners (and public practitioners) has been docu-
mented by Das et al. (2011) and Das and Hammer (2006, 2007). In a review 
of microstudies on private provision, Baru and Nundy (2008) found a number 
of shortcomings in private facilities in terms of infrastructure, equipment, 
sanitary conditions, and staffing, particularly among smaller hospitals known 
as nursing homes. The authors also cited studies outlining inappropriate and 
harmful practices in terms of treatment of tuberculosis, malaria, and other 
diseases, as well as irrational use of drugs. Concessional pricing for the poor is 
a widespread practice of qualified private inpatient and outpatient providers, 
but private allopathic providers usually cater to a wealthier segment of the 
population than public providers, at least in rural areas (Peters et al. 2002).
 16. The schemes in railways, defense, and civil service for civil employees in non-
CGHS areas (CS-MA) are all noncontributory and entirely funded by the 
GOI as an employment benefit. For railway and defense employees, services 
are delivered largely through a captive network of health facilities owned and 
operated by these departments. CS-MA reimburses government hospitals and 
authorized private medical practitioners. Because these schemes do not have 
the features of the “insurance” schemes examined here, they have been 
excluded from discussion.
 17. These structural features are a departure from more traditional contributory 
“social insurance” models such as ESIS and CGHS. These latter schemes are 
financed mainly through payroll taxes and, unlike the recently established 
GSHISs, provide coverage for a comprehensive benefits package including 
inpatient and outpatient care. ESIS beneficiaries receive most care through 
scheme-owned and -operated facilities. Specialty inpatient care, however, is 
contracted out to private hospitals. CGHS outsources inpatient care to both 
public and private facilities, but mainly the latter.
 18. These state-owned non-life insurance companies are entirely owned by the 
Indian government, but are registered as for-profit companies and operate as 
commercial insurers. Public and private insurers offer the same range of prod-
ucts. The term “private health insurance” used in this study refers to govern-
ment-owned and privately held insurance companies. Nevertheless, the 
bottom line is probably far more closely monitored in private commercial 
insurers than in their publicly owned counterparts. Consequently, there could 
be differences in the expected incentive structure of private vis-à-vis public 
insurers.
 19. However, some features of Mediclaim such as exclusions for preexisting 
conditions (which is primarily a deterrent against adverse selection used by 
private voluntary plans) were not adopted by the GSHISs due to their much 
wider member base and highly subsidized premium, which potentially 
address adverse selection.
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 20. Population coverage under voluntary PVHI schemes is estimated at about 
5 percent of the population. In FY2009–10 PVHI was a Rs. 75 billion 
 industry, excluding revenues from services provided under contract with 
GSHISs.
 21. The rapid growth in the health insurance industry after 2001 can be attrib-
uted to the introduction of a new regulatory structure for the insurance 
industry in the late 1990s. Privately owned insurance companies were once 
again permitted to operate, which led to more efforts to increase public 
awareness of health insurance products. The other regulatory change was 
the introduction of third-party administrator (TPA) regulations in 2001, 
which provided a quick market entry for newer health insurers that could 
use already organized hospital networks and established claim processing 
capacities created by TPAs.
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Results and Cross-Cutting Issues
The results drawn from the nine case studies, presented in appendix A, 
are synthesized in this chapter. Twelve cross-cutting themes are dis-
cussed. For each theme, general and innovative scheme features are 
described, strengths and shortcomings are identified, and emerging issues 
are raised. Focus is put on both big picture and operational issues. In 
cases where there is insufficient data to make sound interpretations, 
potential issues are hypothesized. For the most part, the themes follow 
the areas of inquiry specified in table 1.1. They are: (1) population cov-
erage; (2) enrolment and beneficiaries; (3) benefits; (4) utilization; 
(5) expenditures and costs; (6) rate setting and provider payment; 
(7) provider networks, quality, and patient satisfaction; (8) the role of 
public hospitals; (9) financial benefits and burdens on patients; (10) cost 
containment; (11) institutional arrangements and managerial capacity; 
and (12) political economy issues. The chapter concludes with a sum-
mary of successes and challenges emerging from scheme design features 
and implementation experience.
Population Coverage 
Extending population coverage has been the major focus of the new 
wave of government-sponsored health insurance schemes (GSHISs), 
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particularly during the continuing roll-out phase, which commenced in 
the late 2000s. In this section, past trends in population coverage and 
future projections are examined. 
Table 3.1 tracks the significant growth in population coverage by 
GSHIS and commercial insurers over three time periods.1 Between 
2003–04 and 2009–10, population coverage through GSHISs increased 
by well over fivefold. 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) and two state schemes (Rajiv 
Aarogyasri and Kalaignar2) account for nearly all the growth achieved by 
GSHISs. Consequent to the focus of these schemes on the poor and eco-
nomically vulnerable populations, lower-income groups predominate in 
this growth. Most of the expansion has been recent, after 2007. In the 
case of Rajiv Aarogyasri and Kalaignar, state governments have in theory 
extended coverage to more than 80 percent and 50 percent of their 
respective populations, which they deemed low-income and vulnerable to 
health shocks. Thus, these states are approaching universal coverage, at 
Table 3.1 India: Population Coverage and Projected Growth, 2003–04, 
2009–10, and 2015 (million people)
Scheme 2003–04 2009–10 2015a
Central government
Employees’ State Insurance Scheme (ESIS) 31 56 72
Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) 4.3 3 3
RSBY n.a 70 300
State government
Andhra Pradesh, AP (Aarogyasri) n.a 70 75
Tamil Nadu, TN (Kalaignar) n.a 40 42
Karnataka, KA (Arogyashri) n.a 1.4 33
KA (Yeshasvini) 1.6 3 3.4
Total government-sponsored 37.2 243 528.4
Commercial insurers 15b 55b 90
Grand total (includes others not listed above)c 55 300 630
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on scheme data.
Note: n.a = not applicable, scheme not yet in existence.
a. See annex 3B for estimation methods. 
b. Estimated based on average premium from Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) 
sample database Traffic Advisory Committee/Insurance Information Bureau (TAC/IIB) applied to published 
revenue data of the industry. 
c. Includes other health protection and health insurance schemes, including community health insurance 
schemes, publicly subsidized schemes for handloom workers and artisans, noncontributory coverage by 
employers of government (defense, railways, state government staff ) and nongovernment employees 
(where employers run their own facilities or provide reimbursements without using insurance mechanisms) 
as an employment benefit.
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least for the defined benefits packages. Over this same period, commercial 
insurers also made impressive strides in coverage expansion, registering an 
estimated four-fold increase in coverage. 
With 243 million persons estimated to be covered in the major gov-
ernment-sponsored health insurance schemes (table 3.1), the authors 
estimate that more than 300 million persons, about 25 percent of India’s 
population, now have access to some form of health insurance.3 This 
estimate includes coverage by schemes not reviewed in this book, includ-
ing those for government employees and pensioners managed by the 
Railways and Defense departments, targeted government schemes such 
as those sponsored by the Department of Handlooms and Handicrafts, 
and the community-based self-managed schemes.4 
In light of current trends, and assuming continued political and finan-
cial support from government, insurance coverage is expected (perhaps 
conservatively) to reach more than 630 million persons, 50 percent of 
the population by 2015. Most of the growth is likely to occur along 
three lines: RSBY, commercial insurance, and state-sponsored schemes. 
RSBY aims to reach 60 million families by 2015 (roughly 300 million 
members), and will account for most of the growth in GSHISs. State 
schemes such as Vajpayee Arogyashri (VA) in Karnataka will continue 
to expand.5
Other potential drivers of growth are commercial insurance as well as 
new state schemes in the planning stage. As mentioned above, other states 
will be introducing new schemes. Any additional states that launch 
schemes will further expand coverage, increasing membership well above 
the projected 630 million.6
India’s rapid economic growth is creating a large middle- and upper-
middle class that can afford to buy mostly individual and family plans 
from commercial insurers. According to the National Commission for 
Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS 2009), about 23 percent 
of the population (270 million people in 2010) can be categorized as 
middle class and higher and the remaining 77 percent as poor or vulner-
able. Therefore, 23 percent may represent an upper limit on potential 
coverage through private voluntary health insurance (PVHI).7 
Because of its linkage to the formal economy, ESIS will probably 
experience slow growth. NCEUS (2009) estimates that between 1992–
93 and 2005–06 national income grew by 125 percent. However, eco-
nomic growth has had no impact on formal employment growth as a 
percent of total work force. Informal workers remained at about 92 per-
cent of the workforce over this period. Most of the growth in ESIS 
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population coverage over the last decade was due to increases in the 
wage ceiling, thereby bringing previously uncovered groups of the for-
mal sector under the ESIS umbrella. The impact of a recent 50 percent 
hike in the wage ceiling will similarly contribute to ESIS membership 
expansion in the near future.8 
CGHS is limited to civil servants, a group that has experienced a 
decline in numbers in recent years. According to the Census of Central 
Government Employees (2009), the total number of regular central 
government employees (including railways but not including defense) in 
2006 was 3.1 million compared with 3.2 million in 2004, a drop of 
about 1.5 percent. However, as CGHS also covers retirees and is an 
attractive proposition for retiring civil employees,9 it is assumed that the 
number of employees retiring (and thus exiting CGHS at the end of 
their service career) will be offset by new pensioners joining the scheme. 
Also, new recruitments (capped at an annual 2 percent of the existing 
base) are also likely to be offset by members exiting the scheme due to 
death, keeping the member base for CGHS more or less constant in the 
foreseeable future.
To summarize, if current trends of coverage expansion continue, at 
least one half of the Indian population will be enrolled in a health insur-
ance scheme by 2015. GSHISs (as well as private insurers) are currently 
focusing on expanding the breadth of coverage. As will be seen below, 
the depth of benefit cover will vary considerably, with a large majority 
receiving very limited coverage and a small minority enjoying compre-
hensive benefits. Coverage will continue to expand in a segmented 
manner with different risk pools according to labor status, socioeco-
nomic status, and enrolment in central- or state-sponsored schemes. 
Segmentation has important implications in terms of equity (of finan-
cial protection) and efficiency (of service purchasing and delivery). 
Enrolment and Beneficiaries
Successful coverage extension requires robust enrolment processes and 
targeting mechanisms. These measures contribute to equity while avoid-
ing issues of adverse selection (by both insurers and beneficiaries). Simple 
eligibility requirements, innovative outreach mechanisms, and use of 
smart technologies have facilitated enrolment, allowing schemes to reach 
targeted beneficiaries. To identify the poor, most schemes use the BPL list, 
a proxy means test applied nationally by the central government (and 
implemented by states). It is used primarily for targeting food and other 
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subsidies. Although the BPL targeting system is not without controversy 
(discussed below), by declaring all such BPL beneficiaries automatically 
eligible, the complexity of identification and enrolment is mitigated, and 
administrative costs are kept minimal. Some of the new schemes have 
established enrolment camps or stations that are organized by insurers in 
coordination with state government officials (e.g., RSBY).10 
In state schemes, state officials are closely involved in distribution of 
identity cards (e.g. TN). Yeshasvini uses a novel enrolment mechanism 
linking the payment of insurance contributions to financial transactions 
with the cooperative society (such as loan repayment or payment collec-
tion for milk supplies). It also uses an online identity card retrieval system 
to lower administrative costs. Further, the enrolment period spans five 
months during the harvest season, which facilitates farmers’ payment of 
the premium contribution. 
This section first details enrolment processes and technological inno-
vations applied by specific schemes to facilitate enrolment. The second 
part reviews several impediments to enrolment that have emerged dur-
ing implementation. The final part focuses on issues related to BPL 
targeting.
Enrolment Processes and Innovations
The RSBY enrolment stations are a combination of enrolment, correc-
tion of personal information in the BPL lists where necessary, photo-
graphing family members, registration of biometric information, and 
on-the-spot issuance of corresponding smartcards. The insurance compa-
nies have an incentive to enroll as many eligible families as possible 
because their premium-based income is derived from the quantum of 
cards issued. To be sure, the pace of RSBY enrolment has been impres-
sive. Approximately, 4.5 million households were enrolled in the first 
16 months of the program. In 2010 the scheme added about 7 million 
families in a period of 8 months. In other schemes such as those in AP, 
TN, and KA (Vajpayee Arogyashri), where no specific enrolment process 
was implemented, the state essentially enrolled everyone on the BPL list 
(which they could prove through BPL identity cards). In effect, millions 
of families were registered almost instantaneously, though not all “enroll-
ees” would come to know of their newly acquired insurance status right 
away. 
RSBY has also been a leader in the use of smart card technology, which 
is increasingly adopted by other schemes.11 Typically, 15 to 20 enrolment 
teams are dispatched to each district, depending on population size. 
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Hardware and software are made available to enter (or validate) member 
information such as name, age, photo, fingerprint, residence, and other 
identifiers. This information is uploaded to a server, printed in a smart 
card, and issued on the spot to beneficiaries during registration. 
Importantly, BPL status is validated against the BPL list, which is already 
uploaded on the server. Households (up to five beneficiaries) pay a 
nominal registration fee of Rs. 30 per family per year which flows to the 
state nodal agency to cover administrative costs. Insurers generally com-
plete the registration process for a district in four months. 
Even CGHS and ESIS are moving away from their paper identifica-
tion (ID) cards. For example, CGHS has already issued plastic ID cards 
to its members with a permanent beneficiary ID, while ESIS has also 
embarked on issuing magnetic stripe cards to all its insured persons and 
their dependents. Both these cards will enable online identification of 
members at all health facilities operated by the respective schemes, 
making the benefits portable across the country. In the case of ESIS, the 
biometric information of family members is also being captured and 
made available at the server end, though not on the card itself (as the 
ESIS card does not contain a memory chip, unlike the RSBY or TN 
cards).
Enrolment Issues 
Available research brought to light several obstacles to coverage expan-
sion. Lack of awareness and information about the schemes remains a 
major impediment to enrolment in GSHISs despite a number of outreach 
measures. Aggarwal (2010) reported that lack of information contributed 
to lower enrolment in distant areas for the Yeshasvini scheme. In a subse-
quent analysis (Aggarwal, forthcoming), health status was found to be a 
significant determinant of enrolment (and renewal), suggesting adverse 
selection. The study also found that the scheme had low penetration in 
distant villages and tended to favor villages with a high density of eligible 
populations (e.g., milk cooperative members).
The RSBY team conducted a series of analyses on enrolment to under-
stand problems and identify the determinants of enrolment performance. 
Together, these studies provide insight into demand- and supply-side 
constraints to enrolment. 
Based on a small sample of 248 BPL households12 (1,478 individuals) 
in Delhi, Grover and Palacios (2011) reported that a significant propor-
tion were not clear about RSBY eligibility criteria, covered benefits, or 
cost of the smart card. However, once aware of the scheme, more than 
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70 percent applied for enrolment. Regression analyses found that the 
following factors contributed to the probability of enrolment: (i) head of 
household is between 30 and 45 years of age; (ii) household has links to 
politicians and local authorities; and (iii) head of household completed 
primary education. There was no evidence of gender bias. Interestingly, 
health status was not a determinant of enrolment, suggesting that adverse 
selection may not be a factor affecting enrolment.13 Site visits and inter-
views by the authors suggest supply-side constraints to enrolment such 
as cost of transportation (to access enrolment site) and lost wages, incor-
rect information on identification documentation, and absence of head 
of household. 
Sun (2011) examined RSBY administrative enrolment data from 24 
districts (17,000 villages) in seven states. He observed large variations in 
enrolment ratios in districts and villages, with an average take up rate of 
45 percent. However, in-depth village-level analysis displayed even 
greater variation. For example, in 10 percent of villages there was no 
enrolment while in 2.5 percent full enrolment of BPL families was 
observed. The author suggests several reasons for these disparities, but the 
main problem may rest with the quality of BPL listings (see below). In 
some villages, no BPL families were listed. In other cases, the name of the 
village was incorrectly listed, such that individuals did not match up with 
villages. 
Distance and BPL village density may also affect enrolment. Enrolment 
agencies contracted by insurers are paid a flat fee per family enrolled, and 
therefore have little incentive to incur the extra cost of enrolling potential 
beneficiaries in remote villages or in villages with few BPL families.14 
Insurers may also try to avoid villages where the probability of higher 
utilization is greater, such as villages with a high population of elderly and 
without access to basic primary care.15 In a subsequent analysis, Sun 
found some evidence that enrolment agencies focus on nearby and high 
BPL density villages but reported no evidence of cream skimming in 
terms of avoiding villages with higher ratios of elderly.16
To further examine the determinants of take-up ratios Sun combined 
RSBY administrative data with available household and village data from 
the Census. Of the potential eligible population of 11 million people, 
only 3 million were enrolled. He found the major determinant of take up 
was village BPL density. As suggested above, this makes sense in terms of 
the incentives that the enrolment agencies face. They are usually paid on 
a per family basis and therefore would incur lower enrolment costs in 
villages with high BPL density. Other determinants were [villager] access 
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to commercial facilities such as a bank, immunization rates for diptheria, 
pertussis, and tetanus (DPT3) as a proxy for primary care, and enrolment 
by a private insurance company. 
The latter result is puzzling and could reflect the different incentive 
environment for government-owned vis-à-vis privately owned commer-
cial insurers. Even though both types of commercial insurers (govern-
ment-owned or privately owned) are for-profit firms and in principle 
face the same incentives, does the former’s proximity to government and 
possible lack of incentives to maximize enrolment result in public insur-
ers’ making less of an effort to enroll beneficiaries? Or is it that the 
bottom-line impact of earning higher premiums (which are based on 
enrolment) and ensuring a larger risk pool is more important to privately 
owned insurers than to their public counterparts? Do internal incentives 
for field enrolment agents differ among these types of firms? If so, how 
is this manifested? Further research is needed to understand the incen-
tive environment of public and private insurers. 
Interestingly, Sun found that about a quarter of the difference 
between eligible and enrolled populations was related to the reduced 
number of enrolled family members. More than one third of families 
with five or more members enrolled fewer than five, which is the RSBY 
family limit. Enrolment decreased as family size increased. One would 
expect that large families would enroll the maximum number of five 
members. Why is this not the case? Three explanations come to mind. 
First, during the day of enrolment, not all members were present. The 
second relates to the outdated BPL lists, which may not account for fam-
ily members no longer living in the household (due to marriage, death 
and change of residence). Another explanation may involve incentives 
facing enrolment agencies. Since a flat fee is paid per family irrespective 
of the number of members enrolled, agencies have little incentive to 
incur the extra time and cost to enroll the maximum number of family 
members. 
Targeting and Equity Considerations
The effectiveness of targeting in the enrolment process depends on the 
quality of BPL listings. Unfortunately, the BPL scoring and classification 
system in India is notorious for false positives (leakage) and for false 
negatives (undercoverage). Jalan and Murgai (2007) compared BPL clas-
sification with consumption patterns drawn from the household Consumer 
Expenditure Schedule of the NSS. They found that BPL scores misclassi-
fied 49 percent of the non-poor as poor. The misclassification of non-poor 
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as poor is more prevalent in the richer states. Dreze and Khera (2010) 
performed a similar analysis based on the NSS 61st round (2004–05) and 
the third National Family Health Survey (DLHS-3: 2005–06). The 
results are reported in table 3.2. The second column contains the propor-
tion of BPL cardholding households by quintiles based on the monthly 
per capita expenditures drawn from the NSS. In the third column the 
proportions are based on the “Wealth Index” generated by the authors 
from the DLHS-3. While only 53 percent and 39 percent of the poorest 
quintile had BPL cards according to the NSS and DLHS-3 data respec-
tively, so did nearly 18 percent of the richest. 
State-level analyses of non-poor BPL card holders yield significant 
variation. Ram, Mohanty, and Ram (2009) estimated the percentage of 
non-poor (e.g., 3rd, 4th, and 5th wealth quintiles) possessing BPL cards 
for selected states. Turning to the states operating GSHISs, Andhra Pradesh 
and Karnataka displayed high levels of leakage (59 percent and 37 per-
cent, respectively) to the non-poor. Contrarily, only 5 percent of the BPL 
card holders in Tamil Nadu were non-poor. Himachal Pradesh (HP) per-
formed at a middle range with 13 percent of non-poor BPL card holders. 
Data on characteristics of beneficiaries are scarce across the schemes, 
but what data exist appear to reflect the aforementioned distortions of 
the BPL lists. In a small survey of 210 beneficiaries in six districts cov-
ered under AP’s Aarogyasri scheme in 2007–08, Rao and Kadam (2009) 
found that the scheme does an adequate job of targeting the poor. Rao 
reported that 49 percent of beneficiaries were illiterate, 51 percent were 
classified as of low socioeconomic status, and 66 percent were unem-
ployed, unskilled manual workers, and domestics. Also, 87 percent 
resided in rural areas (compared with 73 percent rural population for the 
state as a whole).
Table 3.2 India: BPL Card Distribution and Economic Status, by Income 
Quintile, 2005 (percent of rural households with cards)
Income quintile Monthly per capita expenditurea Wealth indexb
Poorest 53.1 39.2
Second 41.0 38.9
Third 34.6 36.9
Fourth 25.6 31.9
Richest 17.8 17.6
All households 34.2 32.9
Source: Dreze and Khera 2010.
a. National Sample Survey (NSS Data), 2004–05.
b. National Family Health Survey (NFHS Data), 2005–06.
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However, undercoverage was found for hard-to-reach groups such as 
Scheduled Castes (12 percent of beneficiaries compared with 16 percent 
of the population) and Scheduled Tribes (3 percent of beneficiaries com-
pared with 6 percent of the population). Also, 7 percent and 42 percent 
of beneficiaries were classified as of high and middle socioeconomic 
status, respectively, and 17 percent reported 10 or more years of school-
ing. These data appear to reflect the apparent targeting errors in state 
BPL lists.
In the case of AP, other factors may come into play. The state has 
expanded its BPL lists to include non-poor but vulnerable popula-
tions.17 For example, AP uses a different poverty line (from the one used 
for the GOI Planning Commission estimates of BPL in AP) in which 
more than 70 percent of the state’s population is deemed BPL. This 
broader definition has resulted in eligibility for more than 80 percent of 
the population. However, a relatively well-off, non-BPL family can eas-
ily seek a waiver to secure the same benefits in times of need for tertiary 
care through an alternative mechanism (such as petitioning the chief 
minister’s office), which practically results in universal access to Rajiv 
Aarogyasri benefits. 
Yeshasvini in Karnataka is aimed at rural farmers, both below and above 
the poverty line.18 An evaluation conducted by the scheme found that 
some ineligible members had also joined the scheme (Nabard Consultancy 
Services 2007). The study also found that the members did not under-
stand the scheme fully, especially exclusions and recent revisions. 
Aggarwal (forthcoming) analyzed the equity effects of enrolment in 
Yeshasvini. In general, the scheme tends to favor the well off members of 
cooperative societies. Higher levels of income and education, member-
ship in self-help groups, and access to information19 were found to 
increase the probability of enrolment. Scheduled tribes were also under-
represented after controlling for household and location effects. The 
probability of enrolment (and renewal) was negatively correlated with 
distance from health facilities. Gender, however, was not found to be a 
determinant of enrolment. The flat premium rate, truncated benefits,20 
and no coverage of transportation costs to access empaneled facilities 
probably contribute to curtail demand for enrolment from lower-income 
cooperative members. 
In sum, the recent wave of GSHISs has targeted BPL populations 
across the country. Many have introduced innovative technologies to 
facilitate and lower the cost of enrolment. Insurers under contract with 
the schemes have an incentive to enroll as many families as possible 
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since their revenues, premium payments, are tied to membership. 
However, they also have a disincentive to enroll distant, hard-to-reach 
populations as well as BPL families residing in villages with low BPL 
density. Lower levels of coverage of hard-to-reach but eligible popula-
tions is worrisome. The targeting errors of the BPL lists, particularly in 
terms of leakage, combined with expansion of state-generated BPL lists 
to include the non-poor raise important equity questions about the allo-
cation of scarce government resources. However, NCEUS (2009) esti-
mates that 77 percent of the country’s population is poor or vulnerable. 
This may justify extension of health protection mechanisms to a wider 
group beyond the BPL population, but probably not for the well-off who 
can afford private insurance.
Benefits 
The new generation of GSHISs aims to provide financial protection to 
the poor against catastrophic health shocks. For these schemes, “cata-
strophic” is invariably defined in terms of inpatient care. Ambulatory care 
is largely uncovered. Further, even among these schemes, wide variations 
in benefits coverage exist. The older social health insurance (SHI) pro-
grams, ESIS and CGHS, are the only ones to provide coverage for a com-
prehensive benefits package that includes preventive and primary care 
services. This section describes the nature and depth of benefits covered 
by the schemes and discusses the coverage gaps.
Benefit Definition—Use of Inpatient Treatment “Packages”
In general, and with the exception of RSBY, the newer schemes demon-
strate a strong emphasis on surgical procedures. All the state schemes 
focus on higher-end tertiary care, but often with a similar surgical focus. 
The evolution of this prominence of inpatient care and other character-
istics of this benefits package responds to several factors. First, the sector, 
particularly insurers and large private hospitals in the insurer’s networks, 
have considerable experience in catering to insured patients for inpatient 
care. Second, both were familiar with the “package” rate provider pay-
ment mechanism currently used by all GSHISs.21 Third, preauthoriza-
tion and other control systems for inpatient claims had already been 
developed by the private insurers, and the third-party administrators 
(TPAs) employed by them, mainly because private health insurance 
(PHI) products were (and continue to be) focused predominantly on 
inpatient services. Fourth, inpatient care was seen as a major cause of 
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financial burden for the poor even when provided by public hospitals. 
Fifth, state policymakers who played an important role in the design of 
these schemes considered purchasing surgical and tertiary care services 
from the private sector a priority due to limitations of public supply, 
particularly public hospital infrastructure and specialized human 
resources.22 Sixth, some states (AP, HP, and other states currently in 
planning stages) designed their tertiary-focused health insurance (HI) 
schemes in part to address equity and access shortcomings of the sys-
tem of discretionary sickness grants provided by chief ministers of the 
states for high-cost health care.23 Finally, the potential moral hazard 
issues related to ambulatory care (which the country’s PHI sector is 
still struggling to cover) and the relative inexperience of both govern-
ment and insurers in purchasing ambulatory care services have contrib-
uted to widespread reluctance to offer wider insurance coverage. 
Notably, the only two comprehensive insurance schemes in this study, 
ESIS and CGHS, deliver ambulatory care mainly through their captive 
facilities, partly to control utilization and also to serve as a gatekeeper 
for hospitalization.
In most new GSHISs, benefits are defined in terms of treatment pack-
ages covered by the scheme.24 Most schemes limit their exposure through 
annual per family spending caps, except CGHS and ESIS, which do not 
prescribe any annual (or even lifetime) caps. As observed in table 3.3, 
considerable variation exists among schemes regarding the number of 
eligible treatment packages and amount of annual spending caps. ESIS, 
CGHS, and Yeshasvini cover secondary and tertiary care and therefore 
have defined a larger number of packages than the other schemes. RSBY 
covers mostly secondary care including maternity. In theory, it covers all 
forms of hospital treatment but the depth of coverage is limited by the 
annual cap of Rs. 30,000 per family. Charges for most tertiary care would 
far exceed this amount. As a result, RSBY packages cater primarily to 
secondary care. The remaining schemes stress tertiary care, including car-
diovascular, renal, neurological, and cancer care, and only for the defined 
conditions or procedures that have been priced on a “package” basis. The 
higher annual caps for these schemes are related to the higher pricing of 
package rates for covered services, due to the tertiary nature of the ser-
vices covered. All package rates fall within the cap.
Table 3.4 displays the number of packages by specialty classified by 
type of treatment (surgical or medical). Cardiology, neurosurgery, neph-
rology, orthopedics, oncology, and general surgery account for 60 per-
cent of packages. Interestingly, the areas of pediatrics and obstetrics and 
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gynecology (OBGYN) possess relatively few treatments and procedures, 
together accounting for only about 9 percent of the total. The number 
of defined inpatient packages for the disease groups range from 326 
(RSBY Plus, HP) to 1,229 (Yeshasvini, KA). 
Surgical procedures dominate all categories, representing 96 percent 
of all inpatient packages. However, RSBY, CGHS, and ESIS also cover 
residual forms of inpatient treatment beyond the common, packaged 
conditions. Treatment for nonpackaged conditions is paid for on a fee-
for-service basis, using rules and payment structures prescribed by the 
schemes. For example, unlike the tertiary-focused state schemes, RSBY 
Table 3.3 India: Number of Covered Treatment “Packages” and Maximum Benefit 
Coverage, 2009–10
Scheme Benefit type
No. of 
inpatient 
packages
Coverage extends 
beyond specified 
packages
Maximum annual 
coverage 
(Rs.)
Central government sponsored 
ESIS Comprehensive 1,900a Yes No annual limits 
(or lifetime limits)
CGHS Comprehensive 1,900 Yes No annual limits 
(or lifetime limits)
RSBY Inpatient 
Secondary
727 Yes 30,000/Family
State government sponsored 
Rajiv Aarogyasri 
(AP)
Inpatient
Tertiary
938b No 150,000/Family+
50,000 buffer
Vajpayee 
Arogyashri (KA)
Inpatient
Tertiary
402b,c No 150,000/Family+
50,000 buffer
Kalaignar (TN) Inpatient
Tertiary
412b No 100,000/Family 
(floating over 4 yrs)
Yeshasvini (KA) Inpatient
Secondary, 
limited
Tertiary
1,229b No 200,000/Person
RSBY Plus (HP) Inpatient
Tertiary
326 No 175,000 over the 
RSBY cover of 
30,000
ASBY (Delhi) Inpatient 
Tertiary
n.a. No 150,000 over the 
RSBY cover of 
30,000 (proposed)
Source: Authors’ elaboration from schemes’ documentation and data.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
a. As defined by CGHS. This number includes diagnostic and outpatient department procedures.
b. Mostly surgical.
c. Does not include 50 follow-up packages.
Table 3.4 India: Packages Classified by Major Disease Group and by Surgical and Medical Treatment, 2010 
Disease group classified by 
surgical (S) and medical (M)a RSBYb
Kalaignar’s 
(TN)
Yeshasvini 
(KA)
Vajpayee 
Arogyashri (KA) CGHSb and ESISb
Rajiv 
Arogyashri (AP)
RSBY Plus 
(HP)
Cardiology S n.a. 24 135 134 85 109 109
M  1    11  
Nephrology S 109 9 212 21 129 54 54
M      5  
Neurology S 50 70 67 55 38 67 67
M      12  
Orthopedics S 131 29 295 8 109 68 20
M      0  
Gastroenterology S 73 37 167 n.a. 123 55 55
M      19  
Oncology S 23 121 n.a. 106 11 132  
M  57  60 3 62 12
Opthalmology S 41 14 152  36 26  
M    n.a.   n.a.
Ear, nose, and throat 
(ENT)
S 71 3 124  50 23  
M    n.a.   n.a.
Obstetrics and 
gynecology (OBGYN)
S 46 5 60  75 17  
M    n.a.   n.a.
50  
General surgery S 148 10 117 11 26 79 0
M        
Pediatrics S 31 56 10 7 22 57 n.a.
M      67  
Others S 4 n.a. 18 n.a. 29 n.a.
M 7 24 46
TOTAL 727 412 1,229 402 731 938 326
Percent % S 100 86 100 86 96 77 96
% M 0 14 <1 14 4 23 4
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on scheme data. 
Note: n.a. = not applicable, service not offered.
a. There are some overlaps between categories (such as oncology) where we have based our classification on the categorization adopted by the schemes.
b. These schemes offer coverage for conditions beyond those specified in packages.
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covers all types of inpatient care (though within its limited annual cap) 
and not all of the covered care has been carved into “packages.” Inpatient 
care that does not belong to a defined package is handled through a 
longer process of prior authorization allowing fee-for-service payment 
of charges. These fees are based on specified daily room rent caps and 
other criteria. 
Gaps in Benefit Coverage
Do the schemes cover high frequency conditions that lead to inpatient 
stays? According to data from NSS (60th round) five of the top 10 dis-
ease groups leading to hospitalization for rural residents are mostly cov-
ered in the state schemes:25 heart disease (including hypertension), 
diseases of the kidney and urinary systems, gynecological disorders, and 
accidents and injuries. These conditions account for 25 percent of admis-
sions. Since they are generally higher-cost conditions, they actually 
account for a still greater proportion in terms of inpatient costs. However, 
high-frequency but less-complex conditions such as diarrhea, dysentery, 
gastritis, respiratory infections (including asthma), and malaria remain 
uncovered in all the state-level schemes. They are covered, however, in 
CGHS, ESIS, and RSBY. Together these conditions account for 23 percent 
of admissions, according to the NSS data. Although these conditions 
should ideally be treated at the primary level, an inpatient stay would 
represent a catastrophic expenditure for the poor. 
With the exception of CGHS and ESIS, no scheme covers ambulatory 
care except for some initial screening of patients (e.g., at camps) to deter-
mine if their ailments merit coverage for an inpatient admission. Some 
schemes also have limited coverage for posthospitalization care.26 In 
terms of the latter, RSBY and AP cover medications for the number of 
days specified, which are provided by the hospital upon a patient’s dis-
charge. Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP) and Vajpayee Arogyashri (KA) also cover 
“follow up packages” for 125 and 50 conditions respectively. For example, 
in case of conditions such as renal failure and malignancies, posthospital-
ization coverage includes a year’s supply of any required follow-up 
medicines, consultations, and defined diagnostics. These follow-up pack-
ages are, however, poorly understood and utilized. 
As discussed below, although these schemes reduce the financial bur-
den for hospitalizations, whether they address the overall financial bur-
den of the poor is an open question. Clearly, an inpatient stay would be 
a catastrophic event for most poor people. However, what would qualify 
as “catastrophic” for the poor household requires more precise definition 
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of the term. For example, ambulatory care constitutes a much higher 
share of overall health expenditure than inpatient care, and much of this 
continues to be out of pocket. A chronic ailment requiring regular treat-
ment as an outpatient can involve higher expenditures than an inpatient 
procedure. 
As schemes evolve, they will face pressure to deepen the benefits 
package. This is already the case for some. In Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP), for 
example, the scheme started in a small geographical area, with coverage 
for expensive, tertiary conditions that were among the most common 
causes for which patients approached the chief minister’s discretionary 
“relief” fund for a grant to cover the cost of care. As the scheme 
expanded geographically, it also deepened the benefits package, adding 
several hundred new procedures, including some secondary procedures. 
Similarly, after a year of implementation experience, RSBY added 
maternity coverage and removed the exclusion for HIV/AIDS. Based 
on analyses of claims data, RSBY is also expanding its list of packages 
to standardize costs for an additional set of conditions. Also with the 
aim of deepening the coverage, other schemes are considering follow-
up care packages. Evolution of benefits packages is an ongoing process 
in response to sociopolitical demands, claim experience, and availability 
of financial resources. 
Utilization
Insurance coverage contributes to increased utilization by removing or 
lowering financial barriers. This can help improve welfare. However, con-
trols need to be introduced to reduce unnecessary utilization and overuti-
lization (moral hazard). This section reviews findings on utilization 
patterns and their determinants for a subset of schemes as well as emerg-
ing issues related to induced and unnecessary utilization.
Hospital Utilization Patterns
Table 3.5 compares the frequency of hospitalization from selected 
schemes with the community average, based on NSS/60th (2004–05) 
round survey data for rural and urban areas. One needs to be cautious 
about comparing scheme-specific hospitalization frequency with com-
munity-level data for any form of hospitalization for two reasons. First, 
the benefits package of the scheme may not be sufficiently comprehen-
sive and may cover only a subset of community needs for inpatient treat-
ment. Second, insurance may induce changes in health-seeking behaviors. 
54       Government-Sponsored Health Insurance in India
Table 3.5 India: Hospital Utilization Rates Nationally and for Selected 
Schemes (admissions per 1,000 beneficiaries per year)
Scheme 2009–10
NSS 2004–05
Rural Urban
Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP) 5 22 28
Kalaignar (TN)a 5 37 37
Vajpayee Arogyashri (KA)b 4 23 26
ESIS 7.5 23 31
Yeshasvini (KA) 22 23 26
RSBY 25 23 31
Private insurance 64 23 31
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NSS 2004–05 and IIB (IRDA) 2010.
a. Annualized based on data from August 2009
b. Annualized based on data of April–August 2010 (FY2010–11).
In addition, if the scheme member base is only a small proportion of the 
community (as in the case of Yeshasvini), it may not be representative of 
the community due to possible adverse selection.27
Schemes in AP, TN, and KA (Vajpayee. Arogyashri) provide coverage 
for low-frequency tertiary care only, and their hospitalization rates are 
not comparable with community averages which include all inpatient 
stays. Consequently, their utilization rates are significantly lower than the 
utilization rates generated from the NSS data. Yeshasvini covers mostly 
secondary care but some tertiary care. RSBY covers mostly secondary 
care. As observed in table 3.5, hospitalization rates for these two schemes 
are comparable to national rates.28 
However, this does not appear to be the case for private voluntary 
health insurance. Private insurers generally cover both secondary and 
tertiary inpatient care, but their members are hospitalized much more 
frequently. Hospitalization rates in private voluntary health insurance are 
two to three times the national average, and are suggestive of moral haz-
ard or adverse selection. 
The high claim frequency in PHI schemes does not bode well for 
GSHISs, which as a group are highly dependent on insurers to conduct 
insurance and administrative functions.29 The data suggest that private 
insurers cannot completely address adverse selection (especially in volun-
tary products) or prevent moral hazard or overutilization. In addition, the 
fact that insurers under contract with GSHISs can reprice their portfolio 
on subsequent renewals and pass on the higher claim costs to the schemes 
may reduce their long-term incentives to control costs.30
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Despite offering a comprehensive benefits package, the low frequency 
of hospitalization in ESIS suggests that this scheme is an outlier. ESIS 
covers workers who generally belong to a younger and healthier age 
group and therefore less utilization would be expected. But the scheme 
also covers all dependents, which may include higher age and less healthy 
groups. Thus the composition of the beneficiary pool may not contribute 
to lower the utilization to the level observed in table 3.5. Historic trends 
in the scheme indicate that the absolute number of hospitalizations in 
ESIS has declined despite an increase in the number of beneficiaries (see 
appendix A for details). This decrease in utilization of ESIS has also taken 
place for ambulatory care. Further research is needed to ascertain the 
reasons for lower utilization. Two possibilities come to mind. First, it may 
represent a shift in utilization by long-established, and mostly blue collar 
ESIS beneficiaries to out-of-pocket spending (or, though less likely, to 
duplicate coverage by private insurance). The second reason may relate 
to new beneficiaries who were inscribed because of recent increases in 
the wage ceiling for mandatory coverage under ESIS. These beneficiaries 
are higher-paid, and increasingly, white collar, formal sector employees, 
but may not utilize ESIS facilities due to their perceived low quality. 
These beneficiaries may opt for coverage through duplicate private insur-
ance or pay out of pocket. A study on the ESIS scheme undertaken in the 
southern district of Sivakasi in the state of Tamil Nadu suggests that 
opting-out could be a reason for the low utilization of ESIS facilities 
(Dash and Muraleedharan 2011).
Determinants of Hospitalization
Available evaluation data from one scheme show that affiliation (and the 
resulting financial access) resulted in increased utilization. Aggarwal 
(2010) reported that insured cooperative members demonstrated 
between 6 and 7 percent higher utilization than their uninsured peers. 
Since both groups were matched for health status, it was unlikely that 
adverse selection was causing this higher utilization. Lower-income 
cooperative members increased utilization by 2 percent, which was still 
significant. Gaining insurance coverage resulted in a 19 percent reduc-
tion in the use of free public facilities, and this reduction cut across all 
income groups. 
Research using administrative data identified some factors that affect 
utilization. In an analysis of 16,000 claims in 2007 and 2008 from 
Aarogyasri (AP), Rao and Kadam (2009) found that distance from cities 
where most empaneled facilities demanded by the beneficiaries were 
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located was negatively associated with utilization. Similarly, in an analysis 
of RSBY claims data from 75 districts, Hou and Palacios (2011) reported 
that utilization was related to the distance between blocks and the towns 
where empaneled hospitals are located. Nevertheless, regression analysis 
of the claims data from 18 districts (3,600 villages) detected other factors 
that increased the probability of utilization: being elderly, literate, residing 
in a district with a larger number of empaneled hospitals, having access 
to transportation, and living in a village where other insured villagers have 
already been treated through the scheme. The authors highlighted the 
large variation in utilization across villages that may relate to awareness 
factors which in turn may respond to the recent origin of the scheme. 
Although none of the findings are surprising, these types of analyses pro-
vide insightful information to implementers regarding adjustments to 
improve utilization.
Similarly as enrolment, incorrect understanding of the scheme or lack 
of information may impede utilization. Based on analysis of administra-
tive data, current preauthorization denial rates were about 15 and 20 
percent for the Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP) and Vajpayee Arogyashri (KA) 
schemes, respectively. Denials also vary by conditions or procedures; 
higher rejections are evident for cardiovascular conditions, neoplasm, 
and nervous disorders. The relatively high rates of preauthorization deni-
als in the tertiary-focused state schemes suggest confusion among benefi-
ciaries and providers regarding the contents of the benefits package (and 
perhaps also on the corresponding admissible claim amount). For exam-
ple, it is unlikely that providers would make the administrative effort to 
lodge incorrect or inadmissible preauthorization requests if they had 
understood the insurance coverage better. If beneficiaries and providers 
do not fully understand the covered benefits, this could lead to dissatis-
faction with the scheme and also to out-of-pocket expenditure by the 
beneficiaries who arrive at a hospital only to find that their ailments are 
not covered.31 As many of the newer GSHISs cover a limited set of pro-
cedures, effective communication by these schemes takes on added 
importance and should result in higher utilization and lower preauthori-
zation denials. 
Cognizant of the fact that insurers have few incentives to inform 
enrollees of the scheme and therefore raise usage, schemes such as AP 
and RSBY have made an effort to increase awareness and utilization 
through health camps. Running these camps is usually entrusted to 
insurers. RSBY has instructed insurers to organize health camps 
throughout the country. Camps are generally held at the local level and 
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managed by empaneled public and private hospitals and nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs). They deploy mobile medical units 
where doctors or nurses hold consultations and paramedical staff mem-
bers perform diagnostics. All villagers in a defined catchment area are 
invited to attend the one-day camps. Similar to health camps organized 
by other GSHISs, all services including consultation, basic investiga-
tions (when available), and medicines are free to the extent these are 
available in the camp. If well advertised, camps are attended by large 
numbers of villagers.32 Any RSBY enrollees diagnosed with covered ill-
ness were directed to seek treatment at the empaneled hospital. 
However, the impact has been hard to gauge. Johnson and Kumar 
(2011) investigated 65 health camps in Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh 
and found that the camps did not result in higher utilization as mea-
sured by claims. The authors suggest that camps attract such large 
numbers of people—usually in search of free consultations and medi-
cines—that medical personnel do not have sufficient time to dedicate 
specifically for RSBY enrollees. In contrast, schemes such as AP and 
Vajpayee Arogyashri (KA) use their outreach workers (known as arog-
yamithras) for precamp screening to improve yields from the camps. 
These schemes report that a large part of the covered hospitalizations 
originate from this route.
Emerging Evidence of Unnecessary Care
The newer GSHISs have few incentives for facilities (or for beneficiaries) 
to restrict utilization to only the necessary services. Despite some efforts 
by these GSHISs to align incentives with scheme objectives, hospitals still 
have incentives to induce demand for covered services even when such 
services may not be necessary, provide inpatient care for what could be 
treated more effectively (and cheaply) in an ambulatory setting, maxi-
mize the utilization of the annual family cap under the insurance schemes, 
overtreat, and even provide unnecessary care. Since outpatient care is not 
covered by most schemes, patients also have an incentive to substitute 
inpatient for outpatient care. Further research is needed to determine the 
extent of any of these practices, which can result in inefficiencies and 
raise long-term costs.
Nevertheless, from schemes’ monitoring systems, evidence of unnec-
essary care is emerging. For example, RSBY found that certain hospitals 
perform many more hysterectomies than would be expected, or com-
bine hysterectomies with simultaneous salpingo-oopharectomies 
(which entitles the facility to claim additional charges for one more 
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treatment package). There were similar claims for hernia combined 
with appendectomy to maximize revenues from the scheme. Monitoring 
data from Aarogyasri (AP) also suggests that certain procedures (e.g., 
appendectomy, hysterectomy, laminectomy/discectomy, and renal 
stone lithotripsy) were experiencing provider induced demand. The 
scheme introduced additional checks and guidelines to address this 
situation (such as the requirement to upload the video of a counseling 
session for every hysterectomy recommended for a patient). Officials 
from one GSHIS pointed to evidence of hospitals’ converting outpa-
tient care to inpatient care to seek reimbursement. This substitution 
was also reported in hospitalization products covered by PHI which led 
private health insurers to incorporate exclusions such as “unwarranted 
hospitalization” or “hospitalization only for observation with no active 
treatment” which exist in PHI products. 
Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that some schemes may also 
induce overinvestment in tertiary care and expensive technologies (e.g., 
CT scanners and cardiac catheterization units) at the expense of invest-
ments in ambulatory care, prevention, and coordinated networks. 
Health care in India is inexpensive when compared with costs in coun-
tries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). Nevertheless, care is probably not inexpensive in relation to 
the income of the vast majority of its citizenry, but if insurance drives a 
hospital-based system, costs will escalate beyond what the country can 
afford.
To summarize, insurance coverage is resulting in higher utilization 
among beneficiaries. Adverse selection does not appear to be a major 
problem for the new wave of GSHISs because most are free (or at a neg-
ligible cost) and often automatically cover all eligible beneficiaries. 
However, moral hazard and early signs of unnecessary care and substitu-
tion of inpatient for outpatient services are worrisome, and will require 
tough control measures. Of equal concern is the emerging data of unequal 
utilization patterns that suggest that more effort should be devoted to 
facilitating access for beneficiaries residing in remote localities or far from 
empaneled facilities.
Expenditures and Costs
Health insurance is assuming an increasingly important role in India’s 
health financing system. Some observers promote GSHISs as a future 
conduit for additional government spending33 while others question the 
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affordability of their further extension and whether they will check 
spending on direct public delivery.34 
This section first presents estimates of trends in GSHIS spending, 
including projections of expenditure growth. Government spending on 
GSHISs is then compared with expenditures on public delivery. The sec-
tion concludes with a review of spending across the schemes per benefi-
ciary and per hospitalization. 
Total and Projected Expenditures 
Table 3.6 presents expenditure data by scheme for 2003/04 and 
2009/10 as well as projections for 2015. It also includes estimated 
spending by commercial insurers. This is pictorially depicted in annex 
figure 3A.2. 
Based on updated health insurance data drawn from the respective 
scheme documents and from IRDA annual reports and journals reporting 
private health insurance data for the respective years, our combined esti-
mate for health expenditure incurred through the various health insurance 
Table 3.6 India: Estimated Expenditures on Health Insurance and Projected 
Growth, 2003–04, 2009–10, 2015 (Rs. crores: Rs. 10 million)
Scheme 2003–04 2009–10 2015a
Central government
ESIS 767 1,990 4,500
CGHSb 700 1,600 3,500
RSBY n.a 480ce 4,000
State government
AP (Aarogyasri) n.a 1,200 1,500
TN (Kalaignar) n.a 517b 720
KA (Arogyashri) n.a n.a 660
KA (Yeshasvini) 11 55 80
Total government-sponsored 1,478 5,842 14,960
Commercial insurersc 1,200 7,000 17,500
Other schemesd 1,800 3,200 5,500
Grand totale 4,500 16,000 38,000
Source: Authors’ calculations based on scheme data, IRDA reports, and Jaswal, 2011.
Note: n.a = not applicable; scheme did not exist.
a. See annex 3C for estimation methods.
b. Cost for full year. Includes estimated expenditure on salaried employees recorded in the respective 
departments. 
c. Rounded.
d. Non-life and excludes GSHIS business.
e. Spending estimates for other schemes, not listed above (see table 3.1, n. 3). 
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schemes in 2009–10 is Rs. 160 billion (Rs. 16,000 crores), 6.4 percent of 
the estimated total health expenditure of Rs. 2.5 trillion in 2009–10.35 
Though still relatively small, this amount represents a significantly higher 
participation of insurance in the health financing system than previous 
estimates.36
In 2003–04, ESIS and CGHS were essentially the predominant gov-
ernment-sponsored schemes, while the first of the new generation of 
GSHISs, Yeshasvini, was making a modest beginning. During that same 
period, total spending by these schemes was slightly greater than spending 
by commercial insurers. However, by 2009–10 this situation had changed 
radically. With the launch of state-sponsored schemes in AP and TN as 
well as RSBY, by 2009–10 spending by GSHISs grew to nearly four times 
the 2003–04 levels. Meanwhile, spending on PHI accelerated even faster, 
registering an almost six-fold nominal increase over the same period.
Spending through health insurance mechanisms will continue to 
increase at an estimated overall compounded annual growth rate of 19 
percent per annum, reaching Rs. 38,000 crores (Rs. 380 billion) by 2015. 
The seven GSHISs in table 3.6 will account for about 40 percent of the 
total; commercial insurers will represent about 45 percent (excluding 
their GSHIS business). Other government, employer, and community 
schemes will constitute the remainder. In 2015, spending through health 
insurance will reach 8.4 percent of the total health spending in India, up 
from 6.4 percent in 2009–10.37
Turning to public expenditures, government spending on GSHISs will 
increase to about 8.6 percent of total public spending on health by 2015, 
up from about 8 percent in 2009–1038 if political commitment to the 
National Rural Health mission (NRHM), to demand-side schemes, and 
to growth in government health spending remains at current levels. 
However, this estimate does not include new state schemes that may be 
introduced between 2011 and 2015.39 In short, these estimates should 
be considered conservative projections of government spending on 
health insurance. If more states launch new GSHISs, or if expenditure 
on public delivery does not continue to expand at the same pace of 
growth observed in recent years, total government spending on health 
insurance could easily surpass 10 percent of total public expenditures in 
health by 2015.
Government Spending on GSHISs and Public Delivery
What are the trends of government contributions to GSHISs vis-à-vis 
their supply-side subsidies? The expansion of RSBY as well as state 
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schemes suggests fiscal commitment of additional resources for health, or 
some conversion of supply- to demand-side subsidies.40 
Table 3.7 compares government spending on GSHISs with expendi-
tures on the public delivery system for government of India (GOI), AP 
and KA in 2008–09.41 Due to the maturity of the scheme and political 
commitment, AP contributed significantly more to health insurance than 
other states and the GOI in that year. However, the state expenditures 
shown in column (6) of table 3.7 for AP and KA are only for states’ own 
resources and do not include GOI transfers. GOI transfers account for a 
major share of primary care spending in the states. Therefore, the insur-
ance spending as a percent of total government spending is overestimated 
to the extent that the central share of health spending in the state is not 
accounted for in the denominator.
GSHISs account for 24, 41, and 6 percent of government spending by 
the GOI, AP, and KA, respectively in 2008–09. The level of spending in 
KA is for ESIS and Yeshasvini only, and does not account for Vajpayee 
Arogyashri which had yet to appear on the scene in 2008–09. These 
contributions represent additional spending to supply-side subsidies and 
account for an increasing share of total state spending on health. This is 
evidence of the political support and corresponding budgetary commit-
ment these schemes enjoy. To date, there is no evidence that spending 
on GSHISs is substituting for public spending on public delivery. 
However, as discussed in a later section, some state authorities complain 
that their budgets would have grown more in the absence of GSHISs in 
their states. 
The extent to which these state schemes are approaching a fiscal limit 
is difficult to ascertain from available data. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that AP probably cannot afford to significantly increase outlays for 
Aarogyasri to expand population coverage or deepen the benefits pack-
age. However, only in-depth revenue and expenditure analysis can con-
firm these claims. Converting supply-side to demand-side is an option 
under consideration, but its feasibility needs to be weighed in an environ-
ment in which any reduction in supply-side expenditures may not be 
easy. In the current Indian context, conversion itself would be the subject 
of a polarized and probably bitter debate with considerable political and 
bureaucratic positioning.
Spending on Medical Services 
Table 3.8 displays spending per beneficiary and per hospitalization derived 
from claims data. Noteworthy is the high per beneficiary spending by 
Table 3.7 India: Government Contributions to GSHISs and Public Delivery, 2008–09 (Rs. crores)
Government
entity
(financing source)
ESIS / 
CGHS
(1)
RSBY
(2)
State
schemes
(3)
Other health 
protection 
schemesa
(4)
Total
health insurance 
(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)
(5)
Total 
government 
health spending
(6)
Adjusted 
government 
health 
spendingb
(7)
(5) as a % 
of (7)
(8)
GOI 1,600 100 — 2,000c 3,700 13,370d 15,470 24
APe 100 0 925f 300g 1,325 2,899h 3,199 41
KAe 76 n.a 55i n.a. 131 2,358j 2,358 6
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on state health spending information and schemes’ data. 
Note: — = not available; n.a. = not applicable. 
a. Estimates. 
b. Includes (6) + health insurance expenditure from sources other than MOHFW. 
c. Includes estimated expenses on central employee schemes (railways, defense), schemes in dept of textiles etc. 
d. Union Government Finance Accounts for 2008–09. 
e. Excludes GOI transfers under NRHM to State Health Society.
f. Includes voted expenditure from demand for grants (Rs. 925 crore), but not the estimated expenditure from CM relief fund (public account). 
g. Includes estimated expenses on CM’s Relief Fund account and for state employee schemes.
h. State Government Finance Accounts for 2008–09.
i. Yeshasvini only.
j. State demand for grants 2010–11 showing actual expenditure for 2008–09.
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Table 3.8 India: Average Central and State Government 
Spending per Beneficiary per Admission, 2009–10 (Rs.)
Scheme
Per
beneficiary
Per
hospitalizationa
Central government
ESIS 359 28,599b
CGHSc 5,333 25,000
RSBYd 180 4,100
State government
Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP) 171 28,000
Yeshasvini (KA) 183 8,240
Vajpayee. Arogyashri (KA) 200e 60,000e
Kalaignar (TN) 148 33,720
Private insurancef 1,250 19,637
Source: Authors’ estimates based on claims data from the respective schemes.
a. This is not adjusted for case-mix and is a blind average. 
b. Based on an estimated 60 percent of total medical expenditure being for 
inpatient treatment.
c. Sample data, 2009.
d. Estimate based on Rs. 540 average premium per family and three covered 
members per card. Cost per hospitalization does not include enrolment or 
administration costs.
e. Estimates are based on performance of the scheme in the first half of 2010–11. The 
VA scheme did not have any expenditure in 2009–10. 
f. IRDA sample data.
CGHS which significantly exceeds all other schemes including private 
insurers. A number of factors contribute to the high costs of this scheme. 
CGHS is a comprehensive, rich cover with no overall cap and with no 
cost-sharing provisions. Almost one-third of its members belongs to a 
retired age group and probably has higher health needs than younger 
groups. The scheme also experiences high expenditure on its outpatient 
infrastructure and consumables, including branded drugs. Finally, it caters 
to a population segment, central government civil servants, which is very 
influential in India’s socio-political context.42 
In contrast, PHI per beneficiary costs less than a fourth as much as 
CGHS. This is understandable because private insurance policies cover 
inpatient treatment only, underwrite proposals at entry, and can reject the 
same. Private insurance has defined annual caps and contains a number of 
exclusions and cost-sharing provisions. These provisions help contain 
costs in a scenario otherwise affected by adverse selection, moral hazard, 
and an open-ended fee-for-service provider payment system. 
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Per beneficiary spending of the three state schemes that focus on 
 tertiary coverage—Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP), Kalaignar (TN), and Vajpayee 
Arogyashri (KA)—are roughly similar and respond to similar utilization 
rates. However, the high per admission spending for Vajpayee. Arogyashri 
is probably due to a predominance of cardiac cases in the present case 
mix, which are the proverbial low-hanging fruit for providers in the early 
days of the scheme.43 Given the state-wide rollout of the scheme, scheme 
maturity, and the relatively wider distribution of the case mix, the average 
hospitalization costs in Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP) and Kalaignar (TN) are 
significantly lower than those observed for Vajpayee Arogyashri. 
Given RSBY’s secondary focus and conservatively priced package rates, 
its average claim (per admission) and per beneficiary costs are significantly 
lower than all other schemes.44 This has also translated into overall low 
costs per beneficiary. Yeshasvini is a similar case but with one important 
difference: while the predominance of secondary cases is a key factor for 
the low average claim costs, the scheme also requires cost-sharing by its 
members to pay for the consumables and implants not covered by the 
scheme. This shifts part of the costs of treatment to the members, resulting 
in lower average claim costs for the scheme itself, and in theory, may also 
lower utilization levels, further contributing to low costs per beneficiary. 
Despite its comprehensive coverage and relatively high hospitalization 
costs, ESIS continues to manage with a modest overall cost per covered 
beneficiary for a benefits package similar to CGHS’s. One reason for the 
modest cost is the lower-than-expected utilization of both inpatient and 
outpatient scheme services. However, another reason is the capping of 
overall medical expenses by ESIS at the state level (currently Rs. 1,200 
annually per insured person including his/her dependents). In effect, in 
any state in which the average cost per insured family exceeds this annual 
cap, the excess is borne entirely by the state. This cost shifting effectively 
transfers the risk of higher utilization and higher costs from ESIS to the 
state government.45 This can be seen as a kind of state reinsurance. ESIS 
overall medical costs are thereby controlled, and some state governments 
therefore contribute additional subsidies beyond the 12.5 percent share 
they are normally required to contribute. In 2009–10, AP and West 
Bengal (WB) were among such states with high subsidies (with actual 
costs of Rs. 1,931 and 1,430 per family during the year). Three other 
states in which costs per capita exceeded the Rs. 1,200 benchmark by a 
small amount were Assam (Rs. 1,284), Kerala (Rs. 1,257), and Orissa (Rs. 
1,263). In all other states, the average costs were well within the cap and 
required no additional state subsidies. 
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In sum, the 15-fold variation across these schemes in average cost per 
hospitalization may be explained on grounds of the case mix (which in 
turn depends on the scheme focus, maturity, and benefits package) and 
cost-sharing provisions. The 30-fold variation in costs per beneficiary may 
result from an array of factors including the benefits package, adverse 
selection (in PHI and other voluntary schemes), beneficiary awareness, 
cost-containment mechanisms or lack thereof), moral hazard, provider 
management, and incentive structures for intermediaries such as insurers 
and TPAs. Some of these factors are discussed in the remaining sections 
of this chapter.
Rate Setting and Provider Payment 
Provider payment mechanisms (PPMs) are powerful levers used by 
health care purchasers such as GSHISs that can shape provider behaviors 
and ultimately their performance. Incentives embedded in PPMs can 
induce providers to control costs, raise efficiency, and even improve qual-
ity. Contrarily, a PPM with a different set of incentives can lead to distor-
tions such as cost shifting, care denial, and delivering unnecessary care. 
Rate setting—the pricing of a service or package of services—is an essen-
tial element of PPMs. How rates are determined and the process by which 
rates are bundled and allocated to the providers are key to understanding 
the incentives embedded in any PPM.
Package-Based Rate: Advantages and Disadvantages
All schemes studied here use a system of “package rates” to a greater 
or lesser extent for paying their providers for inpatient services.46 A 
package rate is a simplified case rate consisting of a single fee or close-
ended payment for a set of inputs and services for a specific and pre-
defined treatment or procedure. They generally include room charges 
(including intensive care unit (ICU) or operating room charges where 
applicable), professional fees for medical personnel (for consultation, 
surgery, anesthesia, and so on), diagnostics, drugs, and consumables. In 
some cases, such as in RSBY and AP, the package rates also include 
public transport costs for the patient, ambulatory screening before 
admission, and medicines for a specified number of days after dis-
charge. 
Package rates offer several advantages. They are easy to administer, are 
less complicated or subjective than a fee-for-service arrangement, and in 
principle, can contain costs if the rates are set at or near costs. The early 
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experience suggests that in exchange for the potential volume that the 
GSHISs offer, many providers have committed to package rates that are 
significantly lower than the usual fee-for-service charges for the unin-
sured, and therefore bear some risk of incurring higher costs.47 They also 
limit the liability of the schemes (as payers) and in principle may stimu-
late greater efficiency among providers, if priced correctly.
In practice, the package rates also display some shortcomings. First, 
with the exception of Kalaignar (TN), all schemes apply a one-size-fits-all 
rate structure for “packages” across all territories in which beneficiaries 
reside. In other words, rates are not adjusted for different input prices by 
region or by facility location (such as in Tier 1, 2, or 3 cities48) where 
labor and other input prices vary considerably.49 Therefore, schemes 
maybe be overpaying in some and underpaying in other markets. As 
shown in table 3.9, the usual fee-for-service charges for many services in 
Tiers 2 and 3 cities are notably less than Tier 1 cities. This reflects lower 
input prices. 
For example, the price of a normal delivery in a Tier 2 city can be less 
than one fifth of the price in a Tier 1 city while an appendectomy in a 
Tier 3 city is less than one half of the Tier 1 price. As an extreme example, 
shared or general ward charges can be 15 to 20 times higher in a Tier 1 
city than in smaller cities. Thus, unless the single rate indicates a conscious 
Table 3.9 India: Average Hospital Charges by City Size, 2009 (Rs.) 
Service Tier 1city Tier 2 city Tier 3 citya
Room charges (general) 1,000 45 70
Room charges (shared 
rooms with two patients) 
1,500 630 410
Room charges (ICU) 5,000 1,675 1,500
X-ray 300 145 135
Ultrasound (abdomen) 1,200 480 415
CT (brain, no contrast) 3,000 1,800 1,725
Complete blood count 250 155 140
Biopsy (small) 900 465 385
ECG 150 135 120
Echocardiography 1,500 945 900
Normal delivery 25,000 5,700 3,600
Angiography 12,000 9,500 8,800
Angioplasty 120,000 68,000 73,000
Cataract surgery 15,000 9,500 10,000
Appendectomy 20,000 13,500 8,800
Source: IFC, forthcoming (based on survey of 500 providers).
a. These figures reflect tariffs of a typical corporate hospital in Delhi.
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policy choice to attract greater hospital investment in the underserved 
Tier 2 and Tier 3 markets, it will provide much higher margins to facilities 
located in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities. These providers may be willing to 
deliver the same services for a far lower price.
Second, flat rate-based payment mechanisms can lead to distortions if 
rates are unaligned with costs. Hospitals may focus on only “profitable” 
procedures associated with high rates. In the absence of sufficient con-
trols, packages can still be subject to fraud through “upcoding” and “ghost 
patients.” 
Third, any variations in severity, unexpected complications, or com-
plexity of a treatment have to be managed by the hospital within the 
established rates. Since the rates are not adjusted for case complexity, a 
longer stay resulting from comorbidity will not lead to an additional pay-
ment. The current rate structure provides a disincentive to hospitals for 
treating severe patients and may incentivize providers to select lower-
risk cases. Conversely, providing a higher package rate based on severity 
or complications may also subject the schemes to a “creep” wherein pro-
viders will try to charge the higher rates even when cases do not warrant 
the same. Under the current system, the price setting principle is a bal-
anced mix of high- and low-severity, but providers would have an incen-
tive to screen and treat low complexity cases for any given procedure. In 
short, patients with complications or more severe illness may be turned 
away from hospitals. Such behaviors are neither expressly prohibited nor 
monitored.
Fourth, with the possible exception of AP, none of the schemes possess 
standardized or well-defined descriptions of the packages. The “title” is 
often the only clue to what comprises a package. For example, a package 
for cataract surgery or for enlarged prostate may not specify the method 
of surgery, the consumables to be used, the likely duration of stay, or the 
diagnostics and drugs to be provided by the hospital. This lack of defini-
tion allows considerable wiggle room for providers. Providers may use 
cheaper, short-lived (or even inferior and unknown quality) implants and 
medicines or discharge patients prematurely to minimize hospital costs 
and maximize the bottom line, with consequent adverse effects on 
patient safety and health outcomes. This is yet another provider behavior 
that schemes do not adequately monitor.
Package Rates and Market Prices
Table 3.10 shows the large variation in rates paid for similar packages 
among a subset of schemes for which data are available. RSBY generally 
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Table 3.10 India: Variation in Package Rates for Similar Procedures, 2009–10, 
Selected Schemes (Rs.)
Procedure 
CGHS
ESIS
Rajiv 
Aarogyasri 
(AP)
Kalaignar 
(TN)
Yeshasvini 
(KA)a
Vajpayee 
Arogyashri 
(KA) RSBY
Coronary bypass 
surgery
130,000 95,000 90,000 60,000 95,000 Up to 
30,000
Coronary angioplasty 85,000 60,000 60,000 25,000 60,000
Transurethral 
resection of prostate 
16,200 30,000 25,000 12,000 20,000 14,250
Nephrolithotomy 14,100 10,000 25,000 14,000 10,000 10,000
Nephrectomy n.a. 40,000 40,000 14,000 10,000 10,000
Appendectomyb 12,000 18,000 n.a. 9,000 n.a. 6,000
Cholecystectomyb 10,200 20,000 25,000 9,000 n.a. 10,000
Hysterectomyb 13,000 20,000 25,000 6,000 n.a. 10,000
Tympanoplasty 7,050 15,000 n.a. 3,500 n.a. 7,000
Normal delivery 6,500 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,500
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on scheme websites and other scheme documentation. For Kalaignar, rates 
shown are for the highest category of hospitals. For CGHS, the rates pertain to Delhi.
Note: n.a = not applicable, service not covered.
a. Package rates in Yeshasvini do not include surgical implants or consumables, unlike the other schemes.
b. This is not an equal comparison as the tertiary schemes like AP pay only for laparoscopic appendectomy/ 
cholecystectomy/hysterectomy (which is generally priced higher than conventional methods). CGHS, 
Yeshasvini, and RSBY do not distinguish the payout for different surgical procedures used.
pays the lowest rates. The AP and TN schemes pay more but only for the 
specified modality of treatment (i.e., only endoscopic surgery). For coro-
nary bypass surgery and angioplasty, CGHS and ESIS50 pay the highest 
rates. Even the rates for government-sponsored schemes in the same state, 
such as Karnataka (Yeshasvini and Vajpayee Arogyashri), display consid-
erable disparity.51 However, variations in package rates can lead to distor-
tions. A hospital that is networked with two or more schemes (three of 
the new generation GSHISs exist in Karnataka) and also with private 
insurers may face multiple and significantly different rates for the same 
procedure. This situation of conflicting incentives may lead hospital man-
agers to favor admitting beneficiaries of one scheme over another or cre-
ate an inequitable situation within a hospital in which more responsive 
care would be provided to beneficiaries from schemes with higher rate 
structures. 
Comparing the market prices in table 3.9 with the rates listed in table 
3.10 provides insight into the disjointed relationship between market 
prices and specified rates for three procedures, angioplasty,  appendectomy, 
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and normal delivery. For the former, CGHS and ESIS pay  significantly 
above market rates for all cities while the other schemes pay above mar-
ket rates for Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, but below rates for Tier 1 cities.52 A 
different pattern emerges for appendectomy; Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP) is the 
only scheme that approaches market rates for Tier 1 cities but is signifi-
cantly above market prices for Tier 2 and 3 cities (perhaps because it 
covers only the laparoscopic modality of appendectomy which is often 
priced higher than the conventional open surgery).53 RSBY pays well 
below market rates for all types of cities. CGHS and ESIS are below 
market rates for Tier 2 cities but above for Tier 3 cities. In case of normal 
delivery, RSBY continues to pay below the level for Tier 3 cities, but the 
CGHS and ESIS rate is pitched between Tier 1 and Tier 2 prices. The 
other schemes do not cover maternity.
Some providers, especially large hospitals in metro cities, already 
refuse to accept certain groups of GSHIS beneficiaries because of alleg-
edly “below cost” rates. Interviews with managers of hospitals empaneled 
under RSBY complained of the low package rates (Grover and Palacios 
2011). Although RSBY rates may be lower than the facilities’ usual 
charges as well as rates offered by other schemes, there is no way to deter-
mine with available data whether RSBY rates are below facility costs, as 
claimed by hospital managers.54 If rates are indeed below provider costs, 
providers will have an incentive to balance bill (by charging the patients 
in an unauthorized manner), or to make up their margins by inducing 
additional uncovered services and charging fees. 
To summarize, there is a lack of clarity on how the rates were formu-
lated. Most seem to be borrowed from earlier schemes with few ques-
tions asked about their robustness and relation to market prices or costs. 
Based on a comparison of rates and market prices for three procedures, 
the one-size-fits-all approach to rates may result in schemes’ overpaying 
in some locations while underpaying in others. In general, if most care is 
provided in facilities located in Tier 1 cities, the package rates probably 
exert downward pressure on market prices. But the opposite may be the 
case for Tier 2 and 3 cities where most schemes (except RSBY) pay 
significantly above market prices. Given the nature of the rates, provid-
ers have incentives to oversupply, provide additional and unnecessary 
care, and use treatments that maximize the coverage cap as a means to 
garner additional revenues from GSHISs. There is clearly a need to 
review rates and cost the packages in different markets, applying stan-
dardized protocols.
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Provider Networks, Quality, and Patient Satisfaction 
To be effective, health insurance should make available to beneficiaries 
the providers who possess the knowledge, processes, and capacity to pro-
vide quality care efficiently. Insurance presents an opportunity to raise 
service standards because, as direct purchasers of health care, insurers can 
use their financial leverage to improve quality. This can be done through 
enforcing licensing regulation, incentivizing accreditation, requiring the 
reporting of data on outcomes and quality processes, requiring medical 
audits and, where feasible, introducing pay-for-quality initiatives. 
This section centers on quality-of-care challenges facing GSHISs. 
Clearly, these challenges need to be understood within the Indian context 
in which quality is still a nascent issue. It reviews how networked hospi-
tals are empaneled or certified. Available data on patient satisfaction are 
also presented. Finally, some evidence on the impact of GSHISs on pro-
vider markets is presented.
Addressing Quality of Care in India
Similar to the case of broader public and private delivery systems in 
India, quality is a forgotten or underemphasized component in all 
schemes. Available evidence from micro studies in India suggests seri-
ous quality shortcomings in three main areas: structure, process, and 
outcomes. Many facilities lack basic infrastructure and essential equip-
ment (NHSRC 2009), and adequately trained staff (MOHFW 2009). 
Turning to processes, studies have highlighted the absence of clinical 
protocols or guidelines, and noncompliance with diagnostic and thera-
peutic requirements for common diseases (Parulekar et al. 2009). Poor 
medical record documentation impedes the kind of detailed review 
required to assess protocol compliance (Deodhar and Kakkar 2004). 
Lapses by staff were observed in measures to prevent hospital-acquired 
infections (HAI) (Chandra and Milind 2001). One study revealed that 
the HAI-bacteraemia led to additional spending of $980,000 in the 
cardiothoracic unit of a hospital (Kothari et al. 2009). India also suffers 
significant problems with medication use because of the lack of phar-
macy practice programs. A study revealed that adverse drug reactions 
are one of the important causes of emergency admissions in a public 
hospital in north India (Pattanaik et al. 2009). Inappropriate drug pre-
scribing has been found to be common among hospitalized elderly 
patients. 
For most schemes, little data are available beyond the limited infor-
mation collected at the empanelment stage on facility infrastructure 
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and staffing.55 Quality and patient safety information is not demanded 
or collected from providers. Even empanelment information is usually 
stored manually and is not analyzed or reevaluated. While some 
schemes (e.g., Rajiv Aarogyasri) have created special posts to oversee 
empanelment and monitor quality, the functions are focused on collect-
ing initial information to assess eligibility for empanelment and there-
after only reacting to complaints and grievances received about 
hospitals. Little proactive analysis of empanelment or quality informa-
tion is conducted. 
Importantly, there is a noticeable tendency to deal with unethical prac-
tices or unwarranted treatment. Many schemes have disempaneled hos-
pitals as a disciplinary action after such complaints were examined and 
confirmed. For example, as of September 2010, RSBY, AP and Yeshasvini 
had disempaneled 54, 67, and 58 hospitals respectively. Whether these 
actions have decreased the incidence of such practices is unknown, but 
enforcement of rules and policies is a good sign.
Hospital Empanelment and Quality Certification: Is There a Relation?
Table 3.11 lists the number of empaneled hospitals by scheme. Most 
networked hospitals are private facilities. Particularly for the tertiary-
focused, state GSHISs, one of the main reasons to initiate these schemes 
was the limited capacity in the public sector to provide tertiary care. In 
Table 3.11 India: Number of Scheme-Networked Public and 
Private Hospitals, 2010
Scheme name
Public 
hospitals
Private 
hospitals Total
 Private 
(percent)
Central government
ESIS 148a 400 548 73
CGHS All public 
hospitalsb
401 n.a. n.a.
RSBY 2,267 4,923 7,190 68
State government
Rajiv Aarogysri (AP) 97 241 338 71
Vajpayee. Arogyshri (KA) 5 89 94 95
Kalaignar (TN) 56 636 692 92
Yeshasvini (KA) 29 421 450 94
Commercial insurers nil 10,000c 10,000c 100
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on scheme websites and documents.
Note: n.a = not applicable.
a. All ESIS owned and operated.
b. Eligible for reimbursement, though not networked for cashless service.
c. Estimates.
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addition, the administrative difficulties in establishing formal cashless 
arrangements56 with public hospitals seem to be an important reason for 
the limited “networking” of public hospitals in several schemes. 
Since it is a national scheme operating in 25 states, RSBY has the larg-
est network of hospitals (more than 7,000 as of December 2010). Though 
national in scope, CGHS and ESIS have relatively few networked hospi-
tals since they operate in a limited number of cities where there are high 
concentrations of civil servants and formal sector employees. In the case 
of ESIS, the number of hospitals in the table includes 148 hospitals that 
the scheme owns and operates. Twenty-two of these are ‘model’ hospitals 
directly managed by the central ESIS Corporation while others are man-
aged by the respective state governments’ ESIS departments.
The actual share of private hospitals in service utilization may be 
larger than implied by the quantum of networked hospitals listed in 
table 3.11. In the AP, TN, and KA schemes, private hospitals predomi-
nate in the top 20 facilities ranked by number of admissions. However, a 
few public medical colleges and public autonomous hospitals were also 
among the top 20 hospitals for Vajpayee Arogyashri, Yeshasvini, and 
Rajiv Aarogyasri.57  Nevertheless, barring these few large, tertiary public 
institutions, most other public hospitals listed saw little or no volume of 
the insurance traffic.
Hospital empanelment normally focuses on assessing the structural 
aspects of quality and is not a rigorous process. There is no review of 
processes and results, and there is little evidence of follow-up inspections 
or recertification. Empanelment criteria for most GSHISs have evolved 
from the criteria followed by TPAs in the PHI industry, and the empanel-
ment application forms and assessment processes are also quite similar. 
Most schemes set criteria based on minimum number of beds, availability 
of qualified medical professionals, criteria for adequate ICU beds, certain 
minimum equipment, diagnostic facilities, tie-up with blood banks to 
source blood in the event of an emergency, and compliance with legal 
requirements such as registration or licensing as applicable.58
Table 3.12 displays the minimum bed requirement for different 
schemes. Most of the tertiary care schemes set a 50-bed minimum. With 
the aim of securing a more geographically accessible network, RSBY 
empanels “hospitals” with 10 beds. However, although most small 
facilities may be undertaking only the more common secondary care 
procedures, the volume for the less common procedures in these facili-
ties is probably too low to maintain minimal quality standards. Studies 
elsewhere have shown that performing sophisticated procedures at 
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 low-volume and low-capacity facilities may lead to poor health out-
comes (Noronha et al. 2003; Birkmeyer et al. 2003). The quality stan-
dards of these small facilities are likely to be highly variable and even 
questionable. Strengthening empanelment criteria or raising quality stan-
dards in small facilities will be a major future challenge for GSHISs.
Nevertheless, even larger hospitals may not have sufficient capacity to 
provide quality services. Based on a small survey of 26 hospitals empan-
eled by RSBY in Kerala state, one study found that only 38, 31, and 
19 percent reported the availability of surgeons, gynecologists, and pedia-
tricians, respectively. Radiologists and anesthesiologists were present in 
46 and 62 percent, respectively (Research Institute 2009). Only about 
half reported the availability of nurses exclusively for the operating the-
ater and delivery room. The dearth of medical and nursing staff is surpris-
ing, considering that most of the hospitals (55 percent) were relatively 
large (by Indian standards), possessing over 60 beds. Only about a third 
had registered blood banks, a fifth had a protocol for identifying and 
reporting HAIs, and none reported the maintenance of medical records 
for the last five years. As suggested above, these deficiencies are typical of 
hospitals in India, not just RSBY-empaneled hospitals. 
On a more positive note, a survey of private facilities empaneled by the 
Aarogyasri scheme in a single district in AP found that all had sufficient 
medical staff and operational equipment (Reddy 2011). Of particular inter-
est, the researchers reported that for two hospitals, wards for Aarogyasri 
beneficiaries were notably cleaner than non-Aarogyasri wards. 
In Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP), 77 network hospitals (out of 338) have more 
than 200 beds; 40 of these are private hospitals. Another 66 have between 
100 and 200 beds, while 195 hospitals have 50 to 100 beds. Tertiary 
Table 3.12 India: Minimum Number of Hospital Beds Required 
for Empanelment, by Scheme, 2010 
Scheme
Minimum 
number of beds
ESIS 100a
CGHS 100a
RSBY 10
Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP) 50
Vajpayee Arogyashri (KA) 50
Kalaignar (TN) 30
Yeshasvini (KA) 25b
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on schemes’ empanelment documents.
a. In smaller cities, a 50-bed minimum.
b. Relaxed to 15 beds for subdistrict level. 
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focused schemes seem to be more selective and insist on larger hospitals, 
but even a 50-bed facility may not conform to quality standards if appro-
priate empanelment standards and quality monitoring are not an integral 
part of the system. 
Once empaneled, it is unlikely that a facility will be inspected again 
except in response to a grievance. Through their financial leverage, 
GSHISs hold great potential to drive quality improvements in public 
and private hospitals. Nevertheless, as a consequence of a weak 
empanelment process and lack of quality monitoring, schemes may be 
paying additional charges for the consequences of the uncertain ser-
vice quality such as adverse events, infections, and medication errors 
resulting in readmissions, extra inputs, and longer stays. Most schemes 
do not assess postcare recovery to determine final outcomes.59 There 
is little interest in using evidence-based care as manifested in clinical 
 protocols.
Patient Satisfaction
Though based on small samples, available data from three schemes indi-
cate that patient satisfaction is high. RSBY is one of the few schemes 
assessing patient satisfaction regularly. For example, a survey of 390 RSBY 
beneficiaries in Delhi who had been hospitalized found that 18 percent 
were highly satisfied, 67 percent were satisfied with the scheme, and only 
3 percent were dissatisfied (Grover and Palacios 2011). Importantly, 
 satisfaction appears to be increasing since earlier ratings. In terms of treat-
ments, about 75 percent classified the treatments as good or adequate. 
Not unexpectedly, a regression study found that patient satisfaction was 
highly correlated with patients’ reporting of partial and full recovery. 
Surgical patients as well as those who were treated in an ICU reported 
high levels of satisfaction. In a survey of 108 RSBY beneficiaries in Kerala, 
more than 90 percent state that they would recommend the scheme to 
others (Research Institute 2009). An assessment of 102 beneficiaries con-
ducted by Yeshasvini found that 60 percent were fully satisfied, 30 per-
cent expressed partial satisfaction, and 10 percent were not satisfied with 
the scheme (Nabard Consultancy Services 2007). All households that 
used Aarogyasri in AP’s Prakasam District expressed satisfaction with the 
scheme (Reddy 2011). 
Help desks in RSBY empaneled hospitals and prompt attention may 
contribute to high levels of satisfaction. In the aforementioned survey in 
Kerala, 90 percent mentioned the availability of easy-to-locate help desks 
in the hospitals where treatment was provided (Research Institute 2009). 
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Nearly two thirds reported waiting less than five minutes before being 
attended by hospital administrative staff to arrange admission and verifi-
cation of beneficiary status. Once admitted, all were attended by medical 
staff within one hour. 
GSHIS Impact on Provider Markets
GSHISs have contributed to providers’ markets by reducing underuti-
lized bed capacity and stimulating hospital expansion. Initially, most 
schemes were able to develop a provider network because of under-
utilized bed capacity, especially in the private sector. For example, in 
their review of Yeshasvini, Kuruvilla, and Liu (2007) reported a 
35 percent bed occupancy rate among hospitals in Karnataka during 
the early years of the scheme, and the rate of utilization of operating 
theaters was even lower. Given the lack of statistical data on hospitals 
in India, whether a similar situation is evident in other states is 
unknown.
The wave of new GSHISs seems to have contributed to expansion of 
private sector provision and, in some states, infrastructure upgrading of 
public facilities. Patient choice of care providers may give both public and 
private providers incentives to expand and possibly improve quality. 
Initial reports from the GSHISs suggest that the schemes are stimulating 
new investments in private hospital infrastructure, especially in smaller 
cities and towns, and even in semi-urban areas. This is understandable. 
Patients with difficult geographical access to large cities would prefer to 
seek care at networked nursing homes and public facilities in their vicin-
ity. The field teams observed facility construction or expansion in several 
cities, and interviews with owners suggest that GSHISs are a driver of 
new investments. 
Although in some parts of India there is a dearth of hospital beds, the 
expansion of hospital capacity begs two related questions about the type 
of the health delivery system appropriate for India and its future afford-
ability. The first concern is the rapid promotion of a traditional and 
probably outdated hospital-centric delivery system. There have been 
calls from both public and private sectors to significantly increase the 
number of beds. Private leaders are calling for between 300,000 and 
500,000 new beds (CII 2009; IFC forthcoming) based on comparative 
bed-density ratios in other countries. However, little is known about 
utilization of the existing hospital infrastructure. As suggested above, 
GSHISs may contribute to filling existing underutilized bed capacity. 
However, as mentioned, they may also be incentivizing the substitution 
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of inpatient care for cost-effective care in an ambulatory setting. This 
could drive up costs. Ambulatory-sensitive conditions account for 
18 percent of admissions in Spain, 13 percent in the U.S. state of New 
Jersey, and 30 percent in Brazil. In Brazil, spending on these conditions 
was estimated at $1.6 billion in 2002, 21 percent of total spending on 
inpatient care (Caminal, Starfield, and Sanchez 2004 and 2002; Vali 
2001; La Forgia and Couttolenc 2008).
Examination of recent trends in delivery models in OECD countries 
would be worthwhile for India (OECD 2010 a, b, c). Given the emerg-
ing burden of chronic diseases, changing demographic profiles, the intro-
duction of new medical technologies and pharmaceuticals (particularly 
outpatient therapies and procedures) and increasingly mobile work-
forces—changes that have already commenced in India—nearly all 
OECD countries are reducing the number of acute hospitals beds. They 
are shifting care to alternative, but mostly ambulatory, settings while 
incentivizing coordination or integration among a range of providers. In 
OECD countries, health planners increasingly accept that the traditional 
emphasis on acute care hospitals reflects treatment practices and epide-
miological profiles of bygone days (McKee and Healy 2002). Moreover, 
given the time it takes to design and build hospitals, many may become 
outdated soon after their inauguration (Guenther and Vittori 2008). 
A second concern relates to the possible expansion of small hospitals. 
The schemes may stimulate the proliferation of small, low-volume, and 
probably low-quality hospitals. Most hospitals in India are already small, 
most of them with fewer than 30 beds.60 A considerable body of literature 
exists on the poor outcomes of low-volume hospitals, particularly in per-
formance of sophisticated procedures such as those covered in most of 
the schemes under study here (Birkmeyer et al. 2003 and 2002; Ho 2000; 
Halm, Lee, and Chassin 2002). This is compounded by the lack of quality 
monitoring by the schemes (and the broader health delivery system). 
International experience also suggests that smaller hospitals tend to 
be bypassed and increasingly underutilized as road networks improve, 
primary care is extended, and specialty care becomes concentrated in 
larger hospitals. For example, this has been the case in Brazil, where small 
hospitals (e.g., fewer than 50 beds) represent 61 percent of all hospitals 
(24 percent of total beds), but report occupancy rates of only 22 percent 
on average (La Forgia and Couttolenc 2008). Although small hospi-
tals may address access issues in rural India, demand for their services 
may decline as geographical access to higher-quality (and higher-volume) 
facilities increases.61
Results and Cross-Cutting Issues       77
To summarize, quality has yet to become a major area of focus for the 
schemes. Large purchasers of health care in India—including GSHISs, 
government, and private insurers—have yet to use their financial lever-
age to improve the quality of care provided at their networked facilities. 
Data are not demanded on quality of care. Though not atypical of many 
countries, this failure to focus on quality has multiple causes: ambiguity 
about the role of a purchaser in influencing clinical decisions, assump-
tions that such decisions are best left to medical professionals who would 
also be appropriate managers for quality issues, lack of information about 
the nature and magnitude of quality problems (and their effects on pay-
ers’ costs), and lack of clarity about specific measures that purchasers 
and providers can take to improve quality. Under their current design, 
GSHISs may be incentivizing the expansion of small, low-quality hospi-
tals as well as an outdated and potentially unaffordable hospital-centric 
delivery model.
The Role of Public Hospitals
An important policy issue relates to how GSHISs can improve the perfor-
mance of public hospitals and foster their utilization by beneficiaries. 
In theory, the new generation of GSHISs is designed to foment competi-
tion for beneficiaries among all empaneled public and private hospitals. 
This competition is based on hospitals’ prestige or perceived quality, since 
most schemes are cashless for the beneficiary and information on quality 
of care is generally lacking.62 In most cases, private hospitals, and to a 
lesser extent public medical colleges, that continue to receive the lion’s 
share of beneficiaries, are prestigious or higher-end hospitals that cater 
to the middle class. These facilities are generally located in Tier 1 cities. 
Outside Tier 1 cities geographical access may play an important role 
in facility selection: the real choice is among hospitals that are accessible 
to the patient. 
There could be a greater role for public hospitals in this system, 
especially in areas where private supply is nonexistent, inadequate, or 
of poor quality. This section focuses on public hospitals’ governance 
and accountability arrangements that may be an obstacle to increasing 
their participation in GSHIS provider networks. It also reviews poten-
tial opportunities based on the Indian experience in promoting more 
independent public hospitals. However, understanding the challenges 
and opportunities of public hospitals is constrained by the lack of 
data in India on the supply of hospital services and beneficiaries’ 
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hospital- seeking behaviors, hampering analyses of the potential for 
public hospitals to reap revenues from GSHISs. 
Public Hospital Governance and Accountabilities in India
Under current governance and institutional arrangements, most public 
hospitals are in no position to compete with private facilities. Few have 
the autonomy or flexibility to manage their own affairs (box 3.1). They 
can neither perceive the incentive signals inherent in a payment mecha-
nism, nor are they able to respond to them effectively. They are entirely 
dependent on the hierarchical control of state health authorities for 
nearly all budgetary and input decisions. 
Budgets bear little or no relation to volume, quality, or efficiency of 
care. Unless part of a GSHIS network, these hospitals do not face mar-
ket pressures. Staffing and budget norms—often related to civil service, 
budgetary legislation, or public health codes—restrict managers’ free-
dom to marshal resources to improve quality or achieve efficiency. In 
Box 3.1
India: Alternative Organizational Arrangements of 
Public Hospitals 
Two categories of alternative organizational arrangements have emerged in India. 
The first involves a subset of public hospitals that have been granted autonomy 
through special legislation. These are often tertiary hospitals affiliated with medi-
cal colleges. The second is an emerging arrangement in which committees con-
sisting of local politicians, community members, and medical staff are granted 
decision rights over the spending of a limited amount of revenues.
Autonomous hospitals. A small number of public hospitals have been estab-
lished as “autonomous institutions” under special central or state legislation. 
Examples of such autonomous hospitals include the Post- Graduate Institute of 
Medical Education and Research (PGIMER), Chandigarh; Sri Venkatesvara Institute 
of Medical Sciences, Tirupati, AP; Nizam’s Institute of Medical Sciences, Hyderabad, 
AP); the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi; and the National Insti-
tute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences (NIMHANS), Bangalore. These hospitals 
have broad decision-making authority to manage their inputs and receive grant-
based financing. However, the internal rules created by these institutions often 
(continued next page)
Results and Cross-Cutting Issues       79
mirror the public service rules. A key difference is that many employees of these 
hospitals are not civil servants (except some officials on deputation). Rather, they 
are hired by the facilities. In this respect, often the medical college hospitals under 
municipal corporations, though not created as autonomous institutions, also 
mimic some of the attributes of the autonomous institutions as they are self-
managed and not subject to a statewide transfer policy administered by a state 
directorate. In general, the autonomous institutions, by virtue of their distinct 
legal status, have a high degree of decision-making authority on the manage-
ment of inputs, including human resources, use of resources, financial manage-
ment, procurement of goods and services, and service mix.
Rogi Kalyan Samiti (RKS). The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), the federal 
government’s flagship health program, has taken up the mantle of creating and 
supporting governance bodies for public health facilities called Rogi Kalyan 
 Samiti’s (RKS, patient welfare committees), a nomenclature and concept that was 
initiated in the state of Madhya Pradesh in the 1990s. The RKSs are registered 
societies constituted within each public health facility (district hospital, commu-
nity health center, and primary health center) and receive “untied funds” (grants 
from the central government without any earmarking of how funds should be 
spent). In addition, they are empowered to raise their own resources at the facility 
level. The aim of these committees is to increase participation from people’s rep-
resentatives and improve the health facility, using its own resources raised from 
user charges, grants, and other sources. MOHFW sees RKSs as the foundation for 
broadening decision-making autonomy and fostering management improve-
ments in public hospitals. A recent assessment of 12 RKSs in Madhya Pradesh 
found that they augmented their revenues from local sources.Though limited in 
terms of the total budget, these funds were used to address pressing needs 
(Sadanandan and Shiv Kumar 2006). However, the researchers found no impact of 
RKSs on management practices, monitoring, or facility utilization.
Box 3.1 (continued)
effect, hospital managers have little decision-making authority over 
inputs, including hiring, firing, rewarding, or disciplining of staff, while 
accountabilities for performance are diffuse at best. This model of pub-
lic hospital service delivery, often referred to as direct management, is 
known for low efficiency and quality (Preker and Harding 2003; La 
Forgia and Couttolenc 2008).
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There is some evidence, however, that states are seeking alternative 
approaches to hospital governance. In Kerala and AP, the availability of 
demand-side financing for public hospitals has opened an additional 
stream of funds to upgrade these facilities and incentivize staff. In Kerala, 
for example, public hospitals represent 60 percent of the RSBY case load 
and 53 percent of revenues. Public hospitals are receiving additional state 
financing to upgrade public facilities (Arora and Nanada 2011). According 
to state authorities, this additional financing places public hospitals on par 
with private facilities. However, there are two problems with this experi-
ence. First, since public hospitals receive a supply-side subsidy, the 
demand-side financing from RSBY represents an additional source of 
public revenue while the private providers receive only the demand-side 
package rates. As a result, a situation of dual subsidy is emerging, which 
could lead to accusations of unfair competition from the private provid-
ers. Second, as mentioned, a major problem facing public facilities in 
India is accountability. Upgrading alone will not solve problems related to 
absenteeism, inhumane treatment, poor skills, and insufficient effort, 
which have been documented in public facilities (NCMH 2005; Human 
Rights Watch 2009; Benerjee, Glennerster, and Duflo 2008; Planning 
Commission 2005; Gill 2009; MOHFW 2009; Das et al. 2011; Das and 
Hammer 2007; Chaudury et al. 2006). To its credit, Kerala is exploring 
arrangements to grant greater autonomy to public hospitals. Recently, 
public hospitals have been given greater decision-making authority over 
financing to hire additional staff. 
Drawing solely on revenues from Rajiv Aarogyasri, a government 
medical college in AP strengthened its cardiothoracic surgery infrastruc-
ture, shored up its supplies of medicines and consumables, and also wit-
nessed a steep rise in surgeries performed at the center. The same hospital, 
and several others across the state, introduced a dialysis center through a 
public private partnership (PPP) arrangement. Nearly all the patients are 
members of the state’s health insurance scheme. The hospital is able to 
use some of the “extra” revenues from the same health insurance scheme 
to improve services elsewhere in the facility.63
Despite these innovations, much more will need to be done in terms of 
creating an incentive environment in which public hospitals are account-
able for results, and compete for GSHIS beneficiaries. Also, if states want 
to move toward a situation of competition for demand-side revenues, all 
facilities, public and private, should eventually operate under the same 
rate structure after phasing out dual subsidies. 
Results and Cross-Cutting Issues       81
Financial Benefits and Burdens on Patients
A major objective common to all schemes is to reduce the financial bur-
den of health spending on the poor. The fact that all schemes are cashless 
(or nearly so) and provide coverage for hospitalization, a case can be made 
that they have reduced financial burden on the poor at least for the cov-
ered inpatient services. It can also be hypothesized that the schemes have 
diminished the probability of falling into poverty (or deeper into poverty) 
due to hospitalization for the covered populations. Targeted demand-side 
subsidies combined with an explicit entitlement (e.g., a defined benefits 
package) may have improved the targeting of scarce public resources on 
the poor. However, any statements on impact on household spending are 
tempered by the lack of impact evaluations for nearly all schemes. This 
section reviews evidence of financial benefits as well as the persistence of 
financial burdens. The latter are related to provider charges, transporta-
tion costs, and the absence of ambulatory coverage.
Impacts on Household Spending
Analyses of household data from two schemes provide insights into their 
effects on household spending. In an impact evaluation of the Yeshasvini 
scheme in Karnataka involving a large survey of cooperative members 
and comparing matched beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries, Aggarwal 
(2010) found that borrowing to pay for inpatient surgical care was 
reduced by 30 percent for low-income beneficiaries compared with non-
enrollees (36 percent less for higher-income members). Payments that 
drew from sources other than borrowings (e.g., income, savings) increased 
by 74 percent for all sampled beneficiaries. The author concluded that 
the scheme had a significant price-reduction effect, but only for surgical 
care. However, the study also found that inpatient treatment for care 
other than surgical64 resulted in increased borrowings, but only for the 
higher-income beneficiaries. For the combined sample of lower- and 
higher-income beneficiaries, health expenditures increased by 20 percent 
compared with the uninsured control group. However, this effect was not 
significant for lower-income groups.65
These latter results are not surprising. The Yeshasvini benefits pack-
age covers only surgical procedures. Significantly, the study did not 
report whether additional spending was due to spending on covered 
procedures or uncovered care. Other factors probably contribute to the 
increase in out-of-pocket spending. For example, procedure packages 
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exclude diagnostics and surgical consumables. Follow-up, postsurgical 
care, including medicines, is also not covered. Finally, package rates 
have not been revised since the founding of the scheme in 2003 and 
are currently reported to be between 40 percent and 50 percent of 
market prices, particularly in Tier 1 cities. It can be hypothesized that 
hospitals are probably increasing their revenues by charging for tests 
and consumables. They have an incentive to oversupply these uncov-
ered services, which can result in higher profits. The fact that addi-
tional spending by lower-income households is not significant suggests 
that this group may not access uncovered services, may seek only surgi-
cal procedures that do not require significant copayments, or not 
demand postsurgical care.
Fan, Karan, and Mahal (2011) examined the impact of Rajiv Aarogyasri 
on out-of-pocket health spending during a 12-month period subsequent 
to the rollout of Phase 1 of the program, launched in April 2007.66 The 
authors found that Phase 1 households significantly reduced inpatient 
spending (in absolute terms and as a share of household consumption 
and catastrophic spending).67 Households participating in Phase 1 also 
significantly reduced the probability of having any out-of-pocket health 
spending. The results demonstrate that Aarogyasri provided financial 
protection for inpatient care, which is the main focus of the scheme. The 
reduction in total spending suggests that beneficiaries, who previously 
may have substituted outpatient care for inpatient care, were probably 
not accessing the latter (at that time) due to its high cost. Alternatively, 
beneficiaries (in collaboration with providers) may be substituting inpa-
tient care, which is covered, for outpatient care, which is not. 
Fan, Karan, and Mahal also reported that the above-described effects 
of Aarogyasri on inpatient expenditure were not as robust for households 
from scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (SC/ST). In contrast, the 
effects for non-SC/ST households were significant. This suggests that the 
scheme may not be as effective in reaching SC/STs, one of the more 
impoverished and marginalized segments of Indian society. This finding is 
consistent with the results reported by Rao and Kadam (2009) on [lower] 
levels of coverage of SC/STs.
Except for the SHI (CGHS and ESIS) schemes, limitations remain for 
most GSHISs in terms of geographical access, coverage gaps, after-care 
spending, and charges resulting from balance billing by providers that can 
lead to significant, and sometimes, unexpected out-of-pocket (OOP) 
spending. Costs for room and board of an accompanying family member 
and any transportation costs beyond those covered under the scheme are 
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examples of “legitimate” OOP costs which continue to be incurred by 
beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the limited scope of insurance coverage may 
contribute to significant, and higher, OOP spending as a result of uncov-
ered charges for postsurgical treatment. In some cases, the low annual 
family insurance ceiling may be insufficient to provide adequate coverage 
for an inpatient event resulting in OOP charges. In others, low package 
rates and lack of consumer information provide hospitals with an incen-
tive to exercise balance billing practices. 
Beneficiaries may have limited information about what is and is not 
covered. If, for example, a potential beneficiary is contacted in a health 
camp, an uncovered disease or condition may be detected. If the provider 
convinces the potential patient about the importance or urgency of treat-
ment, the uncovered patient will have to bear all treatment costs out of 
pocket. Also, in some cases, patients may not be fully aware (or informed) 
prior to admission of the need for legitimate out-of-pocket payments 
even when the procedure is otherwise covered (e.g., additional transpor-
tation costs, ambulatory drugs, and follow-up tests, post hospitalization 
costs). Schemes such as Yeshasvini require patients to bear the costs of 
surgical implants, and such details may not be fully clear to patients until 
they reach the hospital.
Evidence of Illegitimate (and Legitimate) Charges by Providers
There is some evidence that network hospitals under RSBY are charging 
patients for medicines and other items that are covered in the package 
rates. A small-scale survey of RSBY beneficiaries in three states reported 
that between a fourth and a third of beneficiaries made a payment for 
medicines, and to a lesser extent, for services that were fully covered 
under the scheme (Palacios 2011; Grover and Palacios 2011). In a survey 
of 108 RSBY beneficiaries in Kerala, the majority reported out-of-pocket 
expenses ranging between Rs. 700 and Rs. 2,000 (Research Institute 
2009). Charges were for physician fees, medicines, diagnostic tests, food, 
and other items that, according to RSBY guidelines, should be provided 
free of charge.68 In about one fourth of cases, patients were asked to 
purchase outside of the hospital drugs, diagnostic services, and meals 
unavailable in-house. Of the patients who were prescribed medicines 
upon discharge, about 70 percent did not receive them from the hospi-
tal, per RSBY rules.
These practices are not particular to RSBY. The incidence of these 
charges may be significant across all schemes, but not all GSHISs 
(or the insurers and TPAs servicing them) have sufficiently sound 
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information systems and grievance procedures to track these abuses.69 
Interviews with providers suggest that they consider the package rates 
too low to cover costs, and therefore have an incentive to continue 
this practice.70
A small survey of 127 beneficiaries of AP’s Aarogyasri scheme found 
that 58, 52, and 32 percent reported incurring expenses for medicines, 
transportation, and tests, respectively (Rao and Kadam 2009). The 
median expenditure was Rs. 3,600. This figure is significantly lower than 
the OOP expenditures for inpatient stays in private hospitals reported in 
the 2004 NSSO survey (even adjusted for inflation), but similar to OOP 
spending for inpatient stays in public hospitals reported in the same sur-
vey (table 2.2). According to Rao, the tests were covered by the scheme 
and therefore should have been free of charge. Also, field workers 
reported that private hospitals tend to admit patients only after a con-
firmed diagnosis but charge for preadmission diagnostic tests. Although 
the schemes do not reimburse hospitals for such tests, hospitals are 
expected (through the empanelment agreement) to provide such ambu-
latory services for free. Rao did not report on whether this expenditure 
on medicines was for covered services as an inpatient or for uncovered 
prehospitalization or posttreatment care.71
Transportation Spending and Geographical Access
Geographical access is another challenge facing most schemes. Several 
schemes now provide for transportation reimbursement as part of the 
total package cost agreed by the hospital. This payment is intended to 
meet the costs of public transport (generally at the base-level fare of an 
ordinary public transport bus). However, the reimbursement is capped at 
about Rs. 100 per hospitalization, which probably does not fully cover 
patients’ traveling costs from distant areas, and certainly not the travel 
costs of accompanying family members. These uncovered costs may rep-
resent a deterrent to access. In AP, Rao and Kadam (2009) found that 
the average travel distance to the closest cities servicing Rajiv Aarogyasri 
beneficiaries ranged from 34 km to 259 km. Nearly a third of Rajiv 
Aarogyasri beneficiaries had to pay out of pocket on transportation. 
Whether this spending was to cover patient travel costs (which are cov-
ered) or those of accompanying family members (which are uncovered) 
is unknown. Palacios (2011) reported that small-scale surveys in a few 
states found that hospitals often do not pay the RSBY transportation 
allowance to beneficiaries.
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The Burden of Ambulatory Care
Finally, except for CGHS and ESIS, none of the schemes cover ambula-
tory care. Yet the demand for outpatient care is very price-sensitive for 
the poor and can result in catastrophic expenses. A recent analysis of the 
NSSO/60th round survey of health utilization and expenditure (MSPI 
2004) patterns defined catastrophic as being pushed below the poverty 
line due to health payments (Berman, Ahuja, and Bhandari 2010). In 
2004, over 63 million individuals (12 million households) fell into the 
BPL category, resulting from out-of-pocket health expenditure. Nearly 
79 percent of these individuals became impoverished due to outpatient 
care in part due to its high frequency and repetitious contacts with the 
health delivery system, resulting in numerous small payments for an 
illness episode. Since 80 percent of the outpatient spending is reported 
by households on drugs (usually dispensed by the attending private 
practitioner or purchased from private pharmacies), expenditure on 
drugs is probably the main driver of impoverishment (Berman, Ahuja, 
and Bhandari 2010). Only 21 percent of impoverishment was due to 
inpatient care, partly because it is a low-frequency event but also partly 
because this figure does not take into account people who may not have 
sought inpatient care at all because of its high costs. 
Figure 3.1 displays the proportion of people falling into poverty for 
inpatient and outpatient health care costs in selected states, based on 
NSSO 60th round data (MSPI 2004). Three states with GSHISs provid-
ing tertiary cover are included in the chart: Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and 
Andhra Pradesh. Except for Rajasthan, AP, and MP, all other states in the 
figure are already implementing RSBY.72 For all the states, the burden of 
outpatient expenditures dwarfs that of inpatient spending.
Using the same NSSO/60th data set, Shahrawat and Rao (2011) esti-
mated the effects of three benefit design strategies on impoverishment as 
measured by reduction in the poverty head count. The first involves 
eliminating OOP payments on outpatient drugs, which would signifi-
cantly lower poverty headcounts. A similar reduction was found for the 
second strategy—abolishing OOP payments for outpatient care. The final 
strategy, eliminating OOP payments for inpatient care, had negligible 
effects on impoverishment. In other words, OOP payment for inpatient 
care is not a significant source of impoverishment compared to outpa-
tient care and drugs.
To summarize, from both a financial protection and health standpoint, 
a case can be made for covering basic outpatient care. By focusing on 
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inpatient care, in theory beneficiaries have an incentive to delay treat-
ment until an illness becomes serious enough to warrant inpatient care, 
although supporting evidence for this hypothesis is uncertain. Questioned 
about extending coverage to basic outpatient services, some scheme 
officials said that in theory the poor are covered for these services 
through the public delivery system. However, as mentioned in chapter 2, 
69 percent of all health expenses in the country are paid out-of-pocket; 
mostly to private providers paid on a fee-for-service basis. Although 
insurers could craft provider payment systems and other mechanisms to 
better control moral hazard related to demand for outpatient care, most 
officials and insurers claim that managerial capacities, spending controls, 
and the information environment are not conducive to introducing out-
patient coverage at this juncture. As described in box 3.2, they may have 
a case in point. 
Together, the schemes have probably helped improve financial access 
to inpatient care for low-income populations for conditions that would 
Figure 3.1 India: Households Falling below Poverty Line due to Inpatient and 
 Outpatient Health Care Costs, Selected States, 2004 (percent)
Source: Berman, Ahuja, and Bhandari 2010.
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probably have gone untreated, resulting in lower health status, loss of 
productivity, school absence, and so forth. However, only longitudinal 
household data can support such a hypothesis. While geographic access 
may seem to be a constraint in exercising this choice, particularly for 
beneficiaries residing in distant areas at least some beneficiaries seem to 
be accessing care from providers of their choice, even after traveling 
 substantial distances. 
Cost Containment
Since beneficiaries do not pay the full cost of care, insurance provides an 
incentive to consume more services and use more expensive providers 
(demand-side moral hazard). Depending on pricing and provider 
payment mechanisms, providers may have an incentive to deliver more 
services than an informed (or price conscious) patient would demand 
(supply-side moral hazard). This is particularly true of fee-based payment 
systems. Typically, health insurance schemes contain design elements that 
may escalate costs though possessing others that can contain them. 
Schemes can also use direct managerial methods (such as copayments, 
Box 3.2
India: Constraints to Introducing Ambulatory Care 
Benefits in Health Insurance 
Including comprehensive ambulatory coverage would be a daunting task under 
current provider payment systems, oversight arrangements, and managerial and 
information capacities. Schemes are still ill-equipped to handle demand-side 
ambulatory care coverage from a control and managerial standpoint. Potentially 
overwhelming moral hazard and fraud issues would require a rethinking of the 
insurance and delivery models. In general, group practices (which in principle can 
be capitated to provide a package of ambulatory services) have yet to take hold 
in India. Under these constraints, GSHISs and nearly all private insurers have yet to 
develop viable products extending coverage for primary care. As described in 
chapter 5, RSBY is piloting an ambulatory benefit in Orissa. More such pilots (with 
proper impact evaluations) are needed before the schemes can consider rolling 
out ambulatory coverage to their beneficiaries.
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preauthorizations) to control utilization. In this section, cost drivers, 
cost-containment measures, and incentives facing insurers, providers, and 
beneficiaries are reviewed. The focus is on the new GSIHSs. 
Cost Drivers
As explained early in this chapter, one cost driver relates to difficulties in 
targeting the beneficiaries. Although expanding coverage to nonpoor but 
still vulnerable groups is laudable, apparently higher-income groups (who, 
in theory, are excluded from membership) appear to have access to ben-
efits under these schemes. Such leakage (false positives) is related to the 
defects of the BPL listing and targeting system73 but increases costs and 
undermines scheme sustainability and possibly capacity to deepen the 
benefits package.
Beneficiaries have no incentive to secure medical care in a timely 
manner to avoid more serious illness. For example, if a condition that 
can be treated on an outpatient basis is detected, treatment will have 
to be out of pocket because newer schemes do not cover ambulatory 
care. People may delay care until conditions become serious enough to 
warrant hospitalization, which is covered. This situation could lead to 
cost escalation. 
Since beneficiaries face near zero costs for covered treatment in any 
of the hospitals, they have an incentive to seek care at “prestigious” hos-
pitals, invariably the more expensive tertiary care facilities with their 
higher cost structures. Given their popularity among beneficiaries and 
the fact that they are generally also politically well connected, these 
facilities may exert influence to raise package rates in the future. In light 
of the absence of quality and outcome information on empaneled facili-
ties, patients will continue to choose facilities by their reputation rather 
than their clinical effectiveness. There is no attempt to steer patients to 
lower-cost but good-quality providers, due partly to lack of information 
on the quality of care, however defined. Also, schemes were founded on 
the principle of “free choice” of provider, and any preference given to a 
specific facility (or facilities) may be viewed negatively. 
Cost-Containment Measures and the Role of Insurance 
Intermediaries
In theory, five features common to most of the studied schemes can 
contribute to cost containment: insurer competition, limited scope of 
the benefits package, annual family spending caps coupled with proce-
dure-specific package rates, and provider competition. Although these 
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features may initially contribute to cost containment, they are unlikely 
to continue to exert downward pressure on costs indefinitely. 
Package rates are the main form of paying the hospital providers 
among the schemes analyzed. Although this payment mechanism may 
be a substantial improvement over the open-ended, fee-for-service 
regime,74 it is still far from an effective cost-containment system for the 
long run. Officials from some schemes claim that package rates exert 
downward pressure on costs and have helped lower market rates for 
similar services. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the impact of pack-
age rates on controlling cost escalation remains to be seen. 
In principle, competition among providers for beneficiaries may exert 
pressure on providers to lower costs (or expand volume). However, in 
rural and semi-urban areas, there may be too few providers to form a 
competitive market. Further, evidence is emerging that beneficiaries in 
rural areas are traveling longer distances to access empaneled and more 
“prestigious” facilities in large cities. This appears to be the case for 
Bangalore based cardiac hospitals for beneficiaries living in the distant 
divisions of Karnataka (covered under Vajpayee Arogyashri), and for 
RSBY beneficiaries in Kerala. Even in larger cities with multiple provid-
ers, provider competition may not be contributing to cost containment 
as evidenced by the high concentration of care provided in a relatively 
limited number of empaneled facilities. For example, table 3.13 shows 
high concentration of care provided in the top 20 facilities according to 
claims data.
The use of managerial cost-containment mechanisms is in its infancy 
in GSHISs as well as in the broader health insurance industry in India. 
Preauthorization is the main form of utilization control but, with the 
Table 3.13 India: Share of Top 20 Network Hospitals in 
 Preauthorized Claims, Selected Schemes 
Scheme 
Percent of all claims 
serviced by top 20 hospitals
Kalaignar’ (TN)a 26
Yeshasvini (KA)b 58
Vajpayee Arogyashri (KA)c 60
Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP)d 34
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on scheme documentation. 
a. July 2009–Aug 2010 data.
b. 2009–10 data.
c. Apr–July 2010 data.
d. 2007–2010 data. 
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possible exception of AP, this mechanism appears to focus on detecting 
uncovered services and fraud, with only limited success in filtering unnec-
essary care and overprovisioning of service. Other managerial practices 
such as utilization review, analysis of practice patterns, use of gatekeepers, 
and claims analysis are rarely applied. Considering hospitals’ incentive to 
induce demand, these methods need to be introduced or strengthened. 
Finally, cost-containment measures such as case-based provider payment 
mechanisms, use of generic drugs, and controlled introduction of expen-
sive technologies are yet to enter into the cost-containment discourse. 
Controlling costs will be a future challenge facing all schemes. Premiums 
are currently low because of the recency of many of the schemes, the 
limited depth of coverage, beneficiaries’ general lack of awareness of ben-
efits and processes, and insurers’ tendency to take a “top-line” approach to 
the GSHIS market. As the schemes mature and expand, this situation will 
change, and cost escalation will become a major concern. Evidence shows 
that claim frequency increases rapidly in the second and third year after 
schemes’ rollout, leading to higher aggregate costs.75
The Challenges and Potential of Insurance Intermediaries in 
Controlling Costs
Before continuing the discussion of cost containment, it is important to 
understand the nature of insurer competition in the GSHISs markets as 
well as insurers’ underlying incentives to compete. Insurers vie for gov-
ernment contracts to cover large groups of beneficiaries residing in 
defined territories such as states or districts.76 The basis of competition is 
their quoted premium prices. Unlike the private voluntary insurance 
market, insurers do not compete for beneficiaries.77 Since they are paid 
according to the number of enrolled families, insurers have an incentive 
to maximize enrolment and minimize costs. 
The use of insurance companies as intermediaries has probably con-
tributed to the highly competitive pricing of premiums, at least in the 
early years of implementation. The health insurance industry is very com-
petitive, and many companies seek to expand revenues and market 
share78 to complement their private insurance products by offering lower 
premiums to GSHISs.79 In addition to the long-term potential of mone-
tary gains from the GSHIS market itself, which is a big driver of insurers’ 
participation, insurers have a number of reasons to continue in this mar-
ket despite some short-term losses on this business (if any at all). Given 
the competitive nature of the insurance market, participation in GSHISs 
establishes brand recognition as well as their credentials as a large insurer. 
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They also gain from a larger geographical presence, an expanded hospital 
network, and greater knowledge of the provider market. Insurers can then 
leverage their increased size to exact better discounts from hospitals for 
their GSHISs as well as voluntary commercial business. Insurers also 
make investment gains on the funds received in advance, which offset 
some of the claim losses (or lower returns). Finally, servicing social poli-
cies probably places the insurers in a favorable light among politicians and 
policy makers. 
However, it is safe to say that the currently observed low levels of pric-
ing will be difficult to sustain. Premiums will eventually increase to more 
realistic levels after a couple of years of operation as awareness levels 
become more widespread among the targeted population, more facilities 
become empaneled particularly in smaller cities and towns, and compa-
nies become more skillful in predicting utilization and costs.
Already there are signs of upward pressure on premiums as insurers 
incur losses in some territories. For example, under RSBY in Kerala, a 
state that had a claim ratio higher than 100 percent,80 new premium bids 
submitted by prospective insurers for 2011were markedly higher than 
the previous year’s. As GSHISs expand, it may be tougher for insurers to 
justify losses resulting from unrealistic pricing in terms of short-term 
policies to grow their business volume.81
Whether the incentives for insurers are sufficiently robust to control 
costs and protect margins is unclear. The large variation in utilization 
rates across insurers suggests that not all insurers are interested in mini-
mizing costs or able to do so. Given this scenario, limits on family ben-
efit coverage alone are unlikely to contribute to cost containment as the 
schemes mature. 
Three factors contribute to insurers’ weak cost-containment incen-
tives. First, while low package rates and limited benefit coverage may 
exert downward pressure on total cost for newer GSHISs, schemes will 
continue to face political demands to raise annual family caps and to 
increase the depth of benefits (e.g., to cover more and more expensive 
procedures).82 This is already happening in HP and Kerala with schemes 
in these states designing top-up coverage for RSBY. In AP, the expansion 
to newer geographic areas in July 2008 was accompanied by the incorpo-
ration of several hundred new procedures to the scheme. Yeshasvini and 
Kalaignar have recently added a number of commonly performed proce-
dures to their benefits package. In short, the trend of expanding the scope 
of coverage is a question of “when” and “how much,” rather than “whether” 
this will happen. 
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Second, with the exception of TN, most schemes do not have long-
term pricing contracts with insurers. Most contracts are annual. As sug-
gested above, insurance companies will anticipate their rising costs and, in 
due course, quote progressively higher premiums for successive annual 
policy cycles, which the public budget will have to cover. Even in the case 
of multi-year contracts for state-managed RSBY policies, contractual 
terms stipulate that government and insurer have to mutually agree to 
renew the insurance annually.83 In effect, insurers can “re-price” their ser-
vices for the next policy period whenever costs rise, which mitigates their 
incentive to make long-term investments in cost containment at the pro-
vider end. If they fail to break even at the quoted or prevalent premium, 
they may exit the contract and bid again at a higher price level for subse-
quent periods. Alternatively, they may decide to exit the GSHIS market 
altogether.84 Given the limited number of insurers in the market, 85 the 
continued willingness of insurers to prefer growth in revenues at the cost 
of bearing some losses is uncertain in the long run. 
Finally, most schemes are cashless to the beneficiary and thus do not 
use other direct forms of cost sharing such as copayments, deductibles, 
and coinsurance. Although such mechanisms can pose barriers to care, 
especially for the poor, not using them does eliminate an important form 
of utilization control.86
To summarize, GSHISs face a number of challenges to control cost 
escalation. Insurers have weak incentives to control costs, in part because 
they can “reprice” or rebid a higher premium for each annual policy cycle 
and therefore shift the medium-term (and long-term) financial risk back 
to the public budget. Provider competition is constrained by the high 
concentration of utilization in a relatively limited number of providers. 
Other measures such as package rates, preauthorization processes, pro-
vider competition, and use of gatekeepers can contribute to cost contain-
ment but will have to be significantly strengthened or introduced as a 
design feature. 
Institutional Arrangements and Managerial Capacity 
Health insurance requires sound and reliable systems of governance and 
management to ensure the execution of key risk-management and 
administrative functions expected of the implementing agency. These 
include the enrolment of beneficiaries, collection of funds (where appli-
cable), engaging intermediaries such as TPAs and service providers, rate 
setting, claims administration and analysis, selection and payment of 
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 providers, utilization and cost control, quality monitoring, enforcement 
of rules and terms related to the delivery of the benefits package, and 
overall monitoring and analysis. 
GSHIS governance and management arrangements are assessed in this 
section. It examines staffing issues and ways insurance and TPA interme-
diaries contribute (or not) to overall capacity. Purchasing of medical ser-
vices, a key GSHIS function, is also reviewed. The remainder of the 
section deals with three emerging institutional issues: use of information 
technology (IT), control of fraud and corruption, and innovation, research, 
and learning. All three are key institutional responsibilities and are perti-
nent to scheme sustainability. 
GSHIS Governance and Institutional Arrangements
Governance arrangements concern accountabilities and relationships 
(Savedoff 2008). Such arrangements establish the institutional architec-
ture to enable coordinated relations between key actors (government, 
insurers, providers, regulators, and beneficiaries) while ensuring that the 
main agents, insurers, and providers are held accountable to the main 
stakeholders: government, beneficiaries, and regulators. An important 
aspect of management involves developing a purchasing capacity to buy 
health services for beneficiaries efficiently and effectively (Baeza and 
Packard 2006; Preker and Langenbrunner 2005). Sound purchasing 
involves selective identification of providers, specification of service and 
quality standards, linking of payments to performance, and robust con-
tract monitoring and enforcement by the purchaser. Insurers’ contracts 
with providers usually involve risk sharing: providers assuming some of 
the risk for variations in treatment costs. Insurers need to become active 
rather than passive purchasers of health care to ensure that the schemes 
achieve objectives related to access and financial protection. 
Given that most of the GSHISs are in their early years, nearly all have 
yet to develop the institutional architecture to ensure robust governance 
and management. However, as will be shown below, exceptions to this 
statement are emerging. Nevertheless, mechanisms for representing 
stakeholders, government, beneficiaries, and providers in decision- 
making processes have yet to be developed. All the newer schemes use 
intermediary agents, such as commercial insurers and TPAs, to conduct 
many managerial functions on their behalf. With the exception of Rajiv 
Aarogyasri, no scheme has yet deployed technology solutions that 
enable informed decision making or developed reliable systems to 
facilitate the effective and efficient purchasing of services (which, for 
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the newer schemes, is a function of their recent origin). Without ade-
quate institutional capacities to perform these functions, the perfor-
mance and survival of any scheme is at risk.
With the exception of CGHS, all the studied GSHISs have established 
governing agencies that are legally autonomous from the government 
department that created the agency and oversees it (table 3.14). However, 
most agencies are not functionally autonomous and generally follow gov-
ernment rules and approval channels governing the use of public funds. 
Also, most senior positions in these agencies are occupied by government 
officials serving ex-officio. Some positions are filled by retired government 
officials, hired under contract. This group continues to act in the “mold” 
of the public servant and are as sensitive to bureaucratic and political 
pressures as their civil servant counterparts. 
Managerial Arrangements, Staffing, and Managerial Capacity 
of Intermediaries
The next layer of institutional structures in the GSHIS system is that of 
the executing agencies, which consist mainly of commercial insurers and 
TPAs. The rapid strides in the commercial health insurance industry in 
recent years have made insurers’ capacity (e.g., technological acumen, 
management experience, professional manpower) available to GSHISs 
for performing such functions as provider network management, admin-
istration of preauthorization processes, claim processing, and informa-
tion management. These managerial contributions would not have been 
conceivable a decade earlier. The new generation of GSHISs has been 
able to leverage this capacity effectively over the last decade. Five 
schemes, Rajiv Aarogyasri, RSBY, Kalaignar, RSBY Plus, and the proposed 
ASBY use health insurance companies (and these insurers may also use 
TPA services to raise implementation performance). Two schemes, 
Yeshasvini and Vajpayee Arogyashri, directly contract TPAs to manage 
the schemes.87 CGHS makes limited use of TPAs to augment its own 
claim-processing capabilities. ESIS is the only scheme that does not use 
commercial insurers or TPAs. 
Most GSHISs work with severe human resource constraints (table 
3.14).88 They lack the institutional architecture to conduct major 
 governance and managerial functions involved in oversight and adminis-
tration of health insurance. Officials usually have many other responsi-
bilities within the government system and cannot dedicate full time to 
scheme oversight and management. Nor do they have adequate staff in 
terms of volume or skill set. In fact, most schemes have fewer than five 
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Table 3.14 India: Features of GSHIS Governing and Executing Agencies, 2010 
Scheme
Governing agency 
and legal status Parent department
External executing 
agency (if any)
Number of full-time staff 
in governing agency
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima 
Yojna (RSBY)
Ministry of Labour and Employment 
(MOLE) + state nodal agency 
 (autonomous society or trust)
State departments of 
labor, health, or rural 
 development
Insurance companies <10 at center + ~100 
 located in 25 state nodal 
agencies
Kalaignar’s (TN) TN Health Systems Society 
 (autonomous society)
Department of Health, TN Insurance companies <10
Employees’ State Insurance 
Scheme (ESIS)
ESIC (Employees’ State Insurance 
Corporation)—(autonomous 
body under a Parliamentary Act)
Ministry of Labour, 
GOI
n.a. 13,585 (includes hospital 
and dispensary staff )
Yeshasvini (KA) Yeshasvini Co-operative Farmers 
Trust (autonomous trust)
Department of 
Co-operatives, KA
TPA <10
Vajpayee Arogyashri 
Scheme (KA)
Suvarna Arogya Suraksha Trust
(autonomous trust)
Department of Health, KA TPA <10
Central Government 
Health Scheme (CGHS)
Department of Health and Family 
Welfare, GOI
MOHFW, GOI TPAs (to some extent) n.a.
Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP) Aarogyasri Healthcare Trust 
 (autonomous trust)
Department of Health and 
chief minister’s office, 
 Government of AP
Insurance company 117
RSBY Plus (HP) State nodal agency (autonomous 
society)
Department of Health, HP Insurance company <10
Apka Swasthya Bima 
Yojna (Delhi) (Proposed)
Apka Swasthya Bima Trust 
 (autonomous trust)
Department of Health, 
Delhi
Insurance company n.a.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on site visits and schemes documents.
Note: n.a. = not applicable; scheme does not use an external agency.
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full-time staff. Few GSHIS staff have the experience or training in the 
complex functions of overseeing or managing health insurance (including 
reviewing and understanding data generated by their information sys-
tems), scrutinizing insurers and TPAs, or supervising field staff. 
Insurance intermediaries serving the GSHISs have picked up some of 
the slack, contributing to the government’s ability to recruit, contract, 
and purchase services from private hospitals on a historically unprece-
dented scale. Yet, poor monitoring of insurers and TPAs by the schemes 
could reduce or nullify these advantages and introduce systemic distor-
tions (such as leakages). Public objectives may not be congruent with 
those of the insurers intermediating in the transactions. Thus, sound inter-
nal control systems and effective supervision of the insurers by the gov-
erning agencies are required.
Most schemes are highly dependent on intermediaries to collect 
and analyze data, manage and control providers, ensure quality, and 
control costs. Experience elsewhere, however, suggests that insurance 
companies have done a poor job with some of these tasks unless forced 
to by payers (e.g., government and employers) (Davidson 2010). The 
same holds for India. Most of the private insurers currently contracted 
by GSHISs perform mainly administrative functions typical of a TPA, 
and the risk-management role expected of them is emerging only 
slowly. Monitoring of providers is sporadic and usually responds to a 
grievance or a claim-related issue, or is intensified only when the 
insurance company experiences a loss. This is an opportunity lost to 
drive improvements in service delivery—the function that has the 
most direct impact on beneficiaries. If beneficiaries receive poor qual-
ity care or inhumane treatment (or are illegitimately made to pay), the 
benefits of the proposed system will be compromised, and with it, 
sustainability. 
One scheme, Rajiv Aarogyasri, has developed a sound institutional 
framework, and may represent a model for others. In the early years, 
only a handful of officials oversaw the scheme. Over time, the trust 
expanded in size and complexity to nearly 120 employees in 2010. 
The insurer employs about 4,000 functionaries exclusively for serving 
the scheme. Most of them are the field workers, known as aarog-
yamithras. The remainder man call center and claim adjudication 
teams and other administrative units. Specialized roles for staff and an 
elaborate IT system are critical characteristics of the scheme’s moni-
toring system. 
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Weakness of Purchasing Functions
Although schemes have separated financing from provision, and money 
already follows patients, providers are not held responsible for productiv-
ity, efficiency, quality of care, or patient satisfaction. In effect, as practiced 
by nearly all schemes, purchasing is a passive, poorly managed activity. 
The commonly used Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)89 is a 
loosely crafted instrument in which provider responsibilities and perfor-
mance are ill-specified, if at all. In their current form the MOUs are not 
tools for modifying or even influencing provider behaviors, in part due to 
their poor enforcement and monitoring by GSHISs.
In GSHISs, insurers and TPAs do not appear to have taken up the slack 
at least in terms of service purchasing. They may have few incentives to 
do so. As mentioned, insurers may be oriented toward securing “top line” 
(revenues) or “bottom line” (profitability) rather than making major 
investments in controlling costs. This is especially true if they can easily 
pass on the increase in costs as higher premiums in the next policy cycle.
Similar to social insurance schemes in Latin America, ESIS and CGHS 
have built their institutional structure as providers of integrated care ser-
vices to their beneficiaries. While they have large numbers of full-time 
staff, a good proportion of them are directly involved in service delivery 
at the schemes’ health facilities.90 In general, both schemes appear under-
resourced for effective purchasing91 and other important governance 
functions such as monitoring and information management for better 
decision making. The absence of robust management information systems 
(MISs) further compromises the ability of these schemes to purchase 
effectively, control costs, and measure performance.
In sum, GSHISs require stronger purchasing capacity to improve the 
drafting and enforcement of contractual terms with insurers, TPAs, and 
providers; pay providers on time; represent the interests of the insured 
population and government; and collect, analyze, and take action based 
on operational data. A shift from passive purchasing to active purchas-
ing is warranted to ensure that the health services financed through the 
schemes are efficient and of high quality.
Use of “Right-Level” Information Technology
Increasing use of information and communication technology (ICT) tools 
is another encouraging trend across all schemes. Even the traditional 
schemes, ESIS and CGHS, have embarked on widespread automation of 
their processes and to develop MISs commensurate with the needs of the 
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schemes. The application of biometric smart cards for enrolment and 
identification in RSBY and Kalaignar, an integrated web-enabled platform 
for a paperless work environment in Rajiv Aarogyasri, and electronic pre-
authorization and claim submission platforms in Kalaignar and Yeshaswini 
schemes are successful examples of the central role played by ICT in 
these schemes. ICT has the potential to play an increasingly important 
role in reducing fraud, containing administrative costs, and generating 
data for monitoring and analysis.
Most schemes already deploy, or are planning, IT applications exten-
sively. A common theme across all of them is the desire to apply IT solu-
tions at the “right” or appropriate level. Some schemes have invested 
considerable sums and effort in developing customized and very detailed 
IT systems. However, such systems may demand a level of effort that may 
not be practical to ensure full compliance from the provider network, or 
similarly, achieve only the mandatory level of compliance required for 
payment. For example, Rajiv Aarogyasri has a relatively advanced IT sys-
tem for admission, preauthorization, and discharge modules. All are well 
populated with the required information. However, the opposite is the 
case for the module on inpatient notes.92 Schemes have not yet mandated 
hospitals to provide information such as international classification of 
disease (ICD-10) codes for diagnosis, which would require significantly 
less effort but would be highly valuable for data analysis. 
Some schemes rely entirely on the IT systems and proprietary 
applications deployed by the insurer or the TPA (e.g., Yeshasvini and 
TN). These may be good quality systems or applications, but they 
were created with different objectives in mind and may not be appro-
priate for the scheme’s requirements. Other schemes such as CGHS 
and ESIS have operated with manual systems for decades and are only 
now gearing up to deploy IT systems. It is vital that all schemes intro-
duce IT tools. Manual systems will not be able to handle the volume 
and data requirements of mass health insurance schemes. However, 
they also have to be pitched at a level appropriate to the user environ-
ment and should not impose an impractical submission requirement 
for which the provider has no incentive for compliance or which raises 
administrative costs in the system without a corresponding gain in 
terms of generating useful information.
Preventing Fraud and Misutilization
Institutional strengthening to prevent fraud and misutilization in the 
scheme is an important focus area for GSHISs. At the claims stage, 
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misutilization or fraud can take multiple forms, including misrepresenta-
tion (ineligible members and/or dependents), claims submitted by non-
existent hospitals or for services not rendered, providing (or billing) 
higher-level services than required, or balance billing of patients. Insurers 
report other types of fraud such as outpatient to inpatient conversion 
and the inclusion of false names in smart cards (ICICI Lombard 2010). 
In some cases, however, hospitals may select the incorrect package due 
to lack of familiarity with or capacity to navigate the claims process. 
In general, schemes require control systems along three domains: con-
stant vigil on claims data, reviews of preauthorization requests, and 
physical verification of beneficiaries undergoing treatment. They also 
need to make use of grievance and feedback systems for patients and 
providers. Some schemes have implemented sound vigilance measures 
along these lines with varying degrees of sophistication. Others appear to 
be in reaction mode, responding to press reports or random beneficiary 
complaints. Few schemes systematically or proactively implement fraud-
detection measures. 
A somewhat extreme example of fraudulent practices was detected 
by RSBY in Dangs (Gujarat) where hospitals logged fraudulent claims 
for several months before being detected and disempaneled by the 
contracted insurers (Palacios 2011). This is not a recent phenomenon 
and has happened in other schemes without an insurer as an interme-
diary. For example, in 2003, CGHS found irregularities in the bills 
submitted by hospitals and chemists in a few cities. In both cases, dis-
ciplinary action was taken against these providers including recovery 
and suspension. This experience demonstrates the importance of good 
oversight by the governing agency, which can be supported through 
systems developed by intermediaries such as insurers. Nevertheless, the 
governing agency is ultimately accountable for detecting fraud as well 
as taking prompt disciplinary action against fraudulent practices. 
Prompt disciplinary action is important as a deterrent to future fraud-
ulent behaviors.
Some public authorities and academics have called for replacing insur-
ers with government agencies to handle enrolment, claims settlement, 
and underwriting functions. Such calls raise questions about government 
agencies’ and insurers’ incentives to control fraud. In theory, insurers 
have a strong incentive to minimize fraud because such measures, if suc-
cessful, would reduce the quantum of claim payments. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the short-term nature of their contract may reduce 
their incentive to invest in fraud control. Nevertheless, it is uncertain 
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whether a government agency that directly pays providers would be able 
to make objective decisions to contain costs and eliminate fraud or pos-
sess the technical and administrative efficiency and wherewithal to ensure 
effective empanelment of hospitals, eliminate leakages, and ensure timely 
claim payments.93 Recent experience with CGHS and state employee 
schemes that purchase services directly from private hospitals suggests 
that, despite several efforts and ongoing reforms, much remains to be 
done to improve purchasing effectiveness and efficiency. A case can be 
made that using insurers as intermediaries may be useful in the short to 
medium term because they have the incentives to check provider and 
beneficiary behaviors that negatively impact their bottom line. 
Under RSBY, at least one insurer is implementing an audit system to 
improve fraud detection. This system involves two features. The first 
consists of culling claims data to uncover potential cases known as “trig-
gers.” These can include a sudden increase in the volume of claims or 
high-value claims, multiple admissions for the same patient or procedure, 
high repetition of certain diagnostic tests, unreasonable lengths of stay, 
and lopsided gender-based treatment (e.g., large number of hysterecto-
mies). Once a trigger is detected, the second feature entails follow-up 
hospital visits conducted by surveillance teams staffed by medical person-
nel to verify records and claims. In some cases, the audit may require 
home visits to authenticate patient residence and ascertain the services 
used. RSBY reported that doing audits in 219 hospitals in 2009 resulted 
in disempanelment of 68 of these facilities (ICICI Lombard 2010). It is 
unknown to what extent audits have been incorporated by other insurers 
under contract with RSBY (or other GSHISs) or rolled out to the major-
ity of RSBY empaneled hospitals.
Innovation, Research, and Learning 
With the possible exception of AP and RSBY, there appears to be a lack 
of innovation in the schemes examined for this study. Some of the origi-
nal schemes, such as ESIS and Yeshasvini, have reached a low level of 
equilibrium and appear to have little interest in or capacity to systemati-
cally address faults in the design or implementation or innovate in terms 
of managerial processes. Some recent state schemes are close carbon cop-
ies of early innovators such as Aarogyasri in AP. Scheme planners have 
rarely examined the contextual conditions in which the earlier schemes 
were planned and launched, or their potential weaknesses that could be 
improved with home-grown innovation. Most managers are too involved 
in day-to-day operations of rollout and their myriad additional assign-
ments. They also do not have adequate technical support. Consequently, 
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senior officials are rarely able to revisit the big picture design issues raised 
in the previous sections, including provider market, access, rate setting, 
financial burden, fiscal space, and relation to primary care. 
Part of the problem lies in the limited orientation toward research and 
analysis. Together, the nine schemes studied spent more than Rs. 5,600 
crores ($1.25 billion) in 2009–10. Despite this large sum of money, only 
very limited systematic research is being done (except by RSBY) to mea-
sure financial performance or impact on financial burden, quality, pro-
vider market, outcomes, and so forth. A donor-driven impact evaluation 
with rigorous methods is planned for three schemes (RSBY, AP, and 
Yeshasvini, KA). Most schemes appear to be in reactive mode, addressing 
problems only as they appear. They seem fairly certain that government 
will continue to fund them. Most lack the information or analytical base 
to make evidence-based decisions. Such information provides important 
inputs into inevitable in-flight structural and process corrections, which 
are necessary for all insurance schemes to thrive (or survive).
The Political Economy of Demand- and Supply-Side Financing 
This final section focuses on issues of political economy facing the 
GSHISs as well as the broader system of health financing in India. The 
extent of political support for the schemes is appraised as well as the 
challenges of uneasy relations between GSHISs and the public delivery 
system and the tenuous linkages between federal- and state-sponsored 
schemes.
Political Support
Political interest in health insurance is strong, especially at the state level, 
and is a driver of expansion of population coverage, deepening of bene-
fits, and increasing public expenditures for health. This is evident in KA, 
TN, and AP where political leaders have extended coverage to non-BPL 
populations, reaching more than 80 percent of the population in the lat-
ter two states. Other states such as HP, Kerala, and Delhi are seeking to 
top-up the RSBY benefits package for the already enrolled BPL popula-
tion. This dual trend of extension to new states and population and ben-
efits expansion in ongoing schemes will likely continue at least over the 
medium-term. Political ownership at the state level is an important lever 
for sustainability, and to date there is no evidence of this support ebbing. 
Although political leadership may change, these schemes have substan-
tial popular support and eliminating or reducing benefits and population 
coverage of ongoing schemes appears unlikely. 
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Political support from GOI as well as from participating states for 
RSBY coverage and its expansion is also strong. This is evidenced by the 
inclusion of new groups of beneficiaries at the central level (such as ben-
eficiaries under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, con-
struction workers, railway baggage handlers, and vendors working in 
railway stations), and the non-BPL population at the state level (such as 
in Kerala), and sustained commitment to financing the scheme.
Significantly, GSHISs have been a driver for increasing public financ-
ing for health from state governments. For example, some state govern-
ments appear more likely to increase health financing if funds are directed 
to the demand side. Given the low level of total government funding for 
health (about 1 percent of GDP) and within that, the state-level contri-
bution (about 0.7 percent of GDP), additional resources for health from 
state coffers will help address the overall public financing gap.94 This is 
particularly relevant inasmuch as states are constitutionally responsible 
for implementing health services and programs in India. 
GSHISs have the potential to help raise public spending on health, 
given the high political commitment. In the past, this has been difficult 
to achieve in practice due to supply-side constraints (NCMH 2005). 
Interviews with political leaders suggest frustration in improving the per-
formance of the public delivery system in their own states. Whether 
demand-side financing can be a catalyst for significant and sustained 
increases in public spending remains to be seen, but the experience so far 
with state-sponsored GSHISs suggests it has strong potential. 
GSHIS Relations with the Public Delivery System
Related to the debate over demand and supply financing, an emerging 
issue involves linkages between these schemes and the public delivery 
system. The expansion of GSHISs has resulted in some friction within 
state governments regarding the expansion of the schemes vis-à-vis 
investing in the public delivery system. Most GSHISs are only margin-
ally linked to the public delivery system, which accentuates the dichot-
omy. Empaneled private facilities outnumber public facilities in nearly 
all scheme networks, and most beneficiaries choose private facilities 
when seeking care. In short, public hospitals are competing with private 
hospitals for clients but are losing due to real or perceived differences in 
service quality.95
Health department officials openly worry that their budgets may be 
negatively affected by the expansion of government-sponsored insurance. 
The argument was voiced by a public hospital representative in one state: 
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“There is no need for cashless GSHISs because care is already free in 
public facilities, and funds would be better spent upgrading public deliv-
ery rather than making private hospitals richer.” Conversely, scheme offi-
cials often question the benefits of public delivery, particularly at the 
hospital level, pointing to the problems of availability of specialized 
human resources, maintenance of medical equipment, perceived issues 
with quality of care, low patient satisfaction, and need for out-of-pocket 
spending to cover irregularly supplied consumables and medicines. Some 
scheme officials also believe that the future expansion of GSHISs rests in 
converting supply-side subsidies to demand-side subsidies, while the 
mere idea of conversion is anathema to state health departments. The 
political economy of supply- and demand-side financing is thus not an 
easy path to tread. However, as discussed in chapter 5, perhaps the solu-
tion lies in a pragmatic and balanced approach, building on the strengths 
of the current health system.
Interface between Federal and State Schemes
How the federally sponsored schemes will interact with state- sponsored 
schemes is another key policy issue. Although health is constitutionally 
a state subject, how this mandate should be applied to health insurance 
is unclear. Should GSHISs be the responsibility of states? If not, what 
is the role of the central government and how can it support funding 
and operations of these schemes? Although the GOI flagship RSBY 
scheme has successfully rolled out in a large number of states, it has not 
been able to progress on the issue of integration with state govern-
ment–sponsored schemes except, to some extent, in Kerala and HP, 
leading to fragmentation and possible distortions. In at least one state, 
RSBY is implemented in one set of districts while a state-sponsored 
scheme is implemented in another set. The schemes are already begin-
ning to overlap in some districts. In other states, RSBY has yet to com-
mence operations due to the inability of central and state authorities to 
arrive at a common ground for integration with state-sponsored health 
insurance schemes. Different criteria for ascertaining BPL status, ben-
efits packages, price structures, coverage caps, empanelment criteria, 
and lack of portability across states (state schemes) have hampered 
merging schemes into an integrated state-based insurance system. 
Nevertheless, some states (such as HP and Kerala) have elected to try 
a “top-off” model that uses RSBY as the base coverage while the state 
finances a deeper tertiary coverage beyond RSBY-covered services. 
These schemes are still evolving and lack of  information prevents 
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 making any definitive statement on the top-off model and overcoming 
the aforementioned constraints.
In the context of multiple federal schemes (e.g., ESIS, CGHS, RSBY, 
and other smaller federal schemes), the system is already fragmented. 
This can lead to inefficiencies and inequities such as overlapping admin-
istrative arrangements and provider empanelment/certification. Varying 
package rates (or provider payment mechanisms) would send mixed 
signals to providers, leading them to gravitate toward higher-paying 
schemes and resulting in insufficient leverage to control costs. Lack of 
portability is another issue (Baeza and Packard 2006). Although CGHS 
and ESIS are mandated for specific groups, they have several common 
features. However, these functions are performed in parallel and with 
separate management structures, resulting in duplication of effort and 
costs. The federal government is losing an opportunity to aggregate pur-
chasing systems for achieving economies of scale. Similarly, the GOI 
Ministry of Labor runs two separate schemes for formal and informal 
sector workers, ESIS and RSBY, with few lines of communication 
between the schemes. At the very least, shared use of the ESIS facilities 
by RSBY could be a way of improving utilization of several underutilized 
ESIS facilities, and ESIS facilities could be a mechanism for RSBY to 
foray into ambulatory care, where they exist. 
Conclusion: Successes and Challenges
The major operational and design features of the GSHISs and their impli-
cations for future and sustained performance were analyzed in this chap-
ter. The focus was on the new wave of schemes launched in the late 
2000s. These schemes introduced a demand-side purchasing approach to 
public financing while embracing several innovative features—in the 
Indian context. GSHISs are well-positioned to become key stakeholders 
in policy decisions regarding health financing and delivery arrangements. 
This final section summarizes major operational successes and challenges 
emerging from GSHIS implementation.
Successes
Building upon the lessons learned from earlier rounds of SHI and 
 government-subsidized health insurance as well as managerial know-
how of private insurers, a new genre of schemes emerged after 2007 with 
a “bottom-up” focus on covering the poor. Together, these schemes rep-
resented a new of way of doing business for government in terms of 
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financing and delivery of health services in which money follows the 
patient. The following are major achievements of these schemes.
Coverage extension and focus on the poor. As newcomers to India’s 
health insurance landscape, these schemes have placed significant empha-
sis on achieving stated population-coverage goals. For the most part, 
GSHISs have rapidly achieved these coverage targets and have multiplied 
membership manifold, while providing financial protection for covered 
conditions.96 The distribution of population coverage has also shifted, 
suggesting important equity enhancements. In contrast to PHI, ESIS, and 
CGHS, which constituted almost the entire member base in 2003–04, 
most of the beneficiaries of the newer government (central and state) 
schemes are BPL populations or lower-income groups. This trend of cov-
ering lower socioeconomic groups will continue in the future. 
Political and financial support. Another important measure of success is 
the willingness of GOI and state political leaders to increase outlays to 
GSHISs. Spending on the recently launched GSHISs will increase by 
nearly threefold in nominal terms between 2009–10 and 2015 (table 3.6 
and annex figure 3A.2).97 It is unlikely that government, particularly state 
governments, can continue to significantly expand health financing on 
both the demand-side (through GSHISs) and supply-side (through 
NRHM) for the indefinite future. In short, the schemes have helped raise 
the political profile of health, which has led to additional financing for 
insurance coverage for the poor.
Access and financial protection. The absence of point-of-service charges 
and other forms of copayments has increased access to care for the poor 
for the covered benefits. The consequences of a poor person’s not having 
insurance through a GSHIS will leave him or her facing the grim prospect 
of foregoing treatment, treating himself (usually self-medication), or 
incurring catastrophic expenses for an inpatient stay. There is some evi-
dence that borrowings to pay for hospitalizations have been reduced for 
beneficiaries.
An emerging social compact. In principle, a comprehensive package is 
available to the entire population through the public delivery system, 
but in reality the government is far from delivering on this promise, 
especially for the poor. The explicit entitlement evident in insurance 
schemes has established a new and more binding compact between 
106       Government-Sponsored Health Insurance in India
government and citizens. Though limited in scope, benefits and the 
service delivery system to which they have access are clearly defined. 
In addition, the purchaser-provider split shifts provider payments from 
inputs to outputs and creates an enabling environment for increased 
accountability for results. Providers are held accountable for service 
provision (or they do not get paid). In theory, patient choice of provid-
ers further contributes to accountability.
Managerial innovations. GSHISs have become industry pioneers on a 
least three fronts. The first is the use of package rates to contain costs. In 
contrast, private health insurers continue to apply itemized fee-for-service 
payments, which tend to induce cost escalation. Second, GSHISs have 
introduced a number of IT solutions on a mass scale including the bio-
metric enrolment, electronic preauthorization, on-line claims and pay-
ment processes, and monitoring field functionaries through video 
surveillance. Finally, the standard packages combined with IT innovations 
have resulted in timelier provider payment than their private insurance 
counterparts.
Engagement with the private sector. The insurance intermediaries used by 
the newer GSHISs have provided an effective and transparent mechanism 
for these publicly funded schemes to buy services for their low-income 
beneficiaries from private providers. In the absence of this arrangement, 
purchasing of services could have been fraught with numerous hurdles, 
including the leakages, delayed payments, and misaligned incentives. The 
GSHISs are also deeply engaged with  private providers, allowing benefi-
ciaries a broader choice of hospitals. Prior to the emergence of GSHISs, 
public financing was directed almost exclusively to public providers.
Challenges
Despite these advances, all schemes are at the beginning of a long and 
steep learning curve. International experience suggests that reaching 
effective and efficient implementation of government-sponsored health 
insurance requires many years and involves overcoming many technical 
and political obstacles while experiencing numerous in-flight adjust-
ments (Hsiao et al. 2007). As the recent generation of GSHISs enters a 
new phase that aims to consolidate gains and build upon lessons learned, 
they will need to tackle a number of design and operational challenges 
that have emerged during implementation, and highlighted in this chap-
ter. If not addressed, the following shortcomings could compromise the 
long term sustainability of the schemes. 
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Institutional arrangements and managerial systems. Governance and 
managerial capacity are two glaring gaps in the institutional architecture 
for most schemes. Arrangements to consult and coordinate with key 
stakeholders are generally absent. There is a heavy reliance on insurers 
and TPAs for most managerial functions, but with insufficient monitoring 
of the same by the schemes themselves. Most GSHISs do not have suf-
ficient staff and management tools to act as effective agents for their 
beneficiaries.
Purchasing and contracting. At their current state of development, 
schemes tend to focus on simple reimbursement of claims. Scant atten-
tion has been given to purchasing and contracting functions to maxi-
mize the performance of insurers and network providers. Invariably a 
single insurer is contracted for a demarcated geographical area (state 
or district), and, in the absence of performance-based contracting 
instruments, insurers face few incentives for improving performance. 
Similarly, schemes have yet to take advantage of their financial lever-
age to affect provider behaviors in terms of driving improvements in 
patient safety, satisfaction, quality, and efficiency. 
Monitoring and evaluation. The general weakness of monitoring systems 
and dearth of data and analysis underlie all issues. Most schemes have yet 
to develop robust systems to monitor insurer, TPA, and provider perfor-
mance regularly. This situation impedes schemes’ capacity to purchase 
services, contract providers selectively, supervise and assess performance 
(e.g., insurers, TPAs, and providers), gauge beneficiary trust and satisfaction, 
and systematically make corrections as problems emerge. Impact evalua-
tions have only recently come under consideration of a couple of schemes.
Cost containment. Insurers and TPAs under contract with the schemes 
face weak incentives to reduce costs. Although an advance over item-
ized fee-for- service payments, package rates are set by the schemes and 
are generally applied to all providers with little relation to underlying 
costs or market prices. Scheme contracts with insurers are short term 
which allows insurers to re-price the premium or exit the market when 
costs rise rather than invest in long-term cost-containment measures. 
There are also no incentives to identify, empanel, or direct beneficiaries 
to  lower-cost providers. Managerial measures to contain costs such as 
preau thorization, provider profiling, utilization review, promotion of 
generic drugs, and claims analysis require implementation or signifi-
cant strengthening. 
108       Government-Sponsored Health Insurance in India
Targeting. Though not under the purview of the GSHISs, the BPL lists 
are fraught with problems. These lists are notorious for an unacceptably 
high incidence of false positives and negatives. This situation severely 
undermines the pro-poor orientation of the schemes and may lead to 
diversion of resources to the non-poor combined with undercoverage of 
the deserving poor. This situation could result in political challenges to 
the schemes’ legitimacy. 
Provider behaviors and markets. Providers have an incentive to induce 
demand, provide unnecessary care, and substitute inpatient for outpatient 
care. Much more needs to be done to detect, control, and penalize such 
behaviors. Further, a case can be made that the schemes are stimulating a 
hospital-centric delivery system—already obsolete in most OECD coun-
tries. In the long term, such a system would become unaffordable as well 
as ineffective in dealing with the emerging large burden of chronic dis-
eases in India. Given the low minimum number of beds required for 
empanelment, schemes may be promoting the expansion of small hospi-
tals where clinical management may be too meager and volume too small 
to meet minimal quality standards.
Provider competition. In theory, providers compete for beneficiaries. 
However, evidence is sketchy that this happens in practice. Utilization is 
concentrated in a limited number of “prestigious” facilities in nearly all 
schemes. Beneficiaries residing in distant areas may be unable to access 
providers located in urban areas. The schemes limit the ability of insurers 
to selectively contract higher quality or more efficient providers due to 
lax empanelment criteria and one-size-fits all package rates. As discussed 
above, schemes also don’t have sufficient information (e.g. on costs and 
quality) to selectively contract providers and foster competition. Finally, 
under current organizational arrangements, few public facilities can com-
pete with their private peers.
Quality of care. The schemes are not using their financial leverage to 
improve the quality of network providers. The schemes do not demand 
or collect quality information from providers. Postempanelment inspec-
tions to verify compliance with minimal empanelment criteria are rare. 
Providers have no incentives to improve standards of care or put in place 
quality-improvement measures. 
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Consumer information. Beneficiaries appear to have insufficient infor-
mation on enrolment, benefits, and providers. When automatically 
enrolled under the schemes, awareness of beneficiaries takes time to build 
up. Insurers have an incentive to avoid enrolment in distant and low-BPL 
density areas as well as to select lower-risk individuals (as in RSBY). They 
also have an incentive to not enroll all family members. Beneficiaries are 
not sufficiently informed of covered vs. uncovered procedures, which can 
result in preauthorization denials and potentially unscrupulous behaviors 
by providers. In general, consumers also do not have sufficient informa-
tion on provider performance (e.g., quality, patient satisfaction, volume, 
and so on) to make well-informed choices of providers. 
Annex 3A Statistical Annex
Figure 3A.1 India: Estimated Health Insurance Coverage, 2003–04, 2009–10, 
and 2015 (million people) 
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Annex 3B Methods Used for Population-Coverage Projections
The member base for 2015 was compiled with professional actuarial sup-
port. Assumptions include: (1) for schemes in which the member base 
has stabilized, for example, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu (TN), Yeshasvini, 
and the Employees’ State Insurance Scheme, the growth rate is based on 
projected population growth; (2) for rapidly growing schemes such as 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), the scheme’s stated 2015 target 
was taken as the expected member base. Inclusion of new population 
groups, changes in benefits package, and other characteristics may alter 
these numbers significantly; (3) for the Central Government Health 
Scheme, the number of retiring employees was assumed to be the same 
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as the number of new pensioners joining the scheme. New recruitments 
are about 2 percent of the existing base. The number of new recruits is 
exactly offset by the number of members exiting the scheme due to 
death; (4) for Vajpayee Arogyashri, it is assumed that the entire state will 
be covered in 2015. 
A 10 percent annual accretion of new members is assumed for private 
health insurance (PHI) companies. There may be some overlap in these 
numbers since some beneficiaries of government-sponsored health insur-
ance schemes may also hold PHI policies. Also, RSBY beneficiaries may 
be beneficiaries of state schemes (such as in a few districts in Karnataka 
and TN).
Annex 3C Methods Used for Expenditure Projections
Expenditure projections for government-sponsored health insurance 
schemes for 2015 were compiled with the help of professional actuarial 
support. Key assumptions are that the schemes will continue to use pack-
age rates and that the package rates will be revised upward by 20 percent 
in 2012–13. In the case of the Central Government Health Scheme, the 
number of retiring employees is the same as the number of new pension-
ers joining the scheme. These new recruitments will be approximately 2 
percent of the existing base and will be offset by members exiting the 
scheme due to death. This will keep the member base more or less con-
stant. For Vajpayee Arogyashri (Karnataka), the assumption is that the 
entire state will be covered by 2015. Finally, a 20 percent annual growth 
rate is predicted for private health insurance: 10 percent annual increase 
in enrolment and a 10 percent annual increase in average premium. 
Notes
 1. For a graphic depiction of the data, see annex figure 3A.1.
 2. In 2011–12, the scheme was modified to include additional procedures and 
relaunched as the Chief Minister’s Comprehensive Health Insurance Scheme, 
and the executing agency serving the scheme also changed. The maximum 
coverage was also changed from Rs 100,000 floating over four years to Rs 
100,000 per year. Hereafter, this write-up reflects the scheme details that 
existed when this study was undertaken, in 2010–11.
 3. As of November 2010. 
 4. While references have been drawn to the private voluntary health insur-
ance schemes (PVHI) and the community-based self-managed schemes 
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throughout this book, a systematic examination of these schemes was 
beyond the scope of this work.
 5. As discussed in the next section, precisely estimating coverage for these state 
schemes is difficult because all holders of state below-poverty-line (BPL) 
cards were automatically enrolled. Initially, many were unaware of their 
newly-acquired enrolment status.
 6. Since at least two states are already planning their own schemes, the estimates 
presented in table 3.1 should be considered conservative.
 7. The employer-based group insurance market remains static, and much of the 
recent growth in private health insurance originates from the retail clientele 
of individuals and families.
 8. Employees earning up to Rs 15,000 per month are now included under the 
ambit of ESIS. Previous to the May 2010 revision, the ceiling was Rs 10,000 
per month. 
 9. Retiring civil employees can opt for life-time coverage under CGHS by making 
a one-time contribution equal to 10 years (120 months) of the applicable 
monthly contribution. This one-time amount can range from Rs. 1,800 (roughly 
equivalent to US$40) to Rs. 60,000 (US$1,300) at current rates, but requires 
no future contributions. The contribution is inflation-proof, and provides 
unlimited coverage for life to the retiring employees and their dependents.
 10. For most schemes, insurers usually outsource enrolment to third-party admin-
istrators (TPAs) and other agencies.
 11. For distributing ID cards, TN used the BPL biometric data that the state had 
already collected and compiled for the BPL cards. Thus, while TN also issued 
smart (storage-enabled) ID cards, they did not specifically enroll beneficiaries 
in the field as in the case of RSBY. Instead, TN undertook an effort to distribute 
the cards to beneficiaries through state officials and local political leaders.
 12. Of these households, 100 were enrolled.
 13. This is understandable given that the scheme is heavily subsidized and pro-
vides beneficiaries cashless access to private providers for which there is 
considerable demand.
 14. Sun reports that although the average village in his sample had 145 BPL 
families, the range spanned from 1 to over 10,000.
 15. Contrarily, insurers have an incentive to enroll villagers in remote areas 
because experience shows that they tend to have lower levels of utilization 
(due to distance to empaneled hospitals), which could justify higher enrol-
ment costs. However, it is unlikely that the enrolment agencies face this 
incentive in a flat-fee environment. 
 16. Since insurers are paid a flat-rate premium per card—irrespective of the num-
ber of family members enrolled—they have no incentive to ensure that the 
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entire family (up to the maximum of five members) is enrolled. Similarly, 
they have perverse incentive to minimize their risk by enrolling a lesser num-
ber of family members as the card issuance requirements are met. As insurers 
usually outsource the enrolment function for RSBY—and that, too, at a fixed 
cost per family—incentives to reduce enrolment costs emerge strongly. In 
contrast, villages with a higher likelihood of claim costs are not a disincentive 
for the enrolment agencies, and so “cream skimming” in those terms was not 
observed.
 17. This is also the case for TN.
 18. BPL status is not an eligibility criterion for this scheme.
 19. Measured as regularity of reading newspapers.
 20. Not covered are nonsurgical treatment, diagnostics, follow-up care, and surgi-
cal consumables (e.g., valves, mesh grafts, stents, nails, and screws) which can 
result in significant out-of-pocket costs even for covered treatment.
 21. As discussed in chapter 2, early GSHISs such as Yeshasvini and CGHS pio-
neered package rates that were fixed, single-fee schedules for defined proce-
dures, for several years. Adopting or modifying the packages could be done 
with relative ease. Package rates have become increasingly acceptable among 
providers due to the volumes these large payers bring them. Package rates are 
discussed in detail in a later section.
 22. Sufficient primary care was considered available from the public sector, but 
that is not necessarily so. Supply varies widely among and within states. 
 23. The system of discretionary grants involves partial cash subsidies for patients 
approaching the chief minister’s office and suffering from illnesses requiring 
expensive treatment that they cannot afford. The system suffers from con-
cerns on equity, transparency, and access, as the poorest groups in the popu-
lation are less likely to know or make use of these channels nor can they 
raise the remaining cost for the treatment themselves. The origin of the 
focus of the state HI schemes on expensive, tertiary care can be at least 
partly attributed to this system, which drew the attention of political leader-
ship to this need.
 24. As will be discussed later in this chapter, package rates are relatively easy to 
specify, verify, and to achieve agreement on price, especially for surgery. 
 25. State schemes are selective even within these disease groups. In other words, 
they don’t cover all conditions under any disease group.
 26. As of this writing, August 2011, RSBY is piloting an outpatient benefit in one 
district (Puri district in the state of Orissa). The pilot pays for up to 10 out-
patient visits per family per year in empaneled clinics and hospitals, and covers 
the cost of consultation and essential drugs on the World Health Organization 
(WHO) list. The clinic is reimbursed Rs. 50 (about $1.10) per visit.
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 27. The utilization rates for the two lowest quintiles—the target group for some 
of the schemes—are in fact significantly lower than depicted in table 3.5. 
 28. This suggests that moral hazard may not be an issue, at least for these two 
schemes. However, the reasons for apparently low moral hazard are different. 
Yeshasvini beneficiaries face hefty copayments while RSBY is still a young 
scheme in an early phase of implementation. Moral hazard may still exist, but 
the apparent conformity with national rates occurs due to lower than 
expected initial utilization rates.
 29. Institutional arrangements are discussed later in this chapter.
 30. As explained in greater detail in a subsequent section, although contracted 
insurers cannot change their premium price mid-way through a contract, they 
can do so at renewal. Given that the typical group health insurance policy is 
for one year, rising claim costs pose only a short-term risk to insurers until 
policy renewal. 
 31. Radermacher et al. (2005) reported that in the early days of Yeshasvini (KA) 
many beneficiaries were unfamiliar with benefits, exclusions, and their 
responsibility for paying for uncovered services.
 32. Doug Johnson and Sushil Kumar (2011) estimate that average patient 
attendance in the states of Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh ranged from 1,884 
to 2,760 villagers per camp. The average number of RSBY enrollees therein 
ranged from 126 to 313 per camp.
 33. Interviews with chief executive officers (CEOs) of GSHISs.
 34. Notes from meeting of High Level Expert Group on Universal Coverage, 
Public Health Foundation of India, New Delhi, January 19, 2011.
 35. Estimated from National Health Accounts (2004–05), 2009, which contain 
projections for total health expenditure to 2008–09, assuming a continuation 
of the same rate of expenditure growth in 2009–10 as in the previous two 
years. 
 36. Previous extrapolations involving older data as published in 2009 in the 
National Health Accounts have estimated insurance mechanisms contributing 
about 4.6 percent (MOHFW 2009).
 37. Using the trends from National Health Accounts (NHA) 2009 which 
reported that total health expenditure grew at a nominal rate of about 13 
percent annually between 2005–06 and 2008–09, total health spending in 
2014–15 is estimated to reach Rs. 450,000 crores at current prices.
 38. Public spending on health is estimated to be Rs. 175,000 crores in 2015. 
Public spending on health has grown at about 20 percent annually in nominal 
terms over the last five years (MOHFW 2009; WHO 2010). Continued 
growth is estimated at this rate.
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 39. Several states are exploring the launching of GSHISs. 
 40. To date there is no evidence of such conversion.
 41. The latest year for which final state expenditure numbers were available.
 42. The creation of special and usually wide-ranging schemes for influential 
groups of the labor force is typical of early social insurance schemes in Latin 
America (Mesa-Lago 1978).
 43. Many cardiac procedures have low incremental costs and relatively higher 
package rates. However, there is probably latent demand in the community. 
For this reason, during the early period of the GSHISs, providers appear to 
focus on cardiac procedures, which have accounted for about 70 percent of 
the claim costs in early months of the VA scheme.
 44. Data are based on available claim data from about 150 districts that have 
experienced at least one year of implementation as of December 2010.
 45. Since state contributions above the cap are not registered in ESIS ledgers, 
total scheme spending is underestimated to that extent. As mentioned, sig-
nificant additional spending occurs in only two states, AP and WB.
 46. As mentioned in chapter 2, package rates were pioneered by CGHS in 2001 
and later adopted by Yeshasvini in 2003. This experience was subsequently 
embraced and customized by RSBY, Rajiv Aarogyasri, Kalaignar, and other 
schemes. Private insurers have not adopted package rate-based payment 
methods and predominantly reimburse itemized hospital bills on a fee-for-
service basis. 
 47. Research comparing package rates with costs is required to determine if the 
rates serve as cost-containment mechanism. 
 48. Categorization of cities is based on population and infrastructure. Tier 1 cities 
are metropolitan cities with more than 5 million people. Generally, Tier 2 
cities have populations between 1 million and 5 million while Tier 3 cities 
have fewer than 1 million residents. 
 49. Currently, the GSHISs set package rates based on previously established 
rates (e.g., CGHS and Yeshasvini), rapid (and often incomplete) market 
assessments, and informal panels with private and/or public providers. There 
has been no systematic attempt to secure information on market prices or 
to cost out packages based on standardized protocols. This may, in part,also 
be due to the limited technical expertise that is available to the GSHISs. 
Rates are rarely adjusted systematically or even periodically to account for 
inflation. 
 50. ESIS uses the CGHS rates.
 51. For Yeshasvini, the difference can be explained in part because its package 
rates do not include surgical implants or posthospitalization drugs.
116       Government-Sponsored Health Insurance in India
 52. RSBY does not include a package rate for this procedure due to the annual 
family cap of Rs. 30,000. RSBY covers treatment until the cap is reached.
 53. Aarogyasri covers only laparoscopic appendectomy. Table 3.9, however, refers 
to any form of appendectomy.
 54. Few hospitals in India measure their costs or possess cost-accounting systems.
 55. One possible exception is CGHS in which National Board of Accreditation 
for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers (NABH/NABL) accreditation has 
been made a criterion for empanelment. NABH-accredited hospitals already 
receive higher payouts for the same procedures.
 56. The cashless arrangement means that the hospital has agreed to extend credit 
to the insurance scheme so that the patient can be discharged without paying 
(or after paying only his share of non-admissible expenses) and that the hos-
pital will subsequently seek reimbursement directly from the insurance 
scheme. It also implies mutually agreeing to the scheme’s tariff structure, 
preauthorization requirements, claim submission requirements and so on.
 57. See box 3.1 for a description of autonomous public hospitals in India.
 58. A handful of states have facility-licensing requirements, but enforcement is 
irregular.
 59. Rajiv Aarogyasri was the first scheme to incorporate after-care packages, and 
the model has been replicated by Vajpayee Arogyashri (KA). In Rajiv 
Aarogyasri, follow-up treatment is periodically monitored by field staff. Some 
schemes also demand and review mortality data from providers.
 60. In 2008 and according to available information, India possessed more than 
52,000 hospitals (see Indiastats.com) containing approximately 1.4 million 
beds, with a bed-to-population ratio of 0.7/1,000 (WHO 2010). 
Approximately 41 percent of hospitals and 61 percent of beds are private 
(MSPI 2004). 
 61. Evidence from a small sample of private facilities in Tier 2 and 3 cities in India 
suggests higher occupancy rates (68 percent for hospitals with fewer than 50 
beds). However, high average lengths of stay (approximately 6 days) for this 
same category of facilities may be a determining factor of the relatively high 
occupancy rates (IFC forthcoming). 
 62. In a small survey of patients seeking care in private hospitals in Tier 2 and 3 
cities, 46 percent and 30 percent choose the hospital based, respectively, on 
the reputation of the facility and physician (IFC forthcoming).
 63. The Aarogyasri scheme in AP has also introduced field staff in primary care 
centers (PHCs) in part to inform patients of a covered condition of their 
insurance benefits and direct them to empaneled hospitals for treatment. 
However, most beneficiaries continue to choose private hospitals.
 64. Nonsurgical care is outside the scope of the scheme and is paid out of pocket.
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 65. The study found that for the higher-income groups, savings from inpatient 
coverage had a spillover effect of increasing expenditure on ambulatory care. 
Borrowing and asset sales on ambulatory care by the poorest beneficiaries was 
reduced by 61 percent (p<.05), but this effect was not significant for higher-
income beneficiaries.
 66. The study was based on an analysis of cross-sectional data from NSSO con-
sumer expenditure surveys over three time periods: 1999–2000 (55th 
round), 2004–05 (61st round) and 2007–08 (64th round). It compared BPL 
household spending patterns before and after scheme implementation in 
samples of villages participating in Phase 1 districts (initiated in April 2007) 
-and matched control villages. Placement in the treatment groups was deter-
mined by both location (residence in Phase districts) and time of program 
implementation. The researchers applied a difference-in-differences estima-
tor to measure variation in program effects over time across treatment and 
control groups. The study also examined the impact on households residing 
in “Phase 2” districts, which was implemented in December, 2007. However, 
no clear effects were found for Phase II in part because of the short imple-
mentation period (six months) prior to treatment measurement.
 67. This was measured in terms of the probability of experiencing inpatient 
expenditures of 50 percent or more of total health expenditures and having 
total health spending exceed 15 percent of total household spending.
 68. Over three fourths were unaware that they would incur any charges while 
two thirds did not know the balance remaining on their smart cards. 
 69. With the exception of RSBY and to some extent Yeshasvini, no scheme has  
made a systematic attempt to detect these distortions through household 
surveys and other means.
 70. As discussed in the previous section on Package Rates and Market Prices, due 
to the lack of data on costs, neither providers nor GSHISs know much about 
the relation between costs and prices. 
 71. While all Rajiv Aarogyasri packages include medicines for a period of 10 days 
after discharge, follow up packages (with duration of one year) for 125 select 
procedures have also been included in the list of covered procedures. These 
include consultation, medication and diagnostics for follow up.
 72. Rajasthan is piloting its own health protection fund for BPL patients who use 
public facilities. It covers any medicine, consumable, or diagnostic not avail-
able in the public system. 
 73. These shortcomings are beyond the control of the health insurance scheme.
 74. Open-ended fee-for-service is still the dominant form of provider payment in 
the private voluntary health insurance system.
 75. In case of Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP), the claim frequency per beneficiary rose 
from about 0.1 percent in 2007–08 to 0.34 percent in 2008–09 and then to 
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0.49 percent in 2009–10. Part of this was also due to a deepening of the ben-
efits package by adding 600 new procedures in July 2008. However, between 
2008–09 and 2009–10, there was no change in beneficiaries or in the benefits 
package. Similarly, for Yeshasvini the claim frequency per enrollee was 0.57 
percent in 2003–04, 1.3 percent in 2006–07 and 2.59 percent in 2007–08, 
but has remained between 2.2 and 2.4 percent thereafter. 
 76. The contracts may pay for the area’s entire BPL population without a specific 
enrolment process, as in AP, or only for those specifically enrolled by the 
insurer, as in RSBY. However, only the eligible population, as defined in the 
contract, is paid for by the scheme. Insurers do not enroll ineligible groups 
since they are paid only for eligible beneficiaries
 77. Therefore, insurer-induced adverse selection or cream skimming are not 
major concerns, when compared to PHI.
 78. In the industry, this is known as a “topline” focus. 
 79. In an effort to increase market share, these products may also suffer losses due 
to low pricing. Losses are covered through revenues from nonhealth insurance 
products.
 80. Claims exceeded the premiums collected.
 81. However, public and private insurers may differ in terms of their response to 
losses. The incentives faced by publicly owned insurers and privately owned 
insurers may vary.
 82. They will also face provider demands to raise package rates.
 83. If an insurer experiences losses during any year of a multi-year contract, it 
may choose to not renew the policy at the existing prices (and lose the poten-
tial business for the next year) rather than continue incurring losses. The 
insurer may still be eligible to participate in a new round of tendering, sub-
mitting a bid with a higher but more realistic price. 
 84. In the early years of government-sponsored health insurance schemes in India, 
a few states had schemes that only lasted one year because the insurer suf-
fered losses and was unwilling to continue at the negotiated but original price 
levels (e.g., Punjab, Mizoram).
 85. Currently only non-life insurers bid for the GSHIS business. About 20 non-
life insurers (including 3 standalone health insurers) offer health insurance 
products in the Indian market and a majority of them are active in the GSHIS 
market also. 
 86. Assuming that the insurers have strong incentives to maximize profits, they 
would take measures to limit utilization. As is apparent from the U.S.experience 
with commercial health insurers, cost containment by insurers may take the 
following path: introduction of copayments, deductibles, coinsurance; reduc-
tion in benefits; the introduction of contributions; or any combination thereof. 
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These measures may only shift costs from insurers and may lead to overall 
spending increases and not result in cost containment in the broader health 
system as patients increase out-of-pocket spending to compensate for reduced 
coverage and higher copayments (as in the case of China and the United 
States). These measures undermine the objectives of the GSHISs, and none 
are politically viable in India’s current environment. 
 87. TPAs have been an integral part of the private health insurance industry in 
India for the last 10 years. About 30 TPAs are licensed in India, and most of 
the active TPAs also serve GSHISs.
 88. Rajiv Aarogyasri in AP, and possibly ESIS, are the exceptions.
 89. Providers sign MOUs with insurance companies or TPAs at the time of their 
empanelment. The MOU forms the basis of the relationship and specifies the 
terms and applicable conditions of both parties. In practice, other than some 
oversight on the monitoring by the insurance company or TPA, MOU imple-
mentation is poorly monitored by the GSHISs. 
 90. The number of full time staff in these schemes cannot be compared with the 
other GSHISs which do not own and operate medical facilities.
 91. Purchasing is a recent function for both ESIS and CGHS. Until about a 
decade ago, all care was provided in-house.
 92. In most hospitals, the detailed day-to-day notes on health status and medica-
tions while the patient is hospitalized are recorded manually in case sheets by 
the nursing staff and attending physicians. The current operating environment 
in most hospitals does not require this detail to be captured in the hospital 
information system (even though there are modules to do so). Entering these 
data electronically would require considerable effort, and, since it is not man-
datory for claim processing, there is no incentive for the provider to do so. 
 93. On the incidence of fraud and corruption in India’s public health delivery 
system, see Center for Media Studies 2008; Reddy et al. 2011, Chatterjee 
2010: 1679, and Solberg 2008: 464. 
 94. See chapter 2 for a discussion on health financing in India.
 95. NRHM financing is mostly directed to the primary care level including small 
rural hospitals known as Community Health Centers. District level hospitals 
are mainly dependent on state financing which has not been adequate in most 
cases.
 96. Given current trends, we estimate insurance population coverage will increase 
significantly over the next five years if recent experience is a predictor of 
future trends (see annex figure 3A.1 and table 3.1).
 97. Considering the large, across-the-board increases in central and state govern-
ment health spending in recent years (chapter 2), it is difficult to gauge 
whether the schemes will contribute to fiscal stress.
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C H A P T E R  4
Addressing GSHIS Operational 
Challenges
Government-sponsored health insurance schemes (GSHISs) can serve as 
change agents for achieving universal coverage. Through pioneering new 
ways of doing business in terms of financing, managing, providing, and 
paying for care, the current crop of GSHISs can facilitate reform of the 
dominant fee-for-service private system as well as the budget-based, pub-
lic direct delivery system. However, before spearheading any reforms in 
the broader health finance and delivery systems, GSHISs first need to 
address operational constraints emerging from both design and imple-
mentation. The future success and sustainability of GSHISs hinge on the 
development of strong governance arrangements, management systems, 
monitoring and purchasing mechanisms, cost-containment tools, and 
quality-improvement instruments. 
In this chapter, the first of a two-phased approach to universal coverage 
is presented. This first, short-term phase addresses the operational or 
“mechanical” challenges of the current crop of GSHISs that were outlined 
in the previous chapter. A series of corrective measures are proposed—
often based on international best practice—to strengthen GSHISs’ insti-
tutional architecture and managerial practices. These operational 
improvements will encourage a more accountable institutional environ-
ment to utilize GSHIS funds effectively to improve access, utilization, 
and financial protection while containing costs. 
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Most measures can be implemented over an estimated two-year 
period. The enabling institutional and accountability environment 
would also facilitate the design of a reconfigured set of schemes pro-
posed to be implemented in a subsequent phase, which is the subject of 
chapter 5. 
Promoting Governance and Coordination
In his study of institutional governance arrangements in social insurance 
schemes, Savedoff (2008) defined governance as a combination of fac-
tors that influence the behaviors of an organization, particularly in 
terms of accountability relations (e.g., to government, members, and 
providers), incentives alignment, and information availability and trans-
parency.1 Governance arrangements continue to be generally inadequate 
or absent in GSHISs, particularly in terms of accountabilities, incentives, 
and information availability. Although the same can be said of the pub-
lic delivery system, the complexity of demand-side financing approaches 
with explicit entitlements necessitates greater attention to establishing 
sound institutional and governance arrangements to make schemes 
viable, sustainable, and high performing. The key to any good gover-
nance arrangement is to protect the schemes from political interference 
while making them accountable to major stakeholders such as govern-
ment and beneficiaries.
Leveraging the fact that the government of India (GOI) already 
finances the major and fastest-growing scheme, Rashtriya Swasthya Bima 
Yojana (RSBY), and is a major contributor to others (Central Government 
Health Scheme [CGHS], and to a lesser extent, Employees’ State 
Insurance Scheme [ESIS]), and will continue to play a major financial 
role in the roll out of GSHISs and any future reconfiguration thereof 
(chapter 5), it should establish a legally autonomous umbrella health 
insurance coordination agency.2 This entity would support, coordinate, 
monitor, and evaluate all GSHISs, including the social insurance schemes 
(e.g. ESIS, CGHS). This agency should also work closely with the private 
insurance regulatory authority, Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority (IRDA) to ensure synergistic and holistic regulation of the 
entire health insurance sector. 
The overall mission of the proposed agency would be to promote the 
timely access and provision of services to beneficiaries of central and 
state GSHISs. It would also ensure that beneficiaries receive care of 
acceptable quality and that schemes are operated in a transparent and 
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efficient manner. The agency should also promote coordination among 
schemes to ensure portability, foster standardization, and stimulate cross-
learning. The umbrella body would facilitate establishing monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms and standards for information reporting. It would 
also promote information disclosure3 and sharing across schemes.
The governance arrangement should contain sufficient government 
oversight and include participation from all stakeholders—central gov-
ernment, including the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) 
and Ministry of Labour and Employment (MOLE) (and other stakehold-
ers such as the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission), state 
governments, and IRDA. The arrangement should also put in place a 
mechanism or structure to facilitate regular consultations with providers, 
insurers, beneficiaries, and other stakeholders. Ideally, this agency should 
not be dependent on or linked to any single ministry or government 
department, partly to guarantee its independence and neutrality to guide 
and coordinate the schemes effectively.4 For the same reason, this body 
will necessarily be structurally and functionally separate from the schemes 
it oversees. 
Among this agency’s responsibilities would be setting objectives and 
principles, preparing and monitoring policies and statutes, and providing 
guidelines for such operational areas as data and communication stan-
dards, management information system (MIS) and data-sharing require-
ments, cost-containment mechanisms, provider audits, quality and patient 
safety standards, fraud and corruption control measures, patient rights, 
and confidentiality. It could also play a crucial role in setting uniform, 
national standards on provider empanelment, provider contracts, billing 
and claim systems, quality measurement and reporting, customer service 
parameters, and information systems for each scheme to implement. An 
added function could also be the provision of technical assistance to 
schemes through its own technical resources, through facilitating cross-
learning between schemes and by tapping national, international, and 
donor professional support. 
To facilitate cross-learning, the agency could catalyze the creation of a 
learning forum with members drawn from all the schemes to encourage 
collaboration and knowledge exchange. Regularly tabulating, analyzing, 
and sharing monitoring data (e.g., empanelment, claims, payments) 
would contribute to continual assessment of overall schemes’ perfor-
mance as well as the details of the schemes’ financing, managerial, and 
delivery systems. A final function would be the promotion and cofinanc-
ing of monitoring and evaluation.
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All the aforementioned activities will evolve, undergoing numerous 
changes over time. Robust data—regularly collected (and analyzed)—
based on household, provider, and market surveys, combined with the 
operational data from the schemes themselves underlies all functions.5 
Such data will provide valuable inputs into the invariable in-flight adjust-
ments for the schemes as well as for the agency itself. 
Strengthening Purchasing and Contracting Practices 
All schemes would benefit from establishing and strengthening the pur-
chasing of care, or similarly, the allocation of pooled funds to providers. 
Sound purchasing can contribute to restructuring of health financing and 
service delivery by providing incentives to shift financing to more effi-
cient and higher-quality providers as well as more cost-effective services 
(Fuenzalida-Puelma et al. 2010).
Provider contracting is one of the most important functions of scheme 
management and is a major determinant of network development. 
GSHISs need to be much more proactive in contracting providers and 
monitoring the delivery of services (even if they use an insurance com-
pany or third-party administrator [TPA] as an intermediary) to take 
advantage of their financial leverage, fostering greater value for money 
and improved service performance. The contribution of insurance inter-
mediaries in augmenting the capacity of GSHISs in recruiting, contract-
ing, and purchasing services from hospitals is in itself substantial and 
suggests a possible route for continued and increasing government 
engagement with the private health sector in purchasing health services 
for the poor.6
An important step toward improving incentives and accountabilities is 
to strengthen contracting of both public and private providers. This can 
be done by significantly expanding the functions of the agencies respon-
sible for scheme execution. The trust that implements the AP scheme is 
an example of a sturdy platform to build upon for strengthening purchas-
ing functions.7 
International experience shows that explicit contracts that link pay-
ment to performance or use provider payment mechanisms8 that stimu-
late efficiency can significantly improve provider performance in terms of 
quality, patient satisfaction, and efficiency (Preker and Langenbrunner 
2005; Langenbrunner, Cashin, and O’Dougherty 2009; Loevinsohn 
2008). It is best to start by developing a purchasing and negotiating strat-
egy that accounts for scheme goals, available resources, degree of market 
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or regional penetration, geographical accessibility (for targeted beneficia-
ries), and minimum quality and patient-safety criteria (for provider selec-
tion). This strategy would serve as the basis for selecting, negotiating with, 
and contracting providers. As data systems improve, more sophisticated 
purchasing strategies can include estimates of utilization (type and vol-
ume of procedures, number of bed days, and the like) and corresponding 
expenditures for each provider. This information can be used as bench-
marks to compare with actual experience.
Contracts should, at the very least, define the type and range of ser-
vices as well as the expected quality standards or processes. For example, 
to complement the empanelment process, contracts can also improve 
upon the existing (empanelment) requirements for hospitals in terms of 
infrastructure, staff qualifications, and patient-safety requirements. 
Contracts can eventually stipulate cost-control measures such as use of 
generic drugs and application of standardized clinical protocols (to reduce 
cost variations). Other possible areas include compliance with data 
reporting requirements, including the use of standard codes for diagno-
sis and procedures. For example, in the Brazilian state of São Paulo, the 
state government has issued contracts with public and private hospitals 
that mandate the establishment and functioning of medical record sys-
tems and facility-based commissions for reviewing mortality data, ethics 
issues, and infection control. Contracts also specify monthly and annual 
reporting requirements for activities, costs, and patient satisfaction sur-
veys (La Forgia and Couttolenc 2008). 
A final important area of focus is contract management and monitor-
ing. By definition, contracting allows payers to focus on outputs and 
outcomes. Contract management and monitoring has generally been the 
weakest component of purchasing in developing countries (Loevinsohn 
2008; La Forgia, Mintz, and Cerezo 2005). Reporting and review systems 
need to be established to monitor contract compliance on a regular basis. 
The review mechanism should be the basis for contract enforcement. 
Consistently poor performance should result in penalties or contract 
cancellation. 
Reinforcing Cost Containment: (1) Provider Payment Systems
Given the third-party payment arrangement, health insurance may be 
more prone to cost escalation than other health financing systems. 
Controlling utilization and provider rate escalation are essential to the 
financial (and political) sustainability of any health insurance scheme. 
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International experience suggests that no single approach to cost con-
tainment can effectively slow the increase of costs over the long run. 
Three categorical methods, taken together, have strong potential to con-
tribute to effective cost containment in the Indian context. The first, a 
direct measure, entails strengthening the current package rate–based pro-
vider payment system and is the subject of this section. The two other 
methods, strengthening the purchasing power of state purchasers and 
improving managerial interventions, are reviewed in the following sec-
tion. Again, the effectiveness of any cost-containment measure depends 
on the robustness of the information system.
Promoting Provider Payment Reform: A Bottom-Up Approach
As part of the proposed explicit contracting approach, in addition to 
prospective agreement between purchaser and provider on the terms and 
conditions regarding types and range of services, there also needs to be 
agreement on the terms of payment. The payment mechanism shapes 
provider behaviors and therefore performance. But the type of mecha-
nism used depends on policy objectives and availability of financial, cost, 
and patient-level data. In the case of health insurance, purchasers usually 
focus on some combination of increased access, cost containment, and 
administrative simplicity. Practical considerations are also important. 
Complex payment mechanisms may tax the administrative capacity of 
both provider and purchaser and result in high transaction costs.
All GSHISs currently use pre-defined procedure-based package rates 
to pay hospitals. These all-inclusive rates bundle into a fixed monetary 
sum different services, including drugs, consumables, professional fees, 
and institutional services related to a specific procedure. This payment 
mechanism, already an accepted arrangement for all GSHISs and their 
networked providers, is a big improvement over the open-ended fee-for-
service payment system still used by private insurers. If properly admin-
istered, this payment system has the potential to create strong incentives 
for cost containment, efficiency, and equity. 
This section outlines a series of bottom-up steps to address a number 
of shortcomings observed in the package rate payment mechanism.9 
Figure 4.1 schematically displays short- and long-term approaches and 
corresponding processes required to introduce data collection and analy-
sis capacities in order to strengthen the package rates. GSHISs can imme-
diately adapt a short-term approach based on cost and market price 
surveys to strengthen the current system. However, a long-term strategy 
for crafting uniform data architecture is required for more robust rate 
Figure 4.1 India: Data Infrastructure for Strengthening Package Rates, Bottom-Up Approaches for the Short and Long Term
implement cost-based rate system adjusted for case mix, location,
and other factors
conduct cross-section surveys 
of hospital costs and charges
introduce uniform data-
collection system in sentinel or 
all empanelled hospitals
collect patient-level data on 
all admissions
integrate package rates with 
patient-level data
redefine, consolidate, and 
standardize procedures and 
treatments
adjust rates for location (tier 1, 
2, and 3 cities)
assemble cost, charges, and price
inflation; perform analyses; establish
base (unadjusted) package rates
develop uniform cost and 
volume data-collection system 
(forms and guidelines)
implement cost-based package 
rates adjusted for location
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base (unadjusted) package rates
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standardizing and collecting 
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long termshort term
Source: Adapted from Murray 2007.
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setting.10 Core elements of such information architecture include detailed 
and standardized data on hospital costs, volume, charges, patient demo-
graphics and diagnoses as well as data on cost inflation. These can be 
complemented by data on quality and outcomes (discussed below). The 
structure and sophistication of data collection and analysis as well as rate 
setting will improve over time as capabilities develop.
The first order of business is to redefine, consolidate, and standardize 
procedures and treatments across the current array of schemes. There is 
no reason why all schemes cannot use the same nomenclature for pro-
cedures, and have a standard content of what constitutes a “package” in 
terms of procedures and protocols, including the specification of con-
sumables. 
The second order of business is to improve how procedure rates are 
calculated. This would require standardized and comparative informa-
tion on unit costs, volume, and market prices for the procedures in dif-
ferent geographical settings. The rates should be aligned with unit costs 
to minimize incentives for under- and overprovision of different ser-
vices, balance billing, or favoring one type of service over another. 
Different methods can be used to measure unit costs, including their 
direct and indirect components.11 Given the absence of cost-tracking 
information systems, any costing exercise to set the rate schedule will 
initially have to rely on cross-sectional studies of samples of providers. 
Such studies will have to be performed biennially so that purchasers 
have the information base to negotiate rate adjustments with providers. 
Another—and perhaps more rigorous—approach, used in Germany and 
Thailand, is to establish a subset of sentinel hospitals where costing and 
other data are collected to adjust package rates regularly. Such a system 
can serve as the basis for developing a sound monitoring system, and 
ultimately, contribute to the development of more robust payment sys-
tems such as Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), as it has in Thailand 
(box 4.1). Over time, standardized cost accounting and reporting sys-
tems (which generate and analyze data related to costs, volume, and 
other areas) would need to be installed in all providers and shared with 
the purchasers (figure 4.1). Cost data derived from these systems can be 
built into provider contracts.
Rates can be based on average costs in a state, but generally the costs 
vary across districts therein. Unless there are policy priorities to act oth-
erwise, rates should not be one-size-fits-all across an entire state but dif-
ferentiated. Costs should be measured (and rates set) across different 
locations (e.g., Tier 1, 2, and 3 cities) as well as across different types or 
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Box 4.1
Thailand: Sentinel Hospitals Evidence for DRG Cost Weights
To be a prudent purchaser, health insurance systems need to develop reliable 
information systems capable of generating two types of databases on a regular 
basis: (1) health services utilization coded by care level and (2) unit costs of ser-
vices, including outpatient, inpatient, diagnostic, and support services. This infor-
mation is critical for development of robust payment mechanisms no matter 
what the basis for reimbursement rates: procedure, diagnosis related groups 
(DRGs), capitation, or global budgets.
Thailand has sought to strengthen costing capacities since the mid-1980s and 
has adopted standardized cost-accounting methods based on international stan-
dards. Hospitals were expected to implement cost-accounting systems but appli-
cation was diffuse. In the meantime, capitation—also based on cost and utilization 
data—has been used by the Social Health Insurance System since its inception in 
1990. DRGs were piloted in the mid-1990s and gradually applied to various health-
welfare schemes, until finally adopted by the Universal Coverage (UC) Scheme in 
2002. The UC scheme, in addition to DRGs, includes a global budget cap to pay for 
inpatient services and uses capitation to pay for outpatient services. 
However, due to cost data limitations, the development of DRGs was originally 
based on charges, which varied across facilities, and not on costs. Although the 
use of DRGs resulted in significant efficiency gains, the absence of cost data ham-
pered the setting of cost weights for different types of facilities and probably led 
to some distortions in payments such as overpaying for some cases and proce-
dures while underpaying for others. 
To align the DRG cost weights with actual costs, the Thai government recently 
established 200 sentinel hospitals where utilization and cost data will be collected 
regularly through standardized accounting and coding methods. These hospitals 
vary by size, type, location, ownership (public and private), and teaching/non 
teaching status and therefore represent the universe of hospitals. The data will 
provide valuable inputs into annual adjustments of DRGs cost weight, which will 
facilitate a transparent, undisputed payment system for inpatient services and 
accurate cost data for estimating capitation rates to pay for outpatient services. 
Sentinel hospitals also benefit from cost data for internal efficiency monitoring 
and cost controls. 
Note: The authors are grateful to Viroj Tangcharoensathien, Walaiporn Patcharanarumol, Kanjana 
Tisayaticom, Kwanpracha Chiangchaisakultha, and Phusit Prakongsai of the International Health Policy 
Program (IHPP), Ministry of Public Health, Thailand, and Peerapol Sutiwisessak of the National Health 
Security Office (NHSO) for their contributions to this box.
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sizes of facilities. As highlighted in chapter 3, market prices for similar 
treatments and procedures vary significantly by location, and the pro-
posed package rate structure should reflect such variations.12 
Also, some facilities concentrate on providing only maternity and lim-
ited secondary care, while others emphasize a small set of mostly surgical 
procedures delivered in large volumes. These facilities may face lower 
costs than multispecialty facilities. From a policy perspective, GSHISs can 
decide to adjust (downward) the rates for these (high-volume) facilities 
while mandating that they are the main providers for a subset of treat-
ments and procedures. In other words, they may be willing to exchange 
lower rates for higher volume. Alternatively, the lower costs of high-vol-
ume facilities can be built into rates applied to all facilities performing 
such procedures (within a given location), which could stimulate effi-
ciency gains in multispecialty hospitals.
Once the unit cost structure is in place, adjustments may also be made 
over time in response to claims and utilization experience. For example, 
and as practiced in Japan, rates can be adjusted upward and downward in 
response to “inappropriate” spikes or drops in volumes for specific proce-
dures or adjusted to incentivize or disincentivize certain types of care 
(Ikegami and Campbell 2004, 1999). For example, rates for high-tech 
tertiary care can be set below costs while the same for high-volume sec-
ondary care can be set above costs. Alternatively, and as part of a coverage 
extension policy, purchasers can initially provide above cost rates in Tier 
2 and 3 cities to stimulate provider expansion in underserved areas. Yet 
another adjustment option, similar to that used in Thailand, would be to 
achieve further close-ending13 of the payment mechanism through the 
use of global budgets.
The third order of business is to eliminate rate disparities among 
government-sponsored schemes, at least within any state territory. Rate 
differences can lead to inequities and distorted incentives such as the 
creation of a multitier system even within the same facility. In other 
words, care that is more responsive (e.g., shorter queues) and probably 
of higher quality is provided to patients affiliated with high-rate pur-
chasers while less responsive and probably lower-quality care is pro-
vided to patients affiliated with lower-rate purchasers. Even private 
voluntary insurers may be encouraged to follow the same provider rate 
structure. Together with information on costs, a single set of rates will 
strengthen the leverage of purchasers to negotiate fair and acceptable 
rates with providers as well as drive efficiency-inducing provider 
behaviors.14
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However, caution will be needed to set rates that do not pay for 
inefficiencies of service provision. This will be a difficult task at first, 
given the lack of information on provider cost structures and perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, the cost data from a cross-sectional provider 
survey can be used to analyze the relative efficiency of providers 
through methods such as Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) and bench-
mark analysis.15 Purchasers can decide to set rates that are increasingly 
aligned with the costs of the most efficient providers. But such an 
adjustment will have to be implemented gradually to reduce the pos-
sibility of massive market exit by the relatively inefficient producers. 
Working to introduce standardized care processes at least for 
 high-volume procedures, including the use of lower-cost inputs such 
as generic drugs, can also go a long way toward improving the effi-
ciency (and quality) of care. Such terms can be included in provider 
contracts but would require significant policy support and technical 
assistance from the proposed national coordination and governance 
agency.
Eventually, package rates will require adjustments for resource use 
and case severity, paving the way for the introduction of a case-based 
payment mechanism such as DRGs. Unadjusted package rates are inde-
pendent of the length of stay and services rendered to treat a patient. If 
hospitals can freely choose patients, they would have an incentive to 
avoid sicker patients or skimp on care provided to the same since they 
consume more medical care, supplies, and pharmaceuticals without 
yielding any additional revenues, and therefore reducing hospitals’ mar-
gins. By admitting less sick patients, hospitals can reduce their costs 
below the revenues received from the package rates. Also, to avoid 
higher costs hospitals have an incentive to reduce the number of tests, 
medications, and bed days for patients with complications (or transfer 
them to other facilities). To avoid these distortions, package rates would 
need to be adjusted for case severity. This means that payments are 
adjusted upward to cover the cost of extra resources needed to treat 
sicker individuals. 
As a long-term policy objective and with the strong support of the 
GOI, the schemes can move toward a case-based payment system such 
as DRGs. DRG is a case-classification scheme that groups cases requiring 
similar resources and treatment processes. International experience dem-
onstrates that when properly implemented, DRGs can contribute to cost 
control and efficiency (USAID 2005; O’Dougherty et al. 2009).16 
Strengthening the current procedure-based package rate system along the 
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lines suggested above would build a solid platform for DRG migration. 
However, introducing DRGs would require significant capacity building 
and investments in complex information management and considerable 
upgrading of medical records systems. Under any case-based system such 
as DRGs, as well as the current package rate system, adjusting for case 
mix is constrained by the general absence of reliable patient information 
at the facility level. This is related to poor recording in medical case sheets 
and charts (and still poorer coding of the data) and the lack of standard-
ized medical practices. Addressing both these constraints will be an 
important long-term endeavor. 
Reinforcing Cost Containment: (2) Additional Measures
Two additional measures to contain costs are discussed in this section. 
The first is structural and involves the development of a state-level pur-
chasing platform for all GSHISs. The second consists of managerial inter-
ventions to control utilization and provider behaviors.17 
Increasing the Purchasing Power of GSHISs 
One potentially effective cost-containment mechanism is the channeling 
of heretofore separate GSHI schemes into a single institutional purchas-
ing platform (but not necessarily a single fund).18 Countries that have 
been able to direct substantial funding to a limited number of purchasers 
have had a better track record in containing the growth of health spend-
ing (Gottret, Schieber, and Waters 2008) than those with multiple pay-
ers. This makes sense: a purchasing unit acting on behalf of several 
schemes would be better able to negotiate with providers than any 
scheme acting alone. 
Given India’s size and federal structure, and the states’ constitutional 
mandate regarding health service delivery, a common purchasing plat-
form should be created in each state in which GSHISs are active.19 
Taking advantage of the monopsony clout of a large purchaser, such an 
entity would impart greater purchasing power in the marketplace to 
negotiate favorable payment rates with hospitals and providers. It would 
also facilitate application of a single set of rates, thereby eliminating rate 
disparities (among GSHISs) and resulting distortions from multiple 
rates for similar procedures.20 In principle, using a single purchasing 
platform would help improve productive efficiency (and quality) of the 
providers. 
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Strengthening Managerial Cost-Containment Measures
Considering the evidence of wide variation in medical practice, which 
suggests issues of overtreatment, undertreatment, wrong treatment, or 
unnecessary treatment, health insurers and other payers in many coun-
tries have instituted interventions to control or manage the utilization of 
medical care. Further, in most GSHISs in India, providers have an incen-
tive to “burn the cap” or attempt to spend more and more from the total 
annual sum available for a family’s health benefits. This may involve pro-
viding unnecessary care (even for eligible conditions), modifying diagno-
ses to make a claim eligible, bundling two or more eligible procedures to 
augment the revenues, and substituting inpatient for outpatient care. 
Some of these practices have already been observed by GSHISs.
Considerable literature exists on utilization management and con-
trol measures. They aim to reduce utilization or the frequency of 
claims, lower spending for the services provided, and, in some cases, 
detect and control fraud. Measures typically used by health insurers 
involve:21 (1) inpatient management to reduce length of stay and avoid 
unnecessary admissions (e.g., preadmission review, concurrent review, 
second opinion before surgery, discharge planning); (2) programs and 
incentives to encourage the substitution of outpatient for higher-cost 
inpatient care (e.g., ambulatory surgery) and the identification of new 
and less costly treatments for high-cost conditions; (3) provider profil-
ing (to enable the analysis and characterization of providers according 
to utilization, costs, quality, and other performance-related features 
that facilitate the identification of high-cost providers as well as pro-
viders with patterns of high utilization); (4) standard treatment guide-
lines and/or provider education programs (to encourage cost-effective 
practice patterns); (5) programs and incentives to promote the use of 
generic drugs and low-cost technologies; and (6) case- or disease-
management programs (to manage costs of patients with high-cost, 
chronic conditions). Health insurers establish medical management 
departments that are staffed with physicians and nurses who conduct 
these practices, applying their clinical knowledge. Software has been 
developed to assist insurers and payers in adopting a number of these 
measures (Kongstvedt, Goldfield, and Plocher 2001).
Finally, although managerial cost-containment measures are widely 
used by health insurers globally, particularly by corporate insurers that 
contract out provision, some observers assert that they result in one-
time savings and may not contribute to sustained cost-containment 
(Davis et al. 1990). Managerial interventions are considered less robust 
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than establishing a common purchasing platform or employing provider 
payment reform. These latter measures have a greater potential to 
improve the productive efficiency of providers.
Establishing Robust Monitoring and Data Use 
The ability of schemes to collect and intelligently use data to assess finan-
cial status, provider performance, and beneficiary utilization and satisfac-
tion may be the major determining factor of overall scheme performance. 
Effective contracting requires close management and monitoring of data 
on utilization, claims, payments, outcomes, quality, grievances, patient 
satisfaction, and outcomes. Cost containment requires timely information 
on utilization patterns and spending. Strengthening the precision of pack-
age rates is dependent on sound data on diagnoses and costs. Some of this 
information can be accessed through claims data, but other data would 
require provider and beneficiary surveys as well as establishing reliable 
and valid reporting systems on utilization, hospital-based statistics, griev-
ances, and quality of care. The proposed GOI governance entity and state-
based purchasing agencies will need to work together to develop and 
standardize monitoring and reporting systems that enable the assessment 
and comparison of performance parameters within and across schemes.
Schemes need to plan for and draw on multiple types of data to 
gain an accurate picture of overall performance. These can include: 
(1) hospital-based statistics on admissions, post-discharge follow-up, 
quality (such as infection rates); (2) claims-based data for monitoring 
procedure-based volume and outlays, authorization records, provider 
utilization patterns, diagnosis and procedure utilization patterns, geo-
graphic utilization patterns; (3) medical record-based data to detect 
deviations from protocols, assess resource use, or identify adverse 
events; (4) household or beneficiary survey–based data to assess enrol-
ment and utilization patterns, beneficiaries’ sociodemographic charac-
teristics, treatment outcomes, and patient satisfaction with both scheme 
operations and health care received; and (5) data from grievance and 
complaint registration systems (letters, emails, and call centers). 
Linking and validating diverse data elements present major challenges. 
For example, provider based data must mean the same to all providers, 
and any analysis must be based on a uniform clinical dataset. In other 
words, how hospitals code procedures, generate statistics, or calculate 
infection rates cannot vary. The rapid introduction of information technol-
ogy can facilitate more accurate reporting, but care must be taken to avoid 
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the development of separate systems that impede the interface of data-
bases that draw on different data sources. Software packages are available 
to facilitate the collection and analysis of data from most sources, includ-
ing variables for measuring quality of care. Protecting the confidentiality 
of patient information is another emerging challenge confronting data-
management efforts. 
An essential element of medical data management is provider monitor-
ing and profiling. This involves the collection, analysis, and classification of 
data on provider performance, particularly in terms of volume, spending, 
appropriateness of care, and quality. Provider profiling can help identify 
low-cost and high-volume providers, provide feedback to assist providers in 
altering their practice patterns, and improve the quality of care.22 None of 
the GSHISs have yet to develop data-management systems to enable the 
analysis of provider performance in part due to their overdependence on 
insurer and TPA data systems that may not collect or analyze such data.
Given the dearth of publicly available data on hospitals and quality, 
the poor quality of medical records, and the weakness and frequent 
absence of information management at hospitals (with few exceptions), 
GSHISs face a long, uphill struggle to improve data collection for moni-
toring and management purposes. A good place to start is to mandate 
data collection of a subset of relevant data elements as part of insurer and 
provider contractual terms. Data collection by providers can be further 
incentivized through a performance-based financing arrangement (“pay-
for-data”). For example, to facilitate utilization management, GSHISs 
can mandate hospitals to maintain a daily log of general hospital statis-
tics, admissions, discharges, and services rendered to beneficiaries, autho-
rizations and denials, identification of high-cost cases, readmissions, 
infections, adverse events, and so on, which would be accessible to the 
GSHISs. Standardizing and expanding the claims information system to 
include additional data elements is another and relatively easy way to 
enhance the collection of performance data. 
Finally, establishing a set of standards against which performance can 
be measured would also contribute to data collection and use. These can 
include, for example, hospital infection rates, readmission rates, and 
lengths of stay23 but can also entail more operational standards such as 
“all claims submitted within 15 days of discharge” or “all patients receive 
transport allowance upon discharge.”24 Finally, schemes should assess 
reputed vendors of software that can assist them in the development of 
information systems that can facilitate the collection and analysis of data 
from multiple sources.
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Fixing Targeting Mechanisms 
The current household-targeting mechanism used to generate BPL lists 
requires reform to address documented inclusion and exclusion errors. 
These faults, though usually outside the control of the entities imple-
menting GSHI schemes, compromise the equity of GSHIS coverage. 
The targeting methodology (and the lists themselves) is determined 
nationally by the Planning Commission based on a national survey of 
consumer spending. The latest estimates are based on the National 
Sample Survey Organization 61st round (MSPI 2005). Recognizing the 
limitations of the BPL mechanism the central government appointed an 
Expert Group in 2008 to recommend corrective measures. The Expert 
Group released a draft report in 2009, known as the Saxena Committee 
Report (GOI 2009), specifying a methodological framework with the 
following components:
(1)  Automatic exclusion of the “visible” nonpoor (criteria can include 
households with at least one member working in the formal economy, 
possess two or more wheeled vehicles, own farm equipment, and 
other evidence of financial well-being). An estimated 25 percent of 
the population would be excluded. 
(2)  Automatic inclusion of the poorest (e.g., schedule caste/schedule tribe 
groups, single women–headed households, in which at least one bond-
ed laborer or main earner is disabled, households with at least one 
member with certain debilitating infectious diseases, homeless house-
holds, among other criteria). An estimated 5 to 7 percent of the popu-
lation would be included. 
(3)  For households not automatically excluded or included, a survey will 
be applied to separate the “deserving” from the “undeserving” poor. 
This will be achieved through a grading system consisting of a weight-
ed point system. A deprivation score will be derived based on criteria 
such as “backward castes” status, landless agricultural workers, self-
employed fishermen and artisans and households headed by seniors. 
It is expected that the deprivation score will be applied to determine 
the percent of deserving or vulnerable poor. 
This proposed methodological approach is considered a major 
improvement over the current system and would contribute to reduction 
of inclusion and exclusion errors (World Bank 2011b). It would also 
increase the percent of the national population deemed poor from 
27 percent to 42 percent.25 Embracing the underlying methodological 
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framework of the Saxena Committee, World Bank (2011a) recommended 
additional measures to further strengthen household targeting. These 
include applying regression models to identify indicators with greater 
predictive power, state-based weighting of indicators, allowing the indica-
tors to vary by state, and planning for regular updating of the BPL lists. It 
is anticipated that some version of these proposed modifications would 
be approved by the Planning Commission in the near future. Even though 
this is not under their direct purview, GSHISs are large users of these lists, 
and will have to work closely with government agencies to expedite 
updating of BPL lists.
Where specific enrolment is envisaged under the respective schemes 
(such as in RSBY), the GSHISs can also enact measures to counteract 
disincentives of enrolment agencies to reach remote villages (where the 
poorest of the poor tend to reside), villages with low BPL densities, or to 
enroll maximum allowable number of family members. One possible cor-
rective measure would be to introduce a performance-based payment 
system in which additional remuneration is provided for enrolling these 
eligible but underrepresented groups (e.g., by reaching out to remote vil-
lages or enrolling the fourth and fifth members of a household). 
Introducing Quality-Based Purchasing
In principle, most providers would be quite interested in building up their 
patient bases or at least holding on to current patient volumes that result 
from affiliation with insurance schemes. Depending on the degree of 
competition, the GSHISs can use their leverage to encourage improve-
ments in quality of care and data reporting on quality and patient satisfac-
tion through applying a performance-based purchasing approach. 
Although evidence is uneven, international experience suggests that 
purchasers can do a lot to incentivize providers to measure and report 
quality-related data as well as improve quality processes and results 
through strategic purchasing and rewarding hospitals for excellence in 
quality and quality improvement (Doran et al. 2006; Velasco-Garrido 
et al. 2005; Borem and Valle 2010 and Lindenauer et al. 2007). The evi-
dence does, however, suggest a business case for improving quality as a 
means to cost containment (i.e., reducing readmissions, long stays, repeat 
procedures) (Leatherman et al. 2010; Greene et al. 2008; Lawrence 
2003; IOM 2000).26 This section outlines how quality can be promoted 
by GSHISs through data reporting, quality-based purchasing, and pay-
for-quality initiatives.
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Collecting and Analyzing Data on Quality
Arguably, the first step in improving quality is to collect and analyze 
quality-related data. At the outset, usually in a contract, the quality data 
to be measured by hospitals and reported to the insurers are specified. 
Currently, no quality data are systematically collected by GSHISs or by 
the government. GSHISs can agree to establish a central repository of 
data on quality of care across schemes while incorporating data reporting 
requirements in hospital contracts. This approach generally consists of 
reporting “tracer” process and outcome indicators for specific high- 
volume procedures and treatments. For example, government contracts 
with hospitals in France include a requirement to report the percentage 
reductions in the rate of nosocomial infections. However, as suggested 
above, systems for defining the indicators and collecting and document-
ing such data have first to be developed. In 1997 the Council of Europe 
recommended that purchasers require providers to establish quality-
improvement management systems in all purchasing contracts. Italy and 
Germany are two countries that require implementation of such systems. 
Other structural mandates used in European hospitals include establish-
ment of adverse effects registers (France), specification of maximum 
waiting times (United Kingdom, Italy, and others), and use of standard-
ized data-collection and reporting systems (Germany and Italy). Finally, 
several European countries specify process indicators in hospital con-
tracts, including establishment of and adherence to clinical protocols.
Establishing Quality “Threshold” Requirements 
Quality threshold requirements are established by selecting only provid-
ers that meet set structure and process standards through prior creden-
tialing or certification by an external agency (“empanelment” in the 
Indian context). The standards would be gradually raised over several 
years according to a pre-defined roadmap, and eventually, a formal 
accreditation could become the threshold level for the GSHISs. In 
Europe, accreditation is increasingly used as an “extra licensing” system to 
determine the eligibility of hospitals to receive public or social insurance 
funding (Figueras, Robinson, and Jakubowski 2005: 226). In the United 
States, only accredited hospitals are eligible for Medicaid and Medicare 
funds. Many private insurers in the United States also require accredita-
tion. In India, CGHS had mandated accreditation as a criterion for 
empanelment of hospitals. However, it has had to extend the timeline for 
compliance a few times.27 Currently, already accredited facilities receive 
a higher payout from CGHS for the same services compared with their 
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unaccredited counterparts. Other GSHISs also have plans to follow the 
CGHS lead and increase their focus on quality standards.
Providing Financial Incentives to Improve Quality
Quality can be rewarded through payment mechanisms. One form of 
quality-based purchasing involves the use of incentives for hospitals to 
modify behaviors so as to improve quality. Rewarding performance 
requires robust information systems to ensure that the rewards are allo-
cated to providers that really do achieve the desired improvements. In the 
decade following the publication of the Institute of Medicine’s report on 
the state of quality of care in the United States (IOM 2000), numerous 
pay-for-quality programs have been piloted or implemented in the United 
States to address quality gaps. Indeed, provider incentive and reward 
strategies applied by purchasers have become widely accepted in 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
member countries as a means of improving performance, particularly in 
terms of quality. Nevertheless, implementation has been irregular, and 
evaluations are just getting under way. Recent analyses demonstrate that 
incentives work, but the research is inconclusive regarding the most effec-
tive quality-based purchasing strategies (Van Herck et al. 2010; Dudley 
2005). Several types of initiatives, however, are worth examining.28 These 
are summarized in box 4.2.
Box 4.2
International Experiences with Pay-for-Quality Incentives 
These five types of quality incentives seem to work.
UNIMED, a private insurer in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, has linked reimbursement 
rates of networked hospitals to their achievement of accreditation levels of the 
National Accreditation Organization (Organização Nacional de Acreditação 
[ONA]). The insurer increases the reimbursement by defined percentages accord-
ing to the accreditation levels attained (level 1 receives an additional 7 percent, 
level 2 gets 9 percent, and level 3 is paid an extra15 percent) (USAID 2010). This 
example is particularly appropriate in India where the NABH Board has recently 
implemented a stage-based accreditation system, comprising “pre-assessment,” 
“preaccreditation,” and “accreditation” stages, which is similar to Brazil’s staged sys-
tem under ONA (Borem and Valle 2010). 
(continued next page)
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CCSS, the Costa Rican social insurance agency (CCSS) pioneered a pay-for-
quality system with public hospitals. It rewarded hospitals for compliance with 
performance indicators related to adherence to protocols for prevention of noso-
comial infections and delivery complications. Two percent of the annual budget 
was allocated to the program for bonus payments (McNamara 2005).
Blue Cross / Blue Shield of Michigan provided up to a 2 percent bonus to hospi-
tals for participation in quality improvement programs related to care processes 
for patients with acute myocardial infarction and congestive heart failure. This 
“pay-for-participation” program compensates hospitals for staff participation in 
quality-improvement programs. The program incentivizes structural changes 
such as the formalization of quality management staff, creation of case-manage-
ment teams, and increasing the engagement of hospital board members in qual-
ity improvement (Nahara et al. 2006; Birkmeyer and Birkmeyer 2006).
The CMS-Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration piloted a pay-for-
quality reporting program in 2003 in hospitals treating Medicare patients. The 
program provided percent bonus over Medicare rates for hospitals that submit-
ted data on 33 quality indicators for five clinical conditions: heart failure, acute 
myocardial infarction, community-acquired pneumonia, coronary-artery bypass 
grafting, and hip and knee replacement. For each condition, hospitals performing 
in the top decile on a composite score received a 2 percent bonus added to the 
regular reimbursement rate (Lindenauer et al. 2007).
Blue Cross / Blue Shield of Massachusetts Hospital Performance Improvement Pro-
gram is a comprehensive pay-for-quality program designed to reward participating 
hospitals in four domains: pay for system improvement, pay for outcomes report-
ing, pay for patient satisfaction, and pay for improvements in governance. Bonus 
payments of between 3 and 6 percent are divided among the four domains such 
that a hospital may earn partial reward for achievements in some domains but not 
in others. Significantly, the system performance domain emphasizes safety-
improvement measures drawing on the Institute for Health Improvement’s Five 
Million Lives Campaign. This campaign essentially aims to reduce adverse events 
leading to needless death, disability, pain, and waste. This is achieved by implement-
ing prevention processes (e.g., prevent pressure ulcers, adverse drug events, central 
line bloodstream infections, surgical site infections, surgical complications). Patient 
satisfaction measures were derived from the Hospital Consumer Assessment of 
Providers and Health Systems Survey. Governance improvement measures 
involved participation by hospitals’ board of directors in a quality-improvement 
training program (Janet 2010; McCannon, Hackbarth, and Griffin 2007).
Box 4.2 (continued)
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Expanding Public Hospital Autonomy
Public hospitals need to be organizationally equipped to respond to a new 
system of incentives and accountabilities inherent in demand-side financ-
ing if they and their patients are to benefit from the aforementioned 
reforms in purchasing systems, provider payment mechanisms, results-
based financing arrangements and coverage extension through reengineer-
ing of GSHISs, discussed in the next chapter. . As evidenced by the paltry 
utilization of public facilities by current GSHIS beneficiaries, public hos-
pitals are poorly positioned to perceive and respond to such signals, 
whether in terms of adjusting bed capacity, range of services, inputs, staff 
mix, skill sets, and attitudinal responses. As GSHISs expand, public hos-
pitals will come under increasing competitive pressure to  perform or risk 
losing (or not gaining) clientele, and therefore, resources. How to position 
public hospitals to reap revenues from GSHISs is also an important 
political economy issue. Given the immense network of public hospitals 
throughout India, a case can be made that the potential success of GSHISs 
will depend on the affiliation of public hospitals in empaneled provider 
networks. Creating the enabling organizational environment for public 
hospitals to compete will probably take a number of years.
A good starting point is to analyze organizational arrangements and 
performance of autonomous public hospitals, particularly those already 
treating GSHIS-covered patients. Most of these autonomous facilities are 
medical college hospitals or nonteaching tertiary hospitals that were 
incorporated through special federal or state legislation in the two or 
three decades after Independence. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some 
of these facilities have witnessed strong demand from the GSHIS benefi-
ciaries as part of the GSHIS provider networks, offering good quality 
services while retaining revenues earned. In many cases, personnel in 
these public facilities receive a share of the facility’s earnings from the 
insurance schemes. In response to the extension of RSBY, Kerala is testing 
a “functional autonomy” model in which public hospitals fully manage all 
inputs and will be in a position to compete for beneficiaries (Arora and 
Nanada 2011). A recent State Government Order has granted hospitals 
more flexibility to hire staff under contract as well as directly manage 
revenues, and the state has allowed payment of staff incentives financed 
from the facilities’ insurance revenues. The Cherthala Taluk hospital of 
Alappuzha district already recovers a significant proportion of costs by 
selling services to RSBY and has used these revenues to upgrade equip-
ment and infrastructure.29 
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Models from other countries are also worth studying. For example, 
Australia, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom have gradually 
increased public hospitals’ decision-making rights over the last two 
decades. Middle-income countries such as Singapore, Brazil, Colombia, 
Tunisia, and Estonia have also made important inroads in reforming 
public hospitals. In some countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Panama, 
and China, reforms have been restricted to a limited number of facili-
ties or cities. In general, reforms involve three core elements: retention 
of public ownership of the facility, conversion of the facility into a 
legally independent entity but free from “public law” constraints 
related to input management and civil service, and the use of contracts 
to foster facilities’ accountability for results and compliance with pub-
lic objectives. However, these reforms are usually undertaken as part of 
a broader package of reforms involving provider payment mechanisms, 
separating purchasing from provision, performance-based contracting, 
upgrading of plant and equipment, improving managerial capacity, and 
modifying human resource management practices. Approaches to the 
implementation of reforms involving these elements are reviewed in 
box 4.3.
As India moves forward with greater GSHIS coverage and more public 
hospitals affiliate with provider networks, it will face the difficult task of 
reducing hospitals’ financial dependence on supply-side subsidies. This 
will be a gradual process but will require strong government commitment 
to create a level playing field in which all networked providers, public and 
private, compete on similar terms for patients and corresponding reve-
nues from GSHISs. This may involve the gradual conversion of supply-
side subsidies to the demand side.
Public hospital reform will require significant leadership and strong 
policy advocacy. Tinkering at the margins through, for example, providing 
partial autonomy, will probably not result in substantive improvements in 
organizational processes and performance. After systematically analyzing 
Indian and international experience in autonomous public hospitals, gov-
ernment will need to develop a strategy backed by a regulatory frame-
work and an implementation plan to convert public hospitals to 
autonomous facilities with decision rights over all inputs, including 
human resources. As a first step, government can mandate that any new 
public hospitals should adopt an alternative arrangement that fosters full 
autonomy. However, current facilities will require a transitional arrange-
ment, particularly for dealing with the complex issue of human resource 
conversion. 
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Box 4.3
International Experience in Public Hospital Reform 
How any hospital responds to the terms of contract or the incentives embedded 
in a payment mechanisms or pay-for-performance arrangement depends on 
how it is governed and managed. International experience suggests that five ele-
ments of the organizational environment are crucial to enable them to respond 
to such incentives (Figueras, Robinson, and Jakubowski 2005; Preker and Langen-
brunner 2005; Preker and Harding 2003; La Forgia and Couttolenc 2008; McKee 
and Healey 2002). These elements are 
• Decision-making authority, particularly regarding input management 
 (autonomy) 
• Exposure to market pressures in providing services to assorted purchasers 
(market exposure) 
• Retention of unspent earnings and responsibility for losses (residual claimant 
status) 
• Degree of directness of responsibility for performance (direct accountability) 
• Specification of objectives and mission as well as of revenues to cover service 
costs (social functions). 
Other factors include qualifications of managers and mechanisms to foster 
accountability for results. Patient choice and provider competition provide pub-
lic hospitals with some market exposure and the defined entitlements and pack-
age rates provide some accountability for results. Arguably, the key element 
involves autonomy. Hospitals with the independence and flexibility to manage 
inputs, set case mix, adjust capacity, reallocate resources, and perform other 
managerial functions are better performers than their counterparts without such 
independence.
How public hospital reforms are implemented can vary significantly. The state 
of São Paulo, Brazil, achieved full autonomy in nearly 20 public hospitals by intro-
ducing public private partnerships (PPPs) in which charitable organizations were 
contracted to operate all clinical and nonclinical services (La Forgia and Harding 
2009). Several countries (including Romania, Turkey, and Slovakia) have intro-
duced private employment contracts for staff working in public hospitals to 
increase flexibility in human resource management and improve staff incentives. 
In Austria, public hospitals were transferred to nonprofit, public holding compa-
nies incorporated under corporate law, in each state. State governments retain 
(continued next page)
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ownership and maintain contractual arrangements with the holding companies. 
Autonomy was enhanced by replacing line-item budgets with global budgets 
(Fidler et al. 2007). A national law in Estonia converted public hospitals into private 
foundations or joint-stock companies. Hospitals were granted independent legal 
status and therefore managerial autonomy, but assets remained public. The here-
tofore public employment status of staff in most facilities was converted to a labor 
regime under private law (Fidler et al. 2007). In Spain, an array of autonomous 
arrangements has emerged in the last two decades in traditional public hospitals. 
Depending on the subnational government, several organizational types were 
legally created such as foundations, consortia, public firms, and autonomous 
organizations. Conversion has been gradual. In cases involving labor status 
changes, public employees are replaced by contracted staff through attrition 
(Martín 2003). The United Kingdom’s experience of partial autonomy under the 
National Health Service Trusts of the 1990s and then greater autonomy under the 
Foundation Trusts (since 2003) has been well documented and provides some 
important lessons on the “how” of public hospital reform. Building the institu-
tional, regulatory, and technical architecture to support, govern, and monitor 
autonomous hospitals has been a work a progress and subject to considerable 
changes and learning (World Bank 2010). 
Reforms involving partial autonomy or autonomy without accountability have 
been less successful. In Colombia, facility managers were granted decision rights 
over all inputs except human resources. This severely restricted their ability to 
respond to incentives in the new insurance-based system (Toro et al. 2007). A 
study of five semiautonomous hospitals in Zambia found little impact on perfor-
mance, in part because the facilities remained dependent on centralized histori-
cal budgets (Kamwanga et al. 2003). In their review of “autonomization” reforms in 
developing countries, Castaño, Bitran, and Giedrion (2004) warn that, without 
strong accountability mechanisms (such as enforced contracts), monitoring, reg-
ulation, and oversight, hospitals may display perverse behaviors such as raising 
user fees, reducing quality, inducing unnecessary demand, or making unneces-
sary and unaffordable investments in technology. 
Box 4.3 (continued)
Strengthening the Collection and Dissemination of Consumer 
Information 
An important institutional responsibility of GSHISs is to provide infor-
mation to their beneficiaries to enable them to better manage their 
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interactions with the scheme, including insurers and providers, as well 
as take a more active role in their treatment and recovery. These interac-
tions can include a number of areas, including enrolment, provider 
selection and access, treatment choices, access to follow-up care, dealing 
with illegitimate provider charges, and navigation of grievance and com-
plaint processes. 
Information disclosure is particularly relevant in the Indian context in 
which beneficiaries generally receive little information on providers, 
treatment options, and costs when involved in an illness episode or 
a care-seeking decision. This lack of information is compounded by 
 socioeconomic, ethnic, and caste differences between beneficiaries and 
providers, leading to nearly absolute deference of patients to providers. 
The specialized cadre of GSHIS field workers, known as arogyamithras 
(in Andhra Pradesh, AP and Karnataka, KA-Arogyashri schemes), is one 
such effort to provide beneficiaries with information on their benefits 
and assist them in accessing providers in a timely matter. These initiatives 
should be reviewed by other GSHISs.30 
Research on insurance beneficiaries in the United States found that 
they are generally uninformed or confused about the basic features of 
private insurance schemes (Accenture 2008; Isaacs 1996) and seek much 
more information on how a scheme works, how much it will cost them 
out-of-pocket including any point-of-service charges, the particulars of 
the covered (and uncovered) services, the competence or quality of pro-
viders, and overall patient satisfaction with both the insurers and provid-
ers (Edgman-Levitan and Cleary1996). They prefer an unbiased source 
for this information. They are also interested in how others “like them”—
friends, family members, neighbors—judge the care experience. It is fair 
to say that Indians enrolled in GSHISs probably have similar questions 
and concerns. 
GSHISs need to strengthen and, in most cases, formalize systems to 
help beneficiaries understand their rights and responsibilities within the 
schemes, access and navigate empaneled providers, track and monitor 
member contacts, deal with routine issues (e.g., change of address, lost 
cards, change of BPL or enrolment status, issuance or reissuance of iden-
tification cards due to new dependent or death), register complaints, 
and resolve problems and questions. Box 4.4 outlines questions for eight 
areas relevant to health insurance and health care information. The 
performance of a well-formulated consumer information system is 
based on how easily a beneficiary can find clear and timely answers to 
these questions.
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Box 4.4 
Areas of Consumer Information and Corresponding 
Questions
Enrolment. Am I eligible? How many members of my family are eligible? How do I 
know I am eligible? How do I maintain eligibility? 
Access. How do I get access to health care providers? Whom can I see? How do I 
find them? How long do I have to wait?
Benefit coverage. For what services am I eligible? What is not covered? What follow-
up care is covered?
Costs. What costs do I have to pay? How much do I have pay? How and when do 
I pay it? What provider charges are considered legitimate?
Quality of care. How good are the different hospitals and physicians? How can I tell 
which will offer me the best care?
Patient satisfaction. What do others say about their experience with the different 
hospitals? In which hospitals do other beneficiaries tend to like the way they are 
treated?
Wellness. Where can I get information about my condition? What can I do to better 
manage my health (and condition)? How can I lead a healthier life?
Routine business. Whom do I contact to register a new dependent, a change of 
address, replace a lost card, renew eligibility?
Complaints and grievances. How do I file a complaint? Who will follow-up on my 
complaint? Is there a formal grievance or appeal process (for uncovered services, 
illegitimate charges, poor treatment)?
Source: Adapted from Accenture 2008. 
Typically many information functions listed in box 4.4 are fulfilled 
through a member services department within a scheme’s institutional 
structure.31 However, some functions can be delegated to independent 
public authorities or nongovernmental organizations. These latter insti-
tutional arrangements would provide for greater flexibility and indepen-
dence, and in principle, may be more representative of consumer 
interests. International experience suggests that any of these institutional 
forms may work for providing certain aspects of consumer information 
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but their feasibility depends on national legal and regulatory regimes 
related to governance models. 
The remainder of this chapter outlines best practices in a subset of 
operational features of a sound consumer information system for an 
insurance scheme.
• Outreach and member education. Schemes need to provide general 
information on how the scheme works, what the benefits are, how 
beneficiaries can best use the scheme, how to access information, and 
on other practical matters related to the insurance. Most schemes in 
India perform this function through camps. Other vehicles include 
village-based group information sessions, newsletters, websites, village 
theaters, and radio spots. Schemes can also launch a mobile phone-
based outreach program, which has the advantage of allowing benefi-
ciaries to ask questions. As mentioned, the AP scheme has hired field 
workers to staff primary care centers and hospitals to orient beneficia-
ries as they navigate the health delivery system. In the United States, a 
number of health insurers have developed “a member’s bill of rights” 
that details a member’s rights and an insurer’s responsibilities.32
• Routine access to and provision of information. Beneficiaries need a “gate-
way” to the scheme to help them with any concerns or questions. In the 
Indian context, where mobile phone use is widespread, this is best 
achieved through a toll free hot line. The use of short messaging ser-
vices (SMS) to provide short responses to specific questions is another 
possibility. GSHISs will have to consider the staff required for this task 
and their training needs. 
• Data collection and analysis. The service department would be respon-
sible for the collection, collation, and analysis of all beneficiary con-
tacts with the scheme including levels of satisfaction/dissatisfaction, 
complaints/compliments, and any problem related to a claim, medical 
service, or administrative process. This would require securing track-
ing software that classifies and codes problems, which in turn will 
facilitate subsequent trend analysis. This information can be comple-
mented by beneficiary surveys to gauge patient satisfaction and 
 dissatisfaction. 
• Complaints and grievances. Complaints are problems that beneficiaries 
would like to raise with the scheme. In most schemes, resolution of 
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complaints is often informal, but all should have a formal policy and 
process for registering, investigating, and resolving complaints. A griev-
ance is a formal complaint and requires a clearly defined internal pro-
cedure to assess and resolve the same. This procedure should be made 
known to all beneficiaries. In some countries, such a procedure is man-
dated by law. Some countries also mandate an appeal process through 
independent ombudsman programs as in the case of the United States 
(Brunner et al. 2012). The Indian Insurance law has created an ombuds-
man mechanism to handle complaints on nonredressal of grievances 
emanating from private health insurance.
• Quality-of-care measurement and dissemination. Providing information 
on quality of care is arguably the most difficult task facing GSHIS due 
to the general lack of quality information in India and the absence of 
institutional arrangements to measure and compare quality across 
health care providers. Many OECD countries have created national 
institutions to develop and apply quality metrics that are used by pub-
lic and private payers to provide information on the quality of care of 
networked providers to their beneficiaries. The quality reports on hos-
pitals, for example, are often referred to as “report cards.” However, the 
breadth and depth of information varies significantly, and the extent to 
which consumers use available information to select providers is uncer-
tain. Examples of quality ratings of hospitals are available in the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and in several U.S. states.33 In the absence of these 
arrangements in India, as mentioned, the schemes themselves will have 
to initiate their own programs to measure and disseminate information 
on the quality of care in their hospital network. A good place to start is 
to adapt the indicators and instruments used to measure hospital qual-
ity in OECD countries.
Notes
 1. The author identified five dimensions of good governance for social insurance 
schemes: coherent decision-making structures (to give decision makers the 
discretion, authority, and tools to comply with organizational objectives), 
stakeholder participation (to enable consensus in the decision-making pro-
cess), transparency and information (to ensure that information is available to 
all stakeholders to fulfill their obligations and comply with rules and stan-
dards), supervision and regulation (to hold stakeholders accountable for 
behaviors and performance), and consistency and stability (to enable sustain-
ability and continuity).
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 2. The GOI already has legitimate interests in this area under existing provisions 
for oversight and regulation of health insurance at the national level. For 
example, the IRDA Act (1999) and the Insurance Act (1938) provide for 
central-level regulation of the health insurance business. The GOI is also the 
major financier of GSHISs through its contribution to CGHS, ESIS, and RSBY 
and other health insurance schemes (such as the one for handloom workers).
 3. Consumer information is taken up later in this chapter.
 4. For example, it would be inappropriate to insert the proposed agency within 
the MOHFW, which cofinances a large provider network currently operated 
by state health secretariats, and this network would be increasingly contracted 
by the state schemes. This may create a situation of conflict of interest. 
Further, MOHFW has a number of stewardship responsibilities for the entire 
health system, including several regulatory aspects. It would be best to keep 
the functions of steward/regulator, insurer, and provider separate among dif-
ferent agencies or ministries.
 5. Data monitoring and use is taken up below.
 6. As discussed in chapter 3, all the new GSHISs depend on insurers, or to a 
lesser extent, TPAs, to perform a gamut of functions, including insurance 
functions such as underwriting, actuarial estimations, premium setting, and 
risk management as well as operational functions such as enrolling beneficia-
ries, provider networking, and claims administration.
 7. See appendix D, Rajiv Aarogyasri case study.
 8. See below for recommendations regarding strengthening provider payment 
systems.
 9. As outlined in chapter 3, these include: variations in definition of what com-
prises a “package”—current packages are replete with duplications and incon-
sistencies. Some packages for similar procedures are not comparable across 
schemes. Package rates and the relative resource use are not aligned, which 
could make some procedures far more attractive for some providers, but not 
for others, and multiple rates are used across parallel schemes for similar 
packages.
10. A well-formulated payment mechanism can contribute to cost containment, 
promote efficiency and equity, and improve transparency and accountability. 
11. Waters and Hussey (2004) review these methods. The activity-based costing 
(ABC) model appears most appropriate for costing package rates. Waters, 
Abdallah, and Santillán (2001) applied the ABC model in a developing-
country setting and found the methodology robust for pricing without overly 
taxing administrative capacity. 
12. For example, input prices, particularly for human resources and real estate, 
can vary considerably between, for example, facilities located in Tier 1 and 
Tier 3 cities.
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13. In Thailand, the DRG provider payment mechanism is applied for inpatient 
services. However, the payout is calculated in terms of relative weights and 
not in absolute monetary terms. At the end of the year, a fixed global budget 
is distributed among providers in proportion to the weight earned. This limits 
the total payout for the government to the pre-declared fixed global budget 
and also reduces the incentive for providers to overserve.
14. Government may want to work with private insurers to have them adapt 
the same rate structure, thus resulting in a single-rate system (even with 
multiple payers and multiple pools). There is evidence from the U.S. state 
of Maryland that single-rate systems have been successful in containing 
costs (Murray 2009).
15. DEA is a method for estimating technical efficiency—the ratio of outputs to 
inputs used. It involves the use of linear programming to rank organizations 
producing goods or services according to their relative efficiency scores. See 
Bowlin et al. (1985) and Jacobs (2001) for a critical review of the DEA meth-
odology. Benchmark analysis refers to a systematic process of evaluating and 
comparing organizations’ processes and performance with those of organiza-
tions considered to represent best practice (Gohlke 1997; Hurst and Jee-
Hughes 2001). Benchmarking has gained considerable acceptance in the 
health sector for comparing provider performance in terms of efficiency and 
quality. 
16. However, case-based payment mechanisms are not without risks. Measuring 
case-mix change over time has been difficult At the same time, hospitals are 
known to game the system through record-keeping practices in which they 
“up code” (also known as “DRG creep”) to higher-weight DRGs to increase 
revenues. To avoid hospitals’ charging for higher severity than existed would 
require major improvements in coding and medical record documentation. 
The latter is particularly lacking in India and would take many years to 
implement.
17. On the demand side, cost sharing is another common cost-containment 
method, but this may be unacceptable in the Indian context because of the 
potential to impede utilization by the BPL population. However, cost sharing 
may be a viable cost-control mechanism for non-BPL populations if the cost 
to the household is significantly lower than the alternative—out-of-pocket 
payments to service providers.
18. As suggested above, this would require implementing sound purchasing 
practices.
19. Based on mutual agreement, smaller states could voluntarily choose to use the 
purchasing platform of an adjacent large state, which could potentially result 
in better bargaining power and a wider provider network. 
20. See discussion on provider payment mechanisms in the previous subsection.
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21. Although some schemes already employ a subset of these measures, in general 
they are weakly or irregularly applied by most GSHISs. 
22. For a detailed account of profiling methods applied by insurers in the US, see 
Kongstvedt, Goldfield, and Plocher 2001; Goldfield 1999; Goldfield and Nash 
1999.
23. Some measures may require adjustment for case severity. 
24. The U.S. government and nonprofit institutions have developed standards for 
measuring the performance of insurers, health plans, and providers. See: 
http://reportcard.ncqa.org/plan/external/plansearch.aspx; http://hospital-
compare.hhs.gov/; http://www.qualitycheck.org/consumer/searchQCR.aspx.
25. This would increase by 10 percent if the transient poor are included.
26. The impetus for quality-based purchasing schemes was reports that docu-
mented quality shortcomings. The Institute of Medicine (2000) in the United 
States estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die annually as 
result of medical errors. An additional hundreds of thousands suffer or barely 
escape from nonfatal injuries that consume an estimated 20 to 40 percent of 
the country’s health expenditures. 
27. Although accreditation by international accreditation agencies of a handful 
of elite hospitals has existed for about a decade, India’s home-grown 
accreditation agency was established only recently. The National Board of 
Accreditation for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers (NABH) under the 
Quality Council of India commenced hospital accreditation in 2005 and 
has had very modest uptake. Hospitals seeking to attract foreign clients 
were the first in line. In 2010, there were only 44 NABH accredited hospi-
tals, but an additional 336 hospitals were at various stages in the accredita-
tion process. Still, at this rate it will take several decades to accredit even 
the 10,000-odd hospitals currently used by the insurance system. Hospitals 
have few incentives to become accredited.
  Experience from accreditation programs in developed and developing 
countries shows that well-designed accreditation systems contribute to 
improved quality of health services. Although few accreditation programs 
have been evaluated using rigorous methodologies, accredited facilities more 
often comply with standards than do unaccredited facilities (Shaw 2004a). 
Accreditation and the quality-enhancement programs employed to achieve it 
can lead to improved health care quality. Compliance with standards is 
related to improved care processes associated with outcomes such as reduc-
tions in hospital infection rates, medical errors, and adverse events (Heerey 
and Necochea 2005; Scrivens 2002; Shaw 2004a, 2004b). This is particularly 
true when the accreditation scheme is integrated into an overall quality mea-
surement and improvement program (WHO 2003). In addition, the processes 
of training personnel, adapting systems, and developing indicators can in 
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themselves improve hospital quality, irrespective of whether accreditation is 
sought or achieved.
28. An emerging literature exists on methods, plans, and guidelines to develop and 
implement pay-for-quality schemes as well as opportunities, pitfalls, and lessons 
learned for different types of schemes; a review of this literature is beyond the 
scope of this report. For reviews, see Van Herck et al. (2010); Damberg et al. 
(2009, 2007); Christianson, Leatherman, and Sutherland (2007). 
29. As highlighted in box 3.1, Rogi Kalyan Samiti (RKS) Committees or their 
equivalents have been established in all public hospitals. These societies are 
responsible mainly for managing flexi-funds granted by the National Rural 
Health Mission as well as their own earnings from user fees and any other 
sources. Revenues are used to make repairs, hire contractual personnel, and 
purchase supplies and minor equipment. In some facilities, the committees 
have contributed significantly to improving facility performance, at least in 
terms of patient satisfaction. The RKSs have potential to foster the decentral-
ization of decision-making authorities to the facility, but deeper reform will 
be required to foster greater autonomy. 
30. See the AP and KA-Arogyashri case studies in appendixes D and G, respec-
tively.
31. Based on U.S. experience, Kongstvelt (2001b) estimates that staffing this 
department would require one staff person for every 7,500 members. 
However, any ratio depends on the incidence and nature of member con-
tacts.
32. See, for example, Aetna’s “Members’ Rights” : http://www.aetna.com/faqs-
health-insurance/member-rights-member-services-faqs.html.
33. For the United States, see: http://hospitalcompare.hhs.gov/; for the United 
Kingdom, see: http://www.nhs.uk/ServiceDirectories/Pages/ServiceSearch.as
px?ServiceType=Hospital&InputError=Default
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C H A P T E R  5
Pragmatic Pathways to Universal 
Coverage
The ultimate objective of universal coverage is to ensure access to and use 
of quality health services for all people and to provide financial protec-
tion against poverty-inducing health shocks. India is far from achieving all 
three. Most Indians are overexposed to financially crippling health shocks. 
Typical of many developing countries in the pursuit of universal coverage, 
India is grappling with three major issues: extending coverage to its infor-
mal poor, expanding (and effectively delivering) a package of services that 
addresses their health needs—including those of the informal nonpoor—
and doing this within a robust financial protection mechanism. Finding 
an affordable and politically viable combination of health financing 
mechanisms to achieve universal coverage underlies all issues. 
Government faces difficult decisions on allocating new resources to 
personal health care, catastrophic care, and population-based public 
health interventions. Currently, all are inadequately financed. It also faces 
tough decisions on how to allocate these resources: through the demand-
side purchasing approach pioneered by the new generation of govern-
ment-sponsored health insurance schemes (GSHISs) or through the 
traditional supply-side public delivery system. To this can be added tough 
decisions about the recipients of government subsidies. Should govern-
ment target the poorest in the below-poverty-line (BPL) population for 
a deeper benefits package? Or, as some states do, should it include the 
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vulnerable nonpoor but offer more limited coverage? Other confounding 
issues include the acceptable mix of public and private provision and the 
roles of central and state governments in financing coverage expansion.
As the government of India (GOI) prepares for the 12th Five Year 
Development Plan, calls are mounting for it to deliver on its promise to 
significantly raise public spending on health. A ‘Call for Action’ was 
recently prepared by a distinguished panel of academics, social advocates, 
and opinion leaders, and published by The Lancet. The panel, known as 
the India Lancet Group for Universal Health Care, recommended a “uni-
versal” and “integrated health plan” that would provide comprehensive 
coverage for all Indians. This benefit would be mostly government-
financed through a single “national insurance fund” (Reddy et al. 2011; 
Shiva Kumar et al. 2011). To finance this program (as well as other rec-
ommended activities) the Group calls on government to increase public 
spending for health to 6 percent of GDP by 2020, including a 2 percent 
of GDP target by 2012. Although the details of how to reach coverage 
and spending goals and put in place the proposed health plan and insur-
ance fund were not specified, the overall proposal has many praiseworthy 
strategic elements.1 Nevertheless, given past growth trends in central 
government health spending, low tax-to-GDP ratio, fiscal limitations of 
state governments, and increasing demands on government coffers, it is 
unlikely that the proposed rate of growth in government financing will 
materialize, at least in the medium term. This in turn calls into question 
the affordability of achieving universal coverage through a comprehen-
sive benefits package for all Indians. 
In the spirit of the Lancet Group’s call for a national debate on its 
recommendations, this chapter details a path in incremental steps toward 
achieving universal coverage that takes as starting points the current con-
figuration of health financing and delivery arrangements, recent trends in 
government health financing as well as innovations and lessons from the 
new wave of GSHISs analyzed in this report.2 Building upon the experi-
ences of the GSHISs, the following actions are recommended: a recon-
figuration of insurance schemes, expansion of population coverage to 
both the BPL and the vulnerable nonpoor populations, and the deepening 
of benefit coverage. In light of stated government commitment to signifi-
cantly augment public spending on health, the proposals are funded 
mostly—but not exclusively—by central and state government fiscal 
resources. Mechanisms to link the schemes to the public delivery system 
are also recommended. These arrangements can be implemented over the 
period spanned by the 12th Five Year Plan.
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The first part of this chapter identifies the foundations already in 
place that serve as the basis for these recommendations. The second 
details the proposed reconfiguration of GSHISs, corresponding institu-
tional arrangements, and links to the public service delivery system. 
Potential regulatory issues related to the private insurance industry are 
also discussed, and the costs of coverage expansion through the restruc-
tured system are estimated. The chapter concludes with a review of 
issues for further research. 
Building Blocks for Change
India’s health sector is expanding in several directions at once, not all of 
which is planned or regulated. India needs to act soon to avoid the chaotic 
and inefficient development of its health system. On the supply side, 
central and state governments are increasing financial allocations to public 
delivery through the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), and this 
has contributed to a major extension of public facilities.3 On the demand-
side, and as documented in this report, the GOI has introduced a national 
insurance scheme for the poor, and more than a handful of states have 
already significantly increased allocations to health through recently 
launched GSHISs. Stimulated partly by the new wave of GSHISs, recent 
tax incentives, and an emerging middle class, that is able and willing to pay 
for medical care, growth of the private hospital industry has accelerated 
with an increasing presence in Tier 2 and 3 cities. Private insurance is 
expanding rapidly, particularly in the corporate sector and among the new 
Indian middle class, and will contribute to expansion of private delivery. 
Figure 5.1 depicts the evolution of health financing systems for low-, 
middle-, and high-income countries. India has the classic features of a 
low-income country due to the predominance of out-of-pocket (OOP) 
spending as the main source of financing and the lack of other mecha-
nisms of social financing. The idea is to move toward greater use of social 
or government-sponsored health insurance as a source of pooled financ-
ing. Given the high levels of informality and poverty in India, this will not 
be easy. 
India needs a vision of a health financing system that delivers value for 
the money, provides financial protection, and allows real access to defined 
packages of health benefits. The country faces the difficult task of 
 calibrating the best blend of financing and risk-pooling instruments 
linked to effective service delivery arrangements and cost-control mecha-
nisms. Such instruments should offer access to an affordable combination 
168       Government-Sponsored Health Insurance in India
Figure 5.1 India: Evolution of Health Financing Systems, by Income Level
Source: Adapted from Gottret et al. 2008.
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of primary, secondary, and tertiary care services that can affect both 
health and financial protection. It is best to start from wherever you are. 
Strong foundations have been put in place to build a positive consen-
sus. NRHM has contributed to making operational a large number of 
primary care centers through upgrading infrastructure and equipment 
and hiring of professional personnel. It also has resulted in improvements 
in public health programs. Several low-cost private delivery models have 
emerged that may represent an affordable and complementary delivery 
platform for public financing (IFC forthcoming). The new wave of 
GSHISs has introduced several innovations in the Indian health system 
from the standpoint of public financing. These potential “spillover” effects 
include: defined entitlements, patient choice (money follows patients), 
provider empanelment, provider competition (in principle), and separa-
tion of purchasing and provision functions. In addition, new GSHISs 
place strong emphasis on the inclusion of the lower segments of Indian 
society. This bottom-up approach to coverage expansion can be seen as 
possessing a “built-in” design to reach universal coverage by increasing the 
depth or scope of coverage for the poor while preparing the way for 
expanding the breadth of coverage to nonpoor but vulnerable groups.4 
Finally, and as observed in the state-sponsored schemes, political leadership 
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appears to increasingly favor a highly visible, well-defined package of 
benefits that can be successfully delivered. Emerging evidence suggests 
widespread public support for specified but cashless benefits packages 
and choice of providers. In part because of their public support and 
political viability, these schemes are here to stay, and other states are 
likely to follow. 
Pathways to Expanding Population Coverage 
and Benefit Coverage
In this section we outline a feasible and affordable path to strengthen 
progress toward universal coverage based on realistic assumptions of fiscal 
capacity, the current configuration of health financing and delivery 
arrangements, lessons and innovations from GSHISs, and international 
experience (box 5.1). It consists of three components and four benefits 
packages covering both BPL and vulnerable poor populations.5 (See 
annex table 5A.1 for specification of indicative service coverage for each 
of the four packages.)
(1) GOI-financed benefits
• standard benefits package for secondary and maternity care for 
BPL population;
• ambulatory benefits package for the BPL population; 
(2) State-financed benefits 
• “top-off” tertiary benefits package for the BPL population; 
• “contributory” point of service package for the vulnerable non-
BPL population; 
(3)  Consolidation of Employees’ State Insurance Scheme (ESIS) and 
 Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS).
The recommendations presented here address the following questions: 
How can current financing and delivery arrangements be improved and 
made to work together to contribute to universal coverage? What can 
India do to narrow the gap between current GSHISs while continuing to 
expand both the depth and breadth of coverage? What is the role of the 
central government vis-à-vis state governments in financing and operating 
GSHISs? How can the varying schemes be coordinated and duplications 
avoided? How can GSHISs be better linked to primary care and the pub-
lic health systems? First, the recommended institutional architecture to 
support the proposed financing and delivery arrangements is examined.
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Box 5.1
Extending Coverage to the Informal Sector: Lessons from 
Middle-Income Countries
Analyses of experiences of Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia in 
extending universal coverage to informal sectors suggest several policy prescrip-
tions that are relevant to the Indian context:
Financing
• Aggregate risks into large pools where possible.
• Align proposed expansion with potential for fiscal sustainability. 
• Avoid contradictory policies that fail to coordinate supply- and demand-side 
financing schemes. 
• Shift from payroll tax financing toward general revenues.
• Use general revenues to cover the poor.
• Promote actuarial analysis to establish the long-term solvency of the 
schemes.
Pooling
• Reduce risk-pooling fragmentation and population segmentation through vir-
tual pools with uniform rules, benefits, and payment mechanisms. 
• Avoid contributory schemes for the informal sector due to high costs and com-
plexity of collecting contributions and the potential for adverse selection. 
Benefits
• Move toward uniformity of benefits packages across schemes. 
• Consider partial subsidies for the nonpoor but vulnerable informal sector.
• Benefits packages require costing as well as alignment with fiscal realities.
Purchasing
• Use leverage of large pools to enhance purchasing power vis-à-vis providers.
• Seek efficiency, provider responsiveness, and quality gains through developing 
purchasing functions and explicit contracting.
• Expand choice of service providers.
• Avoid fee-for-service payment systems.
Institutional
• Establish an insurance agency that is independent and insulated from political 
interference.
• Guard against the leakage of funds due to corruption.
Source: Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011; Kutzin et al. 2010; Wagstaff et al. 2009; Hsiao and Shaw 2007; 
Baeza and Packard 2006.
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Institutional Arrangements
Before describing the proposed configuration and expansion of schemes, 
a few words on the proposed institutional arrangements are in order. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the financial and benefit flows of the proposed 
schemes as well as state-based institutional arrangements. As discussed in 
chapter 4, the GOI would establish a governance agency to coordinate 
and support the functioning of all GSHISs. However, it will be the 
responsibility of the states to operate the schemes,6 including the pooling 
of risks, purchasing of services, and direct monitoring of providers and 
beneficiaries.
Pooling (e.g., the collection and accumulation of revenues on behalf of 
the beneficiary populations) would be decentralized at the state level 
managed under a single, autonomous state purchasing agency. For each 
scheme, virtual pools or accounts would be established within the state 
purchasing agency.
Pooling and purchasing will be performed by the same agency, but the 
latter function will be conducted through (or with the support of) private 
and public insurers and third-party administrators (TPAs). The use of inter-
mediary agencies from the private health insurance sector has been an 
innovative feature of GSHISs, contributing to more or less successful ben-
eficiary enrolment, claims management, provider empanelment and pay-
ment, preauthorization systems, and insurance underwriting. In the absence 
of such intermediation, it may have been difficult to create purchasing 
Figure 5.2 Financial and Benefit Flows of Proposed Schemes
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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systems to contract and oversee private providers to the extent that has 
heretofore been possible by the GSHISs.7
Allocation from the pooling accounts to purchasing functions will 
be internal to the agency. Unifying pooling and purchasing under a 
single “umbrella” organizational arrangement promotes equity and 
efficiency by reducing the probability of fragmentation and segmenta-
tion while increasing the schemes’ financial leverage with providers. 
Equity will also be enhanced by purchasing services (for all  beneficiaries) 
from the same set of empaneled providers, thus avoiding the further 
development of parallel delivery systems. As suggested, the proposed 
consolidation of heretofore separate schemes under a single state 
agency creates opportunities to increase their collective purchasing 
power.
Fully Subsidized GOI-Financed Standard Package for the BPL: 
Secondary and Maternity Care 
This package builds upon the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) 
design and implementation experience. It would contain services cur-
rently covered under RSBY—mostly secondary and maternity care. It 
would therefore provide coverage against many financially catastrophic 
health events.8 Similar to RSBY, the proposed common standard benefits 
will be fully subsidized, portable across India, and directed to the BPL 
population. The GOI would provide guidelines for each state to imple-
ment. These can include: benefit definition, eligibility criteria, reporting 
requirements, cost-containment mechanisms, provider audits, fraud and 
corruption control measures and standards, provider empanelment and 
disempanelment, quality measurement and reporting, information sys-
tems, and provider contracts. A subset of these measures has already been 
established under RSBY. Means testing to better target the BPL popula-
tion will need significant strengthening.9
Because health is constitutionally a state subject in India, placing the 
states front and center in the implementation of any GSHIS is an impor-
tant starting point. This scheme would be operated by the states and 
would be cashless to the beneficiaries. GOI can consider financing the 
entire cost of the package from general revenues through state per capita 
(or per family) transfers.10 As discussed below, GOI can incentivize addi-
tional state contributions to deliver a deeper “top-off” package through a 
matching grant arrangement. In other words, GOI would fully finance the 
standard package, but conditioned on state financing of additional ‘top-
off’ benefits.
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However, the implementation and institutional arrangements would 
entail a number of important enhancements to RSBY, some of which 
were described in previous sections: 
(1)  States would administer the GOI-funded standard package as the ba-
sic component of a larger, integrated state-executed insurance system 
which can include “top-off” benefits as well as coverage of non-BPL 
population groups (see below). Essentially this means that each state 
would operate one health insurance system that can include several 
optional components in addition to the base, standard coverage.11
(2)  The full cost of the standard package is assumed by the GOI; this 
would allow states to use their own resources for deepening the ben-
efits package (e.g., top-off benefits) or to include wider population 
groups.12 Nevertheless, full GOI financing can be conditional on state 
contributions to a top-off package (see next section). 
(3)  All purchasing functions would be conducted under a common, state-
based purchasing platform through an independent state agency in 
which all “operational” rules and requirements are set by the states. As 
described in chapter 4, the GOI establishes an autonomous national 
umbrella agency to oversee, coordinate, monitor, evaluate, and pro-
vide technical support to state-sponsored schemes including the prep-
aration of guidelines, policies, statutes, information technology (IT) 
systems, operating instructions, and manuals. 
(4)  States select payment mechanisms and set rates according to local 
costs and market conditions and in line with their policy priorities.
(5)  GOI transfers to the states would be adjusted for local costs of provi-
sion with a possible add-on subsidy for resource constrained states. 
(6)  Contingent on GOI approval, states can alter the standard package to 
address local disease burden.13 
Fully Subsidized GOI-Financed Ambulatory Care 
As part of the GOI-financed standard package for the BPL population, 
an incremental, demand-side subsidy is proposed for government pri-
mary health centers (PHCs). These funds would address financial gaps 
while stimulating accountability for results and leveraging the supply-
side investments underway in these facilities. This arrangement would 
also promote stronger ties between the GSHISs and the public delivery 
system. Nevertheless, given current deficits in governance, manage-
ment, purchasing, and monitoring arrangements, including comprehen-
sive ambulatory coverage within the scope of the newer GSHISs is a 
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long-term objective. Any movement toward introducing an ambulatory 
benefit should be done cautiously and through demonstration projects 
to test their financial feasibility.14
Another emerging issue concerns the interface between hospital and 
ambulatory services. Given rapidly changing patterns of disease (e.g., the 
onslaught of chronic conditions),15 medical technologies, demand for 
health care, and availability of health professionals, India needs to explore a 
less traditional and less hospital-centric care model. Increasingly adopted by 
countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), such a model would involve the use of coordinated or integrated 
delivery approaches that foster strong linkages between primary facilities, 
hospitals, diagnostic centers, and other providers (box 5.2).16 
Nevertheless, there are certain ways in which the proposed GOI-financed 
standard package can include ambulatory coverage while also creating link-
ages between hospitals and primary care providers, including government 
PHCs. Three options can best be described as initial steps to prepare the way 
for subsequent, substantial experimentation with coordinated or integrated 
care approaches to cover outpatient or ambulatory care:
Box 5.2
Health Care Coordination in OECD Countries: Lessons for 
India? 
Health care systems in OECD countries have evolved significantly in the last two 
decades and offer some lessons to India regarding what to anticipate given an 
aging population, economic and medical progress, emergence of chronic dis-
eases, and public dissatisfaction with access to and responsiveness of health care. 
The growing prevalence of chronic disease has been a major driver of calls for 
coordinated care in OECD countries. 
It is well established that people with chronic conditions are high users of 
health services and absorb a higher share of costs (Mackenbach 2005; Broemeling, 
Watson, and Black 2005; Thorpe and Howard 2006). Care models are emerging to 
address the needs of these groups to reduce costs for both patients and institu-
tional payers, improve outcomes, and raise the quality of and satisfaction with care. 
Although models vary considerably, countries are consciously reducing their hos-
pital capacity, which in many cases reflected a bygone era of hospital-based acute 
(continued next page)
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care, and moving toward a care model that places greater emphasis on primary 
care and coordination across care settings (OECD 2009; Hofmarcher, Oxley, and 
 Rusticelli 2007). Care coordination consists of a mix of measures that link profes-
sionals and organizations at all levels of the health system, emphasize patient-
centered care integration, manage patient navigation through the 
delivery system, and promote follow-up care as well as the continuity of long-term 
service provision. The concept is often based on the strong role of primary care as 
the driver of coordination functions (Saltman, Rico, and Boerma 2006). 
Most coordination models target specific patient groups such as seniors or peo-
ple with one or more chronic conditions. One approach is known as disease man-
agement. Disease management programs can consist of a number of components, 
including multi-disciplinary teams, provider education, provider feedback, informa-
tion technologies such as electronic medical records (to share patient information), 
organized provider networks, patient reminder systems, use of evidence-based 
guidelines, financial incentives to providers, and the use of family physicians that 
coordinate treatment (Ofman et al. 2004). A similar approach, sometimes referred to 
as case management, consists of assessing, planning, managing, and monitoring of 
an individual’s social, prevention, and treatment needs. This is performed by a “case 
manager,” who in principle works with providers across all levels to ensure cost-effec-
tive treatment. Case management is often used with seniors. Other, and less com-
mon, models involve the delivery of a comprehensive package of services to a 
defined population through integration of financing, professionals, and facilities 
under a single organizational and managerial structure. Kaiser Permanente and the 
Mayo Clinic in the United States are examples of an integrated delivery system.
The impact of care coordinated models is mixed. Evaluations have been 
plagued by methodological issues. In a review of the literature, Hofmarcher, Oxley, 
and Rusticelli (2007) found disease management programs appear to improve 
quality and outcomes. Although these programs may reduce hospitalizations, 
their impact on cost containment appears inconclusive. Evidence from large inte-
grated delivery systems (e.g., Kaiser Permanente, Mayo Clinic) suggest that these 
organizations are able to follow care management processes (such as clinical 
pathways), reduce unnecessary hospitalizations and lengths of stay, and provide 
higher quality care at lower costs than other types of delivery arrangements 
(Weeks et al 2010; Tollen 2008; Shortell and Schmittdiel 2004). Finally, effective 
primary care systems have resulted in reductions in often unnecessary and costly 
hospitalizations in both high- and middle-income countries (OECD 2010a; 
 Macinko et al. 2010; Bynum et al. 2011; Bitran, Escobar, and Gassibe 2010).
Box 5.2 (continued)
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(1)  Package payments for a defined period of post discharge, follow-up 
care for insured patients which can be provided in government PHCs/ 
community health centers (CHCs) and other contracted primary care 
providers
(2)  Capitation and package payments for defined bundles of primary care 
services that are tied to performance in government PHCs/CHCs; non 
government organizations (NGOs) and private clinics can also be con-
tracted under this arrangement to deliver primary services in areas where 
the presence of government services is absent, inadequate, or irregular
(3)  Standard outpatient insurance “product” provided by public and 
 private outpatient clinics and hospitals. 
These options are summarized in table 5.1.
Package payments for follow-up care. The first and perhaps easiest 
arrangement is to include in the benefits package essential follow-up 
ambulatory care for several years (lifelong care will be required in some 
cases) after procedures such as organ transplants, heart valve replace-
ments, and certain neurosurgical procedures. The need for follow-up 
Table 5.1 India: Options for Expanding Ambulatory Care to BPL Population under 
GSHISs
Options Payment mechanism Provider Benefits
1.  Postdischarge 
packages
Modified hospitaliza-
tion package rates 
that include a 
 specified follow-up 
care component
Government PHCs
Contracted NGOs
Private clinics
Defined packages of 
follow-up care that 
are automatically 
authorized 
 postdischarge
2.  Primary care 
packages
Performance-based 
capitation credit for 
defined package of 
ambulatory services 
Government PHCs
Contracted NGOs
Private clinics
Defined bundles of 
services such as 
maternal and child 
health services, 
 ambulatory surgery, 
and chronic care 
management 
packages 
3.  Outpatient
“product”
Outpatient  capitation 
rates (or blended 
payment models)
Empaneled 
 hospitals and 
 public and private 
clinics
Defined services 
 including 
 outpatient visits, 
 diagnostic tests, 
and drugs for a 
specified period
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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medications and, in certain cases, diagnostic tests is long term for a num-
ber of procedures. Neglecting postsurgical treatment is associated with 
poorer health outcomes. Such follow-up care is not adequately addressed 
in the current, procedure-based, inpatient model which includes only a 
few days of after care, if at all. 
Adding such a benefit would be administratively easy (e.g., by includ-
ing the incremental cost in the current package rates among already 
authorized and verified beneficiaries) and would not cause significant 
increases in outlays.17 Many of these benefits can be easily bundled into 
a package payment in which the precise services, drugs, and consumables 
are defined. Public and private ambulatory providers can be contracted 
by empaneled hospitals to provide these packages of follow-up care. 
Primary care packages with performance-based payments. A second 
arrangement holding great potential for convergence with primary care as 
well as for strong linkages with the public health service system entails a 
(demand-side) performance-linked payment for government PHCs. 
Essentially, PHC providers would be paid for delivering a defined package 
of primary services to BPL populations. Such an arrangement would 
require measurable indicators that are also in line with policy priorities 
and robust monitoring systems to verify performance indicator compli-
ance.18 The demand-side subsidy would also reduce beneficiaries’ OOP 
spending. This could work in two ways:
• Capitation credit. This approach involves paying a credit of, for example, 
Rs. 500 or Rs. 1,000 (or higher) per covered family per year into the 
PHC account in return for compliance with indicators such as the fam-
ilies’ enrolment with the PHC; meeting requirements for provision of 
immunizations, antenatal care, and well-baby care; undertaking chronic 
disease management; providing a gatekeeper role for inpatient care; and 
ensuring that postdischarge follow-up care and medications are pro-
vided (as discussed below). The list of possibilities with which this 
incentive could be linked is virtually unending, and will depend upon 
state policy priorities for the state as well as monitoring capacities. 
Paying for drugs should be the major use for this credit, based on 
the understanding that pharmaceuticals are often scarce at PHCs due 
to underfinancing.19 Drug purchases account for between 70 and 80 
percent of OOP spending in ambulatory settings, and this is a major 
bone of contention for local populations. The additional financing for 
drugs will go a long way toward eliminating stock outs while represent-
ing a first step toward linking the demand-side schemes with primary 
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care and existing public health facilities. The availability of a bulk pro-
curement and logistics agency such as Tamil Nadu Medical Supplies 
Corporation (TNMSC) of the state of Tamil Nadu will also be an 
essential prerequisite to make this option operational.
Upon verification of compliance with the prespecified performance 
indicators, the PHC would receive this credit, and the total (or partial) 
amount of the credit would be redeemable against the purchase of 
generic pharmaceuticals from the bulk procurement agency estab-
lished by the state.20 It would be best to start simply, by incentivizing 
a limited set of benefits at PHCs. Gradually, the benefits package, and 
corresponding indicators to monitor PHC performance, can be 
expanded to include coverage of other areas of wellness, prevention, or 
case management. Indicators can be calibrated for performance on a 
quarterly or semester basis and therefore the credit could also be 
released in smaller increments. 
• Ambulatory package rates. Similar to follow-up care packages, ambula-
tory services involving easily definable services and corresponding vol-
umes can be bundled into a global fee or ambulatory package rate.21 This 
package rate encompasses all interventions, consultations, diagnostics, 
and consumables related to a set of outpatient services or an outpatient 
treatment regime. Service bundling provides incentives for the efficient 
use of services but at the same time is attractive to providers because 
payments are linked to provision of the interventions constituting the 
package. A bundled, single fee can thus be applied to cover services such 
as mother-infant care (e.g., antenatal care package, childbirth/labor pack-
age, and postnatal and well-baby care package), ambulatory surgery, and 
case management of specific chronic conditions. A scheme could cover 
all or part of the variable costs of care offered at PHCs.
In addition to paying for drugs and consumables, part of this addi-
tional financing can be distributed as performance incentives among 
staff against compliance with output and quality indicators, which could 
even be verified by local communities. Nonmonetary incentives are 
another option that could be considered in lieu of or in addition to 
monetary incentives.22 Examples of ambulatory packages are provided 
in box 5.3. In the context of public PHCs in India, any payment can be 
channeled through Rogi Kalyan Samities to finance consumables, facility 
upkeep and upgrades, and if feasible, performance incentives to staff.
Performance-based arrangements can also be extended to NGOs to 
deliver a package of primary care services in PHCs where government has 
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difficulty recruiting and maintaining professional staff. NGOs can be 
contracted and paid through a capitated, performance-tied payment. 
Performance-based contracting of NGOs and nonprofit providers has 
been found to be an effective means of covering hard-to-reach popula-
tions in several countries (Loevinsohn and Harding 2004). NGO con-
tracting is also underway in several Indian states, though in a very limited 
way. As discussed earlier in this chapter, as the schemes strengthen their 
purchasing platform, they can contribute to effective extension of basic 
care while addressing many of the managerial shortcomings related to 
NGO contracting that have impeded performance in India.23 
Outpatient product. Yet another option to deliver demand-side financing 
for ambulatory care is to structure an outpatient product. Providers would 
Box 5.3
International and Indian Experiences with Ambulatory 
Package Rates
In the U.S. state of Maryland, global fees (similar to package rates) are applied to 
ambulatory surgery (e.g., ophthalmologic, arthroscopic) and other treatments 
(Atkinson and Murray 2008). 
In India, some GSHISs already include ambulatory care packages associated 
with ophthalmology (RSBY, Yeshasvini) and parenteral chemotherapy (AP, TN). A 
package purchasing model is being implemented through the Chiranjeevi pro-
gram in the state of Gujarat. The state government purchases a package of mater-
nal and child care directly from private providers. A preliminary assessment has 
shown that Chiranjeevi has increased institutional births among the poor while 
reducing their out-of-pocket spending (Singh et al. 2009; Bhat et al. 2009). 
In Peru the government created a demand-side payment scheme for public 
providers to cover a set of maternal and child care interventions. The program was 
essentially a mother-child insurance scheme for public providers that partially 
financed the variable (mostly nonsalary) costs of the benefits. Bitran, Muñoz, and 
Prieto (2010) report that the program had a positive impact on financial protec-
tion and access for a number of (but not all) services.
In each of these cases, payments (e.g., fees) to private and government facili-
ties were made against verification that services were delivered. The funding pro-
vided an incentive to deliver the covered services.
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be paid for a complete set of defined outpatient services on a capitation 
basis (or using a blended model combining capitation with performance-
based payments). Both public and private providers could be chosen by the 
beneficiaries, similarly as the inpatient care structure, although the choice 
would not be for each episode of care but for a period of time. The provid-
ers would undertake to provide all the defined services, including outpa-
tient visits, diagnostic tests, and drugs for the specified period, to 
beneficiaries enrolled with them. The claim risk as well as the development 
of provider networks and a system for paying them could be transferred to 
insurers or retained in-house by the state purchasing platform. A fee-for-
service payment mechanism for this outpatient product is not recom-
mended because it could lead to significant moral hazard and cost 
containment issues. 
Fully Subsidized State-Financed Top-Off Package 
States, of their own volition, could choose to offer an expanded set of 
tertiary care benefits for the poor, drawing on their own resources. Two 
states, HP and Kerala, are already implementing “top-off” benefits pack-
ages to complement RSBY, and Delhi is planning the same. The GOI can 
underwrite the full cost of the aforementioned standard package of sec-
ondary and maternity services—conditional on state financing of a top-off 
scheme to cover higher-cost, tertiary care events not included in the stan-
dard package. 
Similar to the standard package, these top-off benefits would be fully 
subsidized for BPL populations without any premium contribution or cost 
sharing when using services. The GOI and states may draw on the utiliza-
tion experience of the existing state-sponsored top-off and tertiary care 
schemes to guide their design of the benefits package. However, final deci-
sions in this regard should be left to the states for greater ownership. 
The fiscal capacity of the states would probably determine the depth 
of coverage. Therefore, richer states can be encouraged to offer a deeper 
package. For states fiscally unable to fully or partly finance the proposed 
top-off scheme, the GOI can consider two options. The first would involve 
eliminating the top-off package but requiring a cost-sharing arrangement 
in which the state contributes to the cost of the standard package. This 
could be similar to the current arrangement under RSBY (e.g., 75 percent 
or 90 percent central contribution, the rest from the state). The second 
option could involve a matching-grant arrangement in which the GOI and 
the state cofinance a limited top-off package. The second option would be 
feasible for states that can only partially finance the top-off package.
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Partially Subsidized, State-Sponsored “Contributory” Point of Service 
Benefits Package for Vulnerable Non-BPL Populations 
This proposed component, also voluntary for the states, is directed at that 
part of the above-poverty-line population that is classified as the vulner-
able poor (NCEUS 2009). This group may not be the poorest in the 
population but its members are financially vulnerable to health shocks 
and generally seek care from private providers, paying out of pocket for 
nearly all services.24 Ideally, this scheme would consist of both the afore-
mentioned standard central (secondary and maternity) and the top-off 
(tertiary) packages offered to the BPL population. It would thus contrib-
ute to equity by reducing population segmentation. However, some 
diversity will emerge among states. 
The scheme would be state-funded but require cost sharing by patients, 
at point of service when they receive treatment. Potential beneficiaries 
would join the scheme for free, that is, without any upfront contribution 
or premium payment, exactly akin to the BPL enrolment.25 However, 
they would not have to “contribute” copayments when they actually use 
a hospital service. In other words, they would be required to pay the hos-
pital a proportion of the treatment costs (with the remaining cost subsi-
dized by the scheme). Such copayments could be a defined percentage of 
the package rates. Applying the state subsidy to the negotiated (and thus 
substantially discounted) package rates would in effect significantly lower 
OOP spending compared with the fee-for-service market prices which 
the intended beneficiaries would otherwise incur. This would give them 
both a strong incentive to enroll and considerable financial protection. 
Depending on their fiscal capacity, states can consider designing schemes 
which provide this vulnerable group with a package-cost subsidy of 
between 30 and 70 percent. Free enrolment would also facilitate broad 
population coverage and also minimize any adverse selection. Finally, the 
copayment required upon service utilization will greatly reduce the sub-
sidy element and overall costs of covering this group relative to the fully 
subsidized coverage for the BPL population. 
Some state GSHISs (e.g., AP and TN) already offer fully subsidized cov-
erage beyond the poor to cover lower-middle income groups, reaching over 
80 percent of the states’ population through a narrow, tertiary-oriented 
benefits package. Covering the nonpoor is a laudable goal. However, this 
approach poses a policy dilemma for the government: should scarce public 
resources be used to cover groups that could afford to pay for at least part 
of their coverage through coinsurance or copayments, or should they be 
used to deepen coverage for the poorest population segments? 
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The feasibility of the proposed contributory POS scheme, however, 
will depend on sharpening targeting and separation of BPL from the vul-
nerable nonpoor. Feasibility will also depend on sound oversight of pro-
viders to control overbilling of beneficiaries. Finally, this scheme (as well 
as the top-up scheme for the BPL) would be operated by the same state 
agency responsible for the execution of the GOI-funded standard pack-
age and the state funded top-off package (if applicable). All schemes will 
be administered as one integrated system, using the same operational 
processes and procedures.
Consolidation of CGHS and ESIS 
The fragmented pool of social health insurance schemes (ESIS and 
CGHS) and the noncontributory health schemes operated by govern-
ment departments such as railways contribute to system inefficiency 
through overlapping administrative arrangements, duplication of gener-
ally underutilized health facilities catering to their specific member 
groups, and loss of economies of scale in procuring supplies and services. 
Although CGHS and ESIS are mandated for specific groups, they con-
tain several common features: funding through contributions from 
employees and employers, a package of comprehensive benefits, inte-
grated care through facilities they own and operate, systems to recruit 
and manage clinical staff, bulk procurement of medicines and consum-
ables, and the purchase of care from private super-specialty hospitals. 
However, these functions are performed through parallel systems and 
with separate management structures. 
As a short-term measure, efficiency gains can be derived by merging 
the management structures of these two SHIs by establishing an 
 autonomous body outside the Ministries of Health and Labour into 
which the existing management structures could converge.26 The resul-
tant body will be a single institution that oversees the two schemes oper-
ating separately with their existing benefits packages. This initial merger 
of common administrative functions of these schemes will make use of 
their shared expertise while contributing to efficiency gains through 
shared management and purchasing systems. If feasible, this institutional 
merger could be extended to the captive health services of the Railways 
Department, the largest employer in India.
However, greater synergies (and efficiencies) can be achieved in the 
medium term if this merger moves beyond the governing bodies and inte-
grates the health facilities operated by both schemes. The shared use of 
health facilities by the beneficiaries across the schemes will help minimize 
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duplication of resources and will also improve the utilization of health 
facilities, some of them grossly underutilized. Taking this logic further, the 
primary care infrastructure of ESIS and CGHS can also support the efforts 
of other GSHISs to extend outpatient services to their beneficiaries. At 
such a stage, the schemes will serve different groups of covered population 
under an integrated system that has the combined (and strengthened) 
expertise, capacity, and structure for more efficient management. 
How Are the Recommendations Linked to the Goals of the 
12th Five Year Plan?
The proposed pathways to universal coverage described here can contrib-
ute significantly to most of the key health sector goals outlined in the 
approach paper for the 12th Five Year Plan (Planning Commission 2011). 
Health insurance is known to contribute to health system goals by 
increasing access to and utilization of health services, protecting the 
population against financial loss, and improving health status (Escobar, 
Griffin, and Shaw 2010). By extending benefit coverage for secondary 
and maternal care (including neonatal care) and improving access and 
quality of primary care and family planning services, our proposal directly 
contributes to Plan objectives to reduce infant and maternal mortality as 
well as fertility rates. The component on performance-based payments 
for primary care, including services provided by government PHCs and 
CHCs, would introduce criteria that directly measure and reward perfor-
mance on maternal and child care (including anemia of pregnant women), 
and thereby play a part in improving neonatal birth weight and nutrition 
status. Improving primary care access in general will also contribute to 
achieving these goals. Also, one of the major uses of the proposed capita-
tion credit for primary care is to direct additional funds for drug procure-
ment by the PHCs/CHCs, contributing in a major way to the secondary 
objective of the 12th Plan to extend coverage of safe drugs.
The primary care packages will be the first steps towards bundling 
preventive services (e.g., antenatal and postpartum care, well-baby care, 
screening of risk factors, and control of chronic diseases) as part of ambu-
latory benefit coverage. This capitation-based financing mechanism 
would provide an incentive to primary care providers to increase the offer 
of preventive services. 
This proposal would directly support other goals and approaches under 
government consideration. First, building upon current GSHIS experi-
ences, concrete steps are proposed toward introducing a government-
funded health insurance plan for all citizens, to cover more than 75 percent 
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of the population. Extending insurance would significantly reduce the 
number of people falling into poverty due to OOP health expenditures. 
Second, expansion of insurance coverage would also entail extension of 
PPP arrangements with insurers, TPAs, and providers, a major component 
of the aforementioned approach paper. Third, GSHISs have a built-in 
mechanism for improving accountability by separating financing from 
delivery and linking funding to actual service delivery. The performance-
based financing mechanism for primary care will further strengthen 
accountability. Finally, extending health insurance can incentivize improve-
ments in purchasing, monitoring, and oversight functions and would con-
tribute to management reforms that improve the efficiency, effectiveness, 
and quality of service delivery.
What about Private Health Insurance?
The private health insurance industry in India has witnessed rapid 
growth over the last decade in terms of business volume, population 
coverage, and number of product lines. Prior to the introduction of the 
GSHISs, commercial insurers had focused mainly on expanding their 
market share among corporate entities and upper-income groups resid-
ing in metropolitan centers, and to a lesser extent, Tier 2 cities. In addi-
tion, they will probably continue, for the foreseeable future, their 
recently established product line of performing administrative and risk-
management tasks for GSHISs. 
The largest share of the industry’s revenues will depend on the volun-
tary private health insurance market. The corporate group plans and the 
fast-growing retail portfolio will contribute over 80 percent of the indus-
try’s business in 2010–11 (an estimated US$2 billion share in a total 
business of about US$2.5 billion). Despite the fact that their GSHIS-
related business has three times as many members and will remain an 
important and promising segment for the private insurance industry, pri-
vate insurers will continue to concentrate on growing the higher-ticket 
retail lines of their voluntary health insurance business.27 In other words, 
the retail market garners higher premiums per member and also a higher 
contribution to their profit margins than their GSHIS-related work. 
Private voluntary health insurance will continue to grow in terms of 
covering the nonvulnerable population: the middle-class and higher-income 
segments of the population that can afford to purchase private health insur-
ance individually or through their employers. Another emerging segment 
will be voluntary, supplementary coverage for any conditions, services, or 
“luxury levels” not covered in government schemes. As GSHISs expand 
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their member base, particularly to the vulnerable nonpoor, members will 
become increasingly aware of the concept of health insurance and may be 
willing to pay out of pocket to extend their protection beyond the GSHIS-
financed package. 
As major payers of health care, private health insurers can exert consid-
erable influence on providers. Insurers can use their financial leverage to 
stimulate efficiency, quality, data collection, reporting, and so on. Contrarily, 
insurers can also induce distortions in provider behavior (e.g., by paying 
providers different rates for the same procedures). If private health insurers 
continue with an open-ended, fee-for-service payment system for provid-
ers, they will influence (and probably inflate) provider rate structures and 
contribute to pressure on government-sponsored schemes to steadily 
increase their package rates (and thereby their total costs) or face the exo-
dus of popular or high-demand providers from public schemes. 
The private insurance industry is already part of the implementation 
machinery for all the new generation GSHISs, and their voluntary health 
insurance products use the same hospital networks as the GSHISs. Thus, 
any discussion of the future of GSHISs cannot be “decoupled” and under-
taken in isolation from the private insurance industry. This also under-
scores the need for close, coordinated, but pragmatic, regulation of the 
entire health insurance sector, including private insurer participation in 
the GSHISs.28 
Since any regulatory regime for private insurance plans has implica-
tions for the costs and effectiveness of GSHISs, the schemes will need to 
coordinate closely with the Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority (IRDA), the national regulator for commercial insurance (and 
vice versa). The impact of GSHIS cost-containment initiatives will 
depend on concerted efforts of the entire health insurance sector, includ-
ing the GSHISs, private insurers, and IRDA. Insurance regulation should 
contribute to strengthening the aggregate purchasing and negotiating 
capacity of the insurance industry with the provider network. For exam-
ple, regulation combined with coordination may help move the private 
voluntary plans away from open-ended, fee-for-service payment mecha-
nisms and toward case-based payments applied by GSHISs. Using similar 
payment mechanisms (and rates) across all health insurers would contrib-
ute to cost containment (and thereby brake increases in premiums) while 
also protecting the GSHISs from the distortions and cost-escalation that 
could result from maintenance of the status quo.
To get providers to espouse and follow appropriate quality norms 
would be another focus of the coordinated regulatory action. This can be 
achieved through voluntary health insurance plans and GSHISs adopting 
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the same quality standards and benchmarks. Transparency and fairness in 
dealings with providers and patients are other virtues that both GSHISs 
and the insurance regulator would expect from the insurance industry, 
and thereby working together in prescribing, monitoring, and enforcing 
these expectations. 
Finally, competition among insurers (for GSHIS contracts) has been an 
important element of the GSHIS model. Insurers should neither benefit 
from nontransparent tendering processes that undermine fair competi-
tion nor should they be allowed to continuously undercut each other to 
chase top-line growth. This behavior would jeopardize sustainability of 
the industry. Coordination of regulatory mechanisms to ensure healthy 
competition between insurers is also important to ensure fair, economical, 
and sustainable premium pricing for the insurers’ services. 
Estimating the Costs of the Proposed Schemes 
Government spending on health insurance represents a small but growing 
proportion of total government health expenditures, as discussed in chap-
ter 3. The quantum of public spending on health has itself increased sig-
nificantly in recent years. In part as a result of NRHM, nominal GOI 
(including transfers to states) and states’ annual spending (from own 
resources) on health increased by more than 23 percent and 17 percent, 
respectively, between 2005–06 and 2008–09 (16 and 10 percent, respec-
tively in real terms).29
Against this backdrop, the estimated fiscal implications of these rec-
ommendations are presented in table 5.2. The estimated incremental 
costs of the proposed schemes are the costs that would involve additional 
financing required beyond that already projected to be incurred by the 
GOI and state governments in 2015 based on current trends of expendi-
ture growth.30 This additional expenditure on the redesigned GSHISs 
would be in lieu of (and not in addition to) the likely expenditure on the 
new generation GSHISs (RSBY and the new state schemes) in the same 
year (2015) if they continued to be implemented as such (table 3.6, this 
volume).
Assuming the introduction of the recommended packages throughout 
India by 2015, including the benefits to be introduced at states’ volition 
and the performance-based incentive for primary care is set at Rs. 500 per 
family per year (table 5.2, Scenario 1), the total incremental cost is esti-
mated at Rs. 38,400 crores, accounting for an additional 22 percent of 
projected total government health expenditure in that same year.31 This 
amount would represent a little less than 0.4 percent of the country’s 
Table 5.2 India: Estimated Incremental Costs of Recommended Schemes, 2015 
Source of 
financing Scheme/package
Unit cost per 
 family per year 
(Rs.) Scenario
Number 
of families 
(million)
Scenario 1
500 capitation
(Rs. crores)
Scenario 2
1,000 capitation  
(Rs crores)
Central Standard package (secondary and 
 maternity coverage)—BPL
1,000a n.a. 60 6,000 6,000
PHC performance-based primary care 
scheme—BPLb
500
1,000
(1)
(2)
 60 3,000 6,000
Central government total, all 
components 9,000 12,000
State Tertiary care top-off scheme—BPL 900c n.a. 60 5,400 5,400
Standard package (secondary and 
 maternity coverage) for vulnerable 
nonpoord
600e n.a. 120 7,200 7,200
PHC performance-based primary care 
scheme—vulnerable nonpoor
500 
1,000 
(1)
(2)
120 6,000 12,000
Tertiary care scheme: vulnerable 
 nonpoor
900 n.a. 120 10,800 10,800
 State governments total costs, all
 components
60 (BPL) + 
120 
 (vulnerable 
nonpoor)
29,400 35,400
Total Estimated annual costs. all components for BPL and vulnera-
ble nonpoor (77 percent of population)
180 38,400 47,400
Sources: Authors’ elaboration.
Notes: n.a. = not applicable. 
All figures in nominal terms, estimates for calendar year 2015. Rs. 1 crore = Rs. 10 million = about US$220,000 at exchange rates in 2010.
a. The price of the secondary and maternity package is estimated at Rs. 500 per family per year at 2010–11 prices with annual growth of 15 percent in nominal terms. 
b. These denote additional costs for the performance-based scheme. The primary care package assumes ongoing supply-side financing of services. In Scenario 1, the performance-based 
primary care package is priced at Rs. 500 per family; in Scenario 2 at Rs. 1,000 per family.
c. The price of the tertiary package is estimated at Rs. 450 per family per year at 2010–11 prices and annual growth of 15 percent in nominal terms.
d. Assumes a 40 percent copayment at point of service.
e. The cost of the secondary and maternity scheme for the vulnerable, nonpoor is estimated at 60 percent of the costs of the BPL package, with a 40 percent copay at point of service. This 
 reduces the costs proportionately (in practice, the cost reduction for the scheme may be higher than 40 percent due to changes in utilization).
The recommendations for CGHS/ESIS and private health insurance components do not require any additional public subsidies and so have not been included above.
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projected GDP in 2015. It is not unduly large relative to the above-
mentioned recent trends of growth in public health expenditure, and is 
well within the stated commitment of the GOI to raise the share of pub-
lic health spending to between 1 percent and 2 percent of GDP.
The share of the additional cost for the GOI is about Rs. 9,000 crores, 
while the state portion is Rs. 29,400 crores, which would represent an 
increase by 10 and 33 percent above the base GOI and state health 
spending, respectively, projected for 2015. Given that nominal GOI 
spending increased by 23 percent annually between 2005–06 and 2008–
0932 (about 16 percent per annum in real 2004–05 prices), these schemes 
are considered affordable to GOI. However, the situation may be differ-
ent for some states, as discussed in box 5.4. Although nominal state health 
expenditure grew by 17 percent between 2005–06 and 2008–09, this rate 
of increase may be insufficient to cover all the optional components for 
some states. Converting a share of incremental supply-side subsidies to 
the demand-side is another, albeit complementary, financing option. 
If a higher investment in ambulatory care is possible, and the public 
policy intention is to move away from fixed supply-side budgets and 
toward performance-based funding of public facilities, the amount of the 
PHC incentive could be set higher. In table 5.2, Scenario 2 assumes that 
this incentive will be Rs. 1,000 per family per year. This raises spending by 
Rs. 9,000 crores (about $2 billion), shared between the center (Rs. 3,000 
crores) and the states (Rs. 6,000 crores). The total expenditure for 
Scenario 2 would still be less than 0.5 percent of India’s GDP in 2015.
These, of course, are preliminary estimates, and the costs hinge on 
multiple factors. For instance, the center may choose to provide higher 
subsidies to states that do not have the fiscal space to take on the volun-
tary components with their own resources. Some states may have the will 
as well as the fiscal resources to reduce the copayment component for the 
vulnerable population. Nevertheless, these numbers do broadly indicate 
the range of incremental costs associated with the recommended options 
and the fiscal feasibility of undertaking these initiatives.
Research Agenda
As noted throughout this book, definitive statements cannot be made 
regarding the effects of most GSHISs for lack of impact evaluations. Of 
particular importance would be to measure the schemes’ impact on 
access, use, financial protection, and health improvement.33 Other issues 
related to potential ill-effects such as overuse, unnecessary use, increased 
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Box 5.4
Does India Have Fiscal Room to Finance Coverage 
Extension by 2015?
The proposed extension of population and benefit coverage (see table 5.1) will cost 
the government an estimated additional 0.4 to 0.5 percent of GDP by 2015. At least 
a quarter of this additional financing will originate from the central government; 
the remainder, from the states (see table 5.2). Are India’s macro-fiscal conditions 
conducive to increasing public financing for health to attain universal coverage?
India’s macroeconomic fundamentals are generally strong. With 10.4 percent 
growth in GDP in 2010, India was one of the world’s fastest growing economies, and 
annual GDP growth rates are projected at around 8 percent in 2011–16 (IMF 2011). 
At the same time, the government has committed to undertake fiscal consolidation 
efforts that are expected to cut the general government deficit by almost half—and 
the debt-to-GDP ratio to almost 60 percent—over the next five years (graph a). In 
such an environment, expanding public spending on health might be expected to 
be challenging unless revenues increase significantly more than projected or the 
government chooses to reprioritize health (e.g., by reducing expenditure on subsi-
dies), or both. The federal government has announced that the 12th Five Year Plan 
(2012–17) will focus on health, and the government is expected to significantly 
increase public spending on health. a
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b. Government Health Expenditure, Trends and Income Elasticity, 1990–2009
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Given India’s federal structure, with health being largely a “state subject” and 
state spending averaging about 75 percent of general (i.e., central and state com-
bined), public spending on health over the past two decades, analysis of recent 
trends in the center-state shares of public spending on health can be informative 
from the perspective of fiscal space. General government health spending in 
India averaged about 0.96 percent of GDP in 1990–2009 (this is low by global 
standards, even after controlling for income). India’s case is anomalous in that, 
despite decades of strong economic growth and rising revenues, general govern-
ment health spending has remained fairly static. 
Since 1990, central health spending has steadily increased as a share of GDP, 
but this has been offset by declining state allocations to health for most of 1990–
2009 (as shown in graph b). The decline in state-level allocations to health can 
be traced back to the fiscal crisis that beset the states in the 1990s. The upward 
trend in state health spending began only around 2008. This responds in part to 
GOI-mandated state contributions to NRHM, and to a lesser extent, state contri-
butions to RSBY and their own schemes. This upward trend should persist, par-
ticularly if the GOI continues to mandate matching health funds from states. 
Using data from 1990–2009, the estimated elasticity of general nominal gov-
ernment health spending to GDP in India was about 0.96.b This is low when 
Box 5.4 (continued)
(continued next page)
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 compared to other low- and lower-middle income countries in which the average 
elasticity is usually in the vicinity of 1.15. This below average elasticity is driven by 
a generally slower rate of state health spending growth relative to GDP growth. 
The elasticity of aggregate state health spending to growth is only about 0.87, 
whereas the elasticity of central health spending to GDP is commensurate with 
the average for low- and lower-middle income countries (graph b). 
Numerous factors suggest that, barring major policy reversals or unforeseen 
economic downturns, the central government’s financing share for resourcing uni-
versal coverage ought to be attainable in the short to medium term. These positive 
factors include past secular trends, two decades of robust economic growth, strong 
growth projections, a high elasticity of central health spending relative to GDP, and 
credible commitments by the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance ever since 
coming to power in 2004 to increasing financing of social protection policies.c 
Procuring the necessary public financing for universal coverage at the state level, 
however, is likely to be more of a challenge in India. As mentioned, past growth rates 
and income responsiveness of aggregate state health spending have been signifi-
cantly lower than those of the central government. At current projections, securing 
the requisite financing for universal coverage would require aggregate state health 
outlays to increase by an estimated 20 to 25 percent per year in nominal terms. An 
increase in outlays of such a magnitude would require a major reprioritization of the 
health sector at the state level or substantial improvements in the efficiency of cur-
rent health spending for many of the states. States such as Uttarakhand have sig-
nificantly increased health spending in recent years and may have an easier time 
financing universal coverage, but Rajasthan and other states may be constrained in 
their ability to do so. Alternatively, the GOI may have to contribute additional funds 
(beyond the proposed central-financial packages in table 5.2) to the proposed state-
financed packages for states unable to generate sufficient funds. Given India’s polit-
ical economy and complex decentralized public health financing structure, a 
detailed, state-by-state assessment would need to be conducted to better analyze 
and outline possible options for financing universal coverage. This would include 
possible additional support from the center for states facing fiscal constraints. 
Source: This box was prepared by Ajay Tandon, drawing upon Berman, Ahuja, and Bhandari (2010), and 
Tandon et al. (2010). 
a. Thaindian News, August 14, 2011, www.Thaindian.com/newsportal/business9 (accessed September 
12, 2011).
b. Elasticity refers to the percent change in health spending for a given percent change in GDP.
c. Another example of the central government’s fiscal capacity is evident from India’s recently announced 
plans to provide $11 billion in official development assistance to other developing countries over the next 
five years.
Box 5.4 (continued)
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OOP spending, inequities in coverage and use, and potential substitution 
of low-cost care for high-cost care are also important areas of research. 
Contrarily, there may be positive spillover effects in terms of better tar-
geting of public subsidies, expanding supply in distant locations, promot-
ing greater continuity of care, and improving the performance of both 
public and private providers. Addressing these issues would require sound 
methodological designs based on household surveys comparing insured 
and uninsured populations (including specific subgroups within each 
such as women, children, the very poor, scheduled castes, and tribes) and 
on provider surveys matching empaneled and nonempaneled providers. 
Most of the new wave of GSHISs contain a common set of institutional 
and design features. Little is known about their overall effectiveness, or 
similarly, the robustness of their implementation. Analyzing these features 
and the incentives they generate for major stakeholders—government, 
insurers, providers, and beneficiaries—will provide important inputs for 
future in-flight adjustments. In this light, the following set of “operational” 
research issues emerges from design elements and implementation pro-
cesses of the GSHISs described in the case studies (appendix A). 
Governance, Regulation, and Institutional Arrangements 
Governance arrangements and purchasing functions of most schemes are 
far from developed. Within the Indian context, research is needed on a 
viable institutional and regulatory model for supporting and overseeing the 
GSHISs. The appropriate institutional structure for the governing agency, 
and the specific skill sets the agency needs to carry out its functions effec-
tively, needs to be determined. In the context of these schemes, new regu-
latory challenges and complexities are emerging. To what extent can 
regulation of private health insurance influence the nature of the insurance 
product, the implementation of the scheme, the claim-management sys-
tem, and the quality of services? What is the interface between the regula-
tor and the governing agencies operating the schemes? What are areas of 
synergy, overlap, conflict, and co-ordination in these regulatory and gover-
nance arrangements and how do they interplay with each other? 
Memoranda of Understanding between purchaser and insurer and 
between insurer and provider are poorly constructed. Even where insurer-
provider contracts provide for certain controls, their implementation is 
lackluster for want of schemes’ institutional structures to ensure adequate 
monitoring and supervision of these aspects. Poor purchasing may under-
mine schemes’ potential to meet stated objectives. Another area of 
inquiry involves assessing the effectiveness of insurance companies as 
administrative intermediaries for GSHIS oversight and management. 
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What is the evidence regarding their control of leakages and moral haz-
ard? How do administrative arrangements of schemes involving TPAs 
differ in performance from those where risk is transferred to an insurance 
company? How can feedback from beneficiaries be tapped to improve 
scheme operations? To what extent do beneficiaries have information 
regarding benefits and any OOP payments they may incur? How does 
possessing such information affect utilization patterns?
Cost Containment 
The new generation of schemes features a common set of design elements 
that in principle can contain costs: preauthorization procedures, annual caps, 
and package rates. Whether these elements are effective cost-containment 
mechanisms is unknown. Further, insurers may have few incentives to make 
long-term investments in containing costs, because they can reprice their 
contracts on annual renewal, raising premiums to cover escalating costs. 
Does a shift from insurance companies to TPAs reduce costs or, alterna-
tively, does it expand the scope for cost escalation (because not even the 
risk of short-term impact on the bottom line exists in case of TPAs)? Are 
providers “maxing out” the annual caps by inducing utilization and unnec-
essary care? The underlying provider incentives of many GSHISs may result 
in induced demand for hospital care resulting in overtreatment, unneces-
sary care, and ineffective treatment. Preauthorization and information sys-
tems may not be sufficiently robust to capture these distortions. Finally, 
research is needed on the composition and costing of the package rates used 
by nearly all schemes. To what extent are these rates aligned with costs 
across different markets, territories, and providers? Does provider competi-
tion for volume lead them to seek affiliation with GSHISs and accept the 
mandated rates? Are providers combining different services to maximize 
earnings? Do rates favor one kind of provider over another? What payment 
systems could be an alternative to package rates in the Indian context?
Ambulatory Care Coverage 
As currently designed, most GSHIS schemes do not provide sufficient 
coverage for the major cause of health-induced poverty, particularly among 
the poor: ambulatory care and drug expenditures. A case can be made that 
these schemes tackle only part of the problem (inpatient care) without 
tackling other parts (ambulatory care, including drugs and prevention). 
Confirming this hypothesis is an important area of research. A related area 
would be to examine the set of specific (and often repeated) ambulatory 
expenses leading to impoverishment, the most feasible way to deliver these 
services, and managerial controls to prevent unaffordable cost escalation.
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Financial Protection and Provider Behaviors 
GSHISs may lower OOP spending for covered procedures at point of 
service but whether the schemes affect total OOP spending is unknown, 
considering that the total amount spent in all these schemes is a small 
fraction of the overall health care expenditure. Increased access and use 
of health facilities may induce utilization of uncovered services, resulting 
in additional OOP spending. In some cases, low annual caps may cut off 
patient benefits and reduce financial protection against catastrophic 
expenditures. Without proper oversight, providers may balance bill or 
shift demand from low-margin covered services to higher-earning uncov-
ered services, raising overall OOP spending. Finally, since there is little 
coverage for postinpatient care, do surgical procedures induce greater 
OOP spending, or, conversely, if households cannot pay for follow-up 
treatment, what is the impact on health outcomes?
Quality of Care 
Introducing quality consciousness and inducing quality improvement 
among providers need to be placed on the policy agenda of all schemes. 
Little is known about the effectiveness of the current hospital empanel-
ment processes in terms of differentiating between high- and low-quality 
facilities. How can empanelment be improved to guarantee minimal 
safety standards? GSHISs have yet to use their financial leverage to 
address quality. What quality and patient safety data can be feasibly col-
lected by all schemes and used to drive quality improvements? Which 
pay-for-quality arrangements are feasible in the current context? 
Links between GSHISs and Public Delivery
How GSHISs are linked with the public delivery system will be a deter-
mining factor for their political viability. An important issue is the basis for 
competition of public and private providers. Is there a market niche for 
public hospitals vis-à-vis their private counterparts? If so, for which types 
of services and in which locations? Under what organizational and mana-
gerial conditions could public providers compete with private providers?
Hospitals
There is a paucity of reliable information and data in India on the number 
of hospitals and beds, their capacity in terms of staff and equipment, and 
their performance in terms of production, utilization, efficiency, diagno-
ses, costs, quality, and outcomes. Anecdotal evidence and information 
from micro studies suggest that most hospitals are run inefficiently, collect 
data irregularly, and pay little attention to basic measures of quality such 
as control of infections, adverse events, and patient safety. Even less 
Pragmatic Pathways to Universal Coverage       195
information exists on spending and types of governance arrangements and 
management structures in both public and private facilities that can con-
tribute to performance. India needs to support a facility survey to secure 
basic structural, process, governance, and management characteristics of a 
large sample of public and private hospitals. The survey should also aim 
to obtain information on production, patient safety, quality, and efficiency. 
The results can be used by health authorities, GSPHIs and private insurers 
to design interventions to improve hospital performance.
Annex 5A Summary of Proposed Expansion of Services
Table 5A.1  Indicative List of Services Covered in the Proposed Packages
Component of proposed 
coverage Services included under the component
Ambulatory benefits 
package (BPL)
Through its linkages to the existing primary care system, the 
package can be used to incentivize, monitor, and facilitate the 
delivery of most primary care services, including but not limited 
to the following:
Public health services
• Antenatal care
• Postpartum care
• Well-baby care
• Family planning services
•  Nutrition counseling and interventions (including iron 
deficiency anemia in women and girls)
• Cancer detection: Cervical and breast screening
•  Directly Observed Treatment Strategy (DOTS), treatment for 
tuberculosis 
• Testing for human immunodeficiency virus 
 
Ambulatory health services
• Consultation and clinical examination
• Basic laboratory testing 
•  Assured availability of quality-tested essential drugs in generic 
form
•  Acute care including acute respiratory infection and diarrhea 
management
•  Treatment for minor injuries, snake bites, common ailments, skin 
diseases, minor wounds, and fractures
•  Chronic disease management including diabetes and 
hypertension
Linkages to hospitalization services
• Gatekeeper role and referral for hospitalization as necessary
•  Follow-up care with drugs and diagnostic services postdischarge
(continued next page)
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Standard benefits 
package for secondary 
and maternity care 
(BPL)
Similar to current RSBY benefits package, this component will cov-
er all common forms of hospitalization, through secondary and 
maternity packages. The most common procedures delivered 
under these services include normal labor, caesarean section, 
cataract surgery, hysterectomy, appendectomy, dilatation and 
curettage, treatment for hydrocele, treatment for cystocele, and 
hernia. 
Top-off tertiary 
package (BPL)
Similar to the benefits package for state schemes such as Rajiv 
Aarogyasri (AP) and Kalaignara scheme (TN), this component 
comprises coverage for high-cost procedures for tertiary care. 
The specialties covered include cardiovascular system, neurology, 
renal, gastrointestinal, oncological, and polytrauma cases.
Point-of-service package 
for the vulnerable poor
This package will contain some combination of the services cov-
ered in the above three packages. The exact composition will 
vary by state and depend on state fiscal capacity.
a. In 2011–12, the scheme was modified to include additional procedures and relaunched as the Chief Minister’s 
Comprehensive Health Insurance Scheme, and the executing agency serving the scheme also changed. The 
maximum coverage was also changed from Rs. 100,000 floating over four years to Rs 100,000 per year. Hereafter, 
this write-up reflects the scheme details that existed when this study was undertaken, in 2010–11.
Notes
 1. These include: integration of public and private delivery, creation of a univer-
sal health care fund, increasing the numbers, diversity, and distribution of 
human health resources, promotion of evidence-based health care practices 
and rational use of drugs and technology, and creation of decentralized gover-
nance structures and social accountability arrangements (Reddy et al. 2011).
 2. These recommendations draw on the goals set by the Lancet Group as well 
as other observers of the Indian health landscape (Jha and Laxminarayan 
2009; NCMH 2005). These include: “Ensure the reach and quality of health 
services;” “reduce the financial burden of health care;” and “empower people 
to take care of the health and hold the health care system accountable” 
(Reddy et al. 2011: 104).
 3. Between 2005–06 and 2008–09 central health allocations for public delivery 
increased by 23 percent annually in nominal terms (Berman, Ahuya, and 
Bhandari 2010).
 4. Expanding social insurance coverage based on formal sector growth has not 
been a robust strategy to reach universal coverage and tends to lead to greater 
segmentation (Londoño and Frenk 1997; Baeza and Packard 2006)
Table 5A.1  (continued)
Component of proposed 
coverage Services included under the component
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 5. The GOI-financed packages as well as the state-financed “top-off” package are 
fully subsidized and directed to BPL populations. The “contributory” benefits 
package is partially subsidized by the state and targets the vulnerable nonpoor.
 6. Except for CGHS and ESIS, at least initially.
 7. The shortcomings of state purchasing arrangements for contracting health 
and hospital services from private providers in India have been documented 
by Raman and Bjorkman (2009). These arrangements tend to lack standard-
ized processes for bidding, monitoring, contract enforcement, grievance, and 
redressal. 
 8. As discussed in the next section, the common package would be linked to 
some primary care coverage which would address high out-of-pocket spend-
ing for ambulatory care by the poor.
 9. As described in chapter 4, addressing the flaws in the current BPL lists is 
beyond the scope of the GSHISs. GOI is preparing a new methodology to 
improve mean testing (Government of India 2009). A BPL census is already 
underway (in 2011–12) which will provide the data for the new methodol-
ogy. The recently initiated project on assigning Unique National IDs will also 
provide a strong basis for improvements in targeting of public programs (see: 
www.uidai.gov.in). For an in depth review of options for improving targeting, 
see World Bank 2011.
 10. Transfers can be adjusted for local costs. They could also contain an add-on 
subsidy element for weaker states to support their institutional strengthening 
for governance and monitoring of the scheme. Institutional arrangements are 
discussed later in this chapter.
 11. To a certain extent this is already happening in the top-up scheme of 
Himachal Pradesh (HP).
 12. Under RSBY, the GOI finances 75 percent of the cost and the states the 
remainder (for some states, the GOI share is as high as 90 percent). 
 13. If state resources permit, it may be best to add some benefits to the standard 
set, rather than substitute coverage from the common standard package. 
Substitution may create difficulties in the national portability of the common 
package, requiring technological and operational fixes to ensure portability. 
 14. Demand for ambulatory coverage is probably high among current GSHIS 
beneficiaries, and this may manifest itself in political pressure to rapidly (and 
perhaps carelessly) roll out the ambulatory benefits. In a recent survey of 
1,733 eligible Aarogyasri beneficiaries in the Prakasam Region of Andhra 
Pradesh (AP), more than three fourths stated their interest in ambulatory 
cover (Reddy 2011). The main reason for such coverage was to provide cash-
less access to private clinics for consultations, drugs, and diagnostics.
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 15. On the rapid emergence of chronic diseases in India, see Engelgau et al. 2011.
 16. Although the two traditional social health insurance (SHI) schemes (ESIS 
and CGHS) already cover inpatient and outpatient care, research is required 
to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of their integrated service 
models.
 17. For example, the total cost of a follow-up regime, including daily low-dose 
aspirin, quarterly tests for activated partial thromboplastin time (an indicator 
of the coagulation pathways that helps monitor the anti-coagulation level 
achieved) and half-yearly heparin injections (required after a heart valve sur-
gery) would cost between $20 and $30 per year, at current prices for high 
volume procurements. Compared with the cost of the hospitalization itself, 
the annual cost of follow up is small for the insurance scheme (but it would 
not be small for a poor family which gets no bulk-purchase discounts). In 
contrast, follow-up treatment for secondary procedures is usually for shorter 
periods, although some endocrinal gland surgeries and neurosurgical proce-
dures may require longer-term follow up. As an illustration, the cost of sup-
plementing thyroxin after surgery on the thyroid gland may cost only a 
couple of dollars per year if procured in bulk but could be critical for favor-
able health outcomes.
 18. NRHM is piloting such a system. 
 19. The performance audit of NRHM 2008–09 found that none of the centers 
checked in nine states had the requisite two-month stocks of essential drugs 
and vaccines (CAG 2009).
 20. This can be achieved by placing an electronic order with the state bulk pro-
curement agency or any other government entity undertaking this role such 
as the TNMSC. The TNMSC is a bulk drug procurement and logistics agency 
serving the health department of the government of Tamil Nadu state. For 
more details of the TNMSC model, see www.tnmsc.com.
 21. Setting rates for individual episodes of ambulatory care (e.g., an outpatient 
visit) is not recommended because it may lead to moral hazard and cost esca-
lation. Paying for individual episodes of outpatient care is essentially a fee-for-
service payment system and may trigger provider induced demand, 
overutilization, leakages, and consequent cost escalation, which India can ill 
afford.
 22. Nonmonetary incentives could include opportunities for post-graduate edu-
cation, promotions, training programs, and special recognitions and rewards.
 23. Assessments of service delivery by public private partnerships (PPPs), 
launched by a number of Indian states, found that many PPPs are informal 
arrangements in which: (1) few bidding and contracting processes are stan-
dardized in practice; (2) selection is often based on nontransparent sole sourc-
ing; (3) resource allocation is often unstructured, irregular, and also lacks 
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transparency; (4) most lack binding contractual instruments that specify roles, 
responsibilities, performance, reporting requirements, and enforcement 
mechanisms; and (5) failure to establish contract management and monitor-
ing units to oversee providers’ performance assessments (Raman and 
Bjorkman 2009, 2006; KPMG 2008; Radwan 2005; Futures Group 2006).
 24. Several states already classify this “vulnerable” population as poor, but poverty 
data suggest that they do have some capacity to pay for care (NCEUS 2009). 
 25. International experience suggests that the administrative costs and the com-
plexity of implementing the collection of contributions from the informal 
sector would be prohibitively high (Baeza and Packard 2006). Further, people 
will probably enroll and disenroll according to their perceived health needs as 
appears to be the case in Yeshasvini. Adverse selection under the proposed 
cost sharing arrangement, however, will remain problematic, but probably less 
so than for a scheme that requires upfront, annual contributions.
 26. Institutional and political impediments would inhibit merger or close linkage 
of these schemes with the proposed schemes for BPL and vulnerable nonpoor, 
at least in the near term.
 27. For commercial insurers, pricing per member in corporate group plans and 
voluntary retail plans is significantly higher (and generally more lucrative) 
than the high-volume, low-price segment of GSHISs.
 28. On the complex political economy of regulating private insurers, see Baeza 
and Packard (2006).
 29. Public health spending data are based on Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare estimates (MOHFW 2009). Health insurance data are drawn from 
table 3.6 in this volume.
 30. To estimate the costs of the standard package and the tertiary top-off cover-
age, the authors used the existing premium structure of RSBY (about Rs. 500 
per family in 2010) and the state tertiary schemes (about Rs. 450 per family 
in 2010). For these calculations, the overall caps for the secondary scheme 
were maintained at Rs. 30,000 and for the tertiary scheme at Rs. 150,000. 
Factored into the calculations was a one-time, conservative 20 percent revi-
sion in package rates (and consequently, in the average claim costs). The 
projected costs for 2015 follow the utilization assumptions mentioned in 
annex 3C. An additional 30 percent buffer is incorporated to avoid underes-
timating the likely costs of such a scheme due to higher than expected 
increases in medical costs. There is no index of change in premium in exis-
tence, but, data on past trends for Mediclaim, the largest-selling health insur-
ance product, indicate that premium revisions took place every 3 to 5 years. 
For the most recent revision, in 2007, the premium increase amounted to 
between 10 and 15 percent a year. The estimates using the methodology 
above amount to an annual 15 percent escalation of premium. Finally, in this 
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estimation, the primary care scheme is set at two levels of Rs. 500 and Rs. 
1,000 per family in Scenario 1 and 2, respectively. It is also assumed that 
states will provide a 60 percent subsidy (and thus require a 40 percent 
copayment) to the contributory point-of-service scheme for the vulnerable 
nonpoor. 
 31. This was discussed in chapter 3 in which, with the current growth trends, 
public expenditure was estimated at a total of Rs. 175,000 crores by 2015. It 
is assumed here that, while the same growth in public health expenditure will 
continue, some of this growth will be directed toward GSHISs. Thus, the total 
government expenditure in 2015 may not need to increase much beyond the 
current estimates, even after accounting for the incremental costs of these 
recommendations. The actual additionality may be lower for two reasons. 
First, states may exclude certain components or insist on higher copayments 
for the contributory, point-of-service schemes for the vulnerable nonpoor. 
Second, some portion of supply-side financing may be converted to demand-
side health insurance.
 32. The GOI budget presented for 2011–12 maintains a similar rate of increase 
in budgetary allocation for the health sector. 
 33. Impact evaluations are planned for R. Aarogyasri in AP and V. Arogyashri 
in KT.
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A P P E N D I X  A
Employees’ State Insurance Scheme
Table A.1 ESIS Summary Matrix
Indicators/name of scheme Employees’ State Insurance Scheme (ESIS)
Launch year 1952
Geographical area PAN India in notified areas (with higher employer 
concentration)
Target/eligible population All employees from any firm having more than 
10 employees and earning up to Rs. 15,000 per month. 
Dependents are also covered.
Number of beneficiaries 55.4 million
Unit of enrolment Family
Benefits package Comprehensive coverage includes health related expenses 
for preventive, primary, secondary, and tertiary care, plus 
cash benefits for loss of wages due to sickness, maternity, 
permanent disablement of self and dependents, funeral 
expenses, and rehabilitation allowance.
Maximum insurance coverage There is no limit on the maximum care which can be 
availed.
Hospital empanelment criteria As per Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) criteria 
(appendix B)
No. of empaneled hospitals 
(government and private)
148 ESIS hospitals plus about 400 networked private 
hospitals
(continued next page)
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Sources of funds Contribution (from employers and employees) and interest 
income. States bear one-eighth of medical care costs 
through direct subsidies.
Total expenditure (million Rs.), 
2009–10
Rs. 1,990 croresa /Rs. 19,900 million (about US$440 millionb)
Premium price, 2009–10 Employees contribute 1.75 percent of wages; employers, 
4.75 percent. 
Provider payment 
mechanism
Budgets for own hospitals, salaries for physicians and staff 
in dispensaries and hospitals, package rates to private 
empaneled hospitals in case of tertiary/specialty 
treatment.
Information technology (IT) 
tools used
Largely manual. But project “Panchdeep” is underway for 
comprehensive management information system (MIS) 
tools, digital identity card (Pehchan card). All the branches, 
hospitals will be connected.
Number of hospitalizations 
per year
417,498, in 2009–10
Utilization rate  0.75 percent per member per year (for hospitalization)
Most common procedures —
Governing agency and legal 
status
ESIC (Employees’ State Insurance Corporation)—
autonomous corporation under the Employees State 
Insurance Act, chaired by union minister, Ministry of 
Labour and Employment
Executing agency ESIC + State ESIS Departments
Number of full-time staff, 
including contract personnel, 
in implementing agency
13,585 (includes hospital and dispensary staff )
Administrative costs as 
percent of total spending
9.27 percent, 2008–09
Cost-containment measures Health care provided through its own integrated network, 
contracted private practitioners, package rates for tertiary 
care and outsourced diagnostics, rate contracts for 
procurement of drugs and other consumables
Note: — = not available.
a. In the Indian numeric system, 1 crore = 10 million. 
b. US$1 = Rs. 45 approximately (2010).
Table A.1 (continued)
Indicators/name of scheme Employees’ State Insurance Scheme (ESIS)
Introduction
Introduced by an act of parliament in 1948, the Employees’ State Insurance 
(ESI) Scheme is the oldest health insurance scheme in India. The 
Employees State Insurance (ESI) Act is akin to the social security legisla-
tion of Europe and Latin America. It protects employees in the formal 
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private sector earning up to Rs. 15,000 per month against medical costs of 
sickness, maternity care, and occupational injury, and also compensates 
them for loss of wages or earning capacity due to such events. The benefits 
of this scheme are also available to the employees’ immediate dependents. 
The scheme, originally introduced in Kanpur and Delhi, is now offered in 
most industrial pockets of the country. It is administered by the autono-
mous Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, under the chairmanship of 
the Union Minister, Ministry of Labour and Employment (MOLE).
Compared with other health insurance schemes in India, ESIS has 
been in a league of its own—in terms of its size (it had 33 million mem-
bers even in 2001, when the country’s total estimated coverage under 
health insurance was just about 55 million persons), comprehensiveness 
of health coverage (full spectrum of preventive, primary, secondary, and 
tertiary care, preexisting diseases included), no caps or limits on how 
much an individual or family may use, compensatory cash benefit pro-
grams for loss of wages during sickness, a disability program and finally, a 
maternity cash benefit program. Similar to social security schemes of 
Latin America, ESIS delivers an overwhelming share1 of integrated health 
services at facilities owned and operated by the scheme. In addition to the 
fact that contributions to ESIS are income rated, the scheme design fur-
ther addresses internal equity concerns by not allowing stratification of 
care among members. In other words, all beneficiaries are eligible for the 
same level of care and same “class” or category of rooms, regardless of how 
much they contribute to the scheme.
Institutional Framework
Created as an autonomous agency of the government of India (GOI), the 
ESI Corporation (ESIC) manages not just the insurance scheme but also 
the corporation-owned network of medical service providers as well as 
the arrangements for outsourced tertiary care to private hospitals. No 
commercial insurers or insurance intermediaries are involved in the 
scheme; risk management as well as implementation are entirely man-
aged by the corporation through ESIS departments of respective state 
governments. A recent amendment to the ESI Act supports conversion of 
state ESIS departments into corporations, similar to the structure at the 
central level. This measure will increase state units’ autonomy in decision 
making and operations. 
As depicted in figure A.1, the ESIC directly manages 22 “model” hos-
pitals2 (roughly one in each state with ESIS services) and all operations 
(including medical facilities) in the state of Delhi. In all other states, 
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Figure A.1 ESIS Institutional Framework 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Note: SSMC = state senior medical commissioner; SMC = state medical commissioner. 
Ministry of Labour
and Employment
(MOLE) 
Employees’ State
Insurance
Corporation (ESIC)
state ESIS
departments 
dispensaries hospitals
state director
for
administration 
ESIC regional
directorate
revenue
collection 
enrolment of
insured
persons
all non-medical
matters
model
hospitals 
SSMC/SMC
outsourced
specialty
treatment
all medical
care matters
Employees’ State Insurance Scheme       209
medical facilities are managed by the state ESIS department, and costs up 
to a specified cap are reimbursed to it by the ESIC. The ESIC also has 
regional offices in the states, headed by a regional director, who is primar-
ily responsible for enrolment, collection of contributions from employers, 
and disbursement of cash benefits. The state medical commissioners 
(SMCs) are responsible for medical care and for networking with private 
hospitals for outsourced specialty care. As of March 2009, ESIC had 
13,585 staff members on its rolls, including those who were directly pro-
viding medical services to the beneficiaries but excluding those working 
in the state ESIS directorates.
Beneficiaries 
ESIS is mandatory for all employers in notified areas with more than 
10 employees.3 All such employers are required to be registered with the 
ESIS (although establishments can be exempted, if alternate equivalent 
or superior coverage is provided). Employees with a monthly salary 
below Rs. 15,000 are required to join the scheme, and their contributions 
are transmitted by the employer through payroll deductions. Since ESIS 
is only available in notified areas with a higher concentration of employ-
ers and employees, an estimated 8 percent of otherwise eligible beneficia-
ries are outside the ESIS on account of their geographical location. With 
several rounds of increase in wage ceilings combined with population 
growth and, to a much lesser extent, growth of the formal sector employ-
ment, the ESIS member base has grown steadily (figure A.2), reaching 
55.4 million beneficiaries in 2009–10. 
By definition, the expansion of ESIS is dependent on the growth of the 
formal labor market, which accounts for between only 7 percent and 
8 percent of the labor force and has not moved much despite the eco-
nomic growth in recent years (NCEUS 2007). Approximately 300 million 
workers from the informal, “unorganized sector” are beyond its ambit. 
According to growth projections for the formal labor sector, it will take 
several decades—if not generations—to extend ESIS coverage to this 
unserved population.
Benefits Package 
ESIS provides comprehensive preventive, outpatient, and inpatient 
medical care as well as compensatory cash benefit programs to compen-
sate for loss of wages during sickness. Moreover, it offers a disability pro-
gram and a maternity cash benefit program, among others. It is the only 
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large scheme besides CGHS to cover ambulatory care. Preexisting condi-
tions are also covered. 
The ESIS benefits package is liberal. It does not charge its beneficiaries 
any user fees or require other forms of cost sharing such as sublimits, 
deductibles, and coinsurance. There is also no annual or lifetime ceiling 
on benefits. Nevertheless, upon using an outsourced service, the benefi-
ciary may have, in some cases, to pay the provider and subsequently seek 
reimbursement from ESIS. Thus, all costs (barring government contribu-
tion) indirectly come through an income-rated mechanism from the 
employee and the employer with no direct or out-of-pocket contribution 
from the beneficiaries when using the ESIS-operated health facilities.
The scheme does not usually conduct health or outreach camps for 
curative services. It does, however, engage in preventive health activities, 
for instance, its outreach on HIV prevention in collaboration with non-
government-organizations (NGOs). Certain occupational disease-
screening activities are periodically organized.
Provider Network
ESIS depends largely on its own inpatient and ambulatory facilities to 
deliver care. In some areas, contractual ambulatory care providers are 
Figure A.2 ESIS Beneficiaries, 1994–95 to 2009–10 (million)
Source: ESIS.
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being used until ESIS sets up its own dispensaries. Where the ambulatory 
care facility and hospital are far from each other, secondary care is out-
sourced to private hospitals. Most outsourcing of inpatient services to 
private hospitals is for tertiary care, and the pricing and empanelment 
criteria for these services are based on CGHS guidelines. 
The ESIS-owned and -operated hospital network is managed through 
two organizational arrangements: 121 hospitals (out of 148) are managed 
by state ESI departments and the remainder—including 22 model hospi-
tals (roughly one per state) and 5 hospitals in Delhi—are directly admin-
istered by the central ESI Corporation. While the centrally managed 
facilities seem to be relatively better-off in terms of infrastructure and 
equipment, the quality and efficiency of services provided in facilities 
under either arrangement are unknown. 
Ambulatory medical care under the scheme is provided through either 
ESI–operated dispensaries administered by full-time staff of the state 
government ESI departments, or a “panel” system consisting of contracted, 
part-time private medical practitioners (called insurance medical practi-
tioners, IMPs). Table A.2 shows the current status of provision of medical 
services in the 1,400-odd medical dispensaries under the scheme. The 
scheme has more than 7,000 doctors on its rolls. The remainder, 1,700-
odd medical practitioners are outsourced by the scheme. Despite a small 
decrease in the medical facilities (captive and outsourced) at ESIS during 
2008–09, ESIS possesses the second largest health care network in the 
country, exceeded only by the publicly owned health care system.
The ESI Corporation has set up five Zonal Occupational Disease cen-
ters for early detection and diagnosis of occupation-related diseases for 
ESI beneficiaries. It also promotes the Indian System of Medicine (ISM) 
and had established 44 ISM units as of March 2009. 
Similar to the government delivery system, nearly all managerial 
 decision making regarding ESIS-owned hospitals is concentrated at the 
Table A.2 ESIS: Provision of Ambulatory Medical Services in ESIS Medical Facilities
Scheme status As of Mar 31, 2008 As of Mar 31, 2009
Number of ESI dispensaries + Indian systems 
of medicine units 1,397 1,398 + 44
Insurance medical officers (physicians 
employed by ESIS) 7,099 7,070
Insurance medical practitioners (contracted 
private providers) 1,753 1,678
Source: ESIS Annual Report 2008–09. 
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 central or state administrative office level. Facilities possess limited 
autonomy with respect to budgetary processes, procurement, and human 
resource management, which could result in diffuse accountability and 
suboptimal performance. International experience has shown that the 
performance lags for facilities under centralized, direct administration, 
particularly in terms of efficient use of resources. Whether this holds true 
for ESIS facilities is an important research question.
Since 2008 all super-specialty or tertiary care has been provided 
through its network of empaneled private hospitals contracted directly by 
the ESI Corporation. Hospital empanelment and claim processing are the 
responsibility of ESI state departments; empanelment criteria and the 
package rates mirror those of CGHS. About 400 private hospitals were 
empaneled with ESIS for super-specialty care as of March 2010. 
The scheme is intended to be cashless as patients do not incur any 
costs at ESI facilities. Outsourced private hospitals are also required to 
extend credit for services rendered to referred beneficiaries and directly 
bill ESIS, although in some cases, as mentioned, beneficiaries may have to 
pay first and seek reimbursement subsequently.4 
Financial Status and Sources of Funds
The ESI scheme is funded by employers and employees in the formal labor 
sector and by the state governments. Employers contribute 4.75 percent of 
the monthly wages of covered employees; employees contribute 1.75 per-
cent. Together, these contributions account for 80 percent of ESI revenues. 
Income from interest is the second largest contributor to ESI revenues. 
State governments contribute one eighth of the costs of medical care under 
the benefits package and all costs exceeding the prescribed aggregate limit 
at state level (currently Rs. 1,200 per insured person multiplied by the 
total number of insured persons in the state). This cap functions as a “stop 
loss” reinsurance for the ESIC, although the state government does end up 
footing the bill. While government subsidy may be questioned from an 
equity perspective considering that the beneficiaries are relatively better 
off segments of the population (i.e., formal sector employees, even if blue 
collared workers, are better off than the poorest in the population), it has 
been historically justified by the argument that the state’s fully subsidized 
facilities no longer bear the burden of this population segment. 
Huge surpluses have been generated by the scheme in recent years 
(table A.3) as higher-paid employees have gradually come under the 
 purview of the scheme. The scheme barely managed a nominal surplus 
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until the 1990s when the wage ceiling for the scheme was Rs. 3,000 a 
month. Subsequently, with the upward revision of the wage ceiling to Rs. 
7,500 in 2004, then Rs. 10,000 in 2006, and finally Rs. 15,000 in May 
2010, the recently enrolled higher-paying scheme members have contrib-
uted substantially to the increased revenues. However, expenditures have 
not kept pace. Between 2000–01 and 2008–09, revenues increased by 
183 percent while expenditures increased by only half as much, resulting 
in a nearly fivefold increase in the surplus. Figure A.3 reflects this rapid 
growth in revenues and the relatively slow pace of growth in the two 
main areas of expenditure, medical care and cash benefits. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the lag in spending may be due to low utilization 
by the new, higher-income beneficiaries. 
The total invested funds of ESIS, as of March 2009, amounted to 
Rs. 195.8 billion (Rs. 19,583 crores), of which Rs. 62.2 billion (Rs. 6,225 
crores) were earmarked reserve funds and Rs. 133.6 billion (Rs. 13,358 
crores) were the ESI general and contingency reserve funds. ESIS lacks a 
specific investment department and unlike commercial insurers where 
investments play a major role in the bottom line, all the surplus funds of 
ESIS are kept as term deposits in nationalized banks or as special deposits 
with the GOI. 
Expenditures and Costs
Per capita expenditure on medical care by the scheme during the 2000s 
shows a flat trend during this period, especially if the steep rise in 2009–
10 is omitted. Table A.4 displays total and per capita expenditures on 
medical care benefits between 2001–02 and 2009–10. Between 2001–02 
and 2008–09, coverage and total expenditures increased by 62 and 78 
percent respectively, over a period of seven years. However, while cover-
age grew by only 10 percent, the expenditure in 2009–10 was 58 percent 
higher than the previous year. The flat trend in per capita spending until 
2008–09 may be attributed to expenditure control or more likely decreas-
ing utilization by beneficiaries. Not shown in table A.4, in real terms per 
Table A.3 ESIS: Financial Position, 1960–61 to 2008–09 (Rs. million)
Item 1960–61 1970–71 1980–81 1990–91 2000–01 2005–06 2008–09
Total income 94.34 495.99 1,932.15 4,378.45 15,642.82 24,106.18 44,524.57
Total expenditure 69.78 447.4 1,880.59 3,145.12 10,825.81 12,789.62 20,688.30
Surplus revenue 24.56 48.59 51.56 1,233.33 4,817.01 11,316.56 23,836.27
Source: ESIS Annual reports, ESIC data.
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Figure A.3 ESIC: Revenue and Expenditure Trends, FY2000–2010
Source: ESIS Annual reports, ESIC data.
Note: The data in this figure represent spending by the ESI Corporation and do not include state government 
expenditures, which are included in table A.4.
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Table A.4 ESIS: Total Beneficiaries and Medical Care Expenditure, 2001–02 
to 2009–10
Year
Total beneficiaries 
(millions)
Total expenditure on 
medical care (Rs. million)
Per capita expenditure on 
medical care (ESIS) (Rs.)
2001–02 31.05 7,090 859
2002–03 30.37 7,270 919
2003–04 30.7 7,670 975
2004–05 32.97 8,060 982
2005–06 35.5 8,280 906
2006–07 39.41 9,130 899
2007–08 46.83 10,920 906
2008–09 50.2 12,600 974
2009–10 55.4 19,900 1,392
Source: ESIS Annual reports, various years.
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capita spending actually declined over most of the period displayed in the 
table. By way of comparison, for the same period per capita health expen-
diture in the country as a whole doubled (MOHFW 2009b). 
State data on per capita spending (not detailed in table A.3) suggest 
marked variation in costs. For example, in 2008–09, the all-India average 
per capita expenditure on medical care was Rs. 974, with Delhi recording 
the highest (Rs. 2,416) and Uttarakhand the lowest (Rs. 182). This huge 
gap may respond to easier access to more sophisticated care for beneficia-
ries residing in larger metropolitan areas (e.g., Delhi) as compared with 
distant regions (e.g., Uttarakhand). Also ESI facilities in large cities prob-
ably experience a higher cost per capita, partly due to the operating costs 
of large health infrastructure, or higher utilization due to improved 
access, or both. The wide variation in states could also be due to inequities 
in utilization or due to poor cost controls in some states and are an area 
for further research. 
The variation in per capita expenditure is not only prominent between 
states but also for different time periods in the same state. While the 
national average in terms of cost per insured person (including his family 
members) per year has been fairly static over the last decade (except for 
the steep increase in 2009–10), the trends in major ESIS states have been 
mixed. As shown in figure A.4, Delhi witnessed a significant 114 percent 
escalation in per capita costs in these eight years, from Rs. 1,137 per per-
son per year to Rs. 2,416 in 2008–09 while Andhra Pradesh (AP) dem-
onstrated an 86 percent increase from Rs. 990 to Rs. 1,844 in the same 
period. In contrast, costs actually declined by 21 percent from Rs. 1,214 
(2001–02) to Rs. 959 (2008–09) in Gujarat, although the state was the 
highest spender among major states at the beginning of the decade.
In what seems more than a coincidence, AP and Delhi also have the 
highest per capita expenditure on services outsourced to private super 
specialty hospitals. Data on this expenditure are available from ESIS only 
for 2009–10,5 and the costs were Rs. 480 and Rs. 338 per capita in Delhi 
and AP, respectively, as against Rs. 103 in Gujarat, and a national average 
of Rs. 140. The total expenditure on private super-specialty hospitals was 
Rs. 178 crores, 9 percent of the medical care expenditure of the scheme 
in 2009–10. The provisions of the ESI Act require administrative costs to 
not exceed 15 percent of the revenues. These are pegged by ESI at about 
9 percent on a healthy (and rapidly growing) revenue base.
The recently announced financial commitment for establishing ESIS 
medical colleges calls for closer review. The currently sanctioned capital 
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cost of each proposed ESIS medical college is Rs. 4 billion to Rs. 6 billion 
(Rs. 400 to Rs. 600 crores). While an investment of Rs. 50 billion (Rs. 
5,000 crores) for these medical colleges has already been approved by 
ESIC, the huge expenditure required for operational expenses is yet to be 
factored in. The strategic relevance of establishing these medical colleges 
to the stated objectives of ESIS and vis-à-vis the benefits to be reaped by 
ESIS in exchange for capital and upcoming operational costs needs to be 
carefully evaluated. 
Information Environment
Currently, all model hospitals and state units manually report to the cen-
tral ESI Corporation on various information parameters of the scheme. 
Figure A.4 ESIS: Per Capita Spending, Selected States, 2008–09
Source: ESIS data.
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The corporation also manually compiles statistics on beneficiaries and 
utilization for annual publication. The corporation is developing an IT 
system for generating regular, electronic reports to improve service deliv-
ery efficiency and analytical accuracy while flagging “exceptions.” This is 
also expected to make service delivery more user friendly for beneficia-
ries. The contracted systems integrator is responsible for design, hardware, 
networking, enterprise resource planning, and system maintenance once 
it is up and running. 
The IT system is expected to network all branch offices, dispensaries, 
and hospitals (40,000 nodes across more than 2,200 locations) with 
dedicated phone lines and computers, and link these to a central database 
for easy access to information. Video conferencing will support tele-
medicine and facilitate virtual meetings. All employers are expected to 
update eligible employee details every month, and this paperless system 
is expected to reduce delays and errors in collecting their contributions. 
Hitherto, ESIS members were assigned to their nearest dispensary as 
the first point of medical care and referral for any further care. With mod-
ernized “Pehchan” cards being issued across the scheme, beneficiaries will 
soon be able to obtain care at any point within the ESI network. 
Beneficiaries and their families will use the magnetic strip–based plastic 
Pehchan Cards to facilitate online identification across all network health 
facilities, making benefits portable across the country. Demographic and 
biometric information about members is collated at the backend.6 A major 
challenge facing ESIC is the lack of an electronic database of insured per-
sons and families. Manual record keeping is fraught with duplication and 
errors, for example due to temporary/migrant workers who, by definition, 
move from one employer to another. The implementation of the IT system 
will be able to weed out such duplication and errors to reflect a more 
accurate member base of the scheme (akin to the CGHS experience). 
Currently, even though most systems are still manual, the usual pro-
cessing time for claims from private hospitals is reportedly three to seven 
days. This, however, needs validation and may not be true of all centers. 
Claims and Utilization
Data from the scheme (figures A.5 and A.6) indicate that the utilization 
of ESIS facilities for both outpatient and inpatient care is low and 
declining. This has contributed to high unit costs of care which are often 
well beyond market rates for purchasing the same services. In view of 
this, expansion and investment plans of the scheme call for careful 
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Figure A.5 ESIS: Trends in New Outpatient Visits for Common Causes, 2000–01 to 
2008–09 (per 1,000 insured persons [primary members])
Source: ESIS data.
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 consideration. According to the published statistics of ESIS for 2008–09, 
the average total old and new outpatient visits to ESIS facilities per 
1,000 family units was 845 and 758 respectively. 
Table A.5 shows the substantial variation in outpatient attendance in 
selected states. Andhra Pradesh, which has the highest number of 
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Figure A.6 ESIS: Trends in New Outpatient Visits, 2000–01 to 2008–09 (per 1,000 
insured persons [primary members])
Source: ESIS data.
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facilities, displays much higher utilization rates than Gujarat or 
Rajasthan. An easier access to medical care facilities may be a driver for 
these comparatively higher rates.
Recorded disease profiles for new, ambulatory cases show that ail-
ments such as common cold and accidents were the main reasons for 
outpatient visits (table A.6). While there are no unexpected illnesses in 
this list of common ailments, there is a divergence in the utilization 
trends of the primary insured individuals and those of entire families. 
Table A.5 ESIS: Number of Outpatient Visits (per 1,000 family units per year)
State New cases Old cases Ratio new:old
Rajasthan 1,913 1,123 0.59
Delhi 2,178 1,343 0.62
Kerala 2,295 2,083 0.91
Madhya Pradesh (SS) 1,369 1,522 1.11
Andhra Pradesh 2,832 3,603 1.27
Gujarat (SS) 416 2,074 4.99
All India 758 845 1.11
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While utilization by the insured individual went up across all six disease 
categories between 2007–08 and 2008–09, it declined for the family as a 
whole, over the same period. This trend needs further study. One possibil-
ity which confounds data on utilization by the insured individual is the 
component for loss of wages, which applies only for primary members 
and not for the family. In other words, compensation for loss of wages 
may be a factor leading to increased utilization by the primary insured.
Temporal trends in outpatient consultation for the above specific dis-
eases and overall out-patient (OPD) visits over the past decade, as 
depicted in figures A.5 and A.6, show a steep decline. Overall outpatient 
attendance per 1,000 insured persons declined from almost 5,500 new 
and old OPD visits per thousand beneficiaries in the early 1990s, to about 
1,600 visits in 2008–09. 
In terms of inpatient episodes and their geographical variations, in 
2008–09 (the latest year for which detailed statistics are available) ESIS 
hospitals registered 337,515 admissions from among their 50 million 
beneficiaries, indicating a hospitalization frequency of 0.67 percent per 
beneficiary per year. Preliminary data from 2009–10 show this number 
has gone up to 417,498 cases and the hospitalization frequency has also 
increased to 0.75 percent per beneficiary per year. Under private health 
insurance, hospitalization frequency was about 10 times greater than that 
of ESIS in 2008–09. The ESIS figure is also significantly lower than the 
community incidence of hospitalization as indicated by the 60th round 
of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) (MSPI 2004). The 
absolute number of hospitalizations has also declined (figure A.7), despite 
an increase in the number of beneficiaries over the last decade. 
Table A.6 ESIS: Most Common Conditions for Outpatient Consultation, 2007–08 
and 2008–09
Disease
Insured individualsa Family unitsa
2007–08 2008–09 2007–08 2008–09
Acute nasopharyngitis (common cold) 84.46 87.31 103.46 75.22
Other specific and ill-defined diseases 76.04 78.85 92.32 71.35
Accidents, poisoning, and violence 42.05 41.75 52.49 37.99
Asthma and allergic disorders 38.22 40.67 46.88 42.16
Anemia 28.59 34.15 38.09 36.28
Dysentery, all forms 21.01 26.59 24.86 26.8
Source: ESIS data.
a. Number of new cases per 1,000 insured persons (i.e., only the primary members form the denominator) and 
per 1,000 family units (i.e., including the primary member and all members of the primary member’s family in 
the denominator).
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An important topic for research is to ascertain the reason for decrease 
in utilization of both outpatient and inpatient care. Is morbidity declining 
among beneficiaries? Are beneficiaries shifting to non-ESIS providers? If 
so, why?
The bed occupancy rates across ESIS hospitals are generally low 
(table A.7), and rising fixed costs translate into higher unit costs per bed 
per day. According to published statistics for 2008–09, only 17 of the 
148 ESIS hospitals had a bed occupancy rate of 80 percent or above, 
suggesting a scope for improving utilization of the available infrastruc-
ture, low demand, and/or overcapacity. An analysis of the available data 
also suggests very high average length of stay (ALOS), well beyond 
international benchmarks. Longer duration of stay is generally suggestive 
of inefficient use of available bed days, which in turn may be linked to 
deficient clinical management practices in the organization. Further 
investigation is needed to flesh out the drivers of the apparent inefficient 
use of resources.
The cost per bed per day for ESIS hospitals ranges from a high of Rs. 
138,954 (this hospital had a bed occupancy of only 0.21 percent) in a 
hospital in Orissa to a low of Rs. 496 (where the bed occupancy for the 
Figure A.7 ESIS: Trends in Hospital Admissions, 2000–01 to 2008–09
Source: ESIS data.
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Table A.7 ESIS: Coverage and Utilization Statistics, Selected States, 2009 
State
Implemented areasa Nonimplemented areasa
Number of 
beds com-
missionedb
Bed occupancy, 
2008–09 
(percent)
Number of beds 
per 1,000 
beneficiaries
Number of cases 
admitted in hos-
pitals (2008–09)
Beneficiaries 
hospitalized 
(percent)
Number of 
centers
Number of 
employers
Number of 
employees
Number of 
beneficiaries
Number of 
inpatients/ 
family units
Number of 
employers
Number of 
employees
Karnataka 32 25,341 1,488,072 5,795,095 1,493,581 996 51,857 1,587 52 0.274 46,050 0.79
Rajasthan 52 15,597 502,863 2,002,084 515,814 1,821 37,650 644 26 0.322 16,038 0.80
Gujarat 35 23,947 712,710 2,790,039 516,001 3,317 172,760 1,581 37 0.567 1,079 0.04
Maharashtra 43 80,076 1,755,833 6,925,774 1,784,993 6,054 307,736 4,048 44 0.584 4,305 0.06
Punjab 46 6,570 318,822 1,241,185 319,893 45 1,455 585 37 0.471 8,506 0.69
Orissa 54 2,732 189,692 736,680 189,866 108 27,500 347 38 0.471 7,580 1.03
Andhra Pradesh 181 22,854 885,861 3,450,162 889,217 668 28,342 1,177 63 0.341 71,052 2.06
All India 783 394,332 12,569,295 50,197,799 12,937,577 18,266 1,032,329 23,088 — 0.460 337,515 0.67
Source: ESIS data.
Note:— = not available.
a. Implemented areas are where the ESI Scheme has been made mandatory for the employers meeting the ESIS eligibility criteria.
b. Regional coverage as of March 31, 2009.
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hospital was 50 percent) in a hospital in Gujarat. The 17 hospitals with 
high bed occupancy averaged a low cost of Rs. 660 per bed per day. It is 
evident that the combination of low bed occupancy and high staff costs 
has led to spiraling unit costs of inpatient care delivery in comparison 
with, for instance, the package rates paid by RSBY7 and other govern-
ment-sponsored health insurance schemes (GSHISs) to private hospitals. 
Further research is needed to validate this hypothesis and inform the 
proposed capital expenditure plans for further construction and upgrad-
ing of ESIS hospitals with respect to feasibility and impact in light of 
utilization and cost-of-care trends. 
Table A.7 reveals that Andhra Pradesh leads the other states in 
terms of bed occupancy and utilization frequency (patients admitted 
as a proportion of total ESI beneficiaries in the state) for inpatient 
services as well. The number of beds in ESI hospitals in the Maharashtra 
region, on the contrary, is high both in absolute (over 4,000 beds out 
of the total 23,000 beds) as well as in relative terms (0.58 beds per 
1,000 beneficiaries compared with the national average of 0.46). 
However, the overall bed occupancy in Maharashtra is only 44 percent. 
The most difficult to understand metric in the table is the frequency 
of hospitalization. It varies from a low of 0.06 percent beneficiaries 
hospitalized in Maharashtra and as much as 2.06 percent hospitaliza-
tion in Andhra Pradesh. These anomalies require investigation into 
their causes. 
Cost-Containment Mechanisms
ESIS is an integrated care organization featuring captive facilities that 
provide outpatient and most inpatient services. It is protected from the 
supply-side moral hazard issues which might have challenged its provi-
sion of ambulatory care. In theory, the referral arrangements required to 
avail super specialty care filter out improper utilization of tertiary care 
facilities. Also, the care purchased from outside its own facilities is pre-
dominantly tertiary by nature and is procured at preagreed (CGHS) rates. 
Use of standard package costs for such outsourced care again limits, to 
some extent, the supply side moral hazard issue common to the fee-for-
service payment methodology. However, the effectiveness of the referral 
system in fostering use of ambulatory care and preventing overuse of 
inpatient care is unknown.
Approximately 17 percent of ESIS costs are for medicines and phar-
maceuticals (table A.8), and controlling these will be an important cost 
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containment initiative. ESIS now procures drugs through a rate contract 
mechanism; rates obtained through a tendering process are valid for two 
years and state units procure drugs directly on these rates. A Technical 
Executive Committee (TEC) updates the list of drugs with inputs from 
the Medical Superintendents of ESIS hospitals from across the country. A 
medical scrutiny committee provides details of quantities of each drug 
required at the state level.
Quality Orientation
ESIS does not systematically monitor or measure quality processes, 
patient safety, or health outcomes. Quality assurance guidelines or stan-
dards for hospital services, specific to ESIC, are lacking. However, ESIS 
hospitals do follow Central Health Service guidelines and some Standard 
Operating Procedures, and have constituted Hospital Committees for 
death audits, infection control committees, and other such systems in 
keeping with mandated requirements. How often these committees 
meet, or how effective they are in addressing quality gaps, is unknown. 
With respect to drugs and pharmaceuticals, the State Drug Controller’s 
Office supports the scheme in providing quality assurance to the drugs 
procured and requires one sample from each procured batch to be tested 
at an approved testing laboratory.
Concluding Remarks
ESIS is the oldest and largest health insurance scheme in India, both in 
terms of its revenue base and total expenditure. It was envisaged to offer 
a comprehensive benefits package delivered through an integrated net-
work at a relatively low cost. However, a decline in utilization in the 
recent past has substantially raised its per-unit costs. Three rounds of 
Table A.8 ESIS: Expenditure on Drugs and Dressings (Rs. million)
Year 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09
Expenditure on drugs and dressings 1,632.7 1,940.2 2,076.2
Total medical care expenditure 9,146.8 10,929.9 12,596.4
Percent share of expenditure on drugs and dressings 
out of total medical expenditure 17.8 17.8 16.5
Source: ESIS data.
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expansion of its mandatory coverage in the last seven years have contrib-
uted to huge surpluses in its finances. The challenge facing ESIS relates to 
raising the efficiency and quality of services by exploring strategies to 
increase utilization (including making available underutilized facilities for 
use outside the network), considering alternative provider remuneration 
systems within its network, revisiting its plan to establish a chain of 
medical colleges; and raising care standards, perhaps through accredita-
tion. A quick deployment of its IT-enabled management information 
system will also help ESIS in analyzing its own data to effectively address 
the above challenges.
Notes
 1. In 2009–10, outsourced services purchased from tertiary/specialty hospitals 
not owned by ESIS constituted less than 7 percent of the cost of the 
scheme. 
 2. “Model” hospitals are distinct from other ESIC hospitals primarily because 
these are directly managed by ESIC and not by state ESIS departments. These 
hospitals seem to be relatively better placed in terms of resources and admin-
istrative oversight than those managed by ESIS departments.
 3. Notified areas are geographical areas where ESIS has sufficient capacity to 
provide the services contained in the benefits package. Nearly all cities with 
a population of 1 million or more are notified areas.
 4. Although contrary to ESIS policies, sometimes hospitals do not extend credit 
and therefore directly charge beneficiaries. This occurs, for example, when 
package rates are not clear or ESIS payments to hospitals are in arrears. 
 5. The annual report and other published information from ESIS were available 
only for 2008–09 when this study was being written. Some, then unpub-
lished, information for 2009–10 was also available from ESI Corporation and 
was incorporated where available and relevant.
 6. Unlike the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) and Tamil Nadu (TN) 
schemes, the ESIS card does not have a memory chip and does not store data 
on the card itself, as off-line access to data is not envisaged in the fully con-
nected ESIS IT system.
 7. For nonsurgical treatment, the RSBY package rate is Rs. 500 per day, which 
is even lower than the unit costs of the ESIS hospitals having high utiliza-
tion. For a common procedure like normal delivery or caesarean section, the 
RSBY payout, including consumables, is Rs. 2,500 and Rs. 4,500 for an 
expected length of stay of two days and three days respectively. Most ESIS 
hospitals have unit costs (per bed per day) higher than Rs. 1,500 per day.
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Central Government Health Scheme 
Table B.1 CGHS: Summary Matrix
Indicators/name of scheme Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS)
Launch year 1954
Geographical area Pan India, 25 cities, in notified areas in vicinity of CGHS 
dispensaries.
Target/eligible population Employees and pensioners of central government, certain 
autonomous, semi-autonomous government 
organizations, members of parliament, state governors, 
accredited journalists and their dependents
Number of beneficiaries 3 million
Enrolment unit Family
Benefits package Comprehensive medical care, including ambulatory, 
inpatient, home care, and medicines and diagnostic 
services.
Maximum insurance 
coverage
No limit on maximum care. 
Hospital empanelment 
criteria
100 beds in metropolitan cities; 50 beds in other cities.
Number of empaneled 
hospitals (government and 
private)
562 private hospitals for secondary and tertiary care. 
Beneficiaries can use any public hospitals and seek 
reimbursement of expenses incurred.
(continued next page)
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Table B.1 (continued)
Sources of funds Employee contribution between Rs. 50 and Rs. 500 per 
month, depending on salary; balance from central 
government funds.
Total expenditure (millions 
Rs.) in 2009–10
Approximately 16,000 (Rs. 1,600 crores)
Premium price in 2009–10 n.a. (see sources of funds, above)
Provider payment 
mechanism
Salaries for doctors in own network for ambulatory care; 
predefined package rates for outsourced private hospitals.
Information technology (IT) 
tools used
Outpatient software module in management information 
system (MIS) functional for two years.
Recently initiated electronic claim settlement using a 
service provider in a small number of hospitals.
Plastic identity cards with national portability.
Call center and online claim status tracker.
Number of hospitalizations 
per year
—
Utilization rate —
Most common procedures —
Governing agency and legal 
status
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW), central 
government
Executing agency Same as governing agency
Number of full-time staff, 
including contract 
personnel, in the governing 
agency
—
Administrative costs as 
percent of total spending
—
Cost-containment measures Ambulatory care provided through its own integrated 
network; fixed package rates for inpatient care and 
outsourced diagnostics
Note: n.a. = not applicable; — = not available; see also note to table A.1.
Introduction
The Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) is one of the oldest 
contributory health schemes in the country, providing access to compre-
hensive inpatient and outpatient care for central government (GOI) civil 
service employees and retirees as well as their dependents. It also covers 
other defined groups such as members and ex-members of parliament 
and employees of certain autonomous institutions. The scheme does not 
cover all GOI employees; large GOI employers such as the defense and 
railway departments operate separate health schemes. Further, even 
among the civil (i.e., nondefense and nonrailway) employees, the scheme 
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is limited to those residing in the catchment areas of CGHS ambulatory 
dispensaries and therefore covers roughly one third of GOI civil service 
employees. The remaining civil service employees are covered by a sepa-
rate noncontributory scheme under the GOI Civil Services (Medical 
Attendance) rules, abbreviated as the CS-MA scheme. 
CGHS was introduced in Delhi in 1954 and was gradually expanded 
to 24 other cities across the country. CGHS owns and operates a network 
of outpatient dispensaries (now known as “wellness centers”) and poly-
clinics, supplemented by a network of contracted providers of diagnostic 
and inpatient services. CGHS does not own or operate hospitals. The 
scheme has about 3 million beneficiaries. Most scheme beneficiaries live 
in a handful of large cities where the concentration of GOI departments 
is high. CGHS has accordingly chosen to emphasize the location of its 
facilities in these cities.
In terms of depth of coverage, CGHS has the most generous benefits 
package of those described in this book and is one of the most generous 
health insurance schemes in the world. CGHS offers a comprehensive 
package of outpatient and inpatient care, also including preventive care. 
It also covers ayurvedic, homeopathy, unani, and siddha systems of medi-
cine. There are no exclusions for preexisting diseases, copayments, 
deductibles, or monetary cap on yearly or lifetime coverage. However, 
beneficiaries may incur out-of-pocket costs if they do not follow the 
scheme-mandated referral systems or incur costs in nonnetwork hospitals 
beyond the specified package rates for any given procedure. However, in 
contrast to the Employees’ State Insurance Scheme (ESIS), a stratifica-
tion system exists among beneficiaries; higher-income employees who 
contribute a relatively higher rate to the scheme are entitled to a better 
category of hospital rooms. 
CGHS pioneered preagreed “package rates” in the Indian health insur-
ance sector, thereby achieving some level of closed-endedness in hospital 
charges. Many other insurance schemes have adapted this hospital pay-
ment mechanism (for inpatient services). 
Institutional Framework 
Figure B.1 illustrates the institutional arrangements for CGHS. The addi-
tional secretary and director general (CGHS) in the Department of 
Health and Family Welfare, GOI, is the administrative head of the CGHS. 
The next in line, Director-CGHS, is an official of the Central Health 
Services, an organizational service in the Department of Health and 
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Family Welfare. Each city with CGHS services has an additional director 
(AD) or a joint director (JD) to oversee operations in the network of 
CGHS wellness centers as well as outsourcing services to private provid-
ers. Chief medical officers (or medical officers) manage each of the 
scheme’s 265 wellness centers and polyclinics, clinically and administra-
tively, and are responsible for attending to beneficiaries and referring 
them to higher level care if needed. 
CGHS has a medical stores department (MSD) that is responsible for 
buying and distributing drugs and medical supplies to outpatient facili-
ties. Nevertheless, since bulk procurement of medicines for clinics’ stocks 
has been outsourced, a key MSD role is procurement of expensive drugs 
in limited quantities needed by individual beneficiaries.
The offices of additional directors and joint directors also undertake 
contracting with hospitals and diagnostic centers according to policies 
and processes prescribed by the headquarters. Given its limited 
 processing capacity and faced with increasing volumes of claims, CGHS 
had engaged third-party administrators (TPAs) to assist in processing 
 reimbursement claims. It has now also contracted a bill clearing agency, 
a third party service provider to process bills as well as make payments 
to hospitals and individuals. This provider is also managing a call center 
Figure B.1 CGHS: Institutional Framework
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Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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for facilitating these services. In sum, CGHS has an elaborate institu-
tional structure with significant numbers of clinical and administrative 
staff. However, the extent to which this structure can meet its require-
ments and enable effectiveness and efficiency of scheme operations 
needs to be ascertained.
Beneficiaries
The CGHS beneficiary population includes the following primary bene-
ficiaries (“cardholders”) and their dependent family members:
• All central government employees paid from civil estimates1—except 
railway and New Delhi administration employees and New Delhi 
police force
• Pensioners paid from civil estimates 
• Members of parliament
• Ex-members of parliament and former prime ministers 
• Sitting and former judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts 
•  Employees and pensioners of listed autonomous bodies covered under 
CGHS (New Delhi) 
• Ex-governors and ex-vice presidents 
• Freedom fighters2 
• Accredited journalists.3
Table B.2 shows the number of cardholders in 24 CGHS cities; a 25th 
city, Jammu, was recently added to the list. As of December 2009, CGHS 
covered about 3 million beneficiaries—866,687 CGHS cardholders plus 
their dependents. Active civil service employees of the GOI are the larg-
est single group covered by the CGHS—67 percent of all cardholders. 
The retired civil service employees of the GOI constituted a little more 
than 31 percent; all other categories represented only about 2 percent of 
all CGHS members. The number of beneficiaries has declined sharply 
from the 4 million estimated to be covered a few years earlier. This 
change is largely due to improved enumeration with the new identity 
cards issued to beneficiaries.4 Any actual reduction in beneficiary num-
bers over the years would have been only gradual.
In terms of geographical location of cardholders, the largest number, 
38 percent of the total, reside in New Delhi where most central govern-
ment offices are located. Not surprisingly, New Delhi has more cardhold-
ers than the next six cities combined: Kolkata (8 percent) closely followed 
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Table B.2 CGHS: Number of Cardholders, by City and Category, December 2009
City
Serving 
employees Pensioners Othersa Total Percent
Ahmedabad 5,970 1,982 134 8,086 0.9
Allahabad 17,413 5,358 11 22,782 2.6 
Bangalore 29,326 12,001 496 41,823 4.8 
Bhopal 3,103 1,343 16 4,462 0.5 
Bhubaneshwar 2,708 724 77 3,509 0.4 
Chandigarh 3,325 3,104 7 6,436 0.7 
Chennai 24,471 15,309 1,167 40,947 4.7 
Dehradun 447 1,762 5 2,214 0.3 
New Delhi 225,105 99,792 2,246 327,143 37.8 
Guwahati 11,298 654 56 12,008 1.4 
Hyderabad 38,678 19,260 6,567 64,505 7.4 
Jabalpur 15,487 11,883 92 27,462 3.2 
Jaipur 4,619 3,552 112 8,283 1.0 
Kanpur 18,027 9,779 81 27,887 3.2 
Kolkata 42,021 24,905 2,717 69,643 8.0 
Lucknow 24,850 5,165 621 30,636 3.5 
Meerut 6,488 4,780 55 11,323 1.3 
Mumbai 41,160 11,502 172 52,834 6.1 
Nagpur 16,447 9,841 98 26,386 3.0 
Patna 12,828 2,510 1,199 16,537 1.9 
Pune 23,808 21,516 228 45,552 5.3 
Ranchi 1,663 819 10 2,492 0.3 
Shillong 1,459 175 5 1,639 0.2 
Trivandrum 6,697 5,166 144 12,007 1.4 
Total (number) 577,398 272,882 16,316 866,596 100 
Share of total 
(percent) 66.6 31.5 1.9 100.0 
Source: CGHS, New Delhi.
a. Includes members of parliament, ex-members of parliament, journalists, freedom fighters, others.
by Hyderabad (7 percent), Mumbai (6 percent), and Pune, Bangalore, and 
Chennai (5 percent each). Together, these seven metro cities account for 
74 percent of all cardholders in the CGHS. 
According to the Census of Central Government Employees (2006), 
the government has 3.1 million civil employees. Of these, 45 percent 
are in the Ministry of Railways, which is outside CGHS coverage. Of 
the remaining 1.7 million active civil employees, 34 percent are 
 covered under CGHS; the rest are covered under the CS-MA rules. 
The CS-MA beneficiaries are typically located in smaller centers 
where no CGHS facility is located. CS-MA allows outpatient care to 
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be delivered through authorized private practitioners (in addition to 
 government facilities), and the inpatient provisions of CS-MA are 
steadily approaching the benefits in CGHS. CS-MA does not require 
an employee contribution and is essentially a fully subsidized employ-
ment benefit.5
While active employees are eligible for CGHS facilities only if they 
live in or near a city served by CGHS (and indeed mandatorily required 
to join the scheme in such a case), pensioners living in areas not cov-
ered by the CGHS can also join the scheme. In this case, the CGHS 
pensioner card is issued from the nearest CGHS covered city. However 
beneficiaries assume the transportation costs of accessing care in 
CGHS-covered cities.
Benefits Package
The coverage is comprehensive and includes both outpatient care and 
hospitalization. The benefits package includes primary, secondary, and 
tertiary health services as well as home visits or home care. It also fully 
covers prescribed medicines, including special imports of recently 
developed medicines, and all diagnostic services, as medically necessary. 
The provision of services is without any cost sharing, or any benefit 
ceilings or caps if beneficiaries receive care in the provider network and 
follow the prescribed referral system. However, they may face copay-
ments if out-of-network providers charge higher fees than the CGHS 
package rates. Unlike most other health insurance schemes in India, 
CGHS provides coverage for therapies under other recognized systems 
of medicine such as homeopathy and ayurveda. Dental care is also 
covered, which is again unusual for a health insurance scheme in the 
Indian context. Antenatal care and immunization, free supply of drugs 
listed in its formulary,6 and select laboratory and radiological investiga-
tions are offered at the scheme’s own ambulatory facilities. Several 
other benefits, such as preventive health checks, neurosurgical implants 
for delivery of drugs, digital hearing aids, and human insulin for diabet-
ics have been added to the scheme over the years, enhancing the ben-
efits package available. In sum, CGHS offers a level of protection in 
terms of depth of coverage not available in any other health insurance 
scheme in India. 
The wellness centers also serve as the gateway to the scheme’s out-
sourced network for higher investigations and for inpatient services. 
However, in the case of emergency medical care, beneficiaries can directly 
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access any public or private health facility. In these cases, any difference 
in costs vis-à-vis CGHS package rates is borne by the patient. 
“Cashless” (or credit) facilities are available to pensioners for treatment 
in private hospitals and diagnostic centers in the CGHS network with 
prior authorization or referral by their designated CGHS wellness center. 
In such cases (and unlike the case for active employees), the hospitals do 
not charge the pensioners and send the bill directly to CGHS authorities 
for reimbursement. Pensioner beneficiaries are also allowed to secure 
medicine refills for chronic ailments for a longer duration than active 
employees. Thus, the network extends additional privileges to its senior 
citizens. However, because active employees are reimbursed only later for 
their hospital expenses, they may need to arrange for large sums of money 
to pay the hospitals.7 This seems to be a major area for improvement in 
an otherwise very generous scheme. 
Provider Network 
The CGHS uses a combination of its own facilities for ambulatory care 
and purchasing services for inpatient care and advanced diagnostics from 
its panel of public and private health facilities. The CGHS wellness cen-
ters also act as gatekeepers for referral to these diagnostic centers and 
inpatient service providers. 
In 2009, the CGHS-owned network comprised of 246 wellness cen-
ters, 19 polyclinics (providing specialist consultation services across mul-
tiple disciplines), 33 ayurvedic, 35 homeopathic, 10 unani, 3 siddha, and 
4 yoga centers, 64 laboratories, 21 dental units, and 1 maternity center 
(table B.3). Together, these facilities constitute the CGHS ambulatory 
care network for modern medicine (allopathy) as well as for other sys-
tems of medicine. Utilization of these centers varies widely within and 
between cities (table B.4).
For inpatient services across 24 cities, 562 hospitals are empaneled. 
There is also a network of 170 diagnostic centers. CGHS beneficiaries can 
also seek inpatient treatment and diagnostic services in all central and 
state government hospitals and claim reimbursement of the expenses 
incurred. For emergencies, they can receive treatment in any nearby or 
accessible hospital regardless of its network affiliation status. However, 
they need to obtain postfacto approval to secure reimbursement and 
submit documentation of the emergency from the attending medical 
practitioner. Reimbursement in such cases is restricted to the package rate 
applicable to the network hospitals. When accessing inpatient care in 
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Table B.3 CGHS: Network of Own Facilities, by City and Type, 2009 
City Starting date
Allopathy Ayurvedic Homeo Unani Siddha Yoga
Total wellness 
centers Polyclinic CGHS labs
Dental 
units
First aid 
post
2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009
Ahmedabad Mar–79 5 1 1 0 0 7 0 1 1 0
Allahabad May–05 7 1 1 0 0 0 9 1 1 0 0
Bangalore Feb–76 10 2 1 1 0 0 14 1 3 1 0
Bhopal Mar–02 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Bhubaneshwar Aug–88 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0
Chandigarh Mar–02 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Chennai May–75 14 1 1 0 2 0 18 2 2 1 0
Dehradun Jul–05 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Guwahati Jun–05 3 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
Hyderabad Feb–76 13 2 2 2 0 0 19 2 1 1 0
Jabalpur Oct–91 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0
Jaipur Jun–78 5 1 1 0 0 0 7 1 3 1 0
Kanpur May–05 9 1 2 0 0 0 12 1 4 1 0
Kolkata Aug–72 18 1 2 1 0 0 22 1 5 1 0
Lucknow May–05 6 1 1 1 0 0 9 1 2 1 0
Meerut Jul–71 6 1 1 0 0 0 8 0 2 1 0
Mumbai Aug–63 26 2 3 0 0 0 31 2 4 3 0
Nagpur Oct–73 11 2 1 0 0 0 14 1 0 1 0
Patna Nov–76 5 1 1 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 1
Pune Jul–78 7 1 2 0 0 0 10 1 1 1 0
Ranchi Jul–85 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0
Shillong Jul–02 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Thiruvanthapuram Jun–05 3 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
New Delhi May–05 87 13 13 5 1 4 124 4 31 6 5
Total: 246 33 35 10 3 4 332 19 64 21 6
Source: CGHS, New Delhi.
236 Table B.4 CGHS Outpatient Utilization, by City and Type of Facility, 2007 and 2009
City
Allopathy Ayurvedic Homeopathy Unani Siddha
Polyclinic Laboratories
Dental 
units Old New Total Total Total Total Total
2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2009 2009 2009
Ahmedabad 133,359 112,939 37,240 19,376 170,599 132,315 1,882 2,509 1,391 4,048 0 0 0 0  0 9,702 1,430
Allahabad 216,705 223,899 80,239 72,675 296,944 296,574 51,034 47,531 31,244 29,236 0 0 0  0  0  0  0
Bangalore 42,029 523,220 9,521 76,852 51,550 600,072 2,198 23,677 1,011 13,662 333 3,916 0 0 326,700 15,382 5,044
Bhopal 15,504 33,495 10,095 2,148 25,599 35,643 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
Bhubaneshwar 24,470 21,235 40,226 40,972 64,696 62,207 0 510 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0  0
Chandigarh 106,946 100,218 16,318 14,346 123,264 114,564 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
Chennai 481,684 588,641 54,224 52,722 535,908 641,363 9,386 8,343 10,061 11,900 0 0 13,104 13,205  0  0  0
Dehradun 13,251 23,452 10,475 1,834 23,726 25,286 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
Guwahati 54,007 52,243 53,333 60,954 107,340 113,197 0 0 8,449 6,727 0 0 0  0  0  0  0
Hyderabad 717,645 647,987 222,705 207,023 940,350 855,010  82,136  26,071  19,078 0 0 51,608 127,635 4,014
Jabalpur 169,384 9,917 87,138 7,817 256,522 17,734 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0  0
Jaipur 193,699 13,122 171,932 15,526 365,631 28,648 9,414 857 9,141 1,000 0 0 0  0  0  0  0
Kanpur 338,575 365,516 238,772 200,192 577,347 565,708 14,768 14,887 40,408 23,169 0 0 0  0  0  0  0
Kolkata 813,336 833,819 82,412 86,166 895,748 919,985 13,635 14,896 23,646 19,287 6,416 4,865 0  0 12,391 20,793 1,868
Lucknow 308,976 39,150 191,782 25,230 500,758 64,380 21,992 28,807 23,171 28,160 11,991 16,260 0 0 19,850 45,210 10,350
Meerut 12,365 14,888 8,872 6,902 21,237 21,790 3,101 4,012 1,668 1,280 0 0 0  0 0 1,324 502
Mumbai 689,256 641,490 159,442 136,846 848,698 778,336 28,701 25,095 47,825 30,197 0 0 0  0  0  0  0
Nagpur 492,283 539,184 133,414 85,036 625,697 624,220 37,461 24,534 16,488 12,896 0 0 0  0  0  0  0
Patna 76,342 100,114 84,997 87,028 161,339 187,142 24,613 24,636 17,603 16,175 0 0 0  0  0 18,530 4,515
Pune 294,364 59,907 43,482 9,425 337,846 69,332 17,484 13,330 20,885 20,420 0 0 0 0 19,016 13,920 2,983
Ranchi 50,125 50,173 6,995 401,719 57,120 451,892 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3,378  0
Shillong 11,834 13,932 1,075 757 12,909 14,689 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
Thiruvanthapuram 9,044 9,298 1,785 1,861 10,829 11,159 1,158 1,264 999 1,826 0 1,294 0  0  0  0  0
New Delhi 3,031,315 2,250,997 1,998,820 1,158,546 5,030,135 3,409,543 311,920 245,905 375,913 228,585 31,932 26,999 11,413 10,600 0 0 0
Total 8,296,498 7,268,836 3,745,294 2,771,953 12,041,792 10,040,789 548,747 562,929 629,903 474,639 50,672 72,412 24,517 23,805 429,565 255,874 30,706
Source: Table B.5, based on CGHS data. 
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public facilities, higher-income beneficiaries tend to seek admission to 
medical college hospitals and other prestigious tertiary care facilities with 
private rooms. This may not work equally across all classes of beneficiaries 
due to the scarcity of such rooms. 
The creation of this outsourced network of private hospitals is of 
recent origin (1996).8 The rationale for outsourcing was to shorten the 
long waiting lists in public hospitals. These private providers have been 
empaneled to provide inpatient care and higher-end diagnostic services, 
neither of which the CGHS provides in its own facilities. Except in the 
case of pensioners (for whom cashless benefits are available from net-
work hospitals), upon accessing an empaneled private facility, CGHS 
beneficiaries must pay for services out of pocket and subsequently seek 
reimbursement from the departments where they work (which charge 
the expense to CGHS) for all eligible payments made by them. This 
may be a deterrent to utilization. However, some options such as 
“medical advances” may be available to the members from their office 
of employment. But sometimes even pensioners may need to pay first 
and seek reimbursement later, for instance, whenever they use a public 
hospital or receive emergency treatment from a private hospital outside 
the network.
CGHS beneficiaries are registered in the wellness center nearest to 
their residence and, until recently, were required to first seek care in that 
center only. However, the introduction of computerization, networking, 
and bar-coded plastic identity cards is changing this limitation, and ben-
eficiaries are already allowed to access CGHS wellness centers elsewhere 
without obtaining special permission, particularly when traveling to 
another city where CGHS is available. In due course, this should also 
even out utilization across wellness centers as beneficiaries may prefer 
less-crowded but more distant locations.
Finance and Expenditures
Trends in overall CGHS expenditure are displayed in figure B.2. This 
includes a rough estimate of the expenditure on active employees. CGHS 
costs have grown rapidly in the last few years. The GOI/MOHFW com-
ponent grew 231 percent over the eight-year period to 2009–10, a com-
pound growth rate of 16 percent per year in nominal terms. Because the 
number of beneficiaries fell by one fourth over the same period, the cost 
per beneficiary grew much more: 341 percent, a compounded annual 
increase of more than 20 percent. This rate of increase is much higher 
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than inflation and dwarfs the experience of other payers in the country’s 
health sector. 
The accounting system for reimbursement to active employees is 
decentralized to the department or office where the cardholder works 
and is recorded by that ministry or department. The accounts of the 
Ministry of Health reflect only the remaining expenditure on CGHS, 
which includes:
• The costs of operating the CGHS-owned centers, including all salaries 
and administrative costs
• The costs of all medicines and other supplies provided at the CGHS 
facilities as well as purchases made by facilities from authorized local 
pharmacies
• The costs of all hospital and diagnostic network services used by retired 
beneficiaries (pensioners) whether as direct payments to hospitals and 
diagnostic centers or as reimbursement to beneficiaries 
• Reimbursement of expenses for active employees of the MOHFW. 
Since 2005, expenditure for pensioners has been recorded under the 
budget head Pensions and Other Retirement Benefits (PORB)—the same 
 Figure B.2 CGHS: Trends in Total Estimated Expenditure, 2001–02 to 2009–10
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Source: Authors’ estimates based on CGHS data, New Delhi. 
a. Data for 2009–10 are the provisional accounting numbers from the “revised estimates” of the budget. 
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head from which pensions are paid. This has helped separate the expenses 
for active and retired employees. It has aided the CGHS in overcoming 
its yearly budget crunches, as PORB is seen as an “inevitable” accounting 
head, being the government’s liability to its past employees, and so is 
 better funded.9 However, because the PORB head mixes actual expenses 
on purchasing inpatient and diagnostic services for pensioners with the 
share of drugs and consumables expenses estimated to be used for pen-
sioners, in-depth analysis of CGHS expenditure from budgetary data 
alone is now difficult to interpret. 
As shown in figure B.3 and table B.5, MOHFW spending in 2009–10 
for the above four expenditure items was about Rs. 1,180 crores (from 
provisional accounting data). Expenditure on salaried employees from 
other departments is estimated at Rs. 420 crores, based on the earlier 
Figure B.3 GOI Spending on CGHS, by Major Expenditure Component, 
2001–02 to 2009–10
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Table B.5 MOHFW Expenditure on CGHS, by Accounting Heads, 2001–02 to 2009–10 (Rs. crores)
Item 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10a
Pensions, other retirement benefits, and 
payment for professional services 65.77 82.19 140.73 252.71 273.19 350.10 439.32 500.39 546.30
Salaries and administration 125.34 134.28 139.49 158.69 172.87 191.78 204.19 323.30 428.46
Materials and supplies 165.39 186.04 222.94 170.24 150.26 205.51 263.03 226.42 205.40
Total MOHFW expenditure 356.49 402.52 503.15 581.64 596.31 747.39 906.54 1,050.11 1,180.16
Source: Authors’ estimates based on aggregated budgetary data, CGHS, New Delhi.
a. Data for 2009–10 are the provisional accounting numbers from the “revised estimates” of the budget. 
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study by the National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 
(NCMH) (2005) for 2001–02. 
The biggest expenditure category for MOHFW was pensioners,10 
amounting to Rs. 546 crores (46 percent of MOHFW expenditure on 
CGHS). As this category indirectly reflects CGHS costs of inpatient and 
diagnostic services, it is evident that this has been the fastest growing 
component of CGHS expenditure over the last decade. The cost of pur-
chased services, when combined with the expenditure on active employ-
ees, not visible from MOHFW data alone, accounts for about half of all 
CGHS costs.
The next largest category was Rs. 428.5 crores (36 percent of 
MOHFW expenditure, and about 25 percent of total estimated CGHS 
expenditure). This sum was spent on running the CGHS-owned health 
facilities and other administrative expenses (as aggregated from various 
accounting heads for salaries and establishment costs). This category 
has grown sharply in recent years as a consequence of the sixth pay 
commission review, which significantly raised GOI employees’ salaries 
in 2006. 
Rs. 205 crores (18 percent of MOHFW spending) was spent on mate-
rials and supplies, mainly drugs and consumables for CGHS outpatient 
facilities. This accounting treatment excludes pensioner costs, which are 
accounted for in the PORB head. Assuming that the expenditure on pen-
sioners was roughly the same per cardholder as active employees, an 
estimated Rs. 300 crores, about one fourth of all MOHFW expenditure 
on CGHS, was for drugs and consumables. This category does not seem 
to have grown as rapidly as the others, which could be attributed to 
improvements in bulk procurement systems, reduced reliance on local 
pharmacists, sharper rises in other expenditure heads, and, at least in part, 
to the change in accounting treatment (as an unknown portion of these 
costs have shifted to the PORB head).
Table B.6 lists the estimated contributions and sources of funds for 
CGHS expenditure between 2007–08 and 2009–10. The comprehen-
sive and benevolent entitlements in CGHS come at a substantial cost 
to the exchequer. The GOI budget is the source of about 
94 percent of CGHS spending in 2009–10, and wage-linked contribu-
tions of the beneficiaries make up the remainder. Between 2007–08 
and 2009–10, spending increased by one third, while contributions 
rose by 80 percent. Despite the increase in monthly employee contri-
butions in 2009, the share of GOI subsidy remains high and the gap 
continues to widen.11 
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The contribution rates, varying between Rs. 50 and Rs. 500 as shown 
in table B.7, became effective June 1, 2009. Based on the estimated 
numbers of government officials at various levels, about 90 percent of 
the beneficiaries are among those mentioned in the first three rows of 
table B.7, contributing between Rs. 50 and Rs. 225 per month. The contri-
bution, progressive with increasing income, also provides an entitlement 
of progressively higher inpatient room categories (and thus higher GOI 
subsidies) to the higher contributors. 
Upon retirement, pensioners can make a one-time payment equal to 
10 years’ contribution that provides them (and their dependents) with 
lifetime coverage and without any further contributions. By making this 
contribution, they are also protected against any future hike in contribu-
tion rates. However, this system may be contributing to the widening of 
the gap between claims and contributions observed in table B.6.12 Further, 
if the pensioners do not have access to CGHS ambulatory coverage (i.e., 
when they reside outside CGHS cities) and choose to use only CGHS 
facilities for inpatient benefits, they also receive a fixed medical allowance 
of Rs. 300 per month. 
To put the above numbers into perspective, the monthly contribu-
tion at 2010 pay levels would amount to less than 1 percent of the gross 
pay of the civil servant. In contrast, the ESIS requires a 1.75 percent 
contribution from the blue collar employees. The GOI contribution as 
an employer is much higher (94 percent of total costs) than the 
4.75 percent of wages (or 73 percent of total contribution) paid by 
other formal sector employers under the ESIS and is not based on any 
specific criteria related to the beneficiaries’ wages. Thus, the govern-
ment pays the entire difference between CGHS expenditure and 
income as budgetary support to the scheme. However, the multiple 
pools within CGHS, including members of parliament, higher echelons 
Table B.6 CGHS: Sources of Funds, 2007–08 to 2009–10 (Rs. crores)
Year
MOHFW 
expenditure 
Estimated 
expenditure on 
active employeesa
Estimated 
total CGHS 
expenditure
Employee and 
pensioner 
contributions
Net GOI 
subsidy
2007–08 906 294 1,200 58 1,142
2008–09 1,050 350 1,400 61 1,339
2009–10b 1,180 420 1,600 102 1,498
Source: MOHFW budget data (except estimates of expenditure on active employees).
a. Estimated for these periods based on NCMH (2005) estimates of this amount for 2001–02.
b. Data for 2009–10 are the provisional accounting numbers from the “revised estimates” of the budget.
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Table B.7 CGHS: Monthly Contribution by Beneficiaries 
Grade paya (Rs. per month) Monthly contribution (Rs.)
<1,650 50
1,800–2,800 125
4,200 225
4,600–6,600 325
>7,600 500
Source: CGHS, New Delhi.
a. The sixth pay commission of the Government of India, effective 2006, introduced a 
concept of grade pay by carving it out separately from the pay scale. This helped 
merge the large number of pay scales into a smaller number of continuous pay 
bands. The grade pay is a smaller component of the pay, but indicates the seniority 
and level in government. 
of the judiciary, active civil employees, civil pensioners, and journalists, 
need to be analyzed and reported separately by the scheme, so that the 
share of the subsidy for each group is known and prioritized. This will 
pave the way for transparency in the payroll share of contributions 
from employees and the government (as an employer). 
Information Environment
For most of its first five decades, CGHS has done little to upgrade the 
“what” and “how” of information management. It has remained largely 
a manual, paper-based scheme. This reliance on manual procedures 
has been the main reason for the limited availability of operational 
information and significant delays in processing of claims. Hospital 
and pensioner claims have taken several months for processing and 
payment.
In the last two to three years, however, CGHS has embarked on a mas-
sive exercise to automate its processes. This has been entrusted to the IT 
wing of the GOI, the National Informatics Center (NIC). Computerization 
of the CGHS outpatient department module, already completed, is 
expected to enable reduction in the waiting period for doctor’s appoint-
ments, facilitate referrals for specialist consultations and for diagnostic 
and inpatient services, allow on-line placement of orders for drug supplies 
to local pharmacists when needed, check patient profiles, and provide 
inventory details on drugs, including usage patterns. As a result of this 
process, CGHS ended jurisdictional restrictions in March 2011; benefi-
ciaries now have portable access across all CGHS centers, wherever they 
are located.
244       Government-Sponsored Health Insurance in India
Since the proposed MIS is a web-enabled system, CGHS has upgraded 
broadband connectivity in the dispensaries. The new Managed Leased 
Data Network provides dual use of leased line and broadband connections 
that can be monitored remotely. Implementation of this connectivity has 
commenced in most CGHS cities. 
The MIS system, which so far has focused on the ambulatory applica-
tions, is testing a claim-processing module for individual beneficiaries and 
diagnostic centers. Until the pilot is rolled out, any analysis of hospitaliza-
tion claims, trends, or patterns requires manual compilation of records 
from different CGHS offices across the country, and information contin-
ues to be sparse. CGHS launched a call center in 2009 to register and 
address beneficiary complaints and grievances. Already, beneficiaries in 
New Delhi can apply for their plastic identity cards online. 
In addition, a decision has recently been made to outsource reimburse-
ment of inpatient claims of hospitals and individuals to a bill clearing 
agency in an effort to speed up processing. This agency is expected to 
provisionally pay the hospital bills within 10 days, a big improvement 
over processing time in the current manual system, which can take sev-
eral months or longer. In sum, the information environment in CGHS left 
much to be desired until very recently. However, a wave of change in the 
last three to four years is dramatically improving information availability 
and flows within CGHS. 
Utilization and Claims
CGHS regularly compiles data on outpatient utilization, summarized in 
table B.4.13 As a result of the recently installed IT system, the availability 
and reliability of these data are improving.
Overall utilization of CGHS dispensaries fell between 2007 and 
2009. As suggested above, this corresponds to the decline in the esti-
mated number of beneficiaries (now 3 million compared with the earlier 
estimate of 4 million). In absolute numbers, the total number of consul-
tations in allopathic wellness centers dropped by about 17 percent to 
about 10 million visits in 2009 compared with 12 million visits in 2007. 
The fall was even steeper in new patient visits (than in “old” visits for 
follow-up), which decreased by 26 percent (from 3.75 million to 
2.77 million) in the same period. Average outpatient department utiliza-
tion is a low 0.9 new visits per beneficiary per year. This change in 
demand for outpatient services needs further exploration to see whether 
it reflects a change in health status of CGHS beneficiaries or a drop in 
Central Government Health Scheme        245
the perceived utility or quality of these services. Beneficiaries may be 
opting to seek other sources at prestigious public hospitals (e.g., medical 
colleges), purchasing private insurance, or paying out of pocket at the 
point of service. 
The 85 wellness centers offering indigenous and other alternative sys-
tems of medicine had 1.1 million visits in 2009, an average of about 
13,000 visits per center per year, roughly one third the average atten-
dance of about 41,000 patients in allopathic (modern medicine) dispen-
saries (table B.4). It is not only the variation between systems of medicine, 
but also the variation across cities and dispensaries that is significant. For 
instance, modern medicine centers in Meerut and Thiruvananthapuram 
recorded annual levels below 4,000 visits per clinic compared with more 
than 60,000 outpatient visits per clinic in Bangalore, Hyderabad, and 
Kanpur. An assessment of utilization levels may be required to provide 
inputs into decisions on relocation, merger, or closure of some of the low-
volume facilities. Another option worth considering is sharing the use of 
existing but underutilized primary care infrastructure in schemes such as 
ESIS or the Ex-Servicemen’s Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS), or 
considering outsourcing to private providers. 
The types of claims settled by CGHS can be classified into three cat-
egories: claims by individual beneficiaries seeking reimbursement of ser-
vices availed by them, claims by authorized local pharmacies for supplying 
medicines outside those available in the centers through bulk procure-
ment, and claims submitted by empaneled hospitals and diagnostic cen-
ters for the cashless services rendered to pensioners. The operational 
characteristics of processing each category of claim can vary depending, 
for example, on the nature of the claim, procedural complexity, and num-
ber of claims received. 
Claims for inpatient care and advanced diagnostic services submitted 
by individual active beneficiaries are processed and paid for by the 
departments where they are employed. For pensioners, the empaneled 
health care providers are expected to offer cashless coverage to the ben-
eficiaries and to seek reimbursement directly from the CGHS. For cer-
tain emergencies such as cardiovascular illnesses, stroke, acute renal 
failure, and cardiac emergencies, empaneled private hospitals are also 
expected to provide cashless care to active beneficiaries presenting a 
valid CGHS card. Finally, for any emergency services obtained outside 
the network, pensioners must pay the providers and then claim reim-
bursement from CGHS or from their former parent department, as per 
scheme provisions. 
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Payment Mechanisms and Cost Containment
Since CGHS uses its own network of facilities for ambulatory care (with 
salaried doctors) and for referrals to higher levels of care, moral hazard 
and cost escalation in theory should be limited. However, as in some 
other health system entities using line-item budgets and salaried pay-
ment systems, such issues as employee motivation, productivity, and 
quality of service are likely to need further examination. As mentioned 
above, salaries and operating costs of CGHS facilities constituted a fourth 
of all estimated costs in 2009–10. Most of these costs are likely to have 
been incurred on the provision of care. The scope for controlling the sal-
ary costs is limited because these move in tandem with civil service pay 
structure.14
The largest CGHS expenditure component is on outsourced inpatient 
and diagnostic services, which accounted for 50 percent of the scheme’s 
total spending in 2009–10. This is managed through the system of pack-
age rates, which CGHS pioneered in India.15 Reimbursement rates for 
services in networked private hospitals are based on a package-rate sys-
tem agreed up front by all providers. The package rates were originally 
generated by inviting quotes from hospitals on specified procedures and 
treatments. However, the methodology for arriving at the final package 
rates has varied over the years. For example, in 2001, the package rates 
were based on a median of the quoted rates. Subsequently, the scheme 
has moved to the lowest quoted rates. In the latest round of package-rate 
revisions, differential package rates have been arrived at for hospitals with 
and without NABH accreditation. 
The CGHS is the only government-sponsored health insurance 
scheme (GSHIS) that sets rates for each geographical area. Each addi-
tional director applies the same process with hospitals within his 
jurisdiction. CGHS package rates are also used by other public 
schemes such as ESIS and Railways to pay for inpatient care from 
private facilities. Most other schemes discussed in this book have used 
CGHS rates as a benchmark or a framework for negotiation. However, 
after the new generation of GSHISs managed to negotiate rates lower 
than CGHS—perhaps facilitated by the high-volume concentration 
offered by their geography and smaller list of packages—the scheme’s 
package rates increasingly appear high. The perception of delays in 
CGHS reimbursements may be another factor contributing to quotes 
for higher rates by hospitals, as the costs of the delay would be fac-
tored in.
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The third largest source of CGHS’s expenses, accounting for about 
20 percent of estimated total spending, is the cost of medicines and sup-
plies for its ambulatory care services, including follow-up care after an 
inpatient episode and chronic disease management. Costs of this compo-
nent have grown more slowly than the others and, at least in theory, have 
been controlled through the use of a formulary and by increasing the 
share of bulk procurement of generic drugs. About 80 percent of drugs 
are now procured in bulk, reducing reliance on retail purchases of locally 
sourced proprietary drug formulations.16 The effectiveness of cost con-
tainment on this front varies with the share of bulk procurement vis-à-vis 
the retail procurement of medicines, which has flip-flopped over the 
years but has largely been bulk procurement in the last three years, with 
retail dependence being about 21 percent by quantity in 2009–10, as 
against 69 percent in 2005–06. Orders for retail purchases can also be 
placed online by CGHS facilities now, and 99 percent of medications are 
received the next day. 
Quality Orientation
The CGHS is an emerging leader among schemes for stimulating quality 
improvement among empaneled providers. CGHS currently requires all 
its hospital to receive National Board of Accreditation for Hospitals and 
Healthcare Providers (NABH) accreditation; all laboratories to receive 
NABL accreditation; and all radiology centers to be approved by the 
Atomic Energy Regulation Board and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre17 
(AERB/BARC). 
Provider deadlines for accreditation have been extended time and 
time again because only a handful could comply within the prescribed 
time limits. Nevertheless, the direction adopted by CGHS is clear and 
will be a strong driver for promoting accreditation-based standards in 
empaneled providers. As an additional motivator, CGHS recently intro-
duced differentiated package-rates, with higher remuneration for accred-
ited providers. 
Like other GSHISs, the empanelment process also provides an oppor-
tunity for the scheme to evaluate the physical infrastructure and other 
aspects that could have a bearing on service quality. The scheme intro-
duced a minimum requirement of 100 beds for its network hospitals in 
larger cities in 2004–05 (although it can be relaxed to 50 beds for single-
specialty hospitals). No other GSHIS insists on more than 50 beds as a 
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prerequisite for empanelment. The original inspection by an internal 
team of doctors has since been devolved to NABH as part of its accredita-
tion process.
On a more negative note, the scheme does not collect data on quality 
of care and may even incentivize poor quality as the scheme pays for 
readmissions (usually resulting from poor quality care) or longer stays 
resulting from adverse events. Little is known about quality in ambula-
tory facilities owned and operated by the scheme. Finally, CGHS has yet 
to measure beneficiary satisfaction with the scheme.
Consumer Information and Protection
By leveraging IT and communication technology, CGHS has steadily 
improved its responsiveness to beneficiaries. In 2009, CGHS established 
a call center to provide information about the scheme. The center also 
receives and registers beneficiary complaints and grievances. CGHS 
maintains a website in which all Government Orders related to all 
stakeholders, including beneficiaries and empaneled hospitals, can be 
accessed in one place. The CGHS MIS has enabled a new web applica-
tion that allows beneficiaries to track claim status online. Considering 
the high educational levels of the CGHS member base, most are likely 
to have adequate access to information through these channels. As a 
government department, the CGHS must abide by the Right to 
Information Act18 and has established grievance channels akin to other 
government departments.
Recent Developments
The Indian government is contemplating the introduction of a new health 
insurance scheme for all central government employees and pensioners 
(and their dependent family members) to be operated through commer-
cial insurance companies as executing agencies. The proposed scheme will 
be implemented on a voluntary basis for existing employees and pension-
ers, but may be compulsory for future employees. A request-for -proposal 
was floated in early 2010 on the CGHS website, but a final decision has 
yet to be made. Once the new scheme is launched, the CGHS will gradu-
ally be phased out through attrition and retirement, similar to the gradual 
phase-out already in place for the old GOI pension system. 
Operated through a commercial health insurer, the scheme may insti-
tute a cap on the government’s liability, with the employee contributing 
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the remainder. This is seen by scheme planners as a feasible and effective 
cost-control measure. This feature is particularly important in light of 
the widening gap between contributions and expenditures that is cov-
ered through GOI subsidies. The proposed insurer-run scheme would 
provide coverage for meeting expenses of hospitalization and surgical 
procedures up to Rs. 500,000 annually per family in empaneled hospi-
tals. Within the overall cap, there are likely to be further limits on the 
amount payable for room rents, costs of specific procedures, and other 
items. For families, a floater benefit is proposed in which the total cap 
will be shared across all family members. The MOHFW is currently 
considering whether and how to proceed further with the proposed 
health insurance scheme. 
Notes
 1. The term “civil estimates” is an accounting term used by the GOI to describe 
the subset of government expenditure that excludes defense spending.
 2. Freedom fighters who participated in India’s freedom movement are entitled 
to several state privileges, including pension, travel, and medical care. In 
CGHS, they are eligible for the highest hospital room category and the com-
plete range of CGHS benefits. As India attained independence in 1947, all 
surviving freedom fighters are quite old and medical benefits are a highly 
valued entitlement.
 3. Journalists accredited by the Press Information Bureau in Delhi have been 
extended partial entitlements for CGHS. They are entitled to outpatient 
benefits (including drugs), but inpatient benefits are available only in GOI-
owned Ram Manohar Lohia hospital. They are not eligible for reimburse-
ments or cashless access to private hospitals or diagnostic centers.
 4. For example, pensioners make a one-time contribution, and in a manual sys-
tem, there is no real way to count how many of them continue to survive, 
remain in the country, or otherwise continue their coverage. The requirement 
for reenrolment for issuance of the plastic cards improved the accuracy of 
CGHS data on its active beneficiaries.
 5. The schemes in railways, defense, and CS-MA (the scheme for civil 
employees in non-CGHS areas) are all noncontributory and funded entirely 
by the GOI as an employment benefit. In the case of railways and defense, 
services are delivered through a captive network of health facilities owned 
and operated by these departments. CS-MA reimburses costs incurred at 
government hospitals and authorized private medical practitioners. These 
three schemes rely largely on their captive networks. They are not insur-
ance schemes and have been excluded from this study. However, many of 
250       Government-Sponsored Health Insurance in India
the issues related to CGHS discussed herein would be relevant to these 
schemes.
 6. Other prescribed drugs are arranged through contracted pharmacies.
 7. They have no access to any credit facilities except for a possible medical 
advance of up to 90 percent of the anticipated treatment costs that could be 
sanctioned by their office.
 8. Private hospitals in the CGHS network were an addition to the public provid-
ers, which have always been eligible under the scheme.
 9. Inadequate budget allocations in this head could delay pension payments, 
which would reflect adversely on the government.
10. As booked under the accounting head of PORB (Pensions and Other 
Retirement Benefits).
11. The MOHFW budget covers salaries of CGHS officials, operational costs of 
CGHS facilities, procurement of medicines, and reimbursement of eligible 
expenditures of pensioners and active MOHFW employees for hospitaliza-
tion and diagnostics. However, these figures do not include the reimburse-
ment of active non-MOHFW employees’ expenses for hospitalization or 
diagnostic investigations received in the CGHS outsourced provider network 
that are in addition to the MOHFW budgetary source and which the employ-
ing ministry pays directly, though under the CGHS provisions. This latter 
amount for active beneficiaries is not captured in MOHFW financial data, 
and has been crudely estimated (table B.6, column 3), based on the NCMH 
(2005) estimates of this amount for 2001–02. 
12. The lump sum contribution is fully accounted as CGHS revenue in the year 
of receipt.
13. Data on inpatient utilization are manually recorded and stored and were not 
available from CGHS at the time of this writing (December 2010).
14. However, the rationalization and redistribution of CGHS centers in the new 
environment of portability of membership may be worth considering, espe-
cially for low volume centers.
15. Like most other GSHI schemes, CGHS pays for inpatient care through pack-
age rates that bundle hospital charges into a single rate. The CGHS package 
rates include charges for registration, admission, accommodations (including 
patient’s diet), operation, injections, dressings, doctor/consultant visits, anes-
thesia, operating room, procedures/surgeon’s fee, surgical disposables and all 
sundries used during hospitalization, medicines during hospitalization, related 
routine and essential investigations, physiotherapy, nursing care, and services. 
The package rate does not include any transportation costs or posthospitaliza-
tion treatment, which are additional components that recent GSHISs have 
tried to incorporate. 
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16. These are procured through a back-up arrangement involving local pharma-
cies affiliated with dispensaries and at a small discount from the retail 
prices.
17. Atomic Energy Regulation Board and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre are 
public nuclear regulatory entities. 
18. India’s Right to Information Act of 2005 mandates a 30-day response time, 
for a nominal fee, to citizen requests for government information (barring 
some excluded categories, including personal or sensitive information).
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A P P E N D I X  C
Yeshasvini Co-operative Farmers 
Health Care Scheme, Karnataka
Table C.1 Yeshasvini: Summary Matrix
 Indicators/name of scheme
Yeshasvini Co-operative Farmers Health Care Scheme
(Karnataka)
Launch year 2003
Geographical area Entire state of Karnataka, but mainly rural areas
Target/eligible population Members of rural cooperative societies regardless of 
poverty status 
Number of beneficiaries 3 million
Enrolment unit Individual
Benefits package All hospitalizations for more than 1,200 notified 
surgeries; certain specified exclusions (e.g., implants) 
Maximum insurance coverage Rs. 200,000 per person ceiling
Hospital empanelment criteria Minimum of 25 inpatient beds, 3 intensive-care-unit 
(ICU) beds, and specialist doctors and equipment 
specific to the specialty
Number of empaneled hospitals 
(government and private)
543 hospitals (including 30 public hospitals)
Sources of funds Contributions by beneficiaries 58 percent; state 
government contribution 42 percent in 2009–10
Total expenditure in 2009–10 Approximately Rs. 550 millions (Rs. 55 crores)
Premium price, 2009–10 Rs. 150 per person per year, including Rs. 10 paid to 
cooperative societies as incentive, 2010–11. 
Provider payment mechanism Predefined package rates
(continued next page)
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Information technology (IT) tools 
used
Electronic claims submission software in 191 network 
hospitals, linked to third-party administrators’ 
systems; TPAs’ proprietary claims software used for 
operations and MIS.
Number of hospitalizations per 
year
66,749 (2009–10)
Utilization rate 2.23 percent per beneficiary
Most common procedures Cardiovascular surgeries
Governing agency and legal 
status
Yeshasvini Co-operative Farmers Health Care Trust 
(autonomous trust under Department of 
Co-operation, Karnataka)
Intermediary Third-party administrator (TPA)
Number of full-time staff, 
including contract personnel, in 
the governing agency
2
Administrative costs as percent of 
total spending
1.6 percent
Cost-containment measures Package rates, scrutiny by TPA during 
preauthorization and verification of high-cost 
procedures.
Source: Authors’ elaboration from scheme data.
Notes: See tables A.1 and A.2.
Table C.1 (continued)
Indicators/name of scheme
Yeshasvini Co-operative Farmers Health Care Scheme
(Karnataka)
Introduction
Yeshasvini Co-operative Farmers Health Care Scheme is a voluntary 
health insurance scheme designed for the members of cooperative societ-
ies in rural Karnataka and implemented by a trust constituted by the 
Karnataka state government. Its genesis is rooted in rural farmers’ lack of 
access to medical care. Yeshasvini was designed by the Karnataka 
Department of Cooperation and senior doctors from a subset of private 
hospitals. It is a community-based health insurance scheme, contributory 
in nature and closely linked to cooperative institution membership of 
smaller farmers and other informal workers. Yeshasvini qualifies as a 
government-sponsored health insurance scheme (GSHIS) because of its 
close links to the Department of Co-operation and dependence on gov-
ernment subsidies for a large share of its revenue. 
The scheme, rolled out on June 1, 2003, is the longest-running state-
supported health insurance scheme for the informal sector in India. For a 
fixed annual contribution of Rs. 150 per member, Yeshasvini provides 
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cashless coverage for a list of surgical procedures.1 A member can go to 
any of the 543 networked hospitals across the state for procedures cov-
ered under the scheme. As of 2009–10, the scheme has over 3 million 
enrolled members, up from 1.6 million in the first year of operation 
(2003–04). Yeshasvini was a forerunner for the new generation of govern-
ment-sponsored schemes that copied several of its features: package rates, 
predefined annual limits, and risk pooling. 
With its relative longevity, Yeshasvini is one of the few schemes with 
historical data on claims, utilization, and spending. It is also the only 
scheme that has already undergone a systematic impact evaluation 
(Aggarwal 2010).2 This case study draws on this available data and the 
results from the evaluation.
Institutional Framework
Yeshasvini is the outcome of a tripartite arrangement between coopera-
tive societies, Karnataka state, and private hospitals. The state government 
cofinances, operates, and oversees the scheme; the cooperative societies 
promote membership and are the main communication channels between 
the scheme, targeted farmers and other unorganized workers, and the 
empaneled public and private hospitals. 
As shown in figure C.1, the scheme is governed by the Karnataka 
Department of Cooperation, through the autonomous Yeshasvini 
Co-operative Farmers Health Care Trust, registered under the Indian Trusts 
Act.3 A third-party administrator (TPA) is contracted as an intermediary 
for the scheme to manage hospital empanelment, preauthorizations, claim 
processing, and payments to hospitals for a flat, lump sum annual fee. 
Decisions related to operational design, implementation, financial risk, 
and enrolment responsibilities rest with the trust. Board members include 
the principal secretary, Department of Co-operation, the registrar and 
additional registrar of state cooperative societies, the managing directors 
of Apex Bank and Milk Federation,4 the commissioner of cane develop-
ment, key officials of five public and private hospitals in the state, and a 
chartered accountant. In addition to subsidizing the scheme with periodic 
grants and managing information, education, and communication for the 
scheme, the Department of Cooperation facilitates the enrolment process 
and collection of contributions from member cooperative societies.
The trust has only two staff members: the CEO and a computer opera-
tor. Due to this limited capacity, the trust has been unable to  systematically 
address hospital and beneficiary complaints or devote much time to 
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 innovation and evolution, and it is highly dependent on the TPA. By design, 
the TPA is contracted only to handle authorizations and payments, but for 
a low, flat fee regardless of how well it performs and with no monitoring, 
there is no incentive or reason for the TPA to focus on anything but routine 
processing of authorizations and payments. Thus, a scheme that began as a 
pioneer and innovator has become relatively static.
Beneficiaries
Any rural citizen under 75 years of age, who has been a member in any 
of the participating cooperative societies for at least six months,5 is eligi-
ble to enroll in the scheme with his family members. The cooperative 
societies are primarily responsible for enrolment of members and collect-
ing their premiums. An innovative feature of the scheme relates to the 
linkage of premium collection with another financial transaction such as 
a payment to a member by the milk cooperative society or an installment 
payment by a member to a credit cooperative society. This arrangement 
reduces the administrative cost of collecting contributions. 
Enrolment and reenrolment occur annually.6 The voluntary nature of 
the scheme results in variable membership. As indicated in table C.1, 
since inception, the enrolment has nearly doubled to 3 million (an 
Figure C.1 Yeshasvini Institutional Framework
Department of Cooperation,
Karnataka state
Yeshasvini Trust
TPA
empanelled
hospitals
beneficiaries
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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Table C.2 Yeshasvini: Enrolment Growth, Contributions, and Claims, 
2003–04 to 2009–10
Year
Enrolled 
members 
(million)
Member 
contribution 
(Rs. million)
Government 
contribution 
(Rs. million)
Number of 
claims paid 
by scheme
Amount of 
claims paid 
(Rs. million)
2003–04 1.60 94.9 45 9,047 106.5
2004–05 2.11 128.7 35.7 14,996 180.8
2005–06 1.47 169.4 110 19,443 257.9
2006–07 1.85 215.6 198.5 38,976 380.9
2007–08 2.32 277.5 250 59,984 533.5
2008–09 3.05 361 300 74,028 599.3
2009–10 3.07 413.6 300 65,623 534.8
Percent increase, 
(2003–04 to 2009–10) 91.7 335.8 566.7 625.4 402.2
Source: Yeshasvini Co-operative Trust.
increase of 91 percent), registering a 30 percent annual increase between 
2005–06 and 2008–09. The jump in enrolment seems to have been 
driven by two incentive mechanisms put in place during the period. The 
first involved a 15 percent discount for families enrolling five members. 
The second was a Rs. 10 incentive to the cooperative society for each 
enrolled individual.7
The scheme covers only a small proportion of its eligible universe, the 
estimated 20 million registered members of more than 32,000 coopera-
tive societies. Its total enrolment of 3 million also includes the family 
members of the cooperative society members (table C.2).8 
Since 2008–09, total membership has remained flat. The scheme 
achieved only half of its stated internal target of 6 million subscribers by 
2009–10. The per capita subscription rate of Rs. 150 may be an impedi-
ment for some families. Enrolment data show considerable turnover in 
members: old members stop contributing, and new ones join in every 
cycle. Thus, some element of adverse selection cannot be ruled out.9 
Members may enroll in a particular year and choose to not renew in sub-
sequent years after fulfilling anticipated medical needs. Further research 
is needed to validate this hypothesis. Some turnover in members can be 
attributed to closure of loan accounts for some members and opening of 
new loan accounts for others in credit cooperative societies, inasmuch as 
these transactions are linked to premium contributions. 
Until 2007–08, all scheme beneficiaries were issued photo identity 
cards that were reissued annually upon renewal of membership. Because 
dispatch of identity cards involved significant administrative costs and 
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resulted in delays, an online “Unique Health Identification” system was 
initiated in 2008–09. Since then, Yeshasvini has maintained web-based 
information on enrolled members and their family (together with photo-
graphs) where network hospitals can verify enrolment and eligibility. 
Benefits Package
An enrolled member is entitled to cashless treatment for more than 1,200 
defined surgical procedures at any of the 543 empaneled hospitals. The 
scheme covers all preexisting conditions for the covered procedures. The 
combination of coverage for existing conditions and voluntary enrolment 
does increase the likelihood of adverse selection. Each listed procedure 
consists of a package of services to be delivered by the hospital and 
includes drugs, diagnostics, hospital bed charges, and the surgeries. Since 
2006–07, normal delivery, neonatal care, angioplasty, and selected medi-
cal emergencies (e.g., accidents, snake and dog bites) have been added to 
the benefits package. Annual medical benefits are capped at Rs. 200,000 
per person. However, since each package has a predefined, low to moder-
ate price, the limit is relevant only when a member has multiple, high-
cost procedures in the same year and is rarely reached.10
The benefits package does not cover any treatment but the defined 
surgeries. In other words, Yeshasvini excludes most medical causes of 
hospitalization and any form of ambulatory treatment. However, network 
hospitals are expected to provide free outpatient consultation facilities 
and discounted diagnostic tests. Among the exclusions are joint replace-
ment surgeries, transplants, burns, chemotherapy for malignancies, cos-
metic surgery, injuries from road accidents or other medicolegal cases, 
dialysis, ambulance service, and food. Not even for the covered surgical 
conditions does the package include diagnostics and surgical consumables 
such as implants, prostheses, meshes, heart valves, stents, bone screws and 
nails, or grafts (although the lens is covered for cataract surgeries and is 
part of the package cost). 
This coverage gap probably translates into an unknown quantum of 
balance billing that providers legitimately charge members and is an area 
for further study. Finally, follow-up treatment is also not covered, imply-
ing high recurring out-of-pocket costs after procedures such as valve 
replacements or others requiring long-term follow-up. Package rates are 
reported to be between 40 and 50 percent of private market prices 
prevalent at inception of the scheme (ILO 2006), and have not been 
revised since then. In sum, moral hazard on the provider side may be 
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limited due to the emphasis on surgeries, below-market package rates, 
and the long list of exclusions. However, providers may have found ways 
to recover their costs and increase revenues through balance billing and 
charges for consumables and tests. The extent to which unnecessary ser-
vices are billed is unknown. 
Aggarwal (2010) reported that overall health spending by members 
increased by 20 percent compared with matched uninsured populations, 
but this increase was mainly observed in higher-income members. The 
author did not report on whether this additional spending was for cov-
ered procedures or uncovered care. No significant increase in overall 
spending was observed for lower-income members.
Provider Network
The TPA has empaneled 543 hospitals located across the state to provide 
services under the scheme. The list includes about 30 public hospitals, 
most of them district hospitals. Criteria for hospital empanelment are 
discussed later in the section on quality, although it appears that the 
minimum 25-bed norm is not rigorously applied. There are no formal 
contracts with network hospitals. The TPA issues a unilateral document 
stating the protocols and guidelines applicable to the hospital.11 In addi-
tion to providing the covered surgical interventions, the network hospitals 
are also responsible for conducting free health check-up camps, which 
were initially the main vehicles for spreading awareness of the scheme.
Of the 543 empaneled hospitals, the top 20 hospitals listed in table C.3 
handled more than 35 percent of all cases and received 56 percent of the 
amount paid under the scheme in 2009–10. In 2009–10, 141 hospitals in 
the network did not present any claims, reducing the effective size of the 
network to about 400. However, this latter figure is about four times the 
number of hospitals that serviced the scheme in 2003–04. 
While hospitals have been empaneled and are utilized in all districts in 
the state, the volume of utilization in Bangalore urban hospitals is higher. 
This probably reflects greater awareness in the region and also beneficiary 
preference for hospitals located in the capital city.
The scheme appears to have stimulated private health care expansion 
and a commensurate decline in utilization of public facilities. A provider 
survey by Aggarwal (2010) found that 75 percent of empaneled hospitals 
have invested in expansion of their facilities postempanelment with 
Yeshasvini. This comes as no surprise, considering that only 30 public 
facilities (mostly district hospitals) are part of the empaneled network 
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Table C.3 Yeshasvini: Number and Value of Claims Paid to Top 20 Hospitals, 
2009–10
Hospital name  District
Number 
of cases Value  (Rs.)
Narayana Hrudayalaya  Bangalore Urban 3,730 88,771,400
Jayadeva Institute of Cardiology  Bangalore Urban 2,819 62,960,000
K.L.E.S. Prabhakar Kore Hospital and 
Medical Research Centre
 Belgaum 1,668 32,929,661
Vikram Hospital and Heart Care  Mysore 1,522 23,203,500
J.S.S. Hospital  Mysore 1,973 13,880,300
Sri Dharmasthala Manjunatheshwara 
College of Medical Sciences and 
Hospital
 Dharwad 1,372 11,544,900
BGS Global Hospital  Bangalore Urban 598 9,721,900
S.S. Institute of Medical Sciences and 
Research Centre
 Davangere 1,007 7,897,000
Kims Hospital and Research Centre  Bangalore Urban 1,052 7,617,200
A.J. Hospital and Research Centre  Dakshina Kannada 388 7,333,300
Narayana Netralaya  Bangalore Urban 2,153 6,679,100
M.M. Joshi Eye Institute  Dharwad 1,828 5,542,700
City Central Hospital  Davangere 600 5,359,700
Sagar Hospital  Bangalore Urban 148 4,770,500
Kerudi Hospital  Bagalkote 747 4,316,800
Patil Nursing Home  Gulbarga 573 3,996,900
Shri Dharmasthala Manjunatheswara 
Narayana Hrudayalaya Heart Center 
 Dharwad 377 3,896,600
M.S. Ramaiah Narayana Hrudayalaya 
Heart Center
 Bangalore Urban 181 3,857,500
Latha Nursing Home  Davangere 622 3,448,300
Kasturba Hosptial  Udupi 255 3,257,143
Total  23,613 310,984,404
Source: Yeshasvini Co-operative Trust.
and that private facilities deliver most of the care. Aggarwal also found 
that the scheme contributed to a 17 percent increase in utilization of 
private hospitals by the better-off members. However, no significant 
changes were seen among lower-income members. In general, the insured 
decreased their use of public facilities by 19 percent.
Information Environment
Because the scheme is cashless for covered expenses, it needs smooth 
flows of information from hospitals for preauthorization of expenses and 
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thereafter for the settlement of claims. However, it takes considerable 
manual and paper-based processing to generate this information. In this 
context, two important IT initiatives have been recently introduced in the 
scheme. The first is electronic connectivity of the TPA with hospitals. This 
is especially vital for preauthorization and claim submissions, and is avail-
able in 191 hospitals through a connectivity vendor. This shortens the 
delay in communications between the hospital and the TPA and enables 
better generation of utilization data for the scheme. The second initiative 
is the online database of beneficiaries being used by the hospitals to verify 
care seekers. While this database is a step toward an IT-enabled environ-
ment, its use is compromised by irregular internet connectivity in smaller 
and remote facilities. Also, the trust has not deployed any IT tools for an 
MIS and is largely dependent on outputs from the TPAs’ claim processing 
system for its information needs. This dependence may limit the extent to 
which the trust can monitor scheme operations in real time (because it 
may receive the information after lengthy delays). In addition, the infor-
mation may not be adequate for monitoring every aspect of scheme 
operations—including the performance of the TPA itself.
Utilization and Claims
Growth in utilization and spending has significantly outpaced enrolment 
since scheme inception. Both the number and amount of claims have 
increased over the seven years of its existence except for a conspicuous 
dip in 2009–10 (figure C.2). Although the membership base has 
 fluctuated, it experienced a much smaller overall increase in the same 
period (table C.2). For example, total spending on claims increased 
 fourfold (table C.2), and the number of cases paid increased more than 
sixfold (table C.2, penultimate column) compared with a 91 percent 
growth in membership. 
Frequency of utilization soared from 0.7 percent (claims per benefi-
ciary) in 2004–05 to 2.7 percent in 2008–09. These trends may reflect 
increased awareness, and improved access (with expansion of hospital 
network). Adverse selection is also a probable reason, particularly in light 
of the increase in the annual subscription amount from Rs. 60 to Rs. 120 
over this period (and, recently, to Rs. 150). 
The increase has been steeper in the number of claims than in the total 
amount claimed, hence, the average claim size has actually come down. 
This could be due to a higher utilization of lower-cost packages such as 
normal childbirth, and calls for further study. The frequency of utilization 
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for this surgical-only benefits package was about 2.2 percent in 2009–10. 
This ratio appears high when compared with the 2.3 percent frequency 
from the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) 60th round for 
community-level frequency of all types of hospitalization in rural 
Karnataka in 2004–05 (MSPI 2004).12 Again, higher frequency than the 
expected community average could be due to improved financial access 
provided by the health insurance coverage, adverse selection, or both.
According to the trust, 90 percent of the claims are settled in fewer 
than 45 days. This efficiency may be consequent to the built-in disin-
centives for late submission of claims by hospitals. The scheme levies 
a 10 percent penalty for claim submissions delayed beyond 30 days, 
and 30 percent for submissions between 60 and 90 days post-discharge. 
In 2009–10, 8 and 1.4 percent of claims suffered the 10 percent and 
30 percent penalties, respectively. 
Turning to conditions for which treatment was sought, figure C.3 
depicts trends in specialty treatment as a share (by value) of all claims. 
Details are provided in table C.7.
Cardiovascular, ophthalmology, and obstetrics and gynecology-related 
conditions were commonest, constituting about half of all claims in 
2009–10. However, in terms of claim value, cardiology is not just the 
predominant specialty utilized under the scheme, it has accounted for as 
much as 40 to 60 percent of the total amount paid under the scheme 
since inception. 
Figure C.2 Yeshasvini: Trends in Number and Value of Claims, 2003–04 to 2009–10
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Figure C.3 Yeshasvini: Trends in Specialty Claim Shares of Total Claims, by Value, 
2003–04 to 2009–10
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As depicted in figure C.4, ophthalmology-related claims have grown 
the fastest in numbers, particularly in the last three years, followed by 
obstetrics and gynecology. This suggests that a large number of cataract 
surgeries are being paid for by the scheme, and this may be due to 
adverse selection. The escalation in claims related to obstetrics and gyne-
cology (beyond the possible impact of hysterectomies in the early years 
of the scheme) is due to the extension of coverage in 2006–07 to include 
normal delivery. With steep hikes in claim numbers for several specialties, 
2006–07 appears to be a watershed year. This occurred despite lagging 
growth in the member base. Increased awareness of patients (probably 
augmented by coverage for common conditions such as normal labor) 
may have been a contributing factor. Also, as discussed previously, while 
the member base remained almost the same between 2008–09 and 
2009–10, most specialties witnessed a decline in the number of surgeries 
in the period after the significant jumps of the previous three years. The 
reasons for these trends need further study.
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Between 2007 and 2010, a minuscule 0.3 percent (532) of the 
200,000 claims filed were rejected (table C.4). The trust clarifies that 
most rejections were due to delayed submission of claims after the 90-day 
limit set in the scheme guidelines for hospitals. These trends and the 
reasons for rejecting claims run counter to those most prevalent in the 
private health insurance industry, where a larger number of claims are 
rejected, often for incomplete supporting evidence or inappropriateness 
of the medical procedure done. However, since the scheme covers all 
Figure C.4 Yeshasvini: Trends in Number of Claims, by Specialty, 2003–04 
to 2009–10
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Table C.4 Yeshasvini: Number and Value of 
Rejected Claims, 2007–08 to 2009–10
Year
Claims rejected
Number  of cases Value (Rs.)
2009–10 78 471,000
2008–09 264 1,748,200
2007–08 190 1,837,450
Totals 532 4,056,650
Source: Yeshasvini Co-operative Trust.
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preexisting conditions, this common cause for claim repudiation is com-
pletely irrelevant for Yeshasvini. Further, the TPA has little incentive for 
closer scrutiny of claims or plugging leakages because its flat fee is 
delinked from the effort it makes in screening out suspicious claims. 
Furthermore, the trust itself has no internal capacity for close monitoring. 
Closer monitoring of both claims and providers is an area in need of 
capacity building inasmuch as the scheme keeps risks in-house.
Over the last four years, the average value of hospital claims has gener-
ally declined in all districts, which could be due to an increase in the 
number of lower-cost claims. This would be true of the recently added 
maternity coverage at the very low package rate of Rs. 1,200, or similarly, 
the increasingly frequent eye surgeries also priced low. In a few districts 
(Bidar, Raichur, Kolar, and Kodagu), the trend has been the opposite for 
unknown reasons needing exploration. There is also considerable varia-
tion in average claim size across districts. Figure C.5 shows that the aver-
age claim size in such districts as Bhagalkot, Mandya, Hasan, and Haveri 
is consistently lower across time periods than in the Bellary, Mysore, 
Kodagu, and other districts. These differences could stem from a varied 
case mix, beneficiary migration, or difference in medical costs.
Figure C.5 Yeshasvini: Trends in Average Claim Values, Different Districts, 2006–07 
to 2009–10
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As mentioned earlier, the emphasis on surgeries, below-market pack-
age rates, the long list of exclusions, and a functional preauthorization 
system may limit moral hazard and hospital-induced demand. Although 
Aggarwal (2010) found little evidence of moral hazard, she did indicate 
that the better-off members reported a higher incidence of illness. In 
addition, low-income members used more outpatient care than did other 
groups, perhaps because of the free access. 
The utilization of services at government hospitals constituted a 
very small share of the claims (except for the autonomous Jayadeva 
Institute of Cardiology, second ranked by patient traffic in the Top 
20 list, table C.3). The few public hospitals empaneled with the scheme 
appear to lack the wherewithal (or the will) to step into the IT-enabled 
environment of electronic beneficiary identification, e-preauthorization, 
and online claims submission. Indeed, as many as 12 district hospitals in 
Karnataka state showed no utilization in 2009–10, while the remaining 
reported a very small number of claims. 
Financial Status 
In principle, Yeshasvini is a contributory scheme, though substantially 
subsidized by the state government. The scheme does not shift risk to an 
insurance company and therefore bears all risk. The state government, as 
a “reinsurer,” provides a subsidy to cover all liabilities not met by member 
contributions. 
The net member contribution received by the scheme, after allowing 
for the Rs. 10 incentive allocated to the collecting cooperative societies, 
is currently Rs. 140 per member per year. In 2009–10, the member con-
tribution constituted 58 percent of the scheme’s total funds (contribu-
tions stood at Rs. 41.64 crores) while the state governments’ subsidy of 
Rs. 30 crores accounted for the rest. Figure C.6 graphically depicts the 
contributions, state government subsidy, and the total scheme expendi-
ture over the years. 
Table C.5 summarizes the trust’s financial statements from its inception. 
Yeshasvini started out with small deficits in the initial years when utiliza-
tion, size of the hospital network, and possibly awareness about the scheme, 
too, were lower. Since 2005–06, the scheme has been running large deficits, 
bridged by the state government. The government subsidy as percent of 
total revenues has grown from 8 percent in 2005–06 to 42 percent in 
2009–10. In nominal terms, the state subsidy has grown 14-fold over this 
period compared with a 171 percent increase in member contributions.
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The up-front collection of contributions has allowed the trust to 
earn some interest income every year, but it is a very small source of 
revenue. Since 2009–10, the trust has also been handling the state’s 
Suvarna Arogya Chaitanya Scheme (a state-funded health insurance 
scheme for school children), which reimburses the trust for claims 
paid on its behalf. Some surplus trust funds (between Rs. 5 crores and 
Rs. 6 crores) are invested as a term deposit in the Karnataka State 
Cooperative Apex Bank. 
The major expense of the scheme is claim payments. The operational 
expenses for running the trust include the flat fee of the TPA and a 
small human resource component of the trust—totaling Rs. 9 million in 
2009–10, 1.6 percent of that year’s total expenses. There is actually 
financial room and a pressing need to invest in strengthening the trust’s 
supervisory and monitoring function. 
Cost Containment
Although scheme design and its packaged prices for surgical procedures 
leave room for balance billing by providers, Yeshasvini deserves credit for 
implementing a package rate system agreed with providers. At its 
Figure C.6 Yeshasvini: Contribution, Subsidy, and Expenditure, 2003–04 
to 2009–10
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Table C.5 Yeshasvini: Summary of Trust Finances and Expenses, 2004–05 to 2009–10 (Rs.)
Particulars 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10
Revenues
Member contribution 119,755,440 163,439,922 215,454,243 276,294,553 364,582,592 416,442,172
Interest 4,880,368 3,311,414 5,062,398 12,534,937 27,147,335 34,477,028
Suvarna Arogya  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 666,183
Total income 124,635,808 166,751,336 220,516,641 288,829,490 391,729,927 451,585,383
Expenses
Medical claims 120,220,941 248,125,477 379,519,463 468,946,302 607,457,734 539,462,259
Other expenses 6,194,962 7,471,938 8,848,075 10,169,839 10,349,527 9,055,467
Total expenses 126,415,903 255,597,415 388,367,538 479,116,141 617,807,261 548,517,726
Surplus/deficit
Deficit –1,780,095 –8,886,079 –167,850,897 –190,286,651 –226,077,334 –96,932,343
Government 
 contribution 
 n.a. 20,000,000 125,788,000 208,500,000 250,000,000 300,000,000
Source: Yeshasvini Co-operative Trust.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
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 inception, package rates were a new concept in the Indian context and 
were generally lower than providers’ usual fees for services. By making 
the claims closed-ended, the scheme reduced its risk of moral hazard and 
cost escalation. 
The trust’s other cost-containment mechanism has been the online 
platform for preauthorization of claims linking 191 network hospitals 
with the TPA. The genesis of this online platform has to be viewed in the 
backdrop of about 10 percent of requests for authorizations being 
rejected due to coding errors or requests for uncovered procedures. Now 
about 40 percent of the network hospitals use this online system, which 
accounts for an overwhelming number of all preauthorizations, facilitat-
ing efficiency and timeliness. About 85 percent of preauthorization 
requests are received from this system (or from an alternative email-
based request system) and are addressed the day the request is received. 
The scheme has a very low administrative overhead due to minimal 
staffing at the trust and the negotiated flat fee for the TPA. Both account 
for about Rs. 2 per beneficiary per year, 1.6 percent of the total spending 
in 2009–10. This low level of administrative spending may lead to 
adverse consequences, however, such as poor monitoring by the trust and 
insufficient cost-containment effort on the part of the TPA. 
Quality Orientation
Like nearly all the schemes in this study, Yeshasvini has yet to address 
quality of care and patient safety. Its primary quality-control mecha-
nism is its empanelment system, which calls for the availability of 
25 inpatient and 3 intensive care unit (ICU) beds, qualified surgeons for 
the respective specialty, qualified anesthetists and ventilator support, 
among other structural items. The bed requirement for sub-district 
level hospitals and nursing homes is further relaxed to 15 beds. Some 
specialty criteria are also defined such as the availability of cath lab and 
intensive cardiac care unit (ICCU) for cardiac surgeries and C-arm for 
orthopedic cases. However, the extent to which these criteria are met 
in practice requires validation, as it is likely that not all the hospitals 
in the network meet all the criteria set by the scheme. Although the 
trust reports on periodic, infrastructure-centric “quality audits” of the 
hospital network, it does not always inspect hospitals at renewal of 
empanelment. 
Disempanelment and other disciplinary action against hospitals is usu-
ally in reaction to a grievance received by the trust. Penalization and 
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disempanelment of network hospitals are also used to protect consumer 
entitlements. The trust reports penal actions having been taken against 
hospitals found to be indulging in irregularities or fraud such as referring 
patients to nonnetwork hospitals, overcharging patients, or submitting 
fake claims. These are also the most common reasons for disempanelment 
of network hospitals by the trust (table C.6). 
Consumer Information and Protection
Considering that Yeshasvini beneficiaries pay a significant annual contri-
bution, some level of consumer awareness is expected. However, there is 
a fair likelihood that credit societies or milk societies deduct contribu-
tions but give members little or no information about the scheme.
The scheme requires its network hospitals to organize health camps 
for consumer information, conduct medical examinations, and arrange for 
patient referrals. Hospitals see these camps as an opportunity for screen-
ing potential “cases,” invariably disseminating information about the 
scheme and its coverage. With no built-in incentives to conduct these 
camps or mechanisms to monitor them, it is likely that the camps are not 
being held on any significant scale. In addition to these camps, the scheme 
uses mass media such as radio and TV to create awareness. 
A study commissioned by the trust and conducted by M/s Nabard 
Consultancy Services in 2006, substantiated that the scheme is well 
received by the target population with 60 percent, 30 percent, and 
10 percent of the sampled beneficiaries expressing full, partial, and no 
satisfaction, respectively. Dissatisfied members of the scheme have the 
option of approaching the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, since 
the trust comes under the purview of consumer courts. In fact, the trust 
Table C.6 Yeshasvini: Reasons for Disempanelment of Network 
Hospitals, since Inception
Reasons Number of cases
Collecting unauthorized payments from patients 18
Indulging in other irregularities or fraud 26
Voluntary disempanelment 3
Nonfulfilment of minimum criteria for empanelment 4
Other 7
Total cases 58
Source: Yeshasvini Co-operative Trust.
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Table C.7 Yeshasvini: Trends in Number of Claims, by Specialty, 2003–04 to 2009–10
Specialty 
2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10
Number 
of 
cases
Claims 
value (Rs.)
Number 
of 
cases
Claims 
value (Rs.)
Number 
of 
cases 
Claims 
value (Rs.)
Number 
of 
cases
Claims 
value (Rs.)
Number 
of 
cases
Claims 
value (Rs.)
Number 
of 
cases
Claims 
value (Rs.)
Number 
of 
cases
Claims 
value (Rs.)
Cardiology 1,420 50,820,640 2,763 91,785,500 4,117 153,771,450 7,193 195,022,000 10,000 251,554,500 10,638 258,173,000 10,656 244,792,500
Ear, nose, throat 418 2,096,468 683 3,401,500 244 2,198,132 2,313 11,854,500 3,105 16,873,600 3,551 18,279,600 2,873 15,204,200
Gastroenterology 443 4,793,664 736 8,100,200 1,132 5,572,200 1,319 13,767,750 1,916 19,552,000 1,681 16,059,000 1,609 16,024,500
General surgery 2,117 10,645,010 3,411 18,862,200 3,882 20,180,650 6,455 31,052,200 9,245 43,912,100 11,244 55,324,300 9,462 45,588,800
Neurology 33 783,693 92 2,143,500 136 3,310,000 186 4,986,500 335 8,471,500 380 9,704,000 365 9,626,000
Obstetrics and 
gynecology 2,286 18,140,831 3,399 26,411,800 3,553 24,865,750 8,147 42,571,500 13,492 67,230,750 18,468 102,714,950 16,400 86,747,250
Eye 623 1,573,383 1,338 3,523,550 2,187 7,328,100 6,474 21,623,300 12,449 44,111,300 18,024 53,759,500 15,312 43,141,900
Orthopedics 806 8,251,965 1,322 13,826,400 1,596 15,812,825 2,873 27,052,800 3,946 37,422,700 4,699 43,793,000 4,176 39,334,850
Urology 748 7,576,086 1,219 12,732,200 1,842 17,224,700 3,793 31,530,600 5,157 42,928,300 5,229 43,775,600 4,414 38,098,200
Other 153 1,853,677 273 3,946,500 988 11,430,300 863 8,139,700 1,214 11,137,000 1,391 11,128,500 1,482 11,489,000
Total 9,047 106,535,417 15,236 184,733,350 19,677 261,694,107 39,616 387,600,850 60,859 543,193,750 75,305 612,711,450 66,749 550,047,200
Source: Yeshasvini Co-operative Trust.
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has had to pay out awards granted by the forum in response to lodged 
complaints.
Experience with the online requests for authorizations and the rejec-
tion of nearly 10 percent of these requests demonstrates the lack of 
 clarity among beneficiaries and providers regarding the entitlements in 
the benefits package. More needs to be done by way of managing infor-
mation, education, and communication to strengthen awareness about 
the scheme.
In her evaluation of the Yeshasvini scheme, Aggarwal (2010) established 
that the scheme had significantly improved its members’ financial 
 protection—reducing total borrowings and asset sales by 36 percent for 
higher-income and 30 percent for lower-income members. Moreover, cov-
erage has financially protected worse-off members from outpatient costs 
(a not fully expected benefit because these services are not explicitly cov-
ered, although network hospitals are supposed to provide free outpatient 
facilities and discounted diagnostic tests). These lowest income affiliates 
reported a 61 percent decrease in borrowings and asset sales for ambula-
tory care. Better-off members displayed higher utilization rates for inpa-
tient care. This probably stems from their ability and willingness to bear 
out-of-pocket expenditure for uncovered services and consumables. The 
better-off members also reported a 20 percent increase in their total health 
expenditures as a result of coverage in comparison with the uninsured. 
Concluding Remarks
Yeshasvini pioneered a new model of health insurance that required a 
small contribution, minimized administrative costs by coupling members’ 
contribution to the scheme to ongoing financial transactions with coop-
eratives, and successfully “packaged” hospital prices at preagreed, reason-
able levels. The scheme was successful in channeling a large number of 
rural, informal workers under its coverage. However, its member base has 
stagnated, benefit design has not witnessed any evolution, and the scheme 
has lost its original innovative spirit. Limited or absent institutional 
capacity of the implementing agency for monitoring, internal controls, 
analysis and use of data, and designing innovations are among the major 
constraints. Yeshasvini must counter the stagnation that has set in. The 
scheme also needs to strategically expand its benefit offering and address 
issues such as balance billing and service quality. It may also need to redis-
cover its niche segment because other GSHISs in Karnataka are offering 
similar coverage for free or at minimal annual costs. 
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Notes
 1. The term “cashless” here means to the extent that the insurance scheme is 
liable. In other words, the beneficiary does not have to pay the hospital first 
and then file a claim with the scheme for a subsequent reimbursement of 
covered expenses. The scheme and the hospital settle these costs directly. As 
discussed in the section on benefits package, Yeshasvini does not cover certain 
costs (e.g., implants), which patients have to pay for themselves. 
 2. Aggarwal (2010) used a propensity score-matching methodology in which a 
group of covered individuals was compared with a group of uninsured. 
 3. The Yeshasvini trust also implements two other schemes for the Government 
of Karnataka through the same TPA and using the same network of hospitals—
the Suvarna Arogya Chaitanya Health Care scheme for children studying in 
government schools in the state, and the Prevention of Parent to Child 
Transmission (PPTCT) scheme for HIV patients and pregnant women ensur-
ing safe delivery. 
 4. These are two large cooperative organizations in the state.
 5. These organizations include primary agricultural credit cooperative societies, 
cooperative sugar factories and other processing societies, self-help group 
members, fishermen and Beedi (hand-rolled leaf cigarette) co-op societies, 
weavers, industrial, and artisans co-op societies. The urban members of the 
last two societies are also eligible.
 6. Enrolment occurs during a five month period coinciding with the harvest 
season when farmers have cash income.
 7. According to trust officials, a small number of cooperative societies pay their 
members a subsidy of Rs. 20 to encourage them to enroll and reenroll. 
 8. Only one member of the family has to be a member of the cooperative for 
the entire family to become eligible for Yeshasvini membership.
 9. Aggarwal (2010) found significantly higher utilization rates among the 
insured when compared to uninsured. She rules out adverse selection as the 
cause for this difference since her studied sample matched both groups by 
health status. Significantly, she did not compare individuals who have main-
tained enrolment with those with variable enrolment. 
10. The average claim amount was only Rs. 8,150 in 2009–10.
11. As discussed in the section on quality, the Yeshasvini empanelment guide-
lines require hospitals to have at least 25 inpatient beds including 3 inten-
sive care beds, qualified surgeons for the respective specialty, qualified 
anesthetists, ventilator support, and such. Once empaneled, the TPA sends 
a network hospital protocol that mandates a separate counter for scheme 
beneficiaries, a board displaying empanelment with the scheme, a photo 
album of patients treated, free outpatient care, discounted diagnostic tests, 
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connectivity and an online preauthorization mechanism to verify identity 
cards, and adherence to timelines and requirements for claim submission. 
Since the arrangements for claim submission are a prerequisite for the 
hospital reimbursement, they are put in place. However, other require-
ments are not closely monitored (e.g., the offer of adequate specialist doc-
tors, free outpatient services). Finally, since the patient identification is left 
to hospitals or their staff members, some impersonation may slip 
through.
12. The NSSO data pertain to all causes of hospitalization, many of which (the 
nonsurgical causes) do not form part of the Yeshasvini benefits package.
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A P P E N D I X  D
Rajiv Aarogyasri Community 
Health Insurance Scheme
Table D.1 Rajiv Aarogyasri: Summary Matrix
Indicators/name of scheme Rajiv Aarogyasri Community Health Insurance Scheme (AP)
Launch year 2007
Geographical area Entire state of Andhra Pradesh (AP)
Target/eligible population All families holding a below-poverty-line (BPL) white ration 
card or scheme-issued health card (criteria of annual 
income below Rs. 75,000) are automatically enrolled 
Number of beneficiaries 20.4 million families, about 70 million individuals
Unit of enrolment Family
Benefits package 938 identified hospitalization procedures—surgical and 
medical, largely tertiary care and some secondary care
Maximum insurance 
coverage
Rs. 150,000 per family per year with additional buffer of 
Rs. 50,000
Hospital empanelment 
criteria
Minimum of 50 beds and other infrastructure criteria, e.g., 
intensive care unit (ICU) with two ventilators
Number of empaneled 
hospitals (government and 
private)
241 private and 97 government hospitals
Source of funds 100 percent from state government, through the health 
budget and through levy on alcohol sales 
Total expenditure (Rs. million), 
2009–10
10,750.00 (Rs. 1,075 crores)
(continued next page)
276       Government-Sponsored Health Insurance in India
Premium price, 2009–10 Rs. 439 per family (varies between phases and districts)
Provider payment mechanism Fixed package rates for all covered procedures, including 
post hospitalization medications and transportation 
Information technology (IT) 
tools used
Comprehensive management information system (MIS), 
field functionaries on mobile phone group, electronic 
operations and payments, digital signature for all users, 
electronic claims process, including requirement for patient 
photographs pre and post procedure 
Number of hospitalizations 
per year
322,723 (2009–10) 
Utilization rate Claims frequency about 1.6 percent per family (about 
0.46 percent per beneficiary) per year, claim ratio between 
69.6 and 128.3 percent and averages 89 percent
Most common procedures Oncology, cardiovascular, polytrauma, genitourinary 
surgeries, general surgeries
Governing agency and legal 
status
Aarogyasri Health Care Trust, an autonomous trust 
established by the AP government 
Executing agency Trust and insurance company (Star Health and allied)
Number of full-time staff, 
including contracted per-
sonnel, in governing agency
117 
Administrative costs as 
percent of total spending
4 percent for trust + insurer’s costs, which are not available
Cost-containment and inter-
nal control measures
Prior authorization, package rates, MIS monitoring, 
surveillance and medical vigilance teams, and field staff 
in hospitals
Table D.1 (continued)
Indicators/name of scheme Rajiv Aarogyasri Community Health Insurance Scheme (AP)
Introduction 
Rajiv Aarogyasri Community Health Insurance Scheme, launched in 
Andhra Pradesh (AP) state in April 2007, provides tertiary cover for 
the treatment of serious and life-threatening ailments. Coverage for 
these ailments was previously provided since 2004 under the chief 
minister’s relief fund, which evolved into the scheme. The stated objec-
tive of the scheme is to “improve access of BPL families to quality 
medical care for treatment of diseases involving hospitalization and 
surgery/therapy through a defined network of health care providers.” 
The geographical population coverage of the scheme (breadth) and its 
depth (in terms of number of procedures covered) have expanded in 
phases. The scheme now covers 20.4 million families across the state, 
comprising all poor families and a significant segment of the 
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 lower-middle class. According to the state, coverage is available to any-
one earning less than Rs. 75,000 per year. The scheme offers cashless 
treatment for 938 medical conditions, predominantly those requiring 
major surgical interventions.
Institutional Framework
The Aarogyasri Health Care Trust established by the state government 
is an autonomous, nodal implementing and oversight agency for this 
scheme. It is chaired by the chief minister, and has a separate minister 
as its vice chairman. The principal secretaries of several departments are 
the members of the trust; while the CEO of the scheme is the trust’s 
secretary. The scheme enjoys strong political support at the highest 
level. The CEO is empowered by the trust board through resolutions for 
making policy decisions and, based on these, facilitating implementa-
tion. Figure D.1 shows the institutional framework, with the trust being 
the governing agency and sourcing services from its insurer (for risk 
management and administration of the scheme), the empaneled hospi-
tals and the IT vendor.
Figure D.1 Rajiv Aarogyasri: Institutional Framework
government of
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Rajiv Aarogyasri
trust
insurance
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Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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The risk is partly retained by the trust and partly transferred to an 
insurance company, chosen through a bidding process. The two teams 
work closely together. 
Some 5,000 full-time personnel work across various entities involved 
in Rajiv Aarogyasri. The trust itself has 117 employees, including 
42 physicians who are not involved in the delivery of care but in claims 
management, quality oversight, and other operational processes. The IT 
vendor has deployed 55 persons for managing the IT infrastructure. The 
remaining personnel are employed by the insurer and include 3,600 field 
staff called aarogyamithras,1 280 call center personnel, and about 180 
doctors employed by the insurer. 
Beneficiaries
All families holding a white BPL ration card issued by the state govern-
ment or a scheme-issued health card based on the BPL database, are 
automatically enrolled in the Rajiv Aarogyasri. Citizens earning up to 
Rs. 75,000 a year in urban areas and Rs. 60,000 in rural areas are also 
eligible. The annual benefit ceiling per family is a floating one, such that 
the maximum annual treatment cost of Rs. 150,000 can be used indi-
vidually or collectively by any or all members of the family within that 
cap. An additional sum of Rs. 50,000 is provided as a buffer to manage 
expenses beyond Rs. 150,000. This buffer effectively raises the annual cap 
to Rs. 200,000 per family. 
The member base was estimated at 20.4 million families in 2009, 
about 85 percent of the state’s population. Citizens not covered by the 
scheme but needing a subsidy for high-cost medical treatment can also 
approach the chief minister’s office for relief.2 Once authorized, the 
treatment processing for these petitioners is also handled by the Rajiv 
Aarogyasri Trust. It is safe to surmise that Rajiv Aarogyasri is fast-
approaching universal coverage, though only for the limited set of condi-
tions covered in the benefits package. 
Benefits Package 
The scheme’s cashless treatment for 938 surgical and medical procedures 
pertains to defined specialties including cardiology, neurology, urology, 
and oncology. Treatment for burns and polytrauma are also covered. 
These procedures were selected primarily because of their unavailability 
at community health centers or area hospitals, their serious nature, 
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requirement for specialist doctors and special equipment, and verifiable 
diagnostic and posttreatment protocols.
All the packages include complete inpatient costs (no cost sharing by 
the beneficiary), reimbursement of the patient’s transportation costs (the 
lowest cost by public transport, e.g., intercity public buses), and medi-
cines provided by the hospital for 10 days after discharge. One-year 
follow-up packages, including consultation, medication, and diagnostics, 
are also available for 125 procedures requiring longer periods of follow 
up. Under their memorandum of understanding with the scheme, net-
work hospitals are expected to provide patients with free outpatient 
consultations. However, as described in the next section, such consulta-
tions are used mainly to screen and select patients with covered condi-
tions for subsequent admission.
Provider Network and Referral System
Hospitals must possess at least 50 beds as well as certain equipment and 
manpower, according to the standards for empanelment to provide ser-
vices to Rajiv Aarogyasri beneficiaries. Enrolled members can seek treat-
ment for covered conditions at any of the 338 empaneled network 
hospitals (241 private and 97 public). Of these, about half have between 
50 and 100 beds, and a fourth have more than 200 beds, reflecting the 
involvement of larger hospitals in a tertiary-focused scheme. Network 
hospitals are expected to earmark a significant share of their beds for 
Rajiv Aarogyasri patients. 
Since the scheme aims to be paperless and extensively uses IT-enabled 
processes in its operations, hospitals are also required to maintain a com-
puter, printer, scanner, digital camera, and broadband internet connectiv-
ity. Network hospitals also provide space for a helpdesk manned by the 
insurer’s field workers, the aarogyamithras, to facilitate outpatient 
appointments for “walk-ins,” coordinate the admission process for walk-in 
and referred patients (e.g., from camps, primary health centers), and assist 
in the discharge process. Aarogyamithras are also mandated to conduct 
exit interviews of patients at discharge to assess satisfaction and elicit 
information on any nonallowable charges levied by hospitals. They also 
coordinate with the hospital at discharge to give patients the public trans-
port reimbursement (included in the package rate paid to hospitals). 
Beneficiaries seeking care for covered disease conditions are referred to 
network hospitals through: screening camps organized and operated by 
groups of network hospitals, referrals by field personnel (e.g., public 
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health functionaries and aarogyamithras) staffing primary health centers, 
area and district hospitals, referral through the scheme’s call center, refer-
ral from the chief minister’s camp office, and spontaneous demand 
(“walk-ins”) to outpatient clinics at empaneled hospitals. According to 
trust estimates, patients first identified at a health camp account for 
45 percent of beneficiary utilization in the scheme; “walk-ins” to network 
hospitals, 25 percent; referrals from primary health center–based aarog-
yamithras, 20 percent; referrals from chief minister’s camp office, 5 percent; 
and telephone referral from the call center, 5 percent.
Each network hospital is required to participate in one free health 
camp a week—typically an outreach activity in a community location 
involving multiple hospitals, local leaders, and the district administration. 
Such camps help build awareness of the scheme and provide free special-
ist consultations, limited medicines for common ailments, and free 
screening for scheme-covered conditions. As of September 2010, more 
than 20,000 camps had been organized in Andhra Pradesh with participa-
tion of more than 3.5 million beneficiaries. 
Aarogyamithras, assigned to primary health centers and to area and 
district hospitals, help identify patients diagnosed for covered conditions 
and arrange for a referral consultation at empaneled hospitals on a 
specified date. They also track appointment openings and bed occupancy 
at empaneled hospitals using the call center and contacting aarogyamith-
ras posted at referred facilities. Aarogyamithras visit the homes of some 
patients referred by them and slated for admission to a hospital to 
ensure that the patient visits the hospital and gets admitted. 
Aarogyamithras also liaise with patients on follow-up appointments for 
postsurgical care.
Evidence suggests that the private health care sector has made sub-
stantial new investments in Andhra Pradesh in response to the infusion of 
resources derived from the scheme. Officials estimate that all leading 
hospital chains in the state have opened new hospitals, and that 6,000 
beds in 29 new hospitals have been added since the scheme was launched. 
Other infrastructural capacities have also been augmented; for instance, 
the supply of linear accelerator machines for treatment of cancer have 
reportedly increased from 13 to 29.
Although government hospitals account for a relatively small share of 
utilization (table D.2), the scheme has generated revenue for them, 
facilitating investments in infrastructure. Currently, 80 percent of reve-
nues earned by government hospitals through the scheme are retained by 
these hospitals while the remaining 20 percent of revenues is retained by 
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the trust and pooled for infrastructural investments in public hospitals 
throughout the state. Of the amount retained in public hospitals, 
65 percent is deposited into the bank account of the facility’s Hospital 
Development Society for infrastructure improvement and the purchase 
of drugs, supplies, and equipment; the remaining 35 percent is used to 
pay bonuses to the treating team of doctors, nurses, and paramedics. 
Financial Status and Sources of Funds
The scheme is entirely funded by the Andhra Pradesh state government. 
Part of it is innovative financing through the Chief Minister’s Relief 
Fund, in turn financed through an earmarked tax on liquor sales.3 The 
residual funding (about Rs. 818 crores in 2009–10) is provided to the 
trust through the state health budget and draws on general revenues. 
From these funds, the trust pays the premium to the insurance company 
for the components outsourced to it. For the components of care not 
outsourced to the insurer (Aarogyasri-II package of benefits in 15 dis-
tricts),4 the trust settles hospitalization claims directly without any 
intermediation. However, this split of tasks is internal, and the process is 
identical for hospitals regardless of the payer. For the outsourced com-
ponents, the premium amount paid by the scheme has varied across the 
districts and across the different phases in which the scheme was rolled 
out. The average premium is approximately Rs. 267 per family per year 
and ranges from Rs. 119 to Rs. 439 per family for different districts, 
phases, and benefits packages.5
From inception to September 2010, the cumulative authorized expen-
diture under the scheme was more than Rs. 21 billion for 750,000 cases. 
The resources dedicated to Rajiv Aarogyasri have significantly increased, 
reaching Rs. 1,075 crores in 2009–10. This sum includes expenditures 
from the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund (Rs. 257 crores in 2009–10) and 
from the general revenues of the state. Expenditures from general reve-
nues (Rs. 818 crores) amounted to 28 percent of all health spending from 
the state’s own resources in that year.6 
Turning to the supply-side financing, state expenditures on secondary 
level services through the Andhra Pradesh Vaidya Vidhan Parishad 
(APVVP7) hospitals, for the same period, have remained more or less 
stagnant at Rs. 286 crores in 2008–09 (actual) and Rs. 306 crores (revised 
estimates) for 2009–10, which is about 10 percent of the state’s expen-
diture on health from its own resources. This may indicate a preference 
for the demand-side financing scheme, which has also meant a constraint 
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on additional resources for the public health facilities providing second-
ary care, even though the scope of the demand-side financing scheme is 
largely around tertiary care. On another note, the Andhra Pradesh gov-
ernment already spends an additional 20 percent of its total health allo-
cation on medical education and tertiary care (for medical college 
hospitals and other tertiary institutions)8 raising the total share of ter-
tiary care to about half of the state’s own health expenditure.9 The state 
government appears to have chosen to increase resources for health 
through demand-side financing, but in doing so, it may be overemphasiz-
ing tertiary care.10
Information Environment 
Rajiv Aarogyasri makes such extensive use of IT solutions as to set it apart 
from other health insurance schemes in India. The scheme is largely 
paperless; all operational processes are electronic and integrated with a 
web-enabled MIS. While internal documentation is incorporated into the 
IT system, correspondence is through email. About 5,000 users are on the 
system, and officials manage their roles using ascribed digital signatures. 
The IT processes, entailing electronic submission and approval of prior 
authorization requests, are initiated at the web-enabled identification and 
preauthorization system installed at the Rajiv Aarogyasri kiosk of network 
hospitals. The IT system is extensively used at every stage: from document 
submission to internal processing and final payment of claims through 
electronic fund transfer systems. Operational process timelines are moni-
tored in real time. These processes include internal controls and innovations 
for fraud mitigation such as a requirement to upload the preoperative, 
postoperative, and “discharge” pictures of the beneficiary with the hospital 
doctor and the hospital aarogyamithra. The innovative “discharge” picture 
is the photo documentation of the handover of transportation money and 
medicines to the patient for the postdischarge period. 
The scheme has established a call center to respond to beneficiaries’ 
queries and grievances. The scheme’s field staff also use the call center to 
refer patients and facilitate identification of appropriate hospitals (with 
requisite clinical specialties and availability of beds). By September 2010, 
the call center had handled more than 3 million incoming and outbound 
calls. The existing ambulance and emergency transport network in AP, 
also known as the “108” system after the telephone access number for the 
network, is linked to Rajiv Aarogyasri and refers patients to the scheme 
network hospitals. Aarogyamithras are connected to each other, the call 
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center, and scheme officials through a closed user group for mobile 
phones that allows unlimited, free calls within the group.
Utilization and Claims
Table D.2 presents a snapshot of empaneled hospitals’ volume and claims 
for surgeries and medical treatment rendered from scheme inception to 
mid-August 2010 by provider type. The cumulative value of preautho-
rized claims under the scheme stood at Rs. 2,046.6 crores (about US$450 
million) for treating around 704,000 cases. The average claim amount 
was about Rs. 29,000 (about US$640). More than 80 percent of the 
beneficiaries were treated in private hospitals, 19 percent were admitted 
to government medical college and tertiary institutions, and less than 1 
percent received treatment at government district hospitals.
Almost 65 percent of the beneficiaries were under 45 years of age, 
and 12 percent were children, indicating that the scheme serves a far 
greater proportion of young people than the older age groups. This is 
Table D.2 Rajiv Aarogyasri: Distribution of Procedures, by Institution, 
2007–August 2010
Hospital type
Number of 
surgeries, 
procedures, 
treatments
Share of total 
number of 
procedures
(percent)
Preauthorized 
value (Rs. crores) 
Share of total 
preauthorized 
value  (percent)
Private 566,858 80.5 1,674.5 81.8
Government 
autonomous ter-
tiary institutionsa 53,581 7.6 142.7 7.0
Government 
APVVP hospitalsb 6,020 0.9 16.1 0.8
Government 
DMEc hospitals 
(medical college 
hospitals) 77,540 11.0 213.3 10.4
Total 703,999 100 2,046.6 100
Source: Rajiv Aarogyasri Trust, August 2010.
Note: APVVP = Andhra Pradesh Vaidya Vidhan Parishad; DME = Directorate of Medical Education.
a. Autonomous tertiary institutions, e.g., Nizams Institute of Medical Sciences (NIMS), Sri Venkateswara Institute of 
Medical Sciences (SVIMS). 
b. APVVP is entrusted with managing AP secondary hospitals. These are usually 100- to 300-bed district and 
subdistrict secondary hospitals.
c. The DME oversees education in the AP public medical colleges. The medical college hospitals are typically 
large, tertiary institutions, often with more than 1,000 beds and multiple specialties.
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somewhat unexpected, considering the tertiary care emphasis of the 
benefits package. Further, since this age group has a residual life expec-
tancy of several decades, quality of life, health outcomes, and long-term 
after care will become important areas of focus for the scheme in the 
future. 
Figure D.2 depicts the monthly trends in the number of claims 
authorized under Rajiv Aarogyasri between April 2007 (inception) and 
July 2010 (latest month for which detailed claims data were available). 
At first, claims grew steadily as the scheme expanded to new districts 
and inculcated awareness among potential beneficiaries. The steep rise 
in 2008–09 corresponds to the scheme’s roll-out to all districts and the 
expansion of the benefits package in July 2008. Thereafter, claims have 
held steady at about 25,000 to 30,000 claims a month. 
Morbidity patterns over the same period (inception to July 2010) 
indicate that oncology-related procedures (144,759 cases) were highest, 
accounting for more than 20 percent of total cases,11 followed by cardiac 
surgeries (92,876 cases, 13 percent), and polytrauma procedures (75,639 
cases, about 11 percent). Procedures with low uptake were dermatology 
related (209 cases), prosthesis related (44 cases), and infectious disease 
related (7 cases). Further research is required to ascertain why utilization 
of treatment is so low under certain disease groups. Two explanations 
come to mind: the infrequency of the specific condition12 or the relatively 
Figure D.2 Rajiv Aarogyasri: Monthly Volume of Authorized Claims for Surgeries 
and Therapies, 2007–July 2010
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low package rate, which demotivates providers from actively screening 
and treating the condition. 
Geographical analysis of claim distribution in 2009–10 shows that 
the highest absolute number of beneficiaries seeking treatment under 
the scheme resided in the East Godavari, Krishna, and Guntur districts, 
and the lowest numbers lived in the Nizamabad and Adilabad districts. 
Since the population and scheme launch dates are different in each 
district, the absolute numbers need adjustment for these variations. 
Thus, as illustrated in figure D.3, the highest utilization per million 
population and per year of coverage was from Hyderabad, the state 
capital and largest city in AP. Hyderabad registered a claims frequency 
five times that of the lowest utilizing district, Ananthapur. Availability 
of and distance to hospitals, as well as variability in how district health 
camps are conducted could substantially affect utilization and is a sub-
ject for further research.
Figure D.3 traces the variation in frequency of hospitalization across 
districts over the years, showcasing a steady rise from 2007–08 to 2009–10 
in all districts. The overall frequency of hospitalization per beneficiary 
rose from about 0.1 percent in 2007–08 to 0.34 percent in 2008–09, and 
then to 0.46 percent in 2009–10. Growth tapered off as the scheme 
matured, despite an expansion of the benefits package. This pattern 
closely reflects the monthly trends seen in figure D.2. 
The trends observed in figures D.2 and D.3—a sharp increase in early 
years and a leveling off thereafter—may reflect the combined impact of 
rising awareness and benefits package expansion coupled with the latent 
demand in the community for surgical intervention during the early 
years. This would be a subject for further research.
Expenditure and Costs
Table D.3 shows the phased roll-out and trends in premiums and claims 
pertaining to the components serviced by the insurer (i.e., Aarogyasri-1 
packages in all districts and Aarogyasri-2 packages in 8 districts) for the 
Aarogyasri Trust. The defined time periods mentioned in column 1 refer 
to the respective durations of the insurance policy.
The per family premium has varied between Rs. 119 and Rs. 439 over 
the lifetime of the scheme. The insurer’s claim experience in different 
phases of the scheme has also been highly variable, between 69.6 percent 
and 128.3 percent, and has averaged 89 percent since inception. The table 
also shows that the phases with the highest claim ratios also had much 
Figure D.3 Rajiv Aarogyasri: Frequency of Hospitalization, by District and Year 
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Table D.3 Rajiv Aarogyasri: Phased Rollout, Premiums, Claims, and Claim Ratio, 
2007–10
Phases 
Number 
of BPL 
families 
(million)
Premium 
per family 
(Rs.)
Number of 
surgeries 
or hospital 
episodes
Number 
of 
claim-
paid 
cases
Actual 
paid 
value
(Rs. 
crores)
Claim ratio 
(claims/
premium = 
percent)
Phase I (April 1, 2007 
to March 31, 2008) 
Anantapur, Mahabub-
nagar, Srikakulam 
2.3 330 11,622 11,192 50.6 76.6
Phase I (1st Renewal, 
April 5, 2008 to April 
4, 2009) 
2.5 119 16,648 15,902 38.6 128.3
Anantapur, Mahabub-
nagar, Srikakulam
Phase I (2nd Renewal, 
April 5, 2009 to April 
4, 2010) Anantapur, 
Mahabubnagar, 
Srikakulam 
Phase III (1st  Renewal, 
April 15, 2009 to 
April 14, 2010) 
Medak, Karimnagar, 
YSR, Prakasam, 
Nellore
6.7 439 91,067 82,820 205.2 69.6
Phase II (December 5, 
2007 to December 4, 
2008) Chittoor, 
Nalgonda, Ranga 
Reddy, East Godavari, 
West Godavari
4.7 219 36,589 34,322 114.6 108.5
Phase II (1st Renewal, 
December 5, 2008 to 
December 4, 2009) 
Chittoor, Nalgonda, 
Ranga Reddy, East 
Godavari, West 
Godavari
5.2 237 44,085 41,159 113.1 98.6
Phase III (April 15, 2008 
to April 14, 2009) 
Medak, Karimnagar, 
YSR, Prakasam, 
Nellore
3.5 249 33,283 31,729 96.7 111.3
(continued next page)
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lower premiums than the other phases. Thus, the phase with the lowest 
premium (Rs. 119) saw the highest claim experience (128.3 percent); con-
versely, the phase with the highest premium (Rs. 439) also had the most 
favorable claim ratio (69.6 percent). As in other Government-Sponsored 
Health Insurance Schemes (GSHISs), a large part of the variation in the 
claim ratio is associated with incorrect pricing of the insurance coverage 
rather than a commensurate variation in utilization.13 The real utilization 
numbers, in absolute rupees per family, have been less variable: Rs. 234 per 
family for all the policies ended in 2008 and 2009 and Rs. 318 per family 
for the policies ended in 2010.
Internal Controls and Cost-Containment Mechanisms
Standard package costs for all identified procedures covered under the 
scheme have more limited supply-side moral hazard than under open 
ended fee-for-service pricing.14 The standard package costs include all 
Table D.3. (continued)
Phase IV (July 17, 2008 
to July 16, 2009) 
Adilabad, Hyderabad, 
Kurnool, Visakhapat-
nam, Vizianagaram)
3.9 238 30,181 28,350 85.0 98.0
Phase V (July 17, 2008 to 
July 16, 2009) 
Adilabad, Hyderabad, 
Kurnool, Visakhapat-
nam, Vizianagaram
4.5 279 45,334 43,253 127.8 115.1
Phase IV (1st Renewal, 
July 17, 2009 to July 
16, 2010)  Adilabad, 
Hyderabad, Kurnool, 
Visakhapatnam, 
Vizianagaram
Phase V (1st Renewal, 
July 17, 2009 to July 
16, 2010) 
Nizamabad, 
Khammam, Warangal, 
Guntur, Krishna
8.4 299 80,403 69,477 191.0 75.8
Total 20.4 267 
(average)
389,212 358,204 1,022.4 89.1
Source: Rajiv Aarogyasri Trust. 
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hospital charges for treatment, room, board, transportation (i.e., cash 
reimbursement for public transport), follow-up consultation, and medi-
cation for up to 10 days after discharge. Nevertheless, certain specialties 
such as cardiovascular diseases, in which hospitals have low marginal 
costs on their existing infrastructure investment, may still be attractive 
enough to induce providers to target and treat this group of patients. The 
package rate system, applied by nearly all GSHISs, may also induce hos-
pitalizations for conditions that could be treated more effectively on an 
outpatient basis and provide additional, uncovered services and even 
unnecessary care. The uncovered and unnecessary care would be charged 
directly to patients. Package rates continue to be an imperfect system as 
packages are often not aligned with real costs of producing the service 
and may induce distortions such as providers’ preferring to serve only the 
packages which are most remunerative. Nevertheless, as a starting point 
for better case-based payment mechanisms, package costs certainly have 
a role and will continue to evolve as the schemes mature. 
The IT-enabled preauthorization process with dual checks (by the 
insurer and the trust) and the physical verification by the aarogyamithra 
stationed at all hospitals, combined with the surveillance and medical 
vigilance teams deployed for sample physical checks in hospitals, affords 
the scheme some protection against fraudulent claims and unnecessary 
procedures. Innovations such as the requirement of uploading photo-
graphs of beneficiaries at various stages of treatment also prevent imper-
sonation and false claims. 
The MIS tools employed by the scheme and the rigorous monitoring 
mechanisms are customized to identify and highlight misutilization. For 
example, when the MIS highlighted the possibility of provider induced 
demand for renal stone lithotripsy (e.g., higher than expected utilization 
patterns), the scheme guidelines for approving payment were revised to 
specify the size of the kidney stone and a requirement was set for an 
80 percent minimum clearance of the stone.15 The scheme is aware of 
the likelihood of provider induced demand in procedures such as appen-
dectomy, hysterectomy, laminectomy, and discectomy and has strength-
ened prior authorization processes to minimize such situations (there 
are requirements such as a patient counseling video to be uploaded for 
each hysterectomy performed). Further research is called for to ascer-
tain the incidence of these distortions and the impact of scheme inter-
ventions.
An Empanelment and Disciplinary Committee under the aegis of a 
chief medical auditor has been established by the scheme and charged 
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with provider oversight. The committee checks for hospital compliance 
with the empanelment criteria, terms and conditions, as well as the 
package prices. Regularly scheduled and unscheduled inspections of all 
providers aim to ensure continued compliance with these require-
ments. These arrangements are further buttressed by a robust MIS and 
a grievance redressal system that highlight instances of noncompliance 
so the committee can initiate disciplinary action. The 24/7 toll-free call 
center is also available for beneficiaries to register complaints against 
providers. District grievance reports are maintained and updated regu-
larly to facilitate 100 percent review of all cases by the trust officials. 
Multiple infractions or failure to address an infraction triggers disciplin-
ary action.
By December 2010, 95 hospitals had been delisted, disempaneled, or 
suspended by the scheme for failure to comply with the scheme condi-
tions. Major reasons for delisting and suspension included unwillingness 
to participate in camps and inadequate or insufficient infrastructure 
and manpower. Filing of false claims, charging patients for “disallowed” 
additionalities, and “lapses” in treatment were other, albeit infrequent, 
reasons. 
Quality and Patient Safety
The preauthorization screening process used by the scheme is also a tool 
to ensure the appropriateness of proposed medical care. Evidence in the 
form of photographic documentation of postoperative status, post proce-
dure X-ray, and such is used to assess service outcomes. The recently 
constituted Mortality Committee reviews hospital deaths within 30 days 
to determine if the death was preventable and the extent to which an 
adverse event or improper care was a contributory factor. Nevertheless, 
beyond the empanelment criteria (which is restricted to minimal stan-
dards for infrastructure, equipment, and manpower), surprise inspections, 
and investigation of reported grievances, there is no system for periodic 
reporting of quality indicators. This lack of reporting requirements leaves 
a wide gap in quality control. The scheme has yet to leverage its financial 
clout to impel quality improvement. 
Consumer Information and Protection
Health camps conducted by empaneled hospitals are the main source 
of consumer information (and patient referrals) to Aarogyasri. This is 
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augmented by mass media activities and word-of-mouth endorsement 
from the beneficiaries of the scheme. The state government’s rural out-
reach campaign, Prajapatham, has a strong information, education, and 
communication component for the scheme. About 35,000 individuals 
who sought treatment under the scheme were included in the larger set 
of 4 million participants in these rural outreach meetings organized by 
public representatives. 
The backbone of scheme consumer protection is its MIS, which 
records all filed grievances and has a time-bound escalation system if 
they remain unresolved. Another effective mechanism for consumer 
information and protection is a letter from the chief minister that is 
automatically generated at the trust’s office and sent to all beneficiaries 
who have sought treatment. To date, the scheme has reported a 
10 percent feedback ratio to this letter, including more than 800 
instances of negative feedback that were addressed by the trust. 
Grievances can also be made through the 24/7 call centers. The major 
reasons for complaints filed in 2010 were related to requests for addi-
tional coverage for follow-up care, reimbursement (or requests) for 
follow-up drugs, treatment for postsurgical complications, and disallow-
able charges levied by providers.
Concluding Remarks
Rajiv Aarogyasri pioneered health insurance coverage for low-frequency, 
high-cost ailments—a model replicated by several Indian states since 
then. The scheme has also deployed an impressive IT system, made 
major investments in its institutional capacity and monitoring systems, 
and demonstrated high political ownership and interest. Such character-
istics may not have been emulated as effectively in other schemes. As a 
pioneer in its category, the scheme is expected to demonstrate leader-
ship in revisiting its provider remuneration system and in emphasizing 
the quality of care delivered to its beneficiaries, both areas that need 
more attention from the scheme management. The fact that the scheme 
receives widespread public and political support and has moved beyond 
the BPL population to cover the “vulnerable poor,” extending its reach 
to nearly 85 percent of AP’s population, has resulted in a relatively large 
share of the state’s health expenditure being allocated to the scheme. 
This situation has brought it face to face with the evolutionary choice 
between a targeted, deeper benefits package or a universal, limited ben-
efits package, to be accommodated within the available fiscal space. 
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Being able to rein in moral hazard, cost escalation, and any compromise 
on service quality or patient safety will continue to be important areas 
of focus for the scheme.
Notes
 1. Aarogyamithras (literally translated as “friends of health”) are the field func-
tionaries in the scheme, employed by the insurer and deployed by the trust in 
field hospitals. Further details of their functions are provided in the “Provider 
Network” section of this case study.
 2. The chief minister’s office assesses petitioners’ socioeconomic status and 
authorizes treatment case by case. 
 3. Although the earmarked tax on liquor is the major contributor, the Chief 
Minister’s Relief Fund also receives voluntary donations and philanthropic 
contributions.
 4. Rajiv Aarogyasri was rolled out in 3 districts of Andhra Pradesh in April 2007 
(Phase 1). Gradually, in successive phases, coverage was expanded to 8 dis-
tricts and then 13, and finally, to all 23 districts by July 2008. The same 
month, a new set of about 600 conditions was added to the coverage, and 
christened Aarogyasri-2. The insurer covered Aarogyasri-1 conditions in all 
districts, and the trust covered Aarogyasri-2 conditions statewide. Subsequently, 
the insurer expanded its coverage to also include Aarogyasri-2 conditions in 
8 districts, so in September 2010, the trust directly covered Aarogyasri-2 
conditions in only 15 districts of the state.
 5. This is further detailed in the section on Expenditure and Costs. The scheme 
started with a smaller benefits package in a subset of districts, and gradually 
expanded its package and geographical coverage over time.
 6. According to AP Finance Accounts for 2008–09, a total of Rs. 2,898.65 crores 
was spent under the major heads for health (2210, 2211, 4210, and 4211). 
 7. These are equivalent to district hospitals, and are under the aegis of the 
special purpose vehicle APVVP.
 8. Authors’ estimates for 2008–09 are based on analysis of the Detailed Demand 
for Grants for 2010–11.
 9. It is important to mention here that, beyond the state’s own funds, substantial 
GOI funds are spent in the state mainly for primary health care but are not 
included here in the numerator or the denominator.
 10. Simultaneously, the central government has been the major contributor 
towards primary care resources in the state through National Rural Health 
Mission, which have steadily increased, unaffected by the state’s own resource 
distribution. 
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 11. This could be driven by the need for multiple procedures per cancer patient 
every year (until the annual ceiling is reached), raising the overall frequency 
of cancer claims.
 12. Within each specialty, only the listed procedures form part of the benefits 
package. If the covered conditions under a specialty are only the rare ones, the 
overall utilization under the specialty itself will be low.
 13. Competition among insurers to secure volumes by quoting low (even unvi-
able) prices, non-availability of good quality actuarial data for better pricing 
of the risk, and lack of prior experience with a similar cover are some of the 
likely reasons for which insurers may have missed the mark.
 14. Moral hazard could have been a real challenge for Rajiv Aarogyasri had the 
payment mechanism been an open-ended fee-for-service system, as is preva-
lent in the private health insurance industry in India.
 15. The lithotripsy technique for treating kidney stones has lower efficacy for 
larger stones. In the absence of such guidelines, providers could do the proce-
dure and make a claim despite poor clearance of the stone.
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A P P E N D I X  E 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana
Table E.1 Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana: Summary Matrix
Indicators/name of 
the scheme Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY)
Launch year 2008
Geographical area Pan India eventually; currently implemented in 25 states
Target/eligible 
population
Below-poverty-line (BPL) families included in the district BPL list 
prepared by state governments and from central government 
Planning Commission estimates of their total count. Total target 
BPL population is 60 million families, 300 million individuals.
New groups being added: National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (NREGA) beneficiaries, building construction 
workers (BCW), contractual postmen, railway porters and 
hawkers, domestic workers
Number of beneficiaries 23.4 million families, 70 million beneficiaries (March 2011)
Unit of enrolment Family
Benefits package All hospitalization episodes (except certain specified exclusions) 
restricted by package limits and subject to an annual ceiling of 
Rs. 30,000 per family. Maternity and preexisting conditions are 
covered.
Package rates include post hospitalization drugs for five days and 
transportation costs of Rs. 100 per visit (maximum: Rs.1,000 per 
year)
(continued next page)
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Maximum insurance 
coverage
Rs. 30,000 per family per year
Hospital empanelment 
criteria
At least 10 inpatient beds; fully equipped medical, surgical, 
diagnostic facility; qualified physician and nursing staff; well-
equipped operating room; registration with income tax 
department and hardware for use of smart card and internet 
connectivity.
Number of empaneled 
hospitals (government 
and private)
8,103 (5,600 private, 2,503 public)
Sources of funds Central government 75 percent, state government 25 percent. In 
the northeastern states and Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), funding 
is 90 percent central government and 10 percent state, plus 
Rs. 30 collected as a registration fee from the beneficiary at the 
time of enrolment.
Total expenditure 
(millions Rs.) in 2009–10
Approximately 4,800 (Rs. 480 crores)
Premium price in 
2009–10
Average: Rs. 540 per family per year including service tax
Provider payment 
mechanism
Package rates have been defined for more than 700 procedures 
and preauthorized fee-for-service rates for non-defined 
packages
Information Technology 
(IT) tools used
Photos and biometric data of families collected on smart chip at 
enrolment. Smart cards enable offline authorization and batch 
transfer of data, as well as interoperability across geographical 
areas and insurers.
Number of 
hospitalizations a year
Approximately 400,000 in 2009–10
Utilization rate Average claim ratio: 66.8 percent as of January 2011
Most common 
procedures
—
Governing agency and 
legal status
Ministry of Labour and Employment (MOLE), GOI; state nodal 
agency (society or trust)
Executing agency State nodal agency and insurance company
Number of full-time 
staff, including contract 
personnel, in the 
implementing agency
About10 employees at center
About 100 employees total working at state nodal agencies 
Administrative costs as 
percent of total 
spending
—
Cost-containment 
measures
Smart card for identity verification; closed-ended package rates 
for common procedures; In-depth analysis of claims experience 
and action against defaulting providers
Note: — = not available.
Table E.1 (continued)
Indicators/name of 
the scheme Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY)
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Introduction
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana was launched by the government of 
India (GOI) in October 2007 to provide BPL families with access, choice, 
and financial-risk protection for inpatient health care. The scheme pro-
vides an annual cashless coverage up to Rs. 30,000 per family for inpa-
tient treatment in more than 8,000 empaneled hospitals. Financing is 
shared between central (75 percent) and state governments (25 percent). 
RSBY is being set up across the country in phases, with the goal of reach-
ing 60 million families, 300 million persons, by 2013. By March 2011, 
23.4 million families, about 70 million beneficiaries, had been enrolled in 
the scheme using information technology (IT) tools such as biometric 
smart cards. The scheme has been implemented in 376 districts in 
25 states and union territories (representing about 60 percent of the dis-
tricts in the country). The only large states where the scheme has yet to 
take hold are Andhra Pradesh (AP), Madhya Pradesh (MP), Rajasthan, 
and Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). An important feature of the scheme is 
its national portability, made possible by the standard enrolment card and 
beneficiary identification process. 
RSBY is one of the few schemes in which sufficient data and research 
have been conducted to assess scheme implementation and early stage 
performance. Available evidence from micro studies suggests high benefi-
ciary satisfaction. Despite many challenges, RSBY appears to be on track 
to achieve its objective of increased access to inpatient care for the poor 
while reducing their financial burden.
Institutional Framework
The central coordinating and policymaking agency for RSBY is the cen-
tral government Ministry of Labour and Employment (MOLE), partic-
ularly the Office of the Director General–Labour Welfare. MOLE plays 
a major role in decisions on scheme structure and implementation and 
also drafts standard documents, defines operational processes, and 
monitors implementation. Figure E.1 displays the institutional sche-
matic of RSBY.
The scheme is implemented at the state level through a specially cre-
ated entity known as the state nodal agency (SNA). SNAs have been 
established in different departments: Department of Labour (in 13 
states), Department of Health (in 10 states), and by Department of 
Rural Development (2 states). The choice of which department should 
house the nodal agencies has been left largely to the respective state 
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governments, based on state-level considerations such as reach, involve-
ment in similar activities, and the like. The state nodal agency is regis-
tered as an independent society or trust in most states; or otherwise, this 
task is assigned to an existing society or trust under the implementing 
department. 
The SNA is the main supervisory and implementing agency for the 
scheme at the state level and is involved in contracting insurance compa-
nies in accordance with the guidelines issued by MOLE. These insurance 
companies (public as well as private sector) are contracted through a 
competitive bidding process. Eligibility criteria include a valid license 
from the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority at the time 
of application. As of March 2011, a total of 14 insurance companies had 
participated in bidding for different districts, and 11 companies were 
engaged by RSBY. Four are public sector companies (owned by the cen-
tral government) and seven are private health insurance providers. In 
terms of the number of districts served, four of the five leading insurers 
for RSBY are public. ICICI Lombard (121 districts) is the only private 
insurer in the top five. 
The insurance companies are responsible for empanelment of hospi-
tals and ensuring that their institutional infrastructure meets scheme 
Figure E.1 RSBY: Institutional Framework 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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empanelment criteria (including requirements for biometric scanners, 
smart card readers and software). Insurance companies are also respon-
sible for ensuring the enrolment of beneficiaries, which is conducted by 
the insurance company’s representatives in the presence of a govern-
ment functionary assigned the role of a “field key officer.” These officials 
are supervised by the district key manager, the district-level authority 
identified for the scheme. In addition to their role in authorizing the 
beneficiary enrolment, district key managers are responsible for moni-
toring and evaluation of the scheme in their jurisdiction.
Insurance companies are mandated to establish a RSBY helpline and 
call center in each district. Insurance companies are also responsible for 
information, education, and communication (IEC) activities during the 
preenrolment stage (motivated by the prospect of enrolling as many 
families as possible, thus bolstering their revenue from premiums col-
lected for each family). After enrolment, IEC becomes primarily the state 
responsibility.
Insurance companies often hire third-party administrators (TPAs) to 
support beneficiary enrolment, hospital empanelment, and claim process-
ing services. The insurers or their TPAs may also hire smart card providers 
to support the enrolment process and issuing of smart cards.
Like most other new government-sponsored health insurance schemes 
(GSHISs), RSBY has yet to establish the institutional arrangements to 
systematically perform key functions such as oversight, supervision, trans-
parency, regulation, consumer information and protection, and data man-
agement and analysis. RSBY relies heavily on insurance companies as 
intermediaries to perform some of these functions. State nodal agencies 
are ill-equipped to fill the void. Also, since about half the nodal agencies 
are located within state labour departments, they are unfamiliar with the 
health system and dealing with hospitals. District key managers are often 
officials from the department of labour, and the quality of training for 
their roles and responsibilities in RSBY varies widely across the states. To 
address some of these gaps, MOLE is tendering for a Data Management 
Agency to collect and analyze claims, utilization, and other data.
Beneficiaries
The target population for RSBY are the BPL families based on definition 
and numbers provided for each state by the GOI Planning Commission. 
According to current estimates, there are 60 million BPL families nation-
wide. Each family can have up to five covered members: the head of 
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family, his/her spouse, and three dependents as specified in the BPL list. 
The family composition can be changed upon renewal, modifying affilia-
tion due to birth or death of family members or inclusion of family mem-
bers not covered in the earlier year. The family head, his/her spouse, and 
other family members to be covered must enroll in person.1 
The RSBY enrolment stations fulfill a number of functions: enrolment, 
correcting personal information in the BPL lists, photographing family 
members, taking their thumb prints, registering biometric information, 
and issuing the smartcards. The insurer is required to issue the card on the 
spot in the village location. This is a unique and praiseworthy character-
istic of the scheme. A contribution of Rs. 30 per family is collected at 
enrolment and at every annual renewal.2 
The field key officer, as mentioned earlier, validates the identity of the 
beneficiary using her thumbprint and key card before the smart card can 
be issued. 
This enrolment process imposes substantial logistic and administrative 
requirements on the scheme, but given the massive scale of the operation, 
the costs are relatively low: about US$3 per family or less. These costs are 
borne by the insurer within its quoted premium (which averages about 
US$12 per family, and so the card issuance still accounts for a high share 
of the insurer’s total costs). RSBY authorities maintain that gain from 
increased awareness and a robust identification system outweighs the 
registration cost.
The conversion ratio—the share of families successfully enrolled as 
against the number of eligible BPL families is about 50 percent (in March 
2011), although it is highly variable across states. Himachal Pradesh (HP) 
and Nagaland have had enrolment conversion ratios of about 80 percent; 
most other states stand at between 34 and 66 percent. RSBY is not yet 
implemented in the states of AP, J&K, and MP, and in large tracts in Tamil 
Nadu (TN) and Rajasthan. In AP and TN, the states operate their own 
scheme; in Rajasthan and MP, RSBY has made some inroads but has not 
yet been able to convince the political leadership to start implementation 
of the scheme. 
Detailed analysis has been undertaken by the scheme to understand 
problems and identify the determinants of enrolment performance. 
Based on a small sample of 248 BPL households3 (1,478 individuals) in 
Delhi, the scheme reports that a significant proportion were not clear 
about eligibility criteria, covered benefits, or cost of the smart card 
(Grover and Palacios 2011). However, once aware of the scheme, more 
than 70 percent of those eligible applied for enrolment. Regression 
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analyses showed that enrolment improved when the household head was 
between 30 and 45 years of age and/or had completed primary educa-
tion. Site visits and interviews by the RSBY team suggest supply-side 
constraints on enrolment such as cost of transportation, wages foregone 
by missing work, incorrect information on identification documentation, 
and absence of head of household. Sun (2011) examined RSBY data 
from 24 districts (17,000 villages) in seven states and found that in-depth 
village-level analysis displayed even greater variation. For example, in 10 
percent of villages there was no enrolment while in 2.5 percent villages 
there was full enrolment of BPL families. The main problem may rest 
with the quality of BPL listings (a problem beyond the scheme’s direct 
control), but distance and BPL village density may also affect enrolment. 
The entities outsourced by insurers to conduct enrolment face additional 
logistics costs and therefore have little incentive to enroll potential ben-
eficiaries in remote villages or in villages with few BPL families.4 Sun 
found that the major determinant of take-up was village BPL density, 
which makes sense in terms of the incentives offered to the insurers’ 
enrolment teams.5 
Recently, the affiliation of new target groups of beneficiaries have been 
announced by the RSBY. These include: beneficiaries of the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA), building construction 
workers, contractual postmen, railway porters and hawkers, and domestic 
workers. MOLE has also announced that RSBY will be open to any group 
of individuals willing to pay the full premium out of pocket. However, 
MOLE will vet the composition of the group before such groups can be 
covered, to avoid adverse selection.6 These new groups will be covered 
under clearly identifiable, unique IDs (for monitoring their utilization 
patterns) and will have a different financing structure from the one the 
BPL group currently follows. This would, however, also make the scheme 
more complex and will bring new challenges to address in terms of enrol-
ment logistics, technology, and management of multiple risk pools.
In March 2011, about 23.4 million cards (covering 70 million persons) 
were active under the scheme. An estimated 3 members per family have 
enrolled in the scheme. The pace of enrolment so far is encouraging. 
However, to sustain this trend, the scheme will have to achieve a break-
through in uncovered states and districts. RSBY also needs to expand 
outreach deeper into partially covered districts and achieve enrolment 
from all “missing” and remote villages. Realignment of incentives to enrol-
ment agencies would contribute to achieving a higher number of family 
members enrolled per card.
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Benefits Package 
The scheme covers inpatient (hospitalization) care on a cashless basis 
through its network of public and private hospitals. Most forms of hospi-
talization are covered with fixed close-ended prices as specified in a list 
of over 700 defined service “packages.” These “package” rates are in the 
form of a national guidance list that state governments can adapt appro-
priately. These 700 procedures are classified by 18 broad categories of 
interventions, which include dental, ear, nose, and throat (ENT), obstet-
rics and gynecology, endoscopic, hysteroscopic, neurosurgery, ophthal-
mology, orthopedic, pediatric, endocrinology, urology, oncology, and 
general surgery. 
There are some exclusions to the inpatient services covered by the 
RSBY. It does not cover congenital external diseases, drug- and alcohol-
induced illness, sterilization and family planning–related procedures, or 
vaccination. Conditions resulting from war and attempted suicide are also 
not covered. Treatments using alternative systems of medicine are also 
excluded. Other than these, however, all forms of hospitalization are 
covered up to the scheme cap. Preexisting conditions are covered as well 
as maternity. The latter includes automatic coverage for a newborn until 
the next renewal cycle (even if five members are already covered for that 
period).
Upon enrolment, each family receives one smart card with encoded 
biometric details of all enrolled family members. With the card in hand, 
family members can use inpatient services costing up to Rs. 30,000 per 
annum at any empaneled hospital. 
Although the state buys a group policy for all enrolled beneficiaries in 
each district (or set of districts), and the package prices and other policy 
conditions are specific to that state, the smart card is portable across India, 
not confined to the particular state. The RSBY has developed arrangements 
for sharing networks created by different insurance companies working 
across the country. Beneficiaries from Uttar Pradesh (UP), for example, can 
use services from a network hospital in Bihar, and the respective insurance 
companies serving each state will settle the claim between them.
The package rate payable to hospitals also includes reimbursement (by 
the hospital) to the beneficiary for public transportation costs (maximum 
of Rs. 100 per visit and Rs. 1,000 a year) within the overall insurance cap 
of Rs. 30,000. 
Ambulatory care is not covered by the scheme, except for medicines 
for five days posthospitalization (which are provided by the hospital and 
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included in the “package” rates). However, the memorandum of under-
standing with all networked hospitals requires the hospitals to provide 
free outpatient consultations to RSBY beneficiaries. Other costs (ambula-
tory diagnostics, pharmaceuticals, and so forth) are borne by the benefi-
ciaries, except if investigations or consultations lead to inpatient admission 
within a day. The extent to which hospitals in practice provide free out-
patient consultations is unknown. These uncovered services may lead to 
higher out-of-pocket spending for these services. 
The absence of ambulatory coverage and the relatively modest cap of 
Rs. 30,000 imply that RSBY benefits package constitutes a small slice of 
the overall spectrum of health expenditure. Although it makes a credit-
able contribution to the financial protection of its BPL beneficiaries for 
lower-cost inpatient procedures, it does not cover the higher-cost inpa-
tient episodes and the frequent, ambulatory care episodes. In theory, the 
public health system provides free or nearly free services that can fill 
some coverage gaps, but the links of GSHISs, including RSBY, to the 
public health system have been variable at best. In particular, linkages for 
posthospitalization follow-up care with the public health system can be 
a good starting point for the scheme to consider. The RSBY also plans to 
pilot ambulatory coverage in a small geographical area, but this will 
require considerable planning and the design of provider payment mech-
anisms that minimize moral hazard while reducing out-of-pocket burden 
for the BPL beneficiaries. 
Provider Network
Beneficiaries can access health care through any of the 8,103 empaneled 
hospitals (table E.2) spread across 376 districts (March 2011). Private 
hospitals make up 70 percent (5,600 hospitals) of the network; all the 
others are public facilities. In HP, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Kerala, 
the share of public hospitals in the network is very high. The opposite is 
the case in Delhi, TN, Maharashtra, and West Bengal. This probably 
reflects the working relationship of the state government department 
that supervises the scheme in each of these states vis-à-vis their public 
health systems. 
According to the standardized process laid down by RSBY, once the 
beneficiary reaches the empaneled hospital, a designated RSBY helpdesk, 
manned by hospital staff (a requirement for empanelment), becomes the 
first contact point. The helpdesk registers and validates the beneficiary’s 
details, using the information encoded on the smart card and the patient’s 
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thumbprint. If the beneficiary’s medical condition requires hospitaliza-
tion, the hospital ascertains the specific “package” of treatment required 
and the availability of funds (within the Rs. 30,000 yearly cap for the 
family), which is also encoded in the smart card. If the required service is 
not listed in the predefined packages, a prior authorization is required, 
and the hospital helpdesk coordinates with the insurer in ascertaining the 
Table E.2 RSBY: Districts and Hospitals, by Type and by State 
State
No. of 
districts
Private 
hospitals
Public 
hospitals
Total 
hospitals
Andhra Pradesh No RSBY 
coverage
No RSBY 
coverage
No RSBY 
coverage 
No RSBY 
coverage
Arunachal Pradesh 6 — — —
Assam 5 27 21 48 
Bihar 37 633 37 670 
Chandigarh 1 8 3 11 
Chhattisgarh 18 223 417 640 
Delhi 10 111 Nil 111 
Goa 2 2 Nil 2 
Gujarat 27 779 317 1,096 
Haryana 21 561 61 622 
Himachal Pradesh 12 42 135 177 
Jammu and Kashmir No RSBY 
coverage 
No RSBY 
coverage
No RSBY 
coverage
No RSBY 
coverage 
Jharkhand 21 174 151 325 
Karnataka 6 113 66 179 
Kerala 14 157 133 290 
Madhya Pradesh No RSBY 
coverage
No RSBY 
coverage 
No RSBY 
coverage
No RSBY 
coverage 
Maharashtra 31 921 8 929 
Manipur 1 4 Nil 4 
Meghalaya 5 7 65 72 
Mizoram 8 10 62 72 
Nagaland 4 6 Nil 6 
Orissa 12 47 67 114 
Punjab 20 329 157 486 
Rajasthan 4 — — —
Tamilnadu 2 32 Nil 32 
Tripura 4 Nil 29 29 
Uttar Pradesh 71 1,014 692 1,706 
Uttarakhand 15 63 82 145 
West Bengal 19 337 Nil 337 
Total 376 5,600 2,503 8,103 
Source: RSBY data.
Note: — = not available.
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amount applicable. The hospital then proceeds to “block” the required 
amount on the smart card. On completion of the treatment, the amount 
is confirmed and deducted from the insured amount stored on the chip. 
The hospital also sends an electronic report to the insurer or TPA for 
reimbursement of the claim. Claims must be paid within the time limit 
agreed in the contract between insurer and the network hospital 
(21 days). In certain states, network hospitals have arrangements with 
ambulatory diagnostic centers and pharmacies to integrate services.7
Detailed information on the size distribution of network hospitals is 
not available, but RSBY primarily attracts small and medium-size hospi-
tals located in semi-urban areas and small towns. RSBY prices the pack-
age rates conservatively, which larger hospitals may not find attractive. 
Financial Status
The scheme is jointly funded by the central and the state governments. 
The central government contribution is 75 percent of the premium 
charged by the insurance company, which is enhanced in the case of 
northeastern states and Jammu and Kashmir to 90 percent. The remain-
ing share is borne by the respective state. The beneficiary families pay Rs. 
30 a year toward registration and card issuance, the state nodal agency’s 
main revenue source of financing for administration, information, educa-
tion, and communication activities, and so forth. The states transfer their 
share of the premium to the nodal agency and inform the central govern-
ment of the same. The central government then contributes its share of 
the premium, and the state nodal agency pays the insurance company.
According to RSBY guidelines, the center’s share is limited to paying 
for the number of BPL families in the Planning Commission’s esti-
mates, up to a cap of Rs. 750 per family. So far, however, the health 
insurance market has been fiercely competitive, and in a bid to gain 
volume and revenue growth, aggressive bidding by the insurers has 
resulted in significantly lower quotes for premiums, such that this Rs. 
750 limit has so far not been breached. The premium paid by the 
scheme has varied within and across states, and also for different years, 
ranging between Rs. 331 and Rs. 748 per family per year, inclusive of 
service tax. The average per family premium was about Rs. 541 
(US$12) in March 2011. 
The total expenditure on RSBY was about Rs. 1 billion in 2008–09, Rs. 
4.8 billion in 2009–10, and was expected to reach about Rs. 8 billion in 
2010–11. According to the projected financial requirements for the 
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scheme in 2014–15, estimated for this book with actuarial support, 
spending on RSBY is expected to be in the range of Rs. 42 billion (Rs. 
4,200 crores).8 This steep increase (about 54 percent compounded annu-
ally) will be driven largely by growth in enrolment and only marginally 
by the change in annual costs per family. For comparison, GOI health 
expenditures (excluding RSBY) increased by about 23 percent a year 
between 2006–07 and 2009–10. Even in 2014–15, GOI expenditure on 
RSBY will be only about 5 percent of its total estimated health spending 
for the year and will constitute about 30 percent of all public spending 
on GSHISs that year. Thus, despite its impressive growth in enrolment, 
the modest benefits package implies that the actual impact of the scheme 
on government finances will be relatively small (Nagpal 2011).
Information Environment
The RSBY scheme has deployed IT applications widely and innovatively, 
particularly at the enrolment and provider levels. About 35 million 
microchip-enabled “smart” cards had been issued under the scheme by 
March 2011. It is safe to say that RSBY represents one of the largest 
deployments of smart cards globally. The smart card technology helps 
make the scheme cashless and paperless by allowing offline verification 
of beneficiary status and electronic recording of transactions at the hospi-
tal level, which is particularly relevant for a scheme using a network of 
remote, small hospitals. The technology keeps the processes ongoing even 
if internet connectivity is erratic. The pertinent information is stored on 
the card, which is all the hospitals need to deliver a service. Subsequently, 
they can transfer the transaction data to scheme servers when connectiv-
ity is restored. 
The scheme requires that issuance of each smart card is verified by the 
field key officer and that the card is printed and delivered on the spot in 
the village itself. This mandate attempts to prevent misuse and identify 
theft. This, however, is still an area in which compliance is far from com-
plete. Studies by RSBY with small sample sizes indicate that cards are not 
being delivered on the spot in a significant proportion of cases. According 
to scheme officials, this is being monitored and action has been taken 
against defaulting intermediaries. The elaborate enrolment process and 
use of smart biometric cards for identification has led to active consider-
ation of possible additional uses or applications of the beneficiary cards, 
such as for the subsidized food provided to BPL families or for storing 
health records of the beneficiaries.
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana       307
Several software applications are deployed in the scheme, including 
those pertaining to key management and security systems for the data 
stored on the card. These have been developed internally by the National 
Informatics Center, the IT solutions department in GOI. Other applica-
tions include data management, including one application developed with 
technical assistance from the World Bank. Further, insurance companies 
and TPAs have deployed proprietary software for claim processing and 
managing internal information and control requirements. Although RSBY 
does not yet feature an integrated management information system (MIS), 
IT systems are used for financial transactions between hospitals and insur-
ance companies, between insurance companies and the state nodal agen-
cies, and between the state nodal agencies and central government. 
Recently, the scheme has worked out a plan to create an integrated data 
exchange platform that will facilitate real-time data movement to the 
concerned agencies and provide MIS inputs to all entities in the system. 
The RSBY estimates that less than 10 percent of hospital-level data is 
transmitted offline through pen drives or CDs, and this is often due to 
temporary power, internet, and system malfunctions. Similarly, the 
scheme estimates that less than 10 percent of the claims are processed 
manually—a big improvement over past practice. The onus is on the 
insurer to provide functional hardware and software in public hospitals to 
process all claims electronically.
A major challenge in the information environment is the lack of a 
central MIS for the scheme. Although enrolment data are well captured, 
it resides at state level (or with the intermediaries) and needs to be 
compiled, cleaned, and analyzed with much more effort than would be 
required were an integrated MIS available. Also, the scheme still does 
not have a claim processing solution of its own, and data on claims, 
utilization, and payments to hospitals are still being generated by the 
insurers and the TPAs and then transmitted electronically to the scheme. 
The absence of such a solution (or a middleware application linking 
insurer and TPA claim processing systems with the central MIS) would 
also prevent real-time monitoring of claims (and possible leakages) by 
the scheme itself. This situation is compounded by the automatic, 
offline preauthorization of hospitalization enabled by the smart cards, 
and delays in online submission of this offline information by the hos-
pitals. In due course, when the proposed data exchange platform 
becomes available, much of these flows will no longer be manual but 
automatic and in real time, considerably improving the scheme’s infor-
mation environment.
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Utilization and Claims
By March 2011, RSBY had processed 1.65 million claims since its incep-
tion.9 At an average cost of about Rs. 4,100 per claim,10 the scheme paid 
out claims worth a cumulative Rs. 7 billion. In the six months from 
October 2010 through March 2011 alone, Rs. 4 billion was paid out, indi-
cating the rapid pace of growth. 
For a subset of the implementing 193 districts, which had been cov-
ered for a full year by January 2011, more detailed, state data are avail-
able (table E.3). The table shows the high variation in the frequency of 
hospitalization (number of hospitalization claims per 100 beneficia-
ries), claim ratio,11 and average claim amount (total cost of claims 
divided by the number of hospitalization claims) across the states 
implementing RSBY. The variations are likely to be even more pro-
nounced across villages. 
Table E.3 RSBY: Hospitalization and Claims, by State, Inception to January 2011 
State
Hospitalization 
frequency Claim ratio
Average 
claim amount
Assam 0.09 2.2 4,250
Bihar 1.33 42.4 4,368
Chhattisgarh 1.14 31.2 4,368
Delhi 3.63 121.8 4,986
Goa 0.11 1.4 3,500
Gujarat 4.33 139.4 4,384
Haryana 2.79 75.5 4,678
Himachal Pradesh 0.49 25.6 5,037
Jharkhand 1.02 54.4 4,939
Kerala 5.21 100.3 2,576
Maharashtra 1.81 52.3 4,570
Nagaland 2.82 149.1 8,450
Orissa 0.40 7.2 2,992
Punjab 1.25 54.2 6,225
Tamil Nadu 2.62 22.0 2,227
Tripura 2.69 51.4 2,250
Uttar Pradesh 3.34 70.6 4,769
Uttarakhand 1.35 29.4 5,530
West Bengal 1.24 68.2 5,366
Chandigarh 0.08 6.7 8,647
Total 2.52 66.8 4,097
Source: RSBY data.
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For the country as a whole the frequency of hospitalization was 2.52 
percent. This figure is not very different from the national community-
level frequency of hospitalizations estimated by the 60th round of 
National Sample Survey Organization. The frequency was estimated at 
2.3 percent for the rural population and 3.1 percent for the urban group 
(MSPI 2004). However, the interstate variation was significant in RSBY, 
ranging from a low of 0.08 percent in Chandigarh (and a similar 0.09 
percent in Assam) to a high of 5.21 percent in Kerala (and an equally high 
4.33 percent in Gujarat). The reasons for these variations require further 
study, but given the early stage of scheme implementation, contributing 
factors would be the correspondingly low beneficiary awareness and the 
limited accessibility of the hospital network. States such as Kerala and 
Gujarat, with high awareness levels, extensive hospital networks, and 
more implementation experience in RSBY, stand out with high utiliza-
tion compared with states such as Assam and Goa where the scheme is 
relatively new and the hospital networks are restricted.
The claim ratios demonstrate similar patterns, but they are attenuated 
by the premium variations between states. Kerala has a high claim ratio 
of 100 percent, but Nagaland, with a much lower utilization, displays a 
claim ratio of 149 percent. This suggests that the insurer was way off the 
mark in predicting potential claims in the state. Other states with evi-
dence of an “adverse” claim ratio and where insurers lost (or are losing) 
money are Delhi and Gujarat. Nonetheless, the average claim ratio is a 
reasonable 67 percent for this entire subset of districts. Considering that 
the insurers spend an estimated 20 to 30 percent of their premium on 
enrolment and other administrative costs, the industry probably managed 
a small profit. 
The average claim size has also varied between Rs. 2,222 and Rs. 8,647 
per claim in TN and Chandigarh respectively, but both states represent 
extremes on a small base. Nevertheless, the claim size is likely to vary 
based on the case mix in the state, the incidence of “combined” claims 
(e.g., two or more packages claimed for the same patient), and the extent 
of upward revisions in the standard package rates by the state nodal 
agency. Price crawl could be a function of health care costs in the state. 
This appears to be the case for Nagaland, where the higher average claims 
may correspond to higher medical costs in the hilly state. 
In the states where the claim ratios were adverse, premium bids in 
subsequent years are likely to rise. This trend is visible in Kerala: the pre-
mium quotes in 2011 were close to Rs. 750 per family, a nearly 50 percent 
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increase over the previous year (Rs. 510). In contrast, in states with low 
claim ratios, subsequent bids may be lower.
Cost Containment 
The use of standard package rates for most procedures is the predomi-
nant cost-containment tool in RSBY. Package rates limit the opportunity 
of supply-side moral hazard but do not eliminate it entirely. In particular, 
there is evidence from preliminary data that providers combine proce-
dures (such as hernia surgery with appendectomy). The extent to which 
this occurs requires further research but the data indicate that providers 
are trying to maximize their billing by adding on additional, perhaps 
unwarranted, services. Considering the low package rates, these behaviors 
are aligned with providers’ underlying incentives to maximize revenues. 
The use of IT tools such as biometric smart cards for beneficiary identifi-
cation at the hospital, combined with data analysis and monitoring by the 
insurance company, state nodal agency, and the GOI, are the other tools 
deployed to control leakages and unwarranted costs. The exact impact of 
these tools needs further study.
RSBY officials maintain that the design is such that the incentive 
structures for stakeholders are aligned, contributing to cost containment. 
In other words, given the per capita premium, insurers have an incentive 
to minimize their claims. However, this may not be entirely the case as 
insurers continue to quote lower premium bids than the past experience 
in some states and districts would justify. The predominance of govern-
ment-owned insurers could partly explain this apparent paradox.12 The 
fact that insurers have a limited, one-year horizon to control claim costs 
may be an important factor discouraging increased investments in con-
trolling costs. In other words, insurers may have few incentives to invest 
in cost containment since an adverse claim ratio in any year can result in 
a “re-pricing” of the district’s premium in the next (annual) round of bids. 
Even three-year contracts in the districts that have them are designed to 
be renewable annually by mutual agreement. Thus, the insurer’s liability 
in a loss-making district is reduced to a one year horizon. 
Quality Orientation
Empanelment criteria constitute the main quality-control provision. 
Hospitals empaneled by the insurance company or TPA must meet 
scheme-specified criteria prescribed with a view to balancing quality 
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parameters vis-à-vis adequate availability of hospitals in rural areas. The 
requirements include a minimum of 10 inpatient beds (and can be 
relaxed further by the state), qualified physicians and nurses available 
24/7, pharmacy and diagnostic services (or linkages to other providers 
that could provide them to the inpatients), hardware and internet con-
nectivity complying with scheme requirements, and acceptance of pack-
age rates. There is no provision for inspections postempanelment. The 
scheme is trying to introduce an incentive system to promote quality of 
care through a proposed grading system.
The extent of monitoring by the insurer and the state also affects the 
quality of services received by the beneficiaries. However, no data are 
collected on service availability nor is there any provision to make a defi-
nite statement on standards of care. The scheme has provisions for disem-
panelment, fines, and denial of claims, and has applied them, as evidenced 
by disempanelment of more than 50 hospitals since inception. However, 
such actions are generally a response to a complaint and not a conse-
quence of monitoring systems, which are for the most part inadequate. 
Consumer Information and Protection
RSBY officials maintain that the act of paying a nominal sum for the 
scheme at the time of enrolment is a powerful consumer-awareness tool. 
At the same time, the extent to which the consumers understand their 
health insurance coverage appears variable and needs further research.
Insurance companies are responsible for informing potential benefi-
ciaries about the scheme to encourage enrolment. They have an incen-
tive to do so since payment is related to the number of families enrolled. 
The role of the field key officer is in principle to ensure that informa-
tion about the scheme is provided to the beneficiaries at the grassroots 
level. After enrolment, the officer is the source of information on 
scheme features and provisions for the beneficiaries at the grassroots 
level. The RSBY representatives in network hospitals also have a role as 
a source of information, besides providing facilitation for the beneficia-
ries. The extent to which field key officers or RSBY representatives 
understand and fulfill these expectations is unknown and is an area for 
further study.
Health camps, organized from time to time, are another mechanism 
to provide information to the beneficiaries. Community-level public 
health functionaries, including Auxiliary Nurse-Midwives and other vol-
untary link workers are expected to act as information sources for the 
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beneficiaries. However, the degree of their participation depends on the 
extent of involvement of the district administration and the state health 
department.
Early findings from small household surveys also suggest that word-of-
mouth messaging from scheme beneficiaries may be an important aware-
ness mechanism. Villages that had an inpatient episode under the scheme 
were more likely to see further utilization than villages that did not have 
any such episode. 
The scheme has established a grievance-redressal mechanism in its 
contractual terms with the insurers. This is in addition to the recourse 
that beneficiaries have to the district administration, state nodal agency, 
and the GOI.
Concluding Remarks
RSBY pioneered enrolment of its BPL beneficiaries on a mass scale. This 
was achieved at a low cost of under US$3 per family. This cost was included 
in the insurance premium, itself low at an average of Rs. 540 (US$12) per 
family per year. The scheme’s use of smart cards for offline identity verifica-
tion and automatic authorization at the hospital is an innovative feature of 
RSBY. The scheme introduced health insurance coverage to millions of 
families and thousands of hospitals that had never before interacted with 
insurers. Early gains and recognition have set the bar high for the scheme 
to raise performance by strengthening monitoring and evaluation, enhanc-
ing financial protection for its beneficiaries, achieving greater linkages with 
the public health system, expanding coverage to ambulatory care, improv-
ing its quality orientation, and minimizing systemic leakage and fraud. 
A major constraint for the scheme will be its institutional capacity: 
both central government and state resources are limited for governing an 
already large and growing scheme. Piggybacking on the existing private 
health insurance system facilitated rollout and early gains, but the 
scheme’s overwhelming dependence on those insurers without an ade-
quate monitoring system is another area for concern. Finally, the scheme 
cannot exist in isolation and needs to invest more in ownership at the 
state level, coordinating with the state departments and forging closer 
integration with other state GSHISs. 
Notes 
 1. When the wife’s name is mentioned in the BPL list, her enrolment in one of 
the allocated beneficiary slots (out of the five) is mandatory.
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 2. This charge is used to cover the administrative costs of the state nodal agen-
cies and is not applied toward the insurance premium. 
 3. Of these households, 100 were enrolled.
 4. Sun reports that, although the average village in his sample had 145 BPL 
families, the range spanned from 1 to more than 10,000.
 5. Insurers invariably outsource the enrolment function for RSBY to enrolment 
agencies at a fixed cost per family. Insurers have an incentive to reduce their 
own cost of undertaking enrolment and therefore would focus on villages 
with high densities of BPL families. Nevertheless, villages with a higher likeli-
hood of claim costs are not likely to be known at the time of enrollment. This 
may also be a reason that “cream skimming” was not observed.
 6. Ideally, opening up a scheme to such groups requires that a high proportion 
of the group’s membership actually enroll to avoid adverse selection. Further, 
this group should have been constituted for reasons other than to obtain 
health insurance. It is not known whether these safeguards will be required or 
monitored by RSBY. 
 7. RSBY also provides coverage for interhospital transfers (from one empaneled 
hospital to another) as long as there is a positive balance in the insurance 
coverage. Thus, if a beneficiary develops complications and needs to be shifted 
to a higher level of care, transfer is possible under scheme provisions.
 8. This represents an average claim size of Rs. 5,000 per year (up from about 
Rs. 4,100 currently, due to likely upward revision in package rates), a projected 
utilization frequency of 2.8 percent per year, coverage of four members per 
enrolled family, and an 80 percent claim ratio, which translates into an esti-
mated premium of Rs. 700 per year for 60 million enrolled families. 
 9. RSBY website at www.rsby.gov.in; accessed April 6, 2011.
 10. This average figure is based on data from 193 districts that had completed a 
full year on January 31, 2011.
 11. Proportion of premium paid out as claims.
 12. The emphasis on bottom lines and profits could have weaker incentives for 
insurers owned by the government than for privately owned counterparts. 
Public sector insurers may also be motivated to attain greater visibility in 
social sector schemes such as RSBY.
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A P P E N D I X  F
Chief Minister Kalaignar’s Insurance 
Scheme for Life Saving Treatments
Table F. 1 Kalaignar Summary Matrix
Indicators 
Chief Minister Kalaignar’s insurance scheme for 
life-saving treatments, Tamil Nadu (TN) 
Launch year 2009
Geographical area Entire TN state  
Target/eligible population Below poverty line (BPL), and,
—families having annual income less than 
Rs. 72,000
—families of members of 26 welfare boards
Number of beneficiaries 13.4 million families/36 million individuals
Unit of enrolment Family
Benefits package Surgical procedures (more than 400) across 
 various specialties 
Maximum insurance coverage Rs. 100,000 over four years, per family
Hospital empanelment criteria Minimum of 30 beds
Number of empaneled hospitals 
(government and private)
692 hospitals, including 56 public hospitals
Sources of funds Entirely financed by TN state government
Total expenditure (Rs. million), 
2009–10
Rs. 5,170 (about 517 crores)
Premium price, 2009–10 Rs. 469 per family + service tax
(continued next page)
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Provider payment mechanism Package rates linked to five-tier categorization of 
hospitals.
Information technology (IT) 
tools used
Web based preauthorization and claim 
submission
Microchip-based smart cards to identify 
beneficiaries
Webcams and closed user group for coordination 
and monitoring of liaison officers in network 
hospitals
Number of hospitalizations per year 153,410 in first year
Utilization rate 0.43 percent per beneficiary in first year
Most common procedures Orthopedics (20.6 percent), oncology (17 percent), 
urology (12.1 percent), ENT (9.7 percent), and 
cardiac diseases (9.5 percent) 
Governing agency and legal status TN Health Systems Society (autonomous society)
Intermediary used Insurance company (Star Health and Allied 
Insurance as lead insurer of a multi-insurer 
consortium)
Number of full-time staff, including 
contract personnel in governing 
agency
<10
Administrative costs as percent 
of total spending
—
Cost-containment measures Preauthorization, preagreed package costs 
according to hospital categories, in-depth analy-
sis of claims, surveillance teams for fraud control
Note: In 2011–12, the scheme was modified to include additional procedures and relaunched as the Chief Minis-
ter’s Comprehensive Health Insurance Scheme, and the executing agency serving the scheme also changed. The 
maximum coverage was also changed from Rs. 100,000 floating over four years to Rs. 100,000 per year. Hereafter, 
this write-up reflects the scheme details that existed when this study was undertaken in 2010–11.
— = Not available
Table F. 1 (continued)
Indicators 
Chief Minister Kalaignar’s insurance scheme for 
life-saving treatments, Tamil Nadu (TN) 
Introduction
Chief Minister Kalaignar health insurance scheme was launched in the 
state of Tamil Nadu on July 23, 2009. The scheme aims to ensure access 
to treatment for identified serious and life threatening ailments through 
a network of public and private hospitals. The stated objective of the 
scheme is to provide quality health care to all citizens of the state, with 
an enhanced focus on the poorest of the poor as well as low-income vul-
nerable groups and unorganized sector workers needing financial protec-
tion for these high-cost ailments. 
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By targeting families earning less than Rs. 72,000 a year, the scheme 
covers not only the BPL group but also the lower-middle class families 
earning below this income level. The available insurance coverage is 
capped at Rs. 100,000 per family over the four-year insurance period. In 
other words, utilization by any enrolled family member at any time dur-
ing the four-year term counts toward the cap, and the available sum for 
the remaining period is accordingly reduced.1 The scheme has many 
similarities with the Rajiv Aarogyasri scheme in Andhra Pradesh (AP) in 
terms of its benefits package, a subset of features of the IT applications, 
and the monitoring mechanisms.2 The key areas in which the TN and the 
AP schemes differ are:
Institutional structure. Unlike AP, there is marked dependence of Kalaignar on 
the insurer’s staff, with very few full-time resources available to the scheme 
from the governing agency.
Variable package pricing. Contrary to the uniform package rates across all 
hospitals in AP, package rates vary across hospitals in TN, which are classified 
into categories by their geographical location and infrastructure.
Single state-wide contract with fixed pricing for four years. The single insurance 
contract for the entire state at a predetermined price for the entire four-year 
period is unlike the multiple bidding processes, prices, and yearly contracts 
in AP. However, this also prevents a reset of the coverage to full availability 
of the sum insured every year.
IT system. The insurer owns and deploys an off-the-shelf software application 
for preauthorization and claim submission, not a customized, integrated, and 
more extensive management information system (MIS) as is used by the AP 
governing agency. 
Institutional Framework
The state government, through the Department of Health, provides 
oversight to and funding for the insurance scheme. Although this insur-
ance scheme is not funded by the World Bank, the state has charged the 
Tamil Nadu Health Systems Society (TNHSS, established by the 
Department of Health to implement the World Bank–funded Tamil 
Nadu Health Systems Project [TNHSP]) to implement the health insur-
ance scheme (figure F.1). 
The health insurance unit of the above-mentioned society is steered by 
the State Empowered Committee, which, under the chairmanship of the 
chief secretary, is responsible for monitoring the scheme. The TNHSP 
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project director is the member-convener of the committee and the insur-
ance scheme’s nodal officer. 
The scheme has devolved some monitoring functions to the district 
administration, implemented by a district core group under the chair-
manship of the district collector, the executive head of district adminis-
tration. His deputy for social security schemes, the deputy collector, acts 
as the convener of this core group, which also comprises the district labor 
officer, joint director of medical and rural health services, deputy director 
of health services, dean of the medical college, TNHSP district program 
manager, and representatives of the departments of rural development 
and municipal administration. 
Star Health, the lead insurer in a consortium of scheme underwriters, 
has the administrative responsibility for enrolling beneficiaries, empanel-
ing hospitals, and providing services through empaneled hospitals. The 
insurer is also responsible for day-to-day monitoring of scheme operations. 
Physical monitoring is done by a battery of 21 vigilance teams of retired 
police personnel that make random, unannounced visits to hospitals and 
Figure F.1 Kalaignar: Institutional Framework 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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patient residences. Other functionaries such as district coordinators, dis-
trict program officers, and district collectors are also entrusted with 
scheme monitoring responsibilities. The scheme’s presence at the interface 
of patients and hospitals is in the form of liaison officers appointed by the 
insurer in each network hospital. Liaison officers staff the scheme’s hospi-
tal kiosk and coordinate and facilitate the beneficiaries’ treatment. 
Beneficiaries and Enrolment
Any family already identified as BPL or with an annual income of up to 
Rs. 72,000 is eligible for the scheme. Members of 26 welfare boards con-
stituted by the state government for identified vulnerable segments of 
the population, including groups engaged in agriculture, construction, 
manual laborers, auto rickshaw drivers, washermen, artists, goldsmiths, 
and tribal persons are also entitled to the benefits of the scheme irrespec-
tive of income criteria. Although the original number of beneficiary 
families was estimated at 11.6 million in March 2011, 13.4 million 
families were actually enrolled, expanding the Kalaignar’s reach to about 
36 million individuals. 
Beneficiaries were enrolled at village camps for three months. This was 
followed up with taluk3-level kiosks functioning for the next six months, 
where enrolment was undertaken on the basis of the list of eligible citi-
zens provided by the welfare board or from eligibility certificates pro-
vided by the local revenue officials, the tehsildars. After the initial 
enrolment phase, missed or remaining beneficiaries could enroll at the 
district kiosk at any time. 
Enrolment relies primarily on the state government’s BPL database. 
The process consists of photographing BPL family members, taking their 
thumbprints, and registering their personal data. After enrolment, a smart 
card is generated for each family. However, unlike Rashtriya Swasthya 
Bima Yojana (RSBY), the cards are not issued in the field and are subse-
quently delivered through the government functionaries (village admin-
istrative officers and revenue inspectors). The entire enrolment process is 
monitored by two TNHSS deputy directors at the central level and the 
district revenue officer at the district level. 
Originally, all eligible beneficiaries were to receive smart cards within 
four to six months of commencing the scheme4 but, due to delays, arrange-
ments were made for them to access scheme benefits without the smart 
card, by simply furnishing a BPL card or any other income document as 
proof of eligibility. No contribution is required from the beneficiary during 
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or after the enrolment process, either as a registration fee or any subse-
quent cost sharing for the insurance package. 
Benefits Package
The scheme emphasizes high-cost, tertiary procedures and offers free 
treatment for more than 400 listed inpatient conditions under 14 broad 
specialties5 including surgical corrections for congenital disorders. In car-
diac cases, drugs worth Rs. 500 (covering a two-month, postdischarge 
supply) are included in the benefits package. In a similarity it shares with 
other state schemes, the TN scheme covers hospitalization only for the 
defined procedures and does not cover ambulatory expenses. However, 
unlike most other recent GSHISs, which commonly reimburse patients 
for transportation expenses incidental to hospitalization, the TN scheme 
does not. 
The stated rationale for selecting the listed procedures was the long 
waiting list for treatment of these conditions in the public health care 
delivery system. Many of the listed conditions are also similar to the Rajiv 
Aarogyasri scheme in Andhra Pradesh, which preceded the Tamil Nadu 
scheme by about two years. 
The health insurance coverage is capped at Rs. 100,000 per family 
over a four-year period. The premium for this benefits package—Rs. 469 
(about $10) per family per year—was determined through a competitive 
bidding process where the insurers bid for the given benefit package and 
for the defined number of beneficiaries. The insurers are required to use 
their managerial and cost-containment experience to maintain the viabil-
ity of this premium for four years without any increases, despite cost 
pressures. 
Provider Network
There are 692 hospitals, public and private, in the scheme’s empaneled 
network. Of these only 56 are public hospitals, a common pattern across 
most GSHISs. Interestingly, also included are some hospitals in neighbor-
ing states for the convenience of members residing in districts near the 
state borders, something not seen in other state GSHISs. A beneficiary has 
the option of seeking care in any network hospital and does not have to 
use a provider from any specific geographical location. 
The insurer grades empaneled hospitals at the time of their empanel-
ment and again on their subsequent request for an upward review of their 
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grading. There are five hospital categories, A+, A, B, C, and G, based on 
location, facilities, infrastructure, and ownership (all public hospitals are 
uniformly placed in the G [government] category based on ownership). 
The minimum requirements for empanelment, apart from having more 
than 30 beds, are to have a built-up area of at least 7,500 square feet, an 
operating room with a C-arm imaging scanner intensifier, an intensive 
care unit (ICU) with centralized oxygen and suction, and minimum of 
4 ICU beds, diagnostics like X-ray and ultrasound, a 24-hour pharmacy, 
two ventilators, and a medical audit system.
Each empaneled hospital is provided with a liaison officer, a dedicated 
field official from the insurance company. This official serves a function 
similar to that of the aarogyamithra of the Andhra Pradesh scheme, which 
includes facilitating and guiding the beneficiaries, coordinating the preau-
thorization and claims processes with the hospital, and generally serving 
as the scheme’s on-site representative. 
The top 25 hospitals (by value of claims) serving the scheme in the 
first year of the policy are tabulated in table F.2. These leading providers 
in the TN scheme network are distributed across the state, without con-
centration in one district or one geographical area. These 25 hospitals 
account for 42 percent of the claims under the scheme. 
An interesting feature of this list is the large presence of missionary or 
faith-based institutions that serve an overwhelming share of the scheme 
beneficiaries. It is likely that these nonprofit, lower-priced, and relatively 
high-volume hospitals would already be catering to the medical needs of 
the vulnerable income groups. The insurance scheme has been a good 
“fit,” giving these institutions an opportunity to further reduce patients’ 
out-of-pocket costs by joining the insurance network.
Financial Status
The entire scheme is funded by the state government from its general 
revenues. The state provides funds to the TNHSS through the budget of 
the Department of Health, under a special component of the state’s 
11th five-year plan. The quarterly premium is paid to the insurance 
 company—Rs. 469 per family per year, plus service tax. Apart from the 
premium paid, the government also incurs an annual expenditure of 
about Rs. 10 million toward administrative costs of TNHSS—primarily 
for the salaries of scheme officials. 
From inception through August 2010, the state’s total premium paid 
to the insurance companies, including taxes, was Rs. 628.80 crores. For 
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Table F.2  Kalaignar: Top 25 Network Hospitals by Claim Value, July 
2009 to July 2010
Name of hospital District
Number of 
claims
Value of claims
(Rs.)
Share of 
total 
value 
(percent) 
Sri Ramachandra 
Medical Centre, Porur
Kancheepuram 2,897 153,047,901 3.7
Sri Ramakrishna 
Hospital, Coimbatore
Coimbatore 5,324 146,863,380 3.5
Ganga Medical Centre 
and Hospitals Pvt. Ltd. 
Coimbatore 3,428 133,058,710 3.2
Narayana Hrudayalaya Bangalore 1,821 112,231,386 2.7
Vinayaka Mission 
Hospital
Salem 1,633 90,888,250 2.2
Billroth Hospital Chennai 1,594 89,475,880 2.2
Madras Medical Mission Tiruvallur 876 87,307,002 2.1
Chettinad Hospital and 
Research Institute
Kancheepuram 1,756 85,188,550 2.0
PSG Hospitals Coimbatore 1,665 82,949,211 2.0
Life Line Multi Speciality 
Hospital
Kancheepuram 975 71,806,900 1.7
K.G. Hospital Coimbatore 810 65,972,411 1.6
MIOT Hospitals Kancheepuram 928 60,267,000 1.4
Kavery Medical Centre 
and Hospital
Trichy 1,258 53,460,590 1.3
Vadamalayan Hospital Madurai 972 52,865,800 1.3
Malar Hospital Chennai 498 49,611,000 1.2
S. Palaniandi Mudaliar 
Memorial Hospital
Salem 876 47,867,820 1.2
City Hospital Dindigul 1,635 47,432,000 1.1
G. Kuppusamy Naidu 
Memorial Hospital
Coimbatore 1,284 47,101,818 1.1
Kovai Medical Center 
and Hospital Ltd.
Coimbatore 799 41,225,100 1.0
Meenakshi Mission 
Hospital and Research 
Centre
Madurai 1,079 41,062,800 1.0
Global Hospitals and 
Health City
Kancheepuram 593 36,500,800 0.9
Kurinji Hospital Salem 1,058 35,168,050 0.8
CMC, Vellore Vellore 999 34,846,144 0.8
Royal Pearl Hospital Trichy 1,371 34,210,000 0.8
Saravana Hospital Madurai 1,076 33,286,540 0.8
Source: Kalaignar Scheme Data (TNHSS and Star Health Insurance).
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the same period, the insurance companies incurred expenses of 
Rs. 613.04 crores (97.6 percent of revenue). These expenses include 
preauthorization amounts committed to hospitals, printing and distribu-
tion of smart cards, advertising, field work costs, and administrative 
expenses. The insurer’s claim expenses began only toward the end of the 
enrolment period. Since then, they have been growing rapidly as a result 
of increasing subscriber awareness, expanding empanelment of hospitals, 
and issuance of smart cards to beneficiaries. By April 2010, monthly 
preauthorized claims exceeded the pro-rata premium for the same 
month. As data for a longer period becomes available, a clearer picture 
may emerge. 
The insurance cost to the government of Tamil Nadu, regardless of 
claim experience, will remain static till July 2013 under its four-year 
contract with the insurers. In 2013, however, the prices quoted for 
renewal of the insurance coverage are likely to reflect the scheme’s claim 
experience. 
Information Environment
The Kalaignar scheme demonstrates a fair degree of use of information 
technology, but it is not yet at par with the Andhra Pradesh scheme, its 
model on several fronts. The governing agency itself does not have IT 
tools for monitoring the scheme although it has access to MIS reports 
generated by the insurer. 
Smart cards, in addition to all beneficiary data, hold financial informa-
tion on the amount allocated and utilized, despite the relatively small 
memory capacity of 8 kb (as compared with 32 kb for the RSBY smart 
cards). The existence of a well-functioning alternate system bypassing the 
smart cards (beset by distribution delays and technical issues with net-
work hospitals’ card readers) had led to a sudden decline in the use of the 
smart cards at the hospitals for several months in 2010. 
The insurer has created IT processes for claim preauthorization and 
processing using acquired rights for a third-party claim processing soft-
ware. The system is regularly used to preauthorize, process, and settle 
claims electronically submitted by network hospitals. Technology is also 
being innovatively used to centrally monitor the functioning of liaison 
officers and their activities at the hospitals through a webcam-based sys-
tem. A closed user group mobile telephony system provides free voice 
connectivity to liaison officers and other field functionaries. 
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Utilization and Claims
Figure F.2 shows a steady pick-up in scheme utilization for the first six to 
eight months of operations and a leveling-off at about Rs. 60 crores a 
month by August 2010. Analysis of longer-term data will be useful to 
understand the trends better.
Table F.3 summarizes the scheme’s utilization pattern by specialty 
during the first complete year of operations (July 2009 to July 2010). In 
terms of the number of claims, the leading conditions were related to 
orthopedics (20.6 percent), oncology (17 percent), urology (12.1 per-
cent), ENT (9.7 percent), and cardiac diseases (9.5 percent) (see also 
figure F.3). The high share of orthopedic cases in TN needs further study, 
because both their number and value were much higher than in AP and 
Karnataka. Hysterectomy, though a subsequent addition to the benefits 
package, already accounted for 8 percent of all claims in TN by the end 
of the first year.
Due to the much higher average claim size in cardiology (more than 
three times the average in other specialties), cardiology accounted for the 
highest share of claims, by value (30 percent). Orthopedic surgery was 
the next highest share (22.4 percent), as also depicted in figure F.3.
For 153,410 claims approved in the first year of the scheme, the insurer 
authorized an amount of Rs. 415.7 crores, with an average claim size of 
Rs. 27,099. Although still in a relatively early stage of implementation, its 
Source: Kalaignar Scheme Data (TNHSS and Star Health Insurance).
Figure F.2 Kalaignar: Utilization Trends since Inception, August 2010 
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Table F.3 Kalaignar: Share of Claims in First Year of Policy, July 2009 to July 2010
Specialty Number of claims
Approved amount
(Rs. million)
Average claim size 
(Rs.)
Share, by number 
(percent)
Share by value 
(percent)
Orthopedic surgery 31,660 929.6 29,361 20.6 22.4
Oncology 26,039 357.4 13,726 17.0 8.6
Nephrology/urology 18,497 402.3 21,751 12.1 9.7
ENT 14,931 276.5 18,517 9.7 6.7
Cardiology and cardio thoracic surgery 14,638 1,247.9 85,249 9.5 30.0
Hysterectomy 12,344 149.0 12,067 8.0 3.6
Neurology 9,247 300.0 32,442 6.0 7.2
Ophthalmology 9,051 108.7 12,010 5.9 2.6
Gastroenterology 5,812 131.7 22,667 3.8 3.2
Plastic and faciomaxilliary 3,220 65.6 20,361 2.1 1.6
Thoracic 2,289 40.4 17,636 1.5 1.0
Vascular surgery 1,707 36.4 21,335 1.1 0.9
Others 1,692 91.0 53,792 1.1 2.2
Gynecology 1,571 19.0 12,069 1.0 0.5
Hematology 712 1.8 2,587 0.5 0.0
All specialties 153,410 4,157 27,099 100.0 100.0
Source: Kalaignar Scheme Data (TNHSS and Star Health Insurance).
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average claim value is comparable to Rajiv Aarogyasri’s, due to a case mix 
that is not dominated by high-cost cardiac care (unlike Vajpayee 
Arogyashri and the early stages of Rajiv Aarogyasri). Kalaignar’s case mix 
includes a high proportion of orthopedics, oncology, ENT, urology, hyster-
ectomy, and eye surgeries, which have much lower average costs. The 
reasons for such a case mix early in the scheme’s evolution need further 
study. They might include differences in package rates as compared with 
other states (possibly reducing the incentives for cardiology), lesser use of 
health camps as the main tool for awareness than in both AP and KA, or 
the differences in the nature of the TN hospital network with its many 
faith-based and mission hospitals.
The maximum expenditure in the first year was on the 31-to-60-year 
age group, indicating that despite the tertiary focus, productive age groups 
were responsible for most utilization. The gender equity is fair, too, with 
about 45 percent of the claims being made by women (table F.4).
Figure F.4 shows that the average claim values were more or less simi-
lar across all groups after 20 years of age but higher below this threshold. 
This seems to be due to the high cost of treatment for congenital heart 
anomalies or other congenital diseases that were more likely to be treated 
early in life (but it also reflected high average costs of the “others” group). 
Source: Kalaignar Scheme Data (TNHSS and Star Health Insurance). 
Figure F.3 Kalaignar: Share of Claim Costs, by Specialty, July 2009 to July 2010
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Table F.4 Kalaignar: Approved Claims, by Gender and Age, July 2009 to July 2010
Age (years)
Female Male
Total number 
of claims
Total value 
of claims 
(Rs. million)(number of claims)
Value of claims 
(Rs. million) (number of claims)
Value of claims 
(Rs. million)
0–12 3,769 159.5 6,242 213.4 10,011 372.9
13–20 3,218 110.7 6,237 182.1 9,455 292.8
21–30 6,939 206.9 12,280 333.0 19,219 539.9
31–40 12,601 298.2 13,839 381.1 26,440 679.3
41–50 20,653 405.4 14,762 440.1 35,415 845.5
51–60 13,103 306.7 14,962 465.2 28,065 771.9
61–70 6,896 167.8 11,257 325.0 18,153 492.8
71–80 1,770 40.6 3,983 100.5 5,753 141.1
81–90 245 5.8 624 14.6 869 20.4
91–100 4 0.1 26 0.6 30 0.6
Total 69,198 1,701.6 84,212 2,455.6 153,410 4,157.2
Source: Kalaignar Scheme Data (TNHSS and Star Health Insurance).
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Figure F.4 Kalaignar: Average Claim Costs, by Age and Gender, July 2009 to
 July 2010
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While average claim costs were higher for females up to 30 years of age, 
they were higher in males in the older age groups. This difference was 
particularly marked for the 41-to-60–year group, which may be due to 
higher frequency of cardiac diseases in men (which have a higher average 
cost) as against hysterectomy in women which is capped at Rs. 12,000. 
The reasons for these trends require further study.
In terms of total claim costs, males continue to corner a higher share, 
in keeping with the higher total number of claims by male patients and 
also the higher average claim size. This is depicted in figure F.4 and 
detailed in table F.4. 
The distribution of claims, by district, in the first year of the scheme is 
depicted in table F.5. The distribution of first year claims among the 
state’s districts resembles the distribution of the top 25 hospitals, except 
that some concentration of claims is evident in Coimbatore, Chennai, and 
Kancheepuram. These metropolitan areas of the state account for 
40 percent of all scheme expenditure. However, the remaining 60 percent 
seems to be relatively better distributed with each of the next 
10 districts accounting for between 3 percent and 8 percent of claims. 
The low utilization in some districts could be linked to the number of 
beneficiaries in the district, the smaller size of the hospital network, and 
the state of development of medical facilities in the district, and is an area 
for further study. 
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Table F.5 Kalaignar: Claim Distribution, by District, July 2009 to July 2010
District Number of claims
Value of claims 
(Rs.)
Share of value 
(percent)
Coimbatore 25,175 774,884,486 18.6 
Kancheepuram 10,326 490,048,358 11.8 
Chennai 10,511 400,108,039 9.6 
Salem 10,345 314,804,740 7.6 
Trichy 11,279 273,188,680 6.6 
Madurai 10,307 267,204,175 6.4 
Erode 12,750 210,568,090 5.1 
Dindigul 90,693 158,514,255 3.8 
Kanyakumari 7,488 143,470,371 3.5 
Krishnagiri 2,819 136,418,486 3.3 
Cuddalore 4,643 127,262,625 3.1 
Thanjavur 5,960 123,209,670 3.0 
Tiruvallur 1,530 115,748,002 2.8 
Ariyalur 647 9,298,400 0.2 
Namakkal 4,663 97,648,734 2.3 
Tirupur 3,264 67,823,880 1.6 
Vellore 2,491 63,152,394 1.5 
Tirunelveli 2,734 59,725,125 1.4 
Virudhunagar 3,228 49,216,000 1.2 
Villupuram 2,310 40,036,950 1.0 
Dharmapuri 8,259 33,268,150 0.8 
Sivaganga 1,964 32,886,480 0.8 
Theni 1,845 31,986,670 0.8 
Karur 1,463 27,757,200 0.7 
Tuticorin 1,485 24,534,800 0.6 
Tiruvarur 1,139 19,065,450 0.5 
Nagapattinam 989 18,759,500 0.5 
Pudukkottai 978 16,187,690 0.4 
Ramanathapuram 655 11,035,800 0.3 
Perambalur 627 9,644,100 0.2 
Tiruvannamalai 477 8,808,900 0.2 
Nilgiris 56 926,800 0.0 
Source: Kalaignar Scheme Data (TNHSS and Star Health Insurance).
Internal Controls and Cost Containment
The scheme has several features that can theoretically contribute to cost 
containment. Use of standard package rates for all identified procedures 
covered by the scheme provides an opportunity to contain cost to some 
extent, by limiting supplier-induced demand that could be rampant in a 
fee-for-service system. The preauthorization process allows control over 
potential misuse of the scheme, limiting supplier-induced demand as well 
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as demand-side moral hazard. The liaison officer at the network hospital 
helps validate the patient’s identity, with back office support from the 
preauthorization and monitoring teams, further reducing the chances of 
fraud or malpractice by providers. Before settling a claim, the postopera-
tive procedures are validated against the approved preauthorization by a 
group of doctors engaged by the insurer.
The medical vigilance teams, which are part of the scheme’s innova-
tive vigilance mechanism and serviced by retired police officers, also 
play a crucial, deterrent role in cost containment. This is achieved 
through unannounced visits to hospitals and beneficiaries’ addresses as 
well as quick response to any adverse reports or suspicion of malprac-
tice in a network hospital. These teams could perhaps assume a far 
greater role than deterrence, through assessing patient satisfaction and 
hospital commitment to patient safety. Currently, the incentive to the 
insurer mainly exists in weeding out fraudulent claims, which pinches 
the insurer’s pocket (particularly in light of the fact that it does not 
have the liberty to re-price the premium till July 2013). Focus on other 
areas for internal control, such as developing the governing agency’s 
own MIS which reflects data and reports in real time, would require 
re-emphasis and continued monitoring by the scheme’s governing body, 
which will also need to be strengthened in terms of its human resource 
capacity.
Quality Orientation
The state government plays a significant role in maintaining scheme qual-
ity orientation, primarily by determining the empanelment criteria for 
network hospitals and also through the disciplinary activities conducted 
by its Empanelment and Disciplinary Committee (EDC). The EDC, 
together with insurance company officials, is charged with setting the 
empanelment criteria. The committee is also responsible for monitoring 
the quality of care provided by network hospitals and delisting hospitals 
where it finds any underperformance, corruption, medical negligence, or 
violation of stated norms.
Several other committees are involved in scheme oversight, includ-
ing the Morbidity and Mortality Committee, Ortho Cardiac Cochlear 
Committee, Vigilance Committee, and Package Cost and Inspection 
Committee. These committees are entrusted with various operational 
and policy roles associated with their areas of intervention. 
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Consumer Information and Protection
Health camps for patient screening and referral, organized by the district 
health officials in tandem with the public health system officials, play a 
crucial role in consumer information. Liaison officers, together with dis-
trict coordinators, program officers, collectors, and revenue officers, are 
responsible for protecting consumers and providing them with informa-
tion. The Indian Medical Association, too, has been involved at the state 
level and disseminates information about the scheme to its members and, 
through them, to the beneficiaries.
To address beneficiaries’ grievances, district grievance-redressal com-
mittees under the chairmanship of district collectors, have been estab-
lished. Recourse is also available from the grievance-redressal systems set 
up by the insurer and the TNHSS.
Concluding Remarks
While it is too early to draw trends from the Kalaignar scheme, they are 
likely to follow a trajectory somewhat similar to that of the Rajiv 
Aarogyasri scheme in AP. The slope of these trends may be different (and 
reduced) as a result of the lower ceiling and four-year floater nature of 
the sum insured. Current data from other schemes indicate a high likeli-
hood of claim cost increases from the 2009–10 levels, which the insurer 
will have to bear until 2013. Losses could add up as the insurer tries to 
reduce its exposure and costs. In this potential scenario, the governing 
agency will need to exercise oversight of patient experience and service 
quality and ensure timely payments to hospitals. Thus, a major challenge 
facing the governing agency is to build its capacity in internal controls for 
adequate monitoring. Investing in an MIS tool of its own could be a start-
ing point, in addition to building adequate human resource capacity to 
manage scheme tasks. Tamil Nadu is well positioned to innovate and 
improve upon the design and benefits package of the scheme so as to 
forge stronger linkages with primary health care and the existing public 
health system.
Notes
 1. Thus, a claim for Rs. 20,000 by one family member in the second year would 
reduce the available sum insured to Rs. 80,000 for the rest of the policy term. 
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A claim of Rs. 30,000 the third year would leave only Rs. 50,000 available for 
the remaining part of the third year and for the fourth year.
 2. Some of these common features are traceable to the fact that the same insur-
ance company serves both the Rajiv Aarogyasri scheme in AP and the 
Kalaignar scheme.
 3. Taluk is an administrative unit at the subdistrict level—several taluks consti-
tute a district. 
 4. By 2010, the beneficiary identification systems were not fully operational, and 
a small number of cards (less than 5 percent) had not been distributed.
 5. These include: cardiac and cardio thoracic, oncology, nephrology, neurology, 
orthopedics, ophthalmology, vascular surgery, gastroenterology, reconstructive 
surgery, ENT, gynecology, thoracic, hematology, and certain other defined 
procedures.
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Vajpayee Arogyashri Scheme, 
Karnataka
Table G.1 Vajpayee Arogyashri Scheme: Summary Matrix
Indicators Vajpayee Arogyashri Scheme (Karnataka)
Launch year 2009
Geographical area Seven districts in the Gulbarga division of Karnataka,
proposed statewide rollout by 2012
Target/eligible population Below-poverty-line (BPL) cardholder families residing in 
Gulbarga, in the database of Foods, Civil Supplies and 
Consumer Affairs
Number of beneficiaries 1.5 million families (7.5 million individuals)
Unit of enrolment Family
Benefits package 402 predefined packages and 50 follow-up packages. 
Scheme covers only tertiary care 
Maximum insurance coverage Rs. 150,000 per family per year and Rs. 50,000 buffer on 
case by case basis
Hospital empanelment criteria At least 50 beds, well equipped operation theatre; post
operative rooms with ventilator; round-the-clock lab and 
radiology support; trained paramedics; availability of 
specialists 
Number of empaneled hospitals 
(government and private)
94 hospitals (86 private and 8 public)
(continued next page)
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Introduction
Launched in 2009–10, the Vajpayee Arogyashri (VA) scheme was 
inspired by the Rajiv Aarogyasri scheme of Andhra Pradesh (AP). The VA 
provides similar tertiary coverage for the treatment of serious and life-
threatening ailments for the vulnerable segments of society (primarily 
people living below the poverty line). The state launched the VA as a 
pilot in the seven districts in the Gulbarga division in the northern part 
of Karnataka state with the objective of covering all the eligible BPL 
population by 2012. As of November 2010, it covered 1.5 million fami-
lies in the Gulbarga division listed on the state’s BPL register.
The VA scheme offers cashless treatment for 402 listed procedures (and 
an additional 50 follow-up packages), with a dominant focus on those 
requiring major surgical interventions. The scheme was initiated primarily 
to protect the BPL population against health shocks caused by serious and 
high-cost ailments. The emphasis on tertiary care is a conscious attempt to 
compensate for its limited availability in public institutions and to enlist 
the substantial capacity available in the private sector. 
Sources of funds 100 percent from state government
Total expenditure, 2009–10 Nil (claim expenditure commenced in 2010–11)
Premium price, 2009–10 n.a.
Provider payment mechanism Predefined package rates
Information technology (IT) 
tools used
Proprietary software of third-party administrator (TPA) 
Comprehensive management information system (MIS) 
planned for the trust; RFP issued.
Number of hospitalizations per 
year
3,738 hospitalizations until November 15, 2010
Utilization rate —
Commonest procedures Cardiovascular surgeries (72 percent by amount)
Governing agency and legal 
status
Suvarna Arogya Suraksha Trust (autonomous trust)
Intermediary used Licensed TPA
Number of full-time staff, includ-
ing contract personnel, in gov-
erning agency
<10
Administrative costs as share of 
total spending
—
Cost-containment measures Package rates, prior authorization, physical verification by 
arogyamithras
Source: Authors.
Note: n.a. = not applicable; — = not available.
Table G.1 (continued)
Indicators Vajpayee Arogyashri Scheme (Karnataka)
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Institutional Framework
As depicted schematically in figure G.1, the Government of Karnataka 
has established a separate governing agency for the VA scheme, the 
Suvarna Arogya Suraksha (SAS) Trust. It is an autonomous trust under 
the aegis of the Department of Health and Family Welfare (DOHFW). 
The trust is responsible for all strategic decisions related to scheme design 
and implementation. For day-to-day functioning, the trust has contracted 
for a three year period an intermediary, a licensed third-party administra-
tor, selected through a competitive bidding process. This TPA undertakes 
the empanelment of hospitals and manages preauthorization and claims 
processing activities on behalf of and in consultation with the trust. The 
TPA has hired field officials for the scheme, known as arogyamithras, who 
have been placed in each network hospital and are managed by district 
level coordinators. In addition to TPA fees, all costs of these field officials 
are borne by the trust.
The trust has an executive committee empowered to ratify and 
approve policy decisions concerning the scheme. Any changes in scheme 
design, guidelines, implementation, and internal controls are made with 
the prior concurrence of the executive committee. The CEO and execu-
tive director of the trust is a senior Indian Administrative Service (IAS) 
Department of
Health, Government of Karnataka 
Suvarna Arogya
SurakshaTrust
Third-party
administrator
(TPA) 
Empanelled
hospitals 
Beneficiaries
Figure G.1 VA: Institutional Framework
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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officer, who is supported by a small team of medical specialists and 
administrative staff. 
Beneficiaries
All families residing in the Gulbarga division of the state and listed on the 
BPL database of the state government are automatically eligible for the VA 
scheme (whether they already hold BPL identity cards or have alternative 
documentation of their BPL status). In November 2010, 1.5 million fami-
lies (an estimated 7.5 million beneficiaries) were covered under the 
scheme. There is no separate enrolment process. Also, VA does not issue 
a parallel identity card for the scheme. To enhance beneficiary awareness 
and utilization, the VA undertakes information, education, and commu-
nication activities and sponsors health camps and mass media activities to 
inform people about their eligibility for coverage and their benefits. To 
use benefits, beneficiaries need only submit proof of residence in the 
Gulbarga division and their BPL status (e.g., BPL identity cards, tempo-
rary BPL identity slips, or alternative documentation issued by the state 
government) at the preauthorization stage.
The VA is gradually expanding coverage to the rest of Karnataka, start-
ing with the Belgaum division (TPA bids were invited in December 2010 
and rollout commenced in early 2011). This will be followed by rollout 
to families residing within Bangalore municipal limits and then the 
remainder of the Bangalore and Mysore divisions. By 2012, all the 
6.3 million BPL families in Karnataka will be covered. This would cor-
respond to about 31 million beneficiaries, about 50 percent of the state’s 
current population of about 61 million people.1
Benefits Package
The SAS Trust designed the scope of coverage largely on the lines of AP’s 
Rajiv Aarogyasri scheme. The VA benefits package in Karnataka consists 
of 402 mostly surgical procedures. These are organized within broad spe-
cialty groups: cardiology, cardiothoracic surgery, cardiovascular surgery, 
neurosurgery, genitourinary surgery, oncology (medical, surgical, and 
radiation), pediatric surgery, polytrauma, and burns. In addition, the 
scheme covers 50 defined follow-up packages that include posthospital-
ization care for a subset of covered procedures, including consultations, 
diagnostics, and drugs for a year. 
“Package prices” are predefined for each of the covered procedures and 
include all inpatient charges, prehospitalization screening costs, costs of 
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medicines for 10 days post discharge, and reimbursement of public trans-
port costs for the patient. The number and range of procedures and their 
corresponding package rates were deliberated and discussed by several 
specialty committees constituted by the trust. These committees con-
sulted existing coverage and package prices elsewhere in the country, 
particularly for other government-sponsored health insurance schemes 
(GSHISs). The package rates are generally priced at the lower end of 
market prices. For example, heart valve replacement (mitral or aortic) 
costs Rs. 120,000 including preoperative and postoperative investigations, 
consumables (including the valve), hospital stay, physicians’ fees, and 
transport costs to be reimbursed by the hospital to the patient. Similarly, 
angioplasty with one stent is priced at Rs. 60,000 and open removal of 
kidney/bladder stones is packaged at Rs. 10,000. The market prices for 
these procedures can be 20 to 100 percent higher depending on the facil-
ity and the geographical location. The total cap on claims per family per 
year is Rs. 150,000, although an additional buffer amount of Rs. 50,000 
can be added to this cap after a case-by-case review and approval by the 
trust. In summary, the benefits package consists mainly of tertiary care, 
with an emphasis on high-cost surgical care. The annual cap is commen-
surate with the higher costs of these procedures.
Provider Network
As a tertiary care scheme, the capabilities and quality of its provider 
network is an important factor that contributes to the success of the 
VA—or not. Hospital empanelment criteria are similar to those applied 
in Rajiv Aarogyasri and other such GSHISs. Hospitals meeting the cri-
teria (largely based on infrastructure requirements) and accepting the 
package prices are eligible for empanelment. The empanelment process 
itself is operated by the TPA following scheme guidelines. A total of 
94 hospitals (86 private and 8 public) were empaneled by the scheme 
as of November 2010. However, 40 hospitals in the network had not 
served any scheme patients until November 2011. 
The provider network in Gulbarga division is very limited—19 hospi-
tals (7 in Gulbarga, 6 in Raichur, 5 in Bellary, and 1 in Bidar). This number 
is a fifth of all hospitals in the scheme network. Limited supply of medical 
facilities is typical of underdeveloped districts throughout India. While 
many smaller hospitals are likely to be present in all the districts, they 
probably do not have the capacity to perform the sophisticated proce-
dures covered by the benefits package. Seventy-five network hospitals are 
located outside the division and among these, 33 mostly large facilities are 
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located in Bangalore, the state capital. Bangalore is situated several hun-
dred kilometers from the aforementioned districts where the scheme cur-
rently operates. As discussed later, the share of Bangalore hospitals in the 
scheme’s total expenditure is even higher than its share in the number of 
network hospitals, indicating beneficiary preference for these facilities. 
Beneficiaries are free to choose any provider from among the empan-
eled hospitals. Once approached for treatment, the arogyamithras in each 
of these hospitals assist the beneficiaries and the treating doctors in com-
pleting the preauthorization requests. The TPA then checks the request 
for completeness of documentation and for medical necessity and passes 
on its recommendations to the trust for approval. Treatment does not 
commence without trust approval. The preauthorization process is sup-
posed to be completed in 24 to 48 hours, but it can sometimes take 
several days while the trust does all processing manually, awaiting the 
implementation of its IT system. On completion of treatment, the hospi-
tal sends the claim documents to the TPA for processing and forwarding 
to the trust with its recommendation for payment or rejection. Trust-
approved claims are paid to the hospitals at the preagreed package rates 
for the procedure performed. Normally, this process should be completed 
in two to three weeks but can take several weeks for the same reasons 
mentioned above and should improve after the process is automated.
Table G.2 shows that the top 20 hospitals provided 76.7 percent of all 
care by monetary value, and the top 3 hospitals alone accounted for 
40 percent of claims. Thirteen of these twenty hospitals, including the top 
6 facilities, are located in Bangalore. The only three hospitals from this list 
located in the Gulbarga division account for a combined share of 
8.1 percent of all claims. The only public hospitals in the top 20 list are 
2 prominent autonomous hospitals in Bangalore that together account for 
about 10 percent of the total claim amount. In short, beneficiaries choose 
to travel long distances, especially for the more sophisticated, higher-cost 
procedures, and prefer the “prestigious” large hospitals in the capital. 
Financial Status
The VA is funded by the state government from its general revenues.2 The 
state government provides funds to the Suvarna Arogya Suraksha Trust 
(SAST) as a grant-in-aid,3 and the SAST uses this money to pay the net-
work hospitals for claims and for its own administrative expenditures.
The scheme began to authorize claims in 2009–10 (and also incurred 
administrative expenses in setting up the institutional infrastructure and 
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processes for the scheme), but claim payment did not commence until 
2010–11. Table G.3 presents the financials for the first 4.3 months in 
2010 for which data are available. By August 2010, the state had released 
Rs. 210 million to the trust for meeting the cost of claims and administra-
tive expenses. According to VA officials, the state government is commit-
ted to make adequate funding available for the scheme, not just for the 
expenditure incurred for current beneficiaries in the Gulbarga division, 
but also for future beneficiaries in the still unserved districts of the state. 
Utilization and Claims
As shown in table G.4, cardiovascular cases predominated in the early 
months of utilization of the VA scheme, representing 51 percent of claims 
and 72 percent of total expenditures. These cardiovascular cases consist 
of valve surgeries, bypass surgeries, angioplasties, and septal defects, 
among others. The predominance of the higher-priced cardiovascular 
Table G.2 VA: Top 20 Hospitals, by Value of Authorized Claims, to 
November 15, 2010
Hospital name Location
Share, by claim 
value (percent)
Narayana Hrudayalaya Bangalore 16.5 
Sagar Hospitals, Banashankari Bangalore 12.0 
BGS Global Hospital Bangalore 11.3 
Vydehi Hospital Bangalore 8.1 
Sri Jayadeva Institute of Cardiovascular Science Bangalore 6.0 
Apollo Hospital Bangalore 5.4 
Rajiv Gandhi Super Speciality Hospital Raichur 3.9 
Jeevani Health Care Hospital Bangalore 3.9 
Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology Bangalore 3.7 
Trinity Hospital and Heart Foundation Bangalore 3.3 
Bangalore Institute of Oncology Bangalore 2.4 
KLES Dr. Prabhakar Kore Hospital Belgaum 2.3 
VIMS Speciality Hospital Bangalore 2.3 
SDM Narayana Hrudyalaya Dharwad 2.3 
Shree Hospital Bidar 2.2 
Mallya Hospital Bangalore 2.1 
Patil Nursing Home Gulbarga 2.0 
Srinivas Cardiac Center Bangalore 1.8 
City Central Hospital Davangere 0.9 
NMR Curie Centre of Oncology Dharwad 0.8 
Top 20 hospitals, by claim value Various 76.7 
Source: Suvarna Arogya Suraksha Trust data, November 2010.
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cases in the initial months is also the reason for the high average claim 
size in the VA scheme: Rs. 58,793 per claim in November 2010. As the 
scheme matures and the case-mix changes, the average claim amount 
should decline. At the outset of the VA, there may have been unmet 
demand for cardiovascular procedures partly due to limited supply in the 
public sector and high prices in the private facilities. 
Nevertheless, the likely lower incremental costs for hospitals4 and the 
relatively attractive package rates (even at package rates lower than mar-
ket prices) may be inducing providers to ferret out cardiovascular cases 
in the health camps. Indeed, the significantly higher average claim 
amount for cardiovascular diseases suggests that providers are favoring 
Table G.3 VA Financial Status, August 2010 (Rs. million) 
Particulars 2009–10
2010–11
(4.3 months)
SAST revenues
Grants released by state government 150 60
Grants from other sources 4.34 6.8
Total grants 154.34 66.8
SAST expenditures
Claims Nil 34.74
Administrative cost 18.43 10.41
Total expenditure 18.43 45.15
Balance 135.92 157.57
Source: Suvarna Arogya Suraksha Trust data, August 2010.
Table G.4 VA: Claim Distribution, by Specialty, to November 15, 2010
Specialty
Total claims preauthorized Share in 
numbers 
(percent)
Share 
in value
(percent)
Average 
claim value 
(Rs.)Cases
Amount 
(Rs. million)
Cardio vascular 
diseases 1,894 157.93 50.7 71.9 83,386
Cancer 753 27.99 20.1 12.7 37,167
Neurological 
diseases 466 18.90 12.5 8.6 40,554
Genitourinary 
and renal 
diseases 485 9.83 13.0 4.5 20,264
Burns 71 2.82 1.9 1.3 39,718
Polytrauma 6 0.17 0.2 0.1 28,333
Neonatal 63 2.13 1.7 1.0 33,833
Total 3,738 219.77 58,793
Source: Suvarna Arogya Suraksha Trust data, November 2010.
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these procedures. Oncology is a distant second in terms of utilization, 
followed by neurology and genitourinary and renal diseases. Burns, poly-
trauma, and neonatal surgical procedures were little used. Further study 
is needed to discover whether the frequency of occurrence of the covered 
conditions in these specialties is related to the incentives offered by the 
package rates. Higher package rates may induce providers to seek benefi-
ciaries with certain conditions and avoid treating those with less remu-
nerative conditions. This differential rate setting is a possibility because 
package rates are set by groups of medical specialists specific to each 
specialty and are subjective. Some specialties may end up with more 
liberal (and attractive) package rates than the others.
Table G.5 shows the geographical distribution of claims across the seven 
districts in the Gulbarga division as of November 2010. With the exception 
of Gadag, a recently created district, there is little variation in average claim 
values, ranging between Rs. 53,402 and Rs. 61,938. The shares in claim 
value may reflect the differing sizes of the districts and the number of ben-
eficiary residents. Based on the available data, it is difficult to determine any 
geographical deterrents to utilization. However, since all the covered dis-
tricts are far from Bangalore, where most hospitals (and utilization) are 
concentrated, whether they suffer low utilization as a group is difficult to 
ascertain but is certainly a potential subject for future research. 
Information Environment
The VA is still far behind the AP scheme in the adoption and use of infor-
mation systems, although it intends to install information technology 
tools. As of March 2011, the governing agency had no IT tools for moni-
toring and depended entirely on the MIS reports generated by the TPA 
using its own claim-processing system. 
Table G.5 VA: Claim Distribution, by District, to November 15, 2010
District Cases Amount (Rs.)
Share of claim 
value (percent)
Average claim 
value (Rs.)
Bellary 805 48,660,000 22.1 60,447
Bidar 658 39,305,100 17.9 59,734
Gulbarga 931 49,717,100 22.6 53,402
Yadagiri 350 20,693,500 9.4 59,124
Koppal 522 31,962,600 14.5 61,231
Raichur 464 28,739,100 13.1 61,938
Gadag 8 690,000 0.3 86,250
Totals 3,738 219,767,400 58,793
Source: Suvarna Arogya Suraksha Trust data, November 2010.
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A firm was engaged to conduct the functional requirements study and 
develop the request for proposal (RFP) to select a service provider for 
design, development, testing, installation, and maintenance of IT solu-
tions. The RFP publication and the procurement and deployment of the 
IT solution was scheduled for 2011–12. 
Internal Controls and Cost Containment
If properly priced, standardized package rates for covered procedures in 
theory can contain costs. The preauthorization process allows some con-
trol over overutilization of the scheme, limiting supplier-induced demand 
as well as demand-side moral hazard. The arogyamithras, as discussed, are 
an additional check against impersonation and other such leakages.
Nevertheless, the trust has limited human resources of its own to 
monitor the various processes conducted by the TPA. In addition, the 
TPA is paid on a predetermined fee structure which provides a weak 
incentive to invest resources in reducing leakages and monitoring provid-
ers. Thus, the trust needs to develop its own capacity to perform these 
functions, investing in monitoring and evaluation systems to tighten inter-
nal controls, especially considering that all risk is retained by the trust. 
Quality Orientation
Similar to other schemes discussed in this book, the VA has yet to con-
sider using its financial leverage to improve quality beyond the empan-
elment process. However, according to VA officials, the trust plans to 
issue quality assurance guidelines and standards, set up a medical audits 
process, and explore other options for evaluating service quality. The 
proposed medical management and monitoring and evaluation depart-
ments in the trust will eventually perform these functions. 
Consumer Information and Protection
Massive health camps with the participation of senior state political lead-
ers have marked the launch of the VA scheme in each district it serves. 
The associated preparations, media activities, and word of mouth messag-
ing from beneficiaries who attended these camps have been important in 
creating awareness about the scheme.5 The arogyamithras facilitate the 
camps and the network hospitals are responsible for providing the man-
power and diagnostic tools to conduct the free health check-up.
Vajpayee Arogyashri Scheme, Karnataka       343
Other outreach media—handbills, posters, bus panels, and the like—
have also been used to widen awareness of the scheme. There has been 
some involvement of the public health system for referring patients to 
the scheme. The potential of the public delivery system, however, has not 
been fully tapped. 
The scheme plans to undertake a baseline study of beneficiary aware-
ness, household health expenditures, access, and utilization patterns as 
part of an impact evaluation. The VA is the only scheme that has built in 
plans to conduct a baseline study as part of its rollout. 
Concluding Remarks
As a new venture, the Vajpayee Arogyashri scheme still has much ground 
to cover in terms of its geographical expansion, IT system implementa-
tion, stakeholder monitoring (TPAs, hospitals, arogyamithras), and qual-
ity improvement. This necessitates a focus on institutional strengthening, 
especially in terms of adequacy and capacity of its human resources. The 
scheme has strong political support and has an advantage of being able 
to learn from its predecessors as it increases its geographical footprint in 
the state.
Notes
 1. Provisional population estimates from the Census of India (2011).
 2. A minor share of expenditure is eligible for financing under the World Bank–
assisted Karnataka Health Systems Development and Reforms Project 
(KHSDRP).
 3. Grant-in-aid, a public accounting term in India, signifies lump sum grants 
made by government to nongovernment entities (as a registered trust, 
SAST is a legal entity outside the government). These grants are associated 
with a prior agreement determining the use of funds and the reporting 
requirements to government. As an illustration, the National Rural Health 
Mission in India widely uses grants-in-aid to the state and district health 
societies.
 4. The infrastructure already exists and is therefore a fixed cost; the cost of 
consumables reflects only a smaller component of the costs of cardiovascular 
treatment.
 5. These health camps have been continued at the district and Taluka level. 
Regular schedules for these camps have been prescribed. For example, Taluka 
level camps are conducted on the 5th of every month in Bidar and Koppal 
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districts, 10th of the month in Yadgir and Bellary, and 15th of the month in 
Gulbarga and Raichur. District-level camps are held on the 25th of every 
month. 
Reference
MOHA (Ministry of Home Affairs, India). 2011. Census of India. Registrar General 
and Census Commissioner. MOHA  New Delhi, India.
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RSBY Plus Scheme, Himachal 
Pradesh 
Table H.1 RP: Summary Matrix
Indicators/scheme name RSBY Plus (RP)
Launch year 2010
Geographical area Entire state of Himachal Pradesh (HP)
Target/eligible population All beneficiaries enrolled under Rashtriya Swasthya 
Bima Yojana (RSBY, appendix E). These are the 
already identified below-poverty-line (BPL) 
population in the HP list. 
Number of beneficiaries 0.24 million families (0.8 million individuals)
Unit of enrolment Family
Benefits package A top-up scheme covering tertiary care services not 
adequately covered under RSBY. Also pays for 
transport expenses and limited pre and posthospi-
talization medical expenses.
Maximum insurance coverage Rs. 175,000 beyond the Rs. 30,000 covered by RSBY
Hospital empanelment criteria At least 50 beds plus the requisite surgical infra-
structure and human resources
Number of empaneled hospitals 
(government and private)
16 (2 public hospitals and 1 private hospital in HP 
and 13 private hospitals outside HP) 
Source of funds State government general revenues
Total expenditure (Rs. million), 
2009–10
2009–10, none; 2010–11, Rs. 85.6 million (March 
2010– February 2011)
Premium price, 2009–10 Rs. 364 per family including service tax
(continued next page)
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Provider payment mechanism Fixed package rates for all covered procedures
Information technology (IT) tools 
used
No management information system (MIS) in the 
implementing agency 
Beneficiary identification tools of RSBY 
Insurer and its third-party administrators (TPAs) use 
their own tools.
Number of hospitalizations per year 241 (March 2010–February 2011)
Utilization rate 0.1 percent (in 12 months) per family
Commonest procedures —
Governing agency and legal status HP Swasthya Bima Yojana Society, autonomous 
society under HP Health and Family Welfare (HFW) 
department 
Executing agency State HFW department and contractual staff
Number of full-time staff, including 
contract personnel, in the 
implementing agency
5
Administrative costs as percent of 
total spending
—
Cost-containment measures Prior authorization, package rates
Note: — = not available.
Table H.1 (continued)
Indicators/scheme name RSBY Plus (RP)
Introduction 
RSBY Plus (RP), one of the newest entrants on the government-sponsored 
health insurance schemes (GSHISs) scene in India, was launched by the 
state government of Himachal Pradesh in early 2010. It was designed as 
a top-up scheme for RSBY during the older scheme’s expansion across 
the state. RP features tertiary-focused coverage which was designed as an 
additional benefits component atop the RSBY coverage for all enrolled 
BPL beneficiaries in the state. It is served by the same insurer and for the 
same policy period as RSBY. The first policy was initiated on March 1, 
2010, with a one-year term. 
The RP scheme does not have a separate enrolment process; it shares 
beneficiary identification and eligibility validation mechanisms as well as 
the technological platform with RSBY. However, the RSBY platform is 
not used for the preauthorization and claim-settlement processes. These 
functions are performed and managed by the insurer (and its TPAs) using 
their proprietary systems.
In RP design, planners recognized the limitations in the supply of tertiary 
care facilities under the public health delivery system. The scheme aims to 
increase access to select tertiary procedures. However, even the private 
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providers of health care are few and far between in HP state, and this scar-
city continues to challenge RP and the state’s health system in general. 
Institutional Framework
The HP Department of Health and Family Welfare (HFW) is the insti-
tutional owner of the RP scheme. The department has created an admin-
istrative arrangement to govern the implementation of RSBY as well as 
RP in an integrated manner, through the HP Swasthya Bima Yojana 
Society. This is an autonomous society, legally outside the state govern-
ment, but still a public institution in terms of its stewardship, affiliation, 
internal procedures, and financing. The principal secretary of health is 
the ex-officio chairperson of the society. A contracted full time CEO 
manages the society’s day-to-day functioning. 
The society has engaged the same insurance company as an intermedi-
ary for both RSBY and RP. The insurer was selected through a competi-
tive bidding process. The insurer is responsible for hospital empanelment 
and ensuring their connectivity and for managing the preauthorization 
and claims-processing activities. To support it in the performance of these 
functions, the insurer has engaged two TPAs. The society is responsible for 
overall supervision, but the breadth and depth of oversight is still not 
adequate with the society’s small staff. 
The institutional architecture is illustrated in figure H.1. The society 
has upward linkages to the parent department (HFW) and the Department 
of Labour (to coordinate for RSBY), and downward linkages to insurers 
that contract TPAs for implementation support, and through them, man-
age the providers. The society is not yet manned with adequate full-time 
human resources other than the CEO, a finance officer on deputation, 
and 3 support staff on a contract basis (as against 10 sanctioned posts in 
the society). However, senior officials of the department of health do 
participate in the supervision of the RP scheme.
Beneficiaries
The beneficiaries for RSBY Plus are BPL families already enrolled in 
RSBY. HP is one of the few states where the BPL list is updated quarterly. 
HP has also enrolled a relatively high number of BPL families in RSBY. 
For example, in 2010–11 out of the total state BPL list of 298,291 fami-
lies, 235,131 families were enrolled in RSBY (and also in RP). Of the 
estimated 1.18 million rural families in the state as a whole, BPL families 
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make up 25 percent of the state’s own BPL list. HP is also one of the few 
states whose BPL numbers closely correspond to the central government 
planning commission estimates used by RSBY. This suggests that the BPL 
targeting in HP may be more focused than seems to have been possible 
in other states running similar GSHISs. This, however, requires further 
study before it can be established either way.
All enrolled families have the RSBY biometric identity card, which is 
their primary means of identification for their coverage under RSBY Plus. 
The RP scheme thus rides on the same beneficiary identification platform 
as RSBY, and RP does not do any specific enrolment of its own. Finally, 
no contributions (other than those already made for RSBY coverage) or 
cost sharing is required from the beneficiaries. 
Benefits Package
RSBY Plus covers 326 procedures within the broad specialties of cardiac 
and cardiothoracic surgeries, genito-urinary surgery, neurosurgery, radia-
tion oncology, trauma, transplant surgeries, spinal surgeries, and surgical 
HP Department 
of  Health
and Family Welfare 
HP Swasthya Bima
Society 
insurance
company
network
hospitals
third-party
administrators 
HP  Department
of Labour
Figure H.1 RP: Institutional Framework
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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gastroenterology. Similar to other GSHISs, all preexisting conditions are 
covered. 
In a departure from other new generation GSHISs, treatment under 
the system of ayurveda is included in the RP scheme. However, the prac-
tical experience with ayurvedic system claims filed and paid under a 
benefits package of predominantly tertiary surgical procedures remains to 
be seen. No ayurvedic hospitals had been empaneled as of December 
2010.
RSBY Plus has a liberal provision for transportation costs in contrast to 
RSBY, where it is capped at Rs. 100 per episode. RP includes a transport 
provision of up to Rs. 1,000 per inpatient visit and is subject to an annual 
ceiling of Rs. 3,000 per beneficiary family. This may be justified in view of 
the hilly terrain and the out-of-state location of most empaneled hospitals. 
The package rates under RSBY Plus also include longer periods of pre 
and posthospitalization expenses than other new generation GSHISs. 
Hospitals are mandated to provide treatment up to 15 days prior to hos-
pitalization and up to 60 days postdischarge, within the prescribed pack-
age rates. How this is monitored in practice is not clear, inasmuch as most 
hospitals would lodge claims well before the end of the prescribed post-
hospitalization period. The scheme does not include follow-up packages 
for any tertiary conditions beyond the 60-day period applicable to all 
packages.
The RP scheme bears the entire cost of the episode, without any con-
tribution from the RSBY. In theory, RSBY also covers the same episode 
(since it covers all forms of hospitalization and RP covers only a subset of 
the RSBY benefits package) payable under RP, but for a smaller cap of 
Rs. 30,000. The sharing of some costs by RSBY would reduce the state’s 
financial burden (as RSBY is largely subsidized by the center) but also 
end up using some or all of the total coverage available to the family 
under RSBY. With low utilization under the RP scheme, and a common 
insurer unaffected by the transaction being under either scheme, this is 
not currently a pressing concern. However, it is an issue that will have to 
be worked out for the future. 
Provider Network
RSBY Plus beneficiaries can seek care in any public or private hospital 
within the network, and are not confined to using a provider from a spe-
cific geographical location. The insurer can empanel hospitals from any 
location within the state as well as outside the state. However, hospitals 
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need not be empaneled by the RSBY or agree to the RSBY rates. The 
empanelment criteria are similar to RSBY’s except that the minimum 
bed size is 50 beds (compared with 10 for RSBY), and RP has specific 
infrastructure and equipment requirements related to tertiary care. If not 
already empaneled by RSBY, hospitals must install the smart card–related 
hardware and software for beneficiary identification and validation. The 
remaining operational processes for obtaining preauthorizations for treat-
ment under RSBY Plus are performed by the insurer and are similar to 
those applied in the private health insurance industry.
RP has a limited provider network of just 16 hospitals. Of these, only 
9 were used in the first 11 months of operations (table H.2). Only 3 of 
these hospitals being used under the scheme (two public medical colleges 
and one private hospital) are located in HP state. All the others are pri-
vate and located outside the state. Unlike RSBY, which has empaneled 
22 private hospitals in the state, RP has empaneled only one private hos-
pital in HP. The bulk of the utilization (58 percent by number of cases 
and 78 percent by claim value) is reaped by a single public hospital, the 
Indira Gandhi Medical College (IGMC) in Shimla. IGMC is a public 
medical college with no user fees and receives supply-side budget support 
from the state. A case can be made that existing private hospitals in HP 
are capable of providing services for some of the covered procedures and 
access to these hospitals may improve scheme utilization. Since the 
responsibility for hospital empanelment lies with the insurer, the govern-
ing agency needs to put pressure on the insurer to deliver. 
Similarly, some of the largest and most utilized tertiary care public 
hospitals in the region, such as the Post Graduate Institute of Medical 
Education and Research in Chandigarh, were not empaneled (as of 
January 2011). A restricted provider network may defeat the purpose of 
health insurance by constraining access to care and offering few provider 
options beyond what was already available to beneficiaries prior to gain-
ing insurance coverage. 
Financial Status and Sources of Funds
The market-determined premium for RSBY Plus was Rs. 364 per family 
including service tax in its first year of operation (2010). This amounts to 
an estimated annual premium of Rs. 85.6 million, paid by the state 
government to the insurer for covering about 235,000 families. This 
expenditure is borne entirely by the state government, drawing on its 
general tax and nontax revenues. The total cost of this insurance coverage 
Table H.2 RP Hospital Network and Its Utilization, March 1, 2010, to February 15, 2011
Location State Hospital Ownership
Number of cases 
treated Claim value (Rs.)
Shimla HP IGMC, Shimla Public 139 9,541,750
Kangra HP Dr. RPGMC Kangra at Tanda Public 0 0
Amritsar Punjab EMC group of Hospital, Shakti Nagar Private 0 0
Amritsar Punjab EMC group of Hospital, B-13, Ranjeet Avenue Private 0 0
Amritsar Punjab EMC group of Hospital, Greet Avenue Private 0 0
Amritsar Punjab Escorts Fortis Hospital, Majitha Verka By Pass Road Private 0 0
Chandigarh Union Territory Kidney Centre, SCO 32, Sector 34A Private 16 465,200
Chandigarh Union Territory Nins Hospital, Sector 34 Private 8 916,398
Jalandhar Punjab Tagore Hospital and Heart Care Centre, Mahavir Marg Private 12 721,609
Jalandhar Punjab Jammu Hospital, Jalandhar Private 4 52,000
Mohali Punjab Silver Oaks, Phase 9, Mohali Private 1 30,000
Mohali Punjab Indus Hospital, SCO 98–100, Phase 3 Private 39 115,000
Mohali Punjab Indus Super Speciality Hospital near SDM Office Private 0 0
Mohali Punjab Ivy Hospital, Sector 71, Mohali Private 0 0
Fatehgarh Punjab Sh. Guru Teg Bahadur, Fatehgarh Sahib Private 19 172,500
Manali HP Lady Willington Hospital Private 2 72,000
Total 241 12,261,457
Source: RSBY Plus, HP HFW department data.
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is marginally higher than the amount paid for the underlying RSBY cov-
erage (Rs. 77.8 million for the same period). However, in terms of claims 
reported to the insurer, RSBY Plus registered claim utilization of only 
Rs. 11.3 million in the first 10 months, compared with Rs. 77.25 million 
claimed under the RSBY insurance coverage over the same period. The 
limited network of hospitals for RSBY Plus, lack of awareness, or both 
may contribute to low levels of claims. 
The RP scheme requires no contributions from the beneficiaries. This 
was the policy option chosen by the HP planners. Similar to the evolu-
tionary history of other state schemes, RP’s predecessor was the relief 
funding available through the chief minister, provided as grants, decided 
case by case, to a small number of beneficiaries for treatment of tertiary 
illnesses. The “relief fund model” did have limitations. First, access to the 
funds was mostly patronage driven. Second, equity was probably compro-
mised because the poorest were unlikely to be aware of the funds or have 
the political access to pursue such options as easily as higher-income 
groups. Further, relief funds did not cover the full cost of care, often 
resulting in a large financial burden for the patient. Similar to other states, 
HP chose to move away from the relief funds and embrace fully subsi-
dized insurance mechanisms.
Utilization and Claims
During the first 11.5 months of the scheme (March 1, 2010, to February 
15, 2011), RP registered 241 claims amounting to a claim expenditure 
of Rs. 12.26 million (against the insurance premium of Rs. 85.6 million 
received by the insurance company for the full year—a claim ratio of 
about 15 percent). Figure H.2 shows the monthly trends in claim 
amounts for the first 10 months of the scheme. The first couple of 
months observed little utilization as awareness was low. Since the third 
month of implementation, monthly expenses have hovered between Rs. 
1 million and Rs. 1.8 million. Compared to other GSHISs, utilization 
appears on the low side. For example, with about six times the number 
of covered families as RP, the VA scheme in Karnataka recorded more 
than 3,000 claims in its first 10 months against just 188 claims in HP. 
Both schemes feature similar benefits packages. In terms of frequency 
of utilization by the beneficiaries, RSBY Plus experienced a utilization 
frequency of only 0.08 percent in the first 10 months, which translates 
to an annualized rate of 0.1 percent. This is 4 to 5 times lower than 
other state schemes with similar tertiary care benefits packages. 
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Access in terms of the limited provider network and the difficult geog-
raphy of this hilly state emerge as possible reasons for this lower than 
expected utilization. The state has already incorporated a liberal transpor-
tation allowance into the benefits package design to partly compensate 
for high transportation costs. However, provider network inadequacy is 
an area for focus. Building awareness among beneficiaries is another area 
that may require close attention by scheme officials. 
Information Environment
The RSBY Plus piggybacks on the beneficiary identification systems of 
RSBY, which provides the scheme with lists of enrolled families, biomet-
ric information, and smart ID cards that can be processed online or 
offline. To process claim information, the insurer and TPAs apply their 
own proprietary IT systems, which they also use to process private health 
insurance claims. The governing agency does not have IT tools of its own. 
Nor are IT investments planned for any time soon. The society is entirely 
dependent on the information and reports made available from the inter-
mediaries. Given that an insurer and two TPAs engaged by the insurer 
together serve the scheme, coordinating with multiple agencies for the 
Source: RSBY Plus, HP HFW department data.
Figure H.2 RP: Monthly Trend in Claim Value, March through December 2010 
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required information is in itself not an easy proposition. Limited institu-
tional capacity in the governing agency also restricts its ability to monitor 
trends and to introduce new design features. The multiplicity of their 
responsibilities in the state department of health severely limits the time 
that the leadership can devote to the scheme. Capacity building in the 
governing agency will help improve the information environment as well 
as the scheme’s ability to act on the information.
Internal Controls and Cost Containment
The society’s institutional capacity needs to be strengthened to improve 
the internal control environment, as discussed above. Cost-containment 
mechanisms already deployed by the scheme include package rates and 
prior authorizations. However, at this early stage of rollout and with the 
low utilization levels, the scheme management should be more concerned 
with factors hampering utilization, which may contain costs (and lead to 
higher profits) for the insurer but not deliver the required benefits.
Quality Orientation
Similar to other GSHISs, the empanelment criteria prescribing the mini-
mum infrastructure requirements at empanelment are the main check on 
provider quality. There are no explicit follow-up mechanisms or other 
quality review systems. 
Consumer Information and Protection
The scheme elicits feedback through letters sent by the chief minister to 
the scheme beneficiaries. Letters informing about the scheme and seeking 
feedback are also sent from the chief minister and the health minister to 
the gram pradhans, who are elected village officials, usually the chairper-
son of the village council. Information on the content of the letters and 
responses to them is not available. All providers are required to conduct 
health camps (12 per provider per year), but the extent to which this is 
practiced or monitored is unknown. 
Media activities are also undertaken by the society, but much more 
outreach is needed. As suggested above, given the lower than expected 
utilization, creating greater awareness of the scheme benefits is an impor-
tant activity for the governing agency.
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Concluding Remarks
Himachal Pradesh has taken the “genealogical” next step of designing a 
tertiary, state-funded coverage riding on RSBY’s secondary and maternity 
coverage. The same state agency manages RP and RSBY. Several chal-
lenges have come to the fore: fragile institutional capacity, low utilization, 
weak information environment, and lack of empaneled hospitals. However, 
as a recent arrival on the GSHIS landscape, RP has an opportunity to learn 
from earlier schemes’ experience. If it does not, it might repeat their 
errors. HP could leverage its public health system to establish closer link-
ages for long-term follow-up treatment after the surgical procedures in 
the RP scheme. 
Both RP and RSBY use the same private insurer as intermediary. So far, 
no issue of sharing of claim costs has arisen, but this situation needs to be 
clarified for the future, and technologically enabled. The scheme will also 
need to consider empaneling more hospitals within the state to improve 
access for its beneficiaries. Finally, the scheme needs to use its financial 
leverage to improve patient safety and quality. 
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A P P E N D I X  I
Apka Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(Proposed), Government of 
National Capital Territory (NCT) 
of Delhi
Table I.1 ASBY: Summary Matrix
Indicators/scheme name Apka Swasthya Bima Yojana (ASBY)
Launch year Proposed for launch in near futurea 
Geographical area Entire NCT of Delhib
Target/eligible
population
Identified below-poverty-line (BPL) and other 
vulnerable population of Delhi and also follows the 
specific enrolment already conducted by Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY, appendix E)
Number of beneficiaries 0.65 million families in launch year (proposed)
Unit of enrolment Family
Benefits package A “top-up” scheme aimed at covering high-cost, 
mainly tertiary care services not adequately 
covered under RSBY
Maximum insurance coverage Rs. 150,000 per family per year
Hospital empanelment criteria Minimum 50 inpatient beds
Number of empanelled hospitals 
(government and private)
Still in planning
Sources of funds Entirely funded by state government
(continued next page)
358       Government-Sponsored Health Insurance in India
Total expenditure (Rs. million), 
2009–10
Nil. Projected budget for first year: Rs. 400 to 
Rs. 600 million
Premium price, 2009–10 n.a.
Provider payment mechanism Predefined package rates
Information technology (IT) tools 
used
Online monitoring system planned with the help of 
National Informatics Center (NIC)
Number of hospitalizations per year n.a.
Utilization rate n.a.
Most common procedures n.a.
Governing agency and legal status Apka Swasthya Bima Yojana trust (autonomous 
trust)
Executing agency Insurance companies and third-party administrators 
(TPAs)
Number of full-time staff, including 
contract personnel, in implement-
ing agency
Still in planning
Administrative costs as percent of 
total spending
n.a.
Cost-containment measures Prior authorization, concurrent review, in-depth 
analysis of claims experience
Note: n.a. = not applicable
a. ASBY was on the drawing board when this study began. The expected launch in 2011–12 had not happened 
when this book went to press.
b. The National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi refers to the Delhi metropolis excluding its suburbs located in the 
state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Haryana. Technically, it is a union territory, administered by the central govern-
ment, but the political administration of the NCT of Delhi today more closely resembles that of an Indian state 
with its own legislature, high court, and an executive council of ministers headed by an elected chief minister.
Table I.1 (continued)
Indicators/scheme name Apka Swasthya Bima Yojana (ASBY)
Introduction 
On the drawing board for most of 2010, Apka Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(ASBY), is a health insurance scheme slated for launch by the state gov-
ernment of Delhi (also known as the Government of NCT of Delhi) in 
the near future. The state government has already constituted a trust 
under its Department of Health and Family Welfare (DOHFW), known 
as the Apka Swasthya Bima (ASB) Trust, to govern the scheme. Planners 
propose to use insurers as intermediaries to implement the scheme. 
The scheme has been designed as top-up, tertiary-focused comple-
mentary coverage to RSBY for all current and future BPL beneficiaries 
holding RSBY identity cards. In this manner, the scheme will be able to 
share RSBY’s identification and validation mechanism and the techno-
logical platform. The stated objective of the ASBY is to improve access of 
vulnerable groups in the NCT to tertiary care facilities (which are not 
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adequately covered under their RSBY policy) and to prevent their falling 
into poverty when they access tertiary care. 
The scheme management recognizes the limitations in the availability 
of tertiary care facilities under the public health system and is imple-
menting demand-side financing for select tertiary procedures instead of 
building more tertiary care hospitals. ASBY officials describe the scheme 
in terms of a “virtual hospital” concept: instead of investing in building, 
equipping, and operating hospitals, public funds will be used to buy hos-
pital services from existing private hospitals. ASBY has many “geographi-
cal” advantages, including those related to operating in a relatively 
compact geographical area in an urban setting with easy access to many 
providers and technical support from locally based development partners. 
It also has the “genealogical” advantage of being the newest kid on the 
block and can learn from the experiences of other states that have imple-
mented similar tertiary-oriented schemes in the recent past, such as 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Himachal Pradesh.
Institutional Framework
The Delhi NCT DOHFW is the institutional owner of the ASBY. The 
department has created an administrative arrangement to govern the 
scheme implementation in the form of the autonomous ASB Trust, which 
is legally outside the state government. However, it is still a public institu-
tion in terms of its stewardship, affiliation, internal procedures, and 
financing. 
The trust will engage insurance companies for day-to-day operations 
as well as risk management. Supervisory responsibilities will remain with 
the trust, but the form and scope of such oversight is unclear. The trust 
intends to build effective internal control mechanisms for scheme opera-
tions, including internal and statutory audit mechanisms.
Figure I.1 displays the institutional architecture of the scheme. The 
trust will be linked to the parent department (DOHFW) and the Delhi 
NCT Department of Labour to coordinate for RSBY. It will contract one 
or more insurers (that may contract TPAs) for implementation support, 
and through them, manage the providers. 
The ASB Trust is not fully staffed. The CEO designate is leading the 
planning process for ASBY in addition to handling his other responsibili-
ties as a senior official in the DOHFW. Several donor partners are techni-
cally supporting the trust in the formative stages of the scheme. The 
scheme seems to have strong support within the Delhi government, and 
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adequate budget and corresponding human resources are likely to be 
made available to the trust.
Beneficiaries
The ASBY proposed beneficiaries are the identified BPL and other vul-
nerable population groups in Delhi. The scheme had originally planned to 
build upon RSBY enrolment in Delhi—212,000 households in 2009–10. 
However, RSBY enrolment in Delhi was considerably smaller in 2010–11 
than the ASBY coverage target of 650,000 households for the first year. 
Consequently, ASBY may have to consider alternative plans to augment 
the enrolment. 
The BPL population of Delhi already enrolled by RSBY is proposed to 
be automatically enrolled in the ASBY. Geographically, the scheme will 
cover all of Delhi immediately with no phasing or staging of geographical 
coverage. By 2014, when all phases of the ongoing vulnerability assess-
ment in Delhi are complete and all eligible beneficiaries are enrolled, the 
scheme expects to reach its full potential of about one million households. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Figure I.1 ASBY Institutional Framework 
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By design, the ASBY addresses only the most vulnerable population seg-
ments to improve equity in access to health services. However, the 
robustness of targeting will finally depend on the list of eligible beneficia-
ries that emerges from the vulnerability assessment now underway and 
the enrolment system for bringing these families under the health insur-
ance coverage.
Benefits Package
The scheme will focus on high-cost, tertiary procedures and will offer 
free treatment for specified inpatient conditions including cardiac and 
cardiothoracic procedures, oncology, nephrology, neurology, and orthope-
dic procedures. Similar to other state schemes, ASBY proposes no cover-
age for ambulatory expenses or hospitalization for any other causes. 
The stated rationale for selecting the listed procedures is the long wait-
ing list and inadequate capacity for treating these conditions in the public 
health care delivery system. Many of the proposed procedures will be 
similar to the Rajiv Aarogyasri scheme (AP), the Vajpayee Arogyashri 
scheme (Karnataka), and the Kalaignar scheme (TN), from which the 
Delhi scheme draws heavily. The health insurance coverage is proposed 
to be capped at Rs. 150,000 per family per year, and will also have pack-
age rates prescribed for each covered procedure. A proposed pool of 
Rs. 1 crore (Rs. 10 million, about US$ 220,000) may be created as a “buf-
fer” to provide additional coverage of Rs. 50,000 on a case to case basis for 
beneficiaries requiring higher expenditure than Rs. 150,000. This buffer 
will be borne by the trust, not the insurance company. No cost sharing by 
beneficiaries is proposed; the scheme will be entirely cashless and based 
on electronic preauthorizations to the empanelled hospitals. The scheme 
also plans to develop and include follow-up packages for select tertiary 
conditions, for ensuring adequate follow-up care after discharge.
Provider Network
The scheme proposes to empanel hospitals based in the state of Delhi, 
none in the bordering states. As a metropolitan centre, Delhi has a large 
number of hospitals that provide inpatient services of the nature pro-
posed in ASBY. Several hundred hospitals in Delhi are already affiliated 
with public and private health insurance scheme networks. Consequently, 
there are enough hospitals for the scheme to craft a network of providers. 
At present, there are no plans to categorize hospitals or to have differential 
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rates for providers. Beneficiaries will have the option of choosing any 
hospital in the network for care, public or private. 
The minimum requirements for empanelment have yet to be finalized. 
However, they may be similar to those set by other state schemes in terms 
of minimum number of beds, physical infrastructure, staffing, electronic 
connectivity, and acceptance of the prescribed package rates. 
Financial Status and Sources of Funds
The state government is contemplating exploring financing options such 
as earmarked “sin taxes,” philanthropic contributions, or other mecha-
nisms. As of end-2010, when the information for this case study was 
compiled, a critical issue vis-à-vis the scheme’s relationship with RSBY 
was yet to be decided: how the cost of specific procedures will be shared 
between RSBY and ASBY and whether and how much of a “first-loss”1 
position RSBY will take.
The scheme envisages competitive mechanisms for premium price 
setting, allowing all eligible insurers to bid for the scheme. The estimated 
budget for the first full year is expected to be somewhere between 
Rs. 40 crores to Rs. 60 crores for the proposed coverage (650,000 house-
holds). Because the scheme has not started operations, it has no assets, 
liabilities, or financial statements for analysis. Similar to other state 
schemes, ASBY’s predecessor is a state relief fund known as Delhi Arogya 
Nidhi together with the discretionary relief funds available through the 
chief minister and the lieutenant general. These funds provide grants to 
a few hundred beneficiaries a year, case by case, for treatment of tertiary 
illnesses.
The scheme also plans to include a clause for “profit sharing” by insur-
ers in the event of a low claims ratio. If the claims ratio falls below a set 
level, the insurer will be required to give back part of the premium paid 
for the insurance. This device may reduce undue repudiations by insurers, 
but at the risk of providing insurers with a disincentive to exercising 
adequate risk management, fraud control, and claims cost containment.
Information Environment
The scheme plans to introduce regular reporting requirements from its 
insurer and network hospitals and is seeking technical support to help 
design the information system. In the meantime, the  provider connectiv-
ity and beneficiary-identification platforms will piggyback on the RSBY 
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 platform, which will be customized for ASBY. As a late entrant, the 
scheme has an opportunity to learn from and build on the information 
environment and capabilities of the older health insurance schemes.
Internal Controls and Cost Containment
Proposed cost-containment mechanisms include prior authorizations, 
physical verification of admitted patients,2 and in-depth analysis of 
claims experience through data mining. The scheme will require provid-
ers to obtain preauthorization and also to submit their final bill elec-
tronically. The preauthorization process is expected to minimize 
unnecessary utilization, limiting supplier-induced demand as well as 
demand-side moral hazard. Use of standard package rates for all identi-
fied procedures provides an opportunity to contain cost to some extent 
by limiting supplier-induced demand which could be rampant in the 
fee-for-service system. 
Quality Orientation
It is too early to make a statement on the quality orientation of the 
scheme; there are no plans so far for scheme-specific quality assurance 
guidelines or standards. The empanelment criteria are likely to be the 
main check on provider quality, which may be augmented by the above-
mentioned reporting mechanisms expected from all networked providers. 
ASBY plans to craft operational manuals for hospitals and organize train-
ing workshops for providers through the insurance companies serving the 
scheme.
Consumer Information and Protection
Unlike many other GSHISs, ASBY will operate in a compact urban geo-
graphical area, in contrast to the vast statewide geographical area and 
predominantly rural beneficiary base for most other new generation 
GSHISs. Accordingly, the scheme does not plan to use health camps or 
outreach services but will focus on raising awareness through the mass 
media. Similar to the Andhra Pradesh scheme, ASBY also plans to send 
feedback letters to beneficiaries who receive treatment. This measure will 
obtain commentary on care and out-of-pocket payments from people 
who actually utilize the services. The insurers and the ASB Trust will also 
institute grievance-redressal mechanisms.
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Concluding Remarks
ASBY has many geographical and genealogical advantages. Operating in a 
metropolitan setting makes it easier to communicate with beneficiaries 
and providers as well as monitor the scheme. As a newcomer to the insur-
ance landscape, ASBY can learn from the experiences of earlier schemes. 
However, ASBY has no institutional structure at this conceptualization 
stage and runs the risk of repeating problems observed in other schemes 
in terms of governance and control. The risk of provider induced demand, 
especially for the more remunerative packages, is a distinct possibility. 
The mechanism of sharing of claim costs between RSBY (first loss) and 
ASBY needs to be clearly defined, as well as technologically enabled. The 
scheme also needs to plan for effective purchasing of services from the 
private hospitals and incorporate quality parameters in contractual 
arrangements. 
Notes
 1. RSBY covers all forms of hospitalization (with a smaller cap) as against the 
ASBY which covers a smaller subset of the hospitalizations but with a larger 
cap. For a hospitalization which falls within the scope of coverage of ASBY, 
RSBY coverage is also triggered. Therefore, RSBY may take a first-loss posi-
tion. In this case the initial admissible amount or share of the total costs is 
paid from the RSBY coverage while the charges exceeding this first loss are 
assumed by ASBY. Even in the absence of ASBY or other top-up insurance 
coverage, RSBY would have paid the hospital charges up to its cap (currently 
Rs. 30,000) while the rest would have to be paid out of pocket by the benefi-
ciary. It is this latter part that schemes such as ASBY are targeting.
 2. It is easier to reach patients within Delhi borders than it is in some other 
states.
365 
A P P E N D I X  J
Tool for Collecting Information on 
Government-Sponsored Health 
Insurance Schemes in India
Data compiled by: ______________________________________________
Respondents from the Insurance scheme (Names and Designations):
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
I. Institutional Features 
Name of the Scheme:
Name of the Implementing Agency: 
Ministry/Department to which affiliated, if any:
Stated Objectives/Mission of the scheme:
Eligible (Target) population/groups/
individual/family units:
Enrollment Criteria Specific enrolment done 
or scheme identity cards issued
Context:
 Why was the scheme created?
Stakeholder support to the scheme (e.g., 
government, charitable organizations, 
healthcare organizations)
Factors that favored development and 
implementation 
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Factors that contributed to scheme design
Geographical Location and Geographical 
Coverage (states, districts) of the 
scheme—present
Geographical Location and Geographical 
Coverage (states, districts) of the 
scheme—proposed (as per present plans, 
at full implementation of the scheme)
Ownership of the Implementing Agency 
(entity which created and owns the 
implementing agency)
®  Government or government agency
®  PPP
®  Private nonprofit
®  Private for-profit
Administrative arrangements for 
management of the scheme (if different 
from ownership)
®  Government or government agency
®  PPP
®  Private nonprofit
®  Private for-profit
Legal Status of the implementing agency ®  Government department or 
government body
®  Autonomous agency established by 
government
®  Trust
®  Society
®  Others (specify)
Which executing agency manages the day 
to day functioning of the insurance 
scheme including beneficiary enrolment, 
hospital empanelment, etc.?
®  Government or government entities 
directly
®  Engaging an insurer with or without 
TPA
®  TPA directly engaged, no insurer
®  Other mechanisms or combinations
Which agency or entity is primarily 
responsible for supervisory oversight of 
the insurance scheme?
®  Government ministry or department 
(specify)
®  Independent agency (specify)
®  Others (specify)
What is the form and scope of supervisory 
oversight?
Is internal auditing of the scheme’s 
operations and processes done on a 
regular basis?
Yes/No
If yes, please describe.
Is external auditing of the scheme’s 
operations and processes done on a 
regular basis?
Yes/No
If yes, please describe.
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Is there any possibility of a potential 
conflict-of-interest situation for the 
supervisory or executing agency in the 
implementation of the scheme?
Yes/No
If yes, details thereof. 
_______________________
How frequently does the Board meet and 
review the scheme?
®  >3 times per calendar quarter
®  2–3 times per calendar quarter
®  Once per calendar quarter
®  Half yearly
®  Annually
®  Less than once per year
What is the extent, depth, and detail of board/
management oversight and stewardship on 
scheme design, implementation, internal 
controls, etc.
What is the extent of detail and robustness 
of contracting instruments used by the 
scheme—with executing agency (where 
applicable), with hospitals, and with any 
other service providers? (specimens to be 
attached where relevant)
®  The contracting instruments are very 
robust and clearly list responsibilities, 
expectations, benchmarks, etc.
®  The contracting instruments are fairly 
robust though not fully capturing the 
range of possible “friction points.”
®  The contracting instruments are 
largely based on similar ones used in 
the industry and have not been 
further customized to the scheme’s 
requirements.
®  The contracting instruments are fairly 
basic and only minimally capture the 
range of responsibilities, expectations, 
benchmarks, etc.
®  No contracting instruments have 
been entered into/contracting 
instruments not available with the 
agency.
Notes on institutional architecture 
(relationship among and differentiation of 
roles and responsibilities of different 
agencies, who appoints head of agency, 
etc.)
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What are the key sources of 
financing the scheme and 
their relative contribution 
in the previous fiscal 
(2009–10)?
Source
Government Funds—Direct Premium 
Subsidies based on enrolment by 
insurers (If multiple government 
agencies involved, share thereof )
Government Funds—support through 
supply side subsidies to hospitals
Government Funds—Claim subsidies to 
insurers based on claims paid (including 
excess of loss mechanisms)
Contribution (%)
_____________
_____________
_____________
Cost-sharing by beneficiaries—
deductibles, co-insurance/copayments
Premium contributions by beneficiaries: 
including basis for calculation—
income rated (and caps, if any), 
community rated
Premium contributions other than 
government and beneficiaries (e.g., 
employers, philanthropic organizations, 
etc.) and basis of contribution by 
employers
Registration fees 
User fees and other health facility-level 
charges including balance billing
Any others (specify)
_____________
_____________
_____________
_____________
_____________
Does the scheme have 
any reserves?
If yes, where are those 
invested?
Yes/No
Does the scheme have 
any liabilities?
If yes, how are those 
funded presently and 
how will those be repaid 
eventually?
Yes/No
Competition among 
insurers: 
Where insurance 
companies are used, 
how many insurance 
companies participated 
in the bidding process?
How many insurance 
companies are presently 
serving the scheme?
_____________
II. Finances of the Scheme and Level of Competition
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What is the relative share 
of the top 5 insurers 
serving the scheme 
(where less than 5 
insurers service the 
scheme, share of each of 
them)?
What is the duration of 
the insurance contract?
_____________
_____________
Competition among 
providers: 
How many hospitals are 
presently participating in 
the scheme?
Are any further details on 
participating hospitals 
available—public/
private, size distribution, 
geographical distribution, 
etc.?
How many non-hospital 
health providers (clinics, 
pharmacies, diagnostic 
centres, etc.) are 
presently participating 
the scheme?
Please annex a list of top 
20 hospitals by claims 
and their relative share in 
% among all claims.
_____________
_____________
Are any reinsurance 
mechanisms available to 
the scheme from formal 
reinsurers, direct insurers, 
or from the government?
If yes, what is the kind of 
reinsurance protection?
Yes/No
From which agency: _____________
Type: 
Stop Loss
Proportional
Others ________________________
Is population coverage on a 
voluntary or mandatory basis?
Voluntary/mandatory
Who are the eligible groups to be 
included in the scheme?
(Please define including eligibility 
unit definition, location, and 
other characteristics.)
III. Scheme Design Features
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Criteria for targeting (de jure and 
de facto) and validation process, 
if any.
Total numbers eligible presently.
Out of the above, total numbers 
covered presently.
Total number proposed to be 
eventually covered in the 
scheme.
(Please give annual estimates for 
the next 4 years.)
At the beginning of 2011:
At the beginning of 2012: 
At the beginning of 2013:
At the beginning of 2014:
What is the enrolment process for 
beneficiaries?
Equity consideration incorporated 
at the time of the scheme, e.g., 
utilization by poor, share of BPL 
v/s APL, real access by BPL 
groups like rural and tribal 
patients.
Services covered under the 
insurance scheme.
All hospitalizations (except certain specified 
exclusions)
Predominantly covers high end surgical 
hospitalization as per defined list
Comprehensive cover—includes hospitalization 
and outpatient
Any others _______________
Where conditions covered are as 
per a defined list, how are these 
defined.
As positive lists (what is covered)
As negative lists (exclusions/not covered)
Combination of positive and negative lists
Others
The listing in turn is based on:
ICD-10 codes
Packages or broad categories of service
Use of DRGs
Others
Major exclusions, and whether 
these are provided under the 
public health system.
Sum insured, Sub-limits and other 
cost sharing provisions 
applicable to the scheme.
If insurance companies are 
involved, what is the duration of 
the insurance contract and the 
renewability arrangements?
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Claims process and turn around 
time for claims
Cashless to patient: Yes/No
Paperless: Yes/No
IT Tools used: Yes/No
If yes, which ones: ___________
Usual time taken to process claims (from receipt of 
documents to dispatch of cheque): _____ days
Time within which 90% of all cashless claims are 
settled by the scheme ____________ days
Claims ratio since scheme 
inception
Claims ratio in 2009–10: (%) ________
Claims ratio in 2008–09: (%) ________
Claims ratio in 2007–08: (%) ________
Claims ratio in 2006–07: (%) ________
Administrative costs as a share of premium 
(%): _____
Monitoring and reporting 
requirements
®  Routine reporting requirements—enrolment, 
claims payment, provider management, 
quality, etc. 
®  Monitoring and reporting systems to ensure 
compliance and remedial actions
®  Information made publicly available
®  Information provided to us but not publicly 
available
®  Information obtained from other sources
®  Key information not collected/ not available/
not shared
Empanelment/selection criteria for 
hospitals and healthcare 
providers
Any quality assurance activities, 
guidelines, or standards.
Any reporting requirements from 
providers and contents of such 
reports.
Use of outreach services, health 
camps, etc.—current practices, 
number of patients recruited 
through this route as a 
proportion of all patients.
Are there any efforts towards 
provider education (discouraging 
inappropriate use, dealing with 
uncovered procedures, etc.)?
Provider penalty mechanisms for 
breach of guidelines.
Penalty mechanism
Fines
Denial of claims
Disempanelment
Others
Number of 
cases 
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Provider payment mechanisms
Methods presently used for 
each provider type.
How are provider rates 
determined?
Reimbursement/payment 
procedures including any 
reports of balanced billing.
Awareness and Communication:
How are beneficiaries/
consumers informed of 
benefits and responsibilities?
Complaint and redressal 
systems including statistics of 
grievances received and 
settled.
Comparative information on 
provider infrastructure, 
statistics, or quality (given to 
consumers) if any.
Consumer protection 
mechanisms.
Premium rate setting
How are premium rates 
determined?
Underwriting/actuarial analysis 
being done, if any, at design or 
during implementation
Cost containment mechanisms 
applied in practice
Prior authorizations 
Screening
Concurrent review
In-depth analysis of claims experience
Gatekeepers
Second opinion
Utilization review and control 
Discharge planning
Others? Pls specify
IV.  Assessment of Performance (data and supporting documents to be 
collected)
• Enrollee satisfaction (from any survey or monitoring data)
• Financial stability (from income and expenditure statements)
•  Utilization and claims: Number & Amount of claims received, paid 
and repudiated, including details on geographical distribution, 
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disease-wise distribution (including analysis of top 10 diseases/
procedures paid under the scheme and their costs), utilization by 
different income quintiles etc as available.
•  Share of hospital charges, physicians’ professional charges, medicines 
and consumables etc in the claimed amounts.
•  Impact on OOP (for both inpatient and outpatient care), overall and 
by income quintiles, over periods of time (if available)
• Impact on health outcomes (if available)
V. Overall Assessment: opinions and perceptions of insiders
What challenges face the scheme in achieving its said objectives? Does 
the scheme design address the stated objectives/mission?
•  How is the scheme placed in terms of eligibility of enrolment, plans 
for enrolment and present status?
•  What “growing or expansion” opportunities and pains does the 
scheme face?
•  How is the scheme linked to the public primary care and ambula-
tory network for referrals, provider coordination and provision of 
primary care and public health services? 
•  How does scheme fit with the overall central and/or state and health 
policies?
•  Principal Strengths and Weakness in addressing the following
Adverse selection
Moral hazard
Cost escalation
Cost control measures and their robustness
Administrative costs
Provider induced demand
Quality of care of provider networks, including
 ° Unnecessary or Ineffective care
 ° Adverse outcomes
 ° Impact on health outcomes
Equity of access and utilization
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Financial protection for health shocks suffered by beneficiaries
Fraud and corruption
Effective catchment of targeted population
Transparency in terms of information
Solvency, sustainability, and actuarial soundness
375 
Ability/willingness to pay. Often inappropriately assumed to be equivalent. 
Willingness to pay (WTP) is mediated by ability to pay (ATP) and by indi-
vidual and cultural aspects that determine the perceived benefit to self and to 
the community. There are two ways to assess WTP: (i) data on past health 
care utilization and expenditure, and (ii) contingent valuation methods based 
on surveys. Ability to pay (ATP) is largely determined by affordability. ATP 
for health insurance must be considered in the context of copayments and 
transaction costs. The concept of fairness may be an important consideration 
in designing a microinsurance scheme and setting premiums. 
Accountability. Result of the process that ensures that decision makers at all levels 
actually carry out their designated responsibilities and that they are held 
accountable for their actions. 
Accreditation. Process involving external peer assessment of competency, credibil-
ity, or authority, used by organizations voluntarily to accurately assess their 
level of performance in relation to established standards and to implement 
ways to continuously improve. 
Actual premium. The premium arrived at by estimating the average benefit payout 
and adding a safety margin for contingencies. 
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Actuarial analysis. Analysis done by an Actuary (see below). 
Actuary. A professional trained in evaluating the financial implications of contin-
gency events. Actuaries need an understanding of the stochastic nature 
of insurance and other financial services, the risks inherent in assets, and the use 
of statistical models. In the context of insurance, these skills are often used, for 
example, in establishing premiums, technical provisions, and capital  levels. 
Adverse selection. Also called antiselection. Problem of asymmetric information 
that disturbs the operation of the insurance market, resulting in an inequita-
ble transaction. The insured, knowing the likelihood of events, chooses to 
insure against only those that pose a strong risk. The insurer, having less infor-
mation, accepts a contract that does not include adequate premium for the 
risks covered. The insured gains from the insurer’s inability to distinguish 
“good” and “bad” risks. Providing asymmetric information allows people who 
are sick and require care to seek health insurance coverage. Constitutes a key 
concern for insurers that can lead to higher losses, which is countered by 
medical underwriting, which minimizes insuring high-risk individuals. 
Affordability. See Ability/willingness to pay. 
Ambulatory care/services. Health care services provided to patients who are not 
admitted overnight to a hospital. These services are performed at outpatient 
clinics, urgent care centers, emergency rooms, ambulatory or same-day sur-
gery centers, diagnostic and imaging centers, primary care centers, community 
health centers, occupational health centers, mental health clinics, and group 
practices. 
Annual caps. The maximum amount given to the provider (or reimbursed to the 
insured) for delivering all covered services to an insured person, regardless of 
the number of services the covered individual receives.
Antiselection. See Adverse selection and Cream skimming.
Arbitrage. The simultaneous buying and selling of securities, currency, or com-
modities in different markets or in derivative forms in order to take advantage 
of differing prices for the same asset. 
Asymmetrical information. Parties to a transaction have uneven access to relevant 
information that governs an informed choice. Such asymmetry can result in 
an inequitable transaction in favor of the party with the most information, or 
it can result in the abandonment of the exchange. 
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Balance sheet. Statement showing the financial position at a particular point in 
time (e.g., at the end of the financial year), listing all assets and liabilities at 
that time. 
Bayesian method. A method (originally enunciated in 1763) for revising the prob-
ability of an event’s occurrence by taking into account data as they come to 
hand. The usefulness of this approach depends on the relevance and power of 
the additional data. 
Below poverty line (BPL). A term used in the Indian context as an economic 
benchmark to denote the poor who have an income below the official pov-
erty threshold or “poverty line,” usually defined in terms of per capita income 
and other factors. 
Beneficiary or principal. The person designated to receive payouts from the 
scheme. This is typically the policyholder or a family member, but it may be 
an employer. 
Benefit exclusion. Refusal of access to a specific benefit for an insured. Because this 
exclusion could be subject to abuse if it is based on arbitrary decisions made 
at the time of claim rather than as set out in the contract, it tends to be regu-
lated. Reasons for exclusion that are typically allowed include a qualifying 
period and preexisting illness. 
Benefits package or scope of coverage or compensation. A list of specific benefits 
agreed upon in the health insurance contract, such as outpatient consulta-
tions, inpatient services, ambulance services, prescription drugs. While private 
insurance typically offers modules of benefits from which to choose, microin-
surers may offer a standard package for simplicity and fairness. 
Biometric. Based on the measurement of biological characteristics, such as 
 fingerprints, DNA, or retinal patterns, for use in verifying the identity of 
individuals. 
Bottom-up. See Top-down global strategy. 
Broker. An intermediary who sells on behalf of another. 
Budget head. An accounting term, used in some countries, under which budgetary 
line item entries are made, usually as part of a chart of accounts. Budget heads 
can consist of multiple hierarchical levels. The term is similar to “accounting 
head,” “cost center,” or “budget category.”
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Capacity. Has two meanings: (i) Insurers’ ability to underwrite a large amount of 
risk on a single loss exposure or many contracts on one line of event. Reinsurance 
enables a greater capacity among primary insurers. (ii) Organizational and 
 individual skills. Organizational capacity implies  appropriate systems for infor-
mation and management and adequate resources for handling operations. 
Capacity building. Increasing organizational and individual skills and establishing 
frameworks for that increase to continue. 
Capitation payment. Under a capitation payment, the provider receives a fixed fee 
per individual per month to provide all covered services regardless of how 
many services are provided to any of the individuals covered. 
Cashless hospitalization. Receiving treatment at a hospital without the insured 
patient’s having paid the hospital a fee or copayment. The payment is settled 
directly between the hospital and the insurer. 
Catastrophic health shocks. Health problems/diseases of major magnitude, often 
defined in terms of exceeding a percentage of household income or expen-
diture.
Claim load. The amount of benefits paid to the insured in a period. Fluctuations 
in claim load in the short term are covered by contingency reserves and in the 
long run by contribution increases. 
Coefficient of variation. The ratio of the sample standard deviation to the sample 
mean. It measures the spread of a set of data as a proportion of its mean. It is 
often expressed as a percentage. This coefficient enables, for example, estima-
tion and comparison of ranges of likely expenses for various communities. 
Coinsurance. An insurance policy provision under which the insurer and the 
insured share a proportion of costs incurred after the deductible is met, 
according to a specific percentage formula that facilitates risk sharing between 
the two parties. In some plans, the insured meets coinsurance obligations 
through a copayment. 
Collection rate or compliance rate. The proportion of possible subscriptions from 
members that the microinsurer collects. Lack of complete compliance can 
result from cultural as well as economic factors. It may be used as a measure 
of a microinsurer’s efficiency/commercial orientation. Members are more 
likely to pay contributions if their perceived risk is higher. 
Commercial insurance or private insurance. Commercial insurance is a contract 
between an insurer and an insured whose purpose is to minimize the owner’s 
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risks against losses (or expenses) from the covered perils. In the health insur-
ance context, typical covered perils are illnesses and injuries.
Community. A group of people with a common interest. Often implies locality, 
but can be occupation-, leisure-, or religion-based. 
Community-based health insurance scheme. A voluntary community prepayment 
health insurance scheme for pooling risks. The community’s policyholders 
share social values, are involved in the management of health plans, and elect 
a group of their members to act as managers. CBHIs are common in many 
low-income countries, where options are unavailable. 
Community financing scheme. See Community-based health insurance scheme. 
Community participation. Sharing by citizens in any kind of community in com-
munal decision-making processes and definitions of problems. 
Community rating. A method for determining insurance rates on the basis of the 
average cost of providing health services in a specific geographic area. This 
method ignores the individual’s medical history or the likelihood of the indi-
vidual’s using the services. All members of a community pay the same pre-
mium without considering individual health status. 
Compensation. Benefit payout. 
Complementary private insurance. Insurance that provides coverage for all or part 
of the costs not covered under the public program. 
Compliance. Payment of contribution owed by members. 
Compliance gap. Difference between contributions due and contributions 
 collected. 
Compliance rate. The ratio of actual contributions over potential contributions. 
See Collection rate. 
Compulsory insurance. Any form of insurance the purchase of which is required by 
law. Governments typically require the purchase of liability insurance with 
respect to three types of potential loss-causing activities: those whose severity 
could be particularly great, with the possibility of large numbers of innocent 
persons being harmed because of a single event; those whose frequency is 
sufficiently great to affect large numbers of innocent persons independently; 
and those judged to be inherently dangerous. 
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Conditional cash transfers (CCT). Conditional cash transfer programs give money 
to the poor in return for fulfilling certain behavioral conditions—with a twin 
objective of generating additional income for the poor household and improv-
ing their health or educational status. 
Confidence interval. A range of values that is estimated to contain the population 
parameter. To be 95 percent confident that a range contains the parameter 
requires a larger range than to be 90 percent confident. For example, analysis 
of data from a community might suggest a 90 percent chance that the number 
of people seeking hospitalization in a year will be between 1,100 and 1,500, 
but the confidence interval for 95 percent confidence is 978 and 1,747. 
Conglomerate risk. Insurance companies that are participants in insurance groups 
can be exposed to some additional sources of risk, such as (but not limited to) 
intragroup exposures, contagion, and risk concentration. 
Contingency reserves or equalization reserves. Funds held by the insurer that are in 
excess of expected benefit payouts in order to cover  unexpected events (con-
tingencies) that cause fluctuations in benefit payouts. They are typically regu-
lated in order to ensure the insurer’s solvency. 
Contribution. Payment of an agreed sum of money by a member to a social insur-
ance system in return for specified benefits. The implied assumption is that 
other sources of income complement members’ payments. See also 
Premium. 
Contribution base. The amount that would be available to the insurer if all mem-
bers contributed fully. When contributions are set as a percentage of income, 
this base relies on full disclosure of income (disclosure rate). 
Contribution rate. The percentage of contribution base actually collected or 
expected to be collected. 
Copayment or cost sharing. The fixed amount of medical expenses paid by a 
member or beneficiary at the time of the visit under coinsurance policy 
provisions. This amount is the balance remaining after the insurer has paid 
its portion. 
Corporate governance. Set of relationships between a company’s management, 
its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance 
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are 
set and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
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are determined. It also includes compliance with legal and regulatory 
requirements. 
Cost drivers. A vast array of factors that directly or indirectly contribute to rises in 
the cost of health care services.
Cost sharing. See Copayment. 
Coverage breadth. A term used to denote the number of people and share of 
population groups protected by health insurance.
Coverage depth. A term used to denote the number of services provided in the 
benefits package.
Cream skimming (preferred risk selection). An exercise whereby an insurer selects 
only a part of a heterogeneous risk group (“preferred risks”), in which all 
individuals pay an identical risk-adjusted premium or the premium variation 
does not fully account for changes in risk. When the insurer reduces its loss 
ratio compared with the expected average cost that determined the premium, 
the insurer can retain a profit from cream skimming. This profit depends on 
the insurer’s ability to distinguish several subgroups with different expected 
costs within the larger group and to predict the (lower) future health care 
expenditure of individuals in the preferred group. The term can also be used 
in relation to health providers that choose patients for some characteristic(s) 
other than their need for care, which enhances the provider’s profitability or 
reputation. Under capitation or other fixed payment schemes, this often 
means that providers choose less-ill patients.
Credit risk. Most commonly, the risk of financial loss incurred by an insurer when 
a vendor or service provider ultimately does not provide agreed services they 
have been paid to provide under a binding contract. Credit risk may also 
result from default or movements in the credit rating assignment of issuers of 
securities (in the company’s investment portfolio), debtors (e.g., mortgagors), 
or counterparties (e.g., on reinsurance contracts, derivative contracts, or 
deposits) and intermediaries, to whom the company has an exposure. Sources 
of credit risk include investment counterparties, policyholders (through out-
standing premiums), reinsurers, and derivative counterparties. 
Crore. A unit in the Indian numbering system equal to ten million.
Cross-subsidies. Amounts effectively paid when the wealthy members pay more 
than poor members or when the healthy pay the same as the sick for lower 
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expected benefits. The poor and the sick are said to receive cross-subsidies 
from the wealthy and healthy. 
Crude birth rate. A summary measurement of the total number of live births in a 
specified population at the end of a specific time period (generally one year), 
divided by the midyear total population count. Expressed as the number of 
births per 1,000 people within that population. 
Crude death rate. A summary measurement of the total number of deaths in a 
specified population at the end of a specific time period (generally one year), 
divided by the midyear total population count. Expressed as the number of 
deaths per 1,000 people within that population. 
Data envelope analysis. A methodology for estimating technical efficiency (the 
ratio of outputs to inputs used). It ranks productive units, such as hospitals, in 
order of their relative efficiency. It also indicates differences in input alloca-
tion between efficient and inefficient units. 
Declaration rate. See Contribution base. 
Deductible. A provision requiring the insured to pay part of the loss before the 
insurer makes any payment under the terms of the policy. Deductibles typically 
are found in property, health, and automobile insurance contracts. The purpose 
of establishing deductibles is to eliminate small claims and reduce the average 
pure premium and administrative costs associated with claims handling. 
Deductibles can also reduce moral hazard by encouraging persons to be more 
careful with respect to the protection of their property and prevention of loss. 
Defined benefit. The amount, usually formula-based, guaranteed to each person 
who meets defined entitlement conditions. The formula usually takes into 
account the individual number of contribution or insurance years and the 
individual amount of earnings during the same period. 
Delphi method or nominal group technique. A method of business forecasting that 
consists of panels of experts expressing their opinions on the future and then 
revising them in light of their colleagues’ views so that bias and extreme 
opinions can be eliminated. 
Demand. The amount of a good or service that consumers seek to buy at a given 
price. Solvent demand implies the ability to pay as well as the willingness to 
pay. Elasticity of demand is a measure of the responsiveness of total spending 
on a particular good or service to a change in its price. Elastic demand implies 
that as the price goes up the total expenditure falls. Inelastic demand implies 
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that as the price goes up total expenditure also goes up. Necessities typically 
have inelastic demand (given an adequate income base). For example, the 
imperative to have an aching tooth removed means that the dentist is in a 
position of power to charge a high price; such dental services have inelastic 
demand, and it is unlikely that a lower price would attract people not suffer-
ing from toothache to have a tooth removed. The concept of “necessity” and 
therefore of what has an inelastic demand is cultural. In some cultures prena-
tal care may not be considered a necessity. Demand for some procedures may 
be truncated in poor communities. Truncated demand means that although 
the demand for surgery (for example) is inelastic and does not change with 
price, above a certain price it becomes zero. As half an operation is not an 
option, the demand is truncated because of poverty. 
Demand-side financing. Demand side financing entails directing subsidies to 
the targeted group of beneficiaries to enable them to purchase specific 
services. It can also involve the directing of subsidies to providers selected 
by beneficiaries.
Derivative. A derivative is a financial asset or liability whose value depends on (or 
is derived from) other assets, liabilities, or indexes (the “underlying asset”). 
Derivatives are financial contracts and include a wide assortment of instru-
ments, such as forwards, futures, options, warrants, swaps, and composites. 
Derivative contract. A contract whose value derives from an underlying financial 
instrument like a stock, commodity, or index. 
Direct public delivery. Provision of services to the people through government 
facilities.
Disempaneled. Removal from the list of networked providers under the insurance 
scheme, usually due to fraudulent behavior or inability to meet specific crite-
ria set by the insurer.
Dual theory of risk. The theory that describes the attitudes of individuals toward 
insuring themselves, by weighing their wealth against their aversion to risk. 
Two possible modifications could swing the balance in favor of insurance: 
decreasing the premium or increasing aversion to risk. Even with identical 
feelings toward monetary loss, individuals would likely adopt different atti-
tudes toward insurance because their feeling is different toward the proba-
bility of monetary loss; the higher that assessment, the more attractive 
insurance is. Consequently, two individuals sharing the same utility index for 
certain wealth cannot have a different degree of aversion to risk (and the 
converse). 
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Dumping. Termination or transfer of membership of the sick and/or older people 
by the insurer. 
Duplicate private insurance. A policy that offers coverage for health services that are 
already included under a public program. The individual remains covered by 
the public program but opts to buy and use private health insurance instead in 
order to obtain broader access or better quality. Individuals are not exempted 
from making their required contribution toward the public program. 
Empaneled hospitals. Hospitals on the list of networked hospitals of an insurance 
plan or a third-party administrator (TPA) from which services can be used 
under the insurance scheme. Empanelment involves meeting specific criteria 
on availability of infrastructure, equipment, and professional staff. In the 
Indian context, this also implies availability of cashless services arranged by 
the insurance plan or TPA in the hospital.
Endemic disease. A sickness habitually present in an area or population. 
Enrolment. The process by which a group of individuals or families register to 
receive scheme services. 
Epidemic. The occurrence of any disease, infectious or chronic, at a frequency 
greater than expected, based on prior patterns of disease incidence and 
prevalence. 
Epidemiological transition. The changing pattern of health and disease within a 
specified population from a predominantly infectious disease pattern of low 
life expectancy and high mortality, to a predominantly chronic disease pattern 
of high life expectancy with high morbidity. In the intermediate stage of 
transition, high survival rates from endemic infectious disease, combined with 
high rates of chronic illness in survivors, result in a “double burden of disease.” 
The latter is typical of many developing countries. 
Equalization reserves. See Contingency reserves. 
Estimation. The process by which sample data are used to indicate the value of an 
unknown quantity in a population. Results of estimation can be expressed as 
a single value, known as a point estimate, or a range of values, known as a 
confidence interval. The outcome of estimation is the  estimator. 
Excluded population or excluded communities. Typically agricultural, self-employed, 
or poor people who have neither formal employers nor steady wages as the 
basis for access to government-run or commercial health insurance. They may 
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also be excluded from housing, education, disaster relief, and other social 
services. They may also be unable to access financial services or to secure 
formal recognition of property they control or own, including property 
obtained under traditional (tribal) law. 
Experience rating. A system in which the insurance company evaluates the risk of 
individuals or groups by examining their health history and claims experience 
when setting premium rates. Modified experience rating places limits on the 
extent to which rates may vary based on claims experience or health status. 
Explicit entitlements. Clearly stated or defined coverage and the terms and condi-
tions associated with such coverage.
Externalities. Benefits or costs with an impact beyond the parties to a transaction. 
That impact is not considered in the buy/sell decision and so is not reflected 
in the price. Pollution is an example of an external cost; safe waste disposal 
has external benefits. 
Fairness. See Ability/willingness to pay. 
False negatives (undercoverage). Overlooking subjects/persons that possess the 
attribute for which the criterion is laid out.
False positives (leakage). Selection of subjects/persons that do not possess the 
attribute for which the criterion is laid out.
Fee-for-service payment is a system in which services are unbundled and providers 
receive a fee for each service they deliver to a patient, such as an office visit, 
test, procedure, or other health care service. 
Fiduciary. A person who holds something in trust for another. 
First-line insurer. See Insurer. 
Fiscal limit. The fiscal limit is defined as the point at which the government no 
longer has the ability to finance higher debt levels by increasing taxes, so 
either an adjustment to fiscal spending or monetary policy must occur to 
stabilize debt.
Formal sector. The part of the economy/society that is registered with authorities 
and that is subject to regulations and standards. 
Free riding. Exists in health care when persons can benefit from a health care 
system without contributing to the system. 
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Gatekeeper. A primary care physician responsible for overseeing and coordinating 
all of a patient’s medical needs. The gatekeeper must authorize any referral of 
the patient to a specialist or hospital. Except in cases of emergency, the autho-
rization must be given prior to care. 
General fertility rate. A measure of the total number of live births per 1,000 
women of reproductive age. 
Government failure. Occurs where government does not provide goods and ser-
vices or an adequate regulatory or support framework for the private sector 
to provide them. 
Gross domestic product (GDP). The annual total value of goods and services pro-
duced in a country for use in that country. 
Health maintenance organization (HMO). See Managed care plan. 
IBNR provision. Provision for claims incurred but not reported by the balance 
sheet date. That is, it is anticipated that a number of insured losses would have 
occurred and would therefore result in a liability on the insurer upon filing of 
a claim. The magnitude of this provision can be expected to be reduced as the 
time since the insurance risk on the contract lengthens. The magnitude is also 
likely to vary depending on the type of insurance risk covered by any particu-
lar class of insurance contract. 
Imperfect competition. Occurs in markets or industries that do not match the crite-
ria for perfect competition. The key characteristics of perfect competition are 
a large number of small firms, identical products sold by all firms, freedom of 
entry into and exit out of the industry, and perfect knowledge of prices and 
technology. These four criteria are impossible to reach in the real world. 
Income effect. A price reduction that gives buyers more real income, or greater 
purchasing power for their income, even though money or nominal income 
remain the same. This price reduction can cause changes in the quantity 
demanded of the good. 
Independence. Two events are independent if the occurrence of one of the events 
gives no information about whether or not the other event will occur; that is, 
the events have no influence on each other. For example, falling ill with 
measles may be independent of being injured in a cyclone. 
Induced demand. Demand created by physicians who face inelastic demand and 
so can set both the price and the level of care. This ability to determine their 
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own income is difficult to control and has great repercussions on health 
budgets. 
Informal risk-protection mechanism. See Informal sector. 
Informal sector. The part of the society/economy that is not registered with 
authorities and, whether with legal exclusion or without it (de jure or de 
facto), is not subject to public regulation and does not benefit from public 
services or goods. For example, support given by a family, friends, and mem-
bers of a community in times of loss or illness effectively forms an informal 
risk-protection mechanism. Despite the presumption that such care is volun-
tarily given, in some cases (e.g., providing care to foster children), payment 
may in fact be given. 
Initial capital requirement. Minimum initial capital that is required to obtain a 
license, that must be provided before an insurer commences business, and 
that cannot be used to finance start-up costs. 
Inpatient. Individual admitted to a hospital for health care and allocated a bed for 
the duration of that admission. 
Insolvency. Inability to meet current expenses from current income plus reserves, 
leading, in the long run, to bankruptcy. 
Institution. Social constructs that contain “rules of the games” and thereby both 
constrain behavior and enable behavior within those rules. By enabling the 
individual and organization to understand and predict behavior, the social 
constructs facilitate economic and social interaction. Institutions include 
regulations and policies of organizations and governments. They also include 
community-based traditional patterns of behavior and those that have devel-
oped in the face of modernization.
Insurability. A risk is insurable if it is random and if there is a party willing to accept 
the risk for an agreed premium and another party prepared to pay that pre-
mium (this means it is solvable). This situation implies that the probability is 
known; it is free of moral hazard and adverse selection problems; it is a legal 
proposition; and the premium is affordable. Practical problems associated with 
information availability may render otherwise insurable risks uninsurable. 
Insurance. Insurance is any activity in which a company assumes risk by taking 
payments (premiums) from individuals or companies and contractually 
agreeing to pay a stipulated benefit or compensation if certain contingen-
cies (death, accident, illness) occur during a defined period. 
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Insurance threshold. Insurers typically request that the insured pay the first part of 
any claim. This cost sharing is a form of deductible, used to simplify adminis-
tration by reducing the number of small claims. 
Insured. Also called principal; the end user contracting with an insurer for insur-
ance coverage. 
Insured unit. See Subscription unit. 
Insurer (first-line, primary, or ultimate). The company that contracts with the end 
user for insurance. The first-line insurer may be the ceding insurer if it chooses 
to reinsure. 
Intermediaries. Any natural person or legal entity that engages in insurance inter-
mediation (in any medium). Intermediaries are generally divided into sepa-
rate classes. The most common types are “independent intermediaries” who 
represent the buyer in dealings with the insurer (also known as “independent 
brokers”) and “agents” (generally including multiple agents and subagents) 
that represent the insurer.
Lakh. A unit in the Indian numbering system equal to one hundred thousand 
(100,000).
Law of large numbers. The concept that the greater the number of exposures, the 
more closely will actual results approach the probable results expected from 
an infinite number of exposures. 
Licensed insurer. Refers to a financial institution/insurer that receives a permit 
from a regulator or a supervisor to do specific financial business as defined by 
that particular license.
Load. The cost of insurance (administration, finance, and so on) as distinct from 
payouts (benefits). Efficient companies have a low load relative to 
benefits. 
Local government unit (LGU). The term used to describe public authorities at 
lower-than-national level (e.g., region, province, district, municipality). 
Macroeconomic. Refers to factors that operate at the national and global levels, 
for example, exchange rates, inflation rates, and interest rates. The origins of 
any factors operating at the local level are large scale. Macroeconomic 
shocks are changes in the large-scale factors that affect the economy and 
society. 
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Managed care plan. A scheme that pools risks and directly provides or arranges for 
health care services. 
Mandated benefits. Minimum coverage standards imposed by government in order 
to ensure that certain benefits are covered, especially when coverage serves a 
primary or more extensive role. They provide protection against insurer risk 
selection that discriminates against high-risk individuals. 
Mandatory private insurance. A system in which individuals or employers are 
required by law to purchase private health insurance. 
Market failure. A condition in which a market does not efficiently allocate 
resources to achieve the greatest possible consumer satisfaction. The four 
main market failures are public good, market control, externality, and imper-
fect information. In each case, a market acting without any government-
imposed direction does not direct an efficient amount of resources into the 
production, distribution, or consumption of the good. 
Mean. Average. It is equal to the sum of the observed values divided by the total 
number of observations. 
Medical underwriting. A process of detailed medical scrutiny of health status used 
by insurers to counter adverse selection and accomplish four specific goals: 
ascertain the level of risk associated with the person or group applying for 
insurance, decide if a policy should be sold, decide the terms of the policy, and 
decide the premium level for the policy. 
Members. See Subscription unit. 
Microfinance institution (MFI). Provides financial services to the poor on a sus-
tained basis. The services include saving and credit societies, agricultural insur-
ance, property insurance schemes, and more recently, health insurance 
schemes. 
Microinsurance. A mechanism for pooling a whole community’s risks and 
resources to protect all its participating members against the financial conse-
quences of mutually determined health risks. 
Microinsurance unit (MIU). A very small finance institution specifically designed 
to offer health insurance to the poor by pooling risks across a community. 
Moral hazard. An insurance-prompted change in behavior that aggravates the 
probability of an event in order to access benefits, for example, an insured’s 
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demanding tests not required on medical grounds (demand-side moral hazard). 
Provider-induced moral hazards include overservicing (supply-side moral haz-
ard). Demand-side moral hazard describes consumers’ propensity to seek more 
health care services than they would if they did not have health insurance. 
Supply-side moral hazard describes providers’ propensity to provide more 
services than they would if the individual did not have health insurance.
Morbidity. Refers to illness from a specified disease or cause or from all diseases. 
It is a change in health status from a state of well-being to disease occurrence 
and thereby a state of illness. 
Mortality. Refers to death from a specified disease or cause or from all diseases. 
Multilateral utility. See Utility. 
Nominal group technique. See Delphi method. 
Nongovernmental organization (NGO). Generally refers to a not-for-profit or com-
munity organization. 
Normal distribution. Statistically speaking, values of events fall in a pattern around 
the average value with known frequencies. For instance, if the average stay in 
hospital after childbirth is three days, the values of each stay would be distrib-
uted around three, some more, some less, approximately symmetrically, with 
greater concentration around three than around any other number. The nor-
mal distribution is a particular distribution of this kind that is rigorously 
defined mathematically and gives the typical bell-shaped curve when graphed. 
This distribution is very powerful in enabling insurers to calculate costs and 
utilization. 
Off-site monitoring. Review not involving physical visits to the regulated entities 
that evaluates the financial condition and performance of these entities, 
including checking assets and liabilities valuation, off-balance sheet exposures, 
and outsourcing. 
Ombudsperson. An official appointed to investigate individuals’ complaints 
against administrative deficiencies, especially those of public authorities. 
On-site inspection. A physical examination of a regulated entity to see if it meets 
the required contractual standards of all involved parties. This procedure 
supplements information needed for analysis of the reports submitted to the 
supervisory authorities. Inspectors can be staff of the supervisory authority or 
the task can be outsourced to specialists certified and supervised by the 
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authority. On-site inspections can be full scale and comprehensive or be 
focused on areas of specific concern. 
Out-of-pocket expenses. The money an individual or family pays a provider directly 
from their own funds, usually because the service or commodity is not cov-
ered by any insurance plan or government scheme. 
Outlier. Denotes events that fall outside the norm. For example, in a “review of 
utilization” a provider who uses far fewer or far more services than the aver-
age is called an “outlier.” 
Outpatient. Person receiving health care without admission to a hospital or accom-
modation in it. The length of stay is less than 24 hours. The care may be a 
consultation or a technical act (diagnosis or therapeutic procedure). 
Package rate. Predetermined bundled price for a range of hospital services related 
to the provision of a specified procedure, episode of illness, or specified treat-
ment, as mutually agreed between hospitals and insurance plans. 
Pandemic. A disease that is prevalent throughout a locality or population. 
Parameter. A number that describes a characteristic of a population. For example, 
the life expectancy of men in a community might be 56 years. Health insur-
ance uses statistical techniques to estimate the parameter, and the estimation 
of the parameter is called the statistic. One sample of 50 men taken from the 
community might estimate the average age statistic to be 54 years while 
another sample might estimate it to be 57.5 years. 
Pay-as-you-go. Refers to a system of insurance financing under which total expen-
diture (benefit expenditure plus administrative expenditure) in a given period 
is met by income (contributions and other sources) from the same period. 
Pay-as-you-go insurance schemes do not accumulate reserves, except contin-
gency reserves; surpluses and deficits translate into increases or decreases in 
the premium. 
Per capita premium. The practice of applying a single premium per head across the 
population. 
Point estimation. An estimate of a parameter of a population that is given by one 
number. 
Population density. A measure of the size of the population relative to the size of 
a specified geographic area (region, country, province, city). Typically, it is a 
count of the number of residents per square kilometer. 
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Preauthorization. Assurance given by the insurer to the providers and the insured 
that the plan will reimburse the providers directly for the authorized costs of 
the services or commodities delivered. 
Preexisting condition exclusion period. A mechanism that protects the insurer 
against adverse selection by delaying coverage for health expenses incurred 
by an individual that is related to a condition an individual had prior to 
applying for health insurance. The rules governing exclusion period vary, but 
often can limit coverage for conditions that received medical attention, or 
conditions for which the person arguably should have sought treatment, or 
for which there were clear signs or symptoms. Premiums are still due during 
this exclusion period. 
Preferred risk selection. See Cream skimming. 
Premium. Fee paid by an insured to an insurance company in return for specified 
benefits. Under social insurance the premium is called contribution. See also 
Contribution. 
Prevalence. The total number of cases or people who have a specified disease, 
health condition, attribute, or risk factor within a specified population at a 
specific point in time. 
Preventive health care. Medical care directed primarily toward early detection 
and treatment or prevention of disease or ill health (e.g., immunizations, 
prenatal care).
Primary health care. The first level of contact by individuals, families, and 
communities with the health system, bringing health care as close as pos-
sible to where people work and live. The organization of primary health 
care depends upon the socioeconomic and political characteristics of the 
country, but should address preventive, curative, and rehabilitative ser-
vices and include education of the population about major health prob-
lems and their prevention and control. Such care may be provided by a 
variety of health workers, acting together as a team, in partnership with 
the local community. 
Primary insurer. See Insurer. 
Primary private health insurance. Term is used when private health insurance is the 
only form of health insurance available to an individual because there is no 
public option available or one is ineligible for it. 
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Probability. A quantitative description of the likely occurrence of a particular event. 
Probability is conventionally expressed on a scale from 0 to 1; a rare event has 
a probability close to 0, a very common event has a probability close to 1. 
Probability distribution. The probability distribution of a discrete random variable 
is a list of probabilities associated with each of its possible values. It is also 
sometimes called the probability function or the probability mass function. 
For example, the probability of a woman’s delivering a single live baby might 
be 98 percent, twins 1.78 percent, triplets 0.218 percent, more than triplets 
0.002 percent. 
Providers. Doctors, nurses, hospitals, clinics, laboratories, imaging facilities, phar-
macies, and other deliverers of medical services. The insurer or regulating 
body typically requires that a provider be qualified or registered in order to 
be included in a health insurance scheme. 
Provider-induced demand. Affecting consumer demands by physician or provider 
variables when common demand-side variables (such as demand price, 
income, and clinical needs) are controlled. In other words, demand that would 
not have existed without provider instigation.
Provider payment mechanisms. Various mechanisms applied to transfer funds 
from the purchaser of health care services or procedures to the provider of 
such services to promote access to health services, improve quality and 
equity, and ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of resources.
Prudential regulation system. Standards that facilitate proper functioning of insurers 
through licensing, reporting, fit-and-proper requirements, capital adequacy, and 
product regulation, which limit risk-taking by insurance institutions, ensure the 
safety of depositors’ funds, and keep the stability of the financial system. 
Public goods. There are two aspects to public goods: it is difficult to prevent non-
payers from consuming them (nonexcludable), and their consumption by one 
party does not affect their consumption by others (nonrival). Vaccination is an 
example—those who do not pay and are not vaccinated cannot be excluded 
from enjoying the lower prevalence of disease, and the fact that they are 
healthy as a result does not affect another’s ability to be healthier as a result 
of the program. Government usually provides public goods, because private 
businesses do so profitably. 
Public private partnership (PPP). Collaboration/partnership between the private 
sector and the government sector for the provision of services, intended to 
maximize each party’s resources and skill sets.
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Pure premium. The pure premium can be defined as the average loss per expo-
sure unit for a specific coverage or, more specifically, the product of the aver-
age severity and the average frequency of loss. The result is the amount that 
the insurance company should collect to cover all the losses to be met under 
the predefined types of coverage. 
Qualifying conditions. Requirements for acceptance into an insurance plan; also 
describes the provisions that must be met before a benefit is payable. 
Rating. See Risk rating. 
Recovery gap. An excess of benefit payouts over income, when the compliance gap 
is assumed to be zero. The recovery gap is not random and so cannot be 
solved by reinsurance. 
Reinsurance. The transfer of liability from the primary insurer, the company that 
issued the contract, to another insurer, the reinsurance company. This mech-
anism allows a diversification of the risk and enlarges the risk-pooling base, 
thereby reducing the risk of insolvency. However, reinsurance extends only 
to risk defined in the cession contract (called treaty). For example, a treaty 
to cede fluctuations in payouts will not cover the primary insurer against the 
financial risk of insolvency, for example, because of poorly run or unviable 
insurance. 
Reinsurance premium. The amount charged by the reinsurer to accept an agreed 
amount of risk. 
Reinsurance threshold. Reinsurers typically require that the insurer retain the first 
proportion of risk for any event. That proportion is the threshold as it is 
equivalent to the deductible or excess borne by the insured when making a 
claim against property insurance. 
Reinsurer. An insurance company for insurers. A reinsurer offers protection 
through the sale of a reinsurance contract to a risk-transferring policyholder 
who is an insurer. If the risk-transferring policyholder is a (re)insurer itself, the 
risk-assuming insurer is called the reinsurer, and the risk transfer is known as 
(retro)cession. 
Reserves. Funds set aside to meet unforeseeable liabilities (i.e., an obligation that 
has not yet materialized) or statutory requirements, and stemming either 
from shareholders’ capital or, in the case of mutuals, members’ contributions 
and from accumulated surplus. Reserves are part of own funds (in contrast to 
provisions) that support liabilities to parties other than shareholders or other 
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owners. A major member management goal is to minimize reserves and thus 
maximize funds available for current use. 
Risk. The probability or likelihood that a specified health event (e.g., the occur-
rence of a disease or death) will occur to an individual or population group 
within a specific period of time. 
Risk factor. An attribute (e.g., a lifestyle factor or a personal characteristic) or an 
exposure to an environmental factor associated with an increase in the prob-
ability that a specified health event (e.g., onset of disease) will occur. 
Risk pooling. A health system function in which collected health revenues are 
transferred to purchasing organizations, and the pooled risk of bearing the 
health burden of health services is shared and dispersed over large  numbers 
of heterogeneous contributors. Insurers pool risk through  reinsurance. 
Risk rating. Calculation of health insurance premiums based on the risk of each 
client. Basing the premium calculation on the risk not of a single individual 
but of a group is called community rating or group rating. Setting the premium 
in relation to the client’s income is called income rating. 
Risk selection. A practice of excluding those who may present a higher risk for the 
insurer by making more frequent or more costly claims. 
Risk sharing. Individuals agree to split the cost of risky events. Insurers share risk 
through reciprocal relationships and reinsurance. Loan guarantees and insur-
ance are among the many ways of sharing risks. 
Self-insurance or self-protection. Refers to all the arrangements made by an indi-
vidual or group to protect themselves from risk. It includes not only saving 
and establishing contingency reserves but also changing behavior to diminish 
or avoid risk. 
Simulation. The technique of imitating behavior and events during an experimen-
tal process. Typically involves a computer. 
Social capital. Refers to the multidimensional “glue” that binds community members 
together. While concepts of social capital vary from culture to culture, Putnam 
(1993) defined it as including trust, community involvement,  tolerance of diver-
sity, value of life, and extent of connectivity (socially and professionally). 
Social exclusion. Inadequate or unequal participation in social life, or exclusion 
from a place in the consumer society, often linked to the social role of 
employment or work. 
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Social insurance. An insurance program that is shaped by broad social objectives, 
not just by the self-interest of each individual principal or agent, while retain-
ing insurance principles that persons are insured against a definite risk. 
Social protection. Policies and programs designed to reduce poverty and financial 
vulnerability. Social protection policies typically focus on labor market poli-
cies, social insurance, social assistance, community-based schemes, and child 
protection. 
Social reinsurance. Reinsurance undertaken in pursuit of social goals rather than 
profit. 
Social utility. The gain to society from, in this case, insurance. Where insurance 
has zero or negative social utility it may be banned; where it has high social 
utility but low private utility it may be mandated. The choice of rendering 
a public utility mandatory or not depends on political will or the power of 
authorities, including community leaders. 
Soft budget. A budget with a flexible limit. 
Solidarity principle. Applying rules that spread risks and resources across members 
of a group in a way that provides both insurance coverage and egalitarian 
distribution. Risk solidarity would imply that high-risk individuals receive a 
subsidy from low-risk individuals, allowing all risk levels equal access to 
health care coverage. Solidarity between high- and low-income individuals, or 
“income solidarity,” implies income redistribution through organized transfers. 
In insurance, the solidarity principle is juxtaposed to the equivalence principle, 
which implies that the insurer has to break even on each insurance contract, 
by applying risk rating. 
Solvable. An insurance transaction is said to be solvable if the risk is observable; 
there is no antiselection (adverse selection), and the premium is acceptable 
to both parties. 
Solvency margin. Surplus of assets over liabilities. 
Solvency requirements. The whole set of statutory requirements or rules as regards 
the required solvency margin and eligible capital elements to cover the mar-
gin. The set includes the performance of the solvency test to prove compli-
ance with these requirements. 
Solvent demand. See Demand. 
Standard deviation. A statistical term for a measure of the variability in a popula-
tion or sample. 
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Subscription unit. Refers to the people covered by a single membership. This may 
be the individual (usually in developed economies) or the household (usually 
in developing economies). 
Supervisor. An administrator of insurance laws responsible for monitoring of 
the management of an insurer or intermediary. Also supervisory agency/
regulator. 
Supplementary private health insurance. Provides coverage for health services that 
are not covered by a public program, such as luxury care, elective care, long-
term care, dental care, pharmaceuticals, rehabilitation, alternative or comple-
mentary medicine, or superior amenities in the hospital (differs by 
country). 
Swaps. See Derivative. 
Target group. Refers to both current and future beneficiaries of the insurance sys-
tem. The target group can comprise several subgroups of people with similar 
characteristics (e.g., income, economic sector). 
Technical provisions. Funds for outstanding claims or unearned premiums, required 
by supervisors. Also reserves. 
Third-party administrator (TPA). An organization that processes insurance claims 
or provides other services related to administration of health insurance plans 
for a separate entity. This can be viewed as “outsourcing” the administration 
of claims processing, since the TPA performs a task traditionally handled by 
the company providing the insurance.
Top-down global strategy. Implies that a public policy, for instance the approach 
to improving access to health care or health insurance, was directed by a 
powerful global body to national governments and down through the rank 
and file to the community. This contrasts with the “bottom-up” approach 
based on the empowerment of communities. 
Transaction costs. The costs additional to the price of a good or service, arising, for 
example, from search costs, travel costs, marketing and distribution, or trans-
fer of ownership costs. 
Ultimate insurer. See Insurer. 
Underwriter. A company that receives the premiums and accepts responsibility for 
the fulfillment of the policy contract; the company employee who decides 
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whether or not the company should assume a particular risk; the agent who 
sells the policy. 
Underwriting. The process by which the insurer decides what risks to cover. The 
profit objectives may conflict with social obligation. For the reinsurer, under-
writing considerations determine the risks of the primary insurer that can be 
accepted for reinsurance, and which the insurer will retain. 
Underwriting assistance. Reinsurance companies gather extensive data on the 
insured and events. They can share this information with insurers to improve 
the performance of insurers. 
Unilateral utility. See Utility. 
Uninsurable. See Insurability. 
Unit cost. The average cost of particular health care treatments. 
Universal coverage. Implies that all members of a country (or a community) have 
health insurance. 
User fees. Charges payable by users, usually at the point of service. 
Utility. The satisfaction gained from having the desire for goods and services met. 
Multilateral utility means that several parties benefit from outcomes. These 
parties can be a group of insured or the insurer and the insured. Unilateral 
utility means that only one party gains. The balance between group and indi-
vidual utility is a delicate component of relations within a community, 
between insurer/insured, or between insurer/reinsurer. 
Utilization. Refers to utilization patterns of medical services in a location over a 
period. Data on recent utilization, collected at the national and community 
levels, are a valuable asset in predicting future patterns. 
Variation coefficient. See Coefficient of variation. 
Vector-borne infectious disease. Infections caused by human contact with an infec-
tious agent, transmitted from an infected individual by an insect or other live 
carrier. For example, malaria is biologically transmitted from an infected indi-
vidual to a noninfected person by the same mosquito (the vector) biting both 
people. 
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Waiting period. A mechanism that protects the insurer against adverse selection 
without significantly restricting access by delaying the period before an indi-
vidual will be covered for any services he or she receives after the effective 
date of coverage. Policy premiums are still paid during this time. 
Working capital. Current assets minus current liabilities. It is the capital available 
for an organization’s short-term financing. 
Willingness to pay (WTP). See Ability to pay. 
Note
This glossary was adapted from “Glossary of Terms,” the appendix in Private 
Voluntary Health Insurance: Consumer Protection and Prudential Regulation, by 
Gregg Brunner, Pablo Gottret, Birgit Hansl, Vijayasekar Kalavakonda, Somil 
Nagpal, and Nicole Tapay, 77–97, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012. 
Definitions derived from the present text were added.
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